Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On : 11.09.2024 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 17 September, 2024
2024:HHC:8690
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
AT SHIMLA
Cr.MP(M) No : 490 of 2024
Reserved on : 11.09.2024
Announced on:17.09.2024
____________________________________________________________
Manoj Kumar …Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge
1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the petitioner: Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate.
For the respondent: Mr. Hemant K. Verma, Deputy
Advocate General.
Ranjan Sharma, Judge
Bail petitioner [Manoj Kumar], being in custody
since 26.06.2020 has come up before this Court, seeking
regular bail, under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, (referred to as Cr.P.C), originating from FIR
No 96 of 2020 dated 23.06.2020, registered at Police
Station, Amb, [HP], under Sections 302 and 120-B of the
Indian Penal Code.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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FACTUAL MATRIX:
2. Case set up by Learned Counsel Mr. Sanjeev
Kumar Suri is that the bail petitioner is alleged to
have conspired with Galema and Reshma for killing
his wife Promila on 22.06.2020. In this background,
it is averred that the allegations contained in instant
FIR No 96 of 2020 dated 23.06.2020 are wrong and
the petitioner is innocent and has no connection with
alleged offence as he has been falsely roped in the
instant case.
2(i). It is averred that the petitioner has no criminal
history and after registration of FIR on 23.06.2020, the
investigation is complete and the Challan-Final Report
stands presented to the jurisdictional Court and in these
circumstances, the petitioner is not required for any
further investigation in the matter.
2(ii). It is averred that the bail application was
dismissed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge
on 05.01.2024 [Annexure P-1], on the ground that the
allegations are serious and the material witnesses are
yet to be examined.
-3- 2024:HHC:8690 2(iii). It is further averred that the bail petitioner
is in custody since 26.06.2020 i.e. for 4 years and
2 months and the prolonged detention has deprived
the petitioner of his personal liberty under Article 21
of the Constitution of India. Moreover, the incarceration
cannot be preventative and by way of punishment, on
the basis of mere accusation, which are yet to be
tested and proved.
2(iv). It is submitted that though the trial had
commenced in which 11 PWs out of 28 PWs have been
examined and conclusion of the trial is likely to take
considerable time. It is submitted that there is no
evidence, at this stage, to connect the petitioner with
alleged accusation and the prolonged. It is averred that
the prolongation of detention has deprived the petitioner
to take care of his old parents who are suffering due
to his prolonged detention.
2(v). Petitioner has furnished an undertaking before
this Court that he would furnish the personal and
surety bonds as may be ordered by this Court. It is
averred that the bail petitioner is a responsible citizen
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having deep roots in the society and he shall neither flee
away nor tamper with the evidence or causing any
inducement, threat or promise to the persons acquainted
with the facts of the case.
In above background, the father has prayed
for release of petitioner on bail, on such conditions as
may be imposed by this Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT:
3. The instant bail petition was listed before
this Court on 16.03.2024, when, notice was issued to
the Respondent to file the Status Report. The matter
was listed on 18.4.2024 when, the Status Report dated
17.04.2024 was taken on record and copy thereof was
furnished to learned counsel for the petitioner. Thereafter,
State Authorities furnished the Fresh Status Report dated
02.05.2024 and the copy thereof was furnished to the
learned counsel for the petitioner.
3(i). Upon listing of matter, on 27.06.2024, the
learned counsel for the petitioner placed on record, the
statements of PWs adduced before Learned Trial Court
with directions to learned counsel for the petitioner to
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furnish the same to Learned State Counsel, which were
furnished only on 25.07.2024 as per records.
3(ii). The matter was then listed on 30.07.2024
when, the State Authorities furnished a Fresh Status
Report dated 29.7.2024, and copy thereof was furnished
to earned Counsel for petitioner also. Ultimately, the
matter was heard on 28.08.2024 and on 02.09.2024
when, at the request of the Learned State Counsel,
the matter was adjourned, so as to enable him to an
update with respect to the stage and status of the trial
and probable time for conclusion thereof.
3(iii). Upon listing of the matter on 11.9.2024, the
Learned State Counsel, on the basis of the information
furnished to him {on WhatsApp} by the concerned SHO
on 11.09.2024, stated that out of 28 PWs, 11 PWs
have already been examined and though the matter was
listed before the Trial Court on 03.09.2024, but the
same was adjourned for proper orders for 29.11.2024
and the Learned State Counsel apprised that conclusion
of trial is likely to take considerable time.
In view of the above background, and with
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the consent of the parties, the instant petition was
finally heard by this Court.
STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES IN STATUS REPORTS:
4. Status Reports dated 17.04.2024, 2.5.2024,
3.7.2024, 29.07.2024 and Status Report dated 11.9.2024,
being pari-materia, narrate the entire sequence of events
leading to the incident, registration of FIR and the
Investigation conducted and the material on record also
reveals that statements of 11 out of 28 PWs recorded
before the Trial court, as on day.
4(i). The Status Reports including the material on
record reveals that Promila, being the deceased/wife,
was brought in dead condition, to Civil Hospital, Amb
on 22.06.2020, by her husband, that is, the petitioner
Manoj Kumar, on which, the hospital authorities informed
the police, when, on statement of the petitioner, the
FIR No 96 of 2020 dated 23.06.2020 was registered.
The complainant, Manoj Kumar, who is the husband
of the deceased, has stated that he was working with
a contractor, namely, Rahul for tarring of the roads and
as usual, he left his home for work at about 7.00 AM
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on 22.06.2020. He further stated that in late evening,
his contractor received a call informing him that his
Promila wife of Manoj Kumar was not well. After
receiving this message, the bail petitioner, reached back
home at about 7.00 PM in the evening on 22.06.2020
and on entering the room, he found that his wife was
lying in pool of blood with injuries on her head and
neck under suspicious circumstances. In this backdrop,
the F.I.R. was registered in the matter.
4(ii). After registration of F.I.R. the police swung
into action and got the postmortem of deceased done
at Dr RPGMC, Tanda on 23.06.2020. During investigation
police visited the spot, which was video graphed and
photographed.
4(iii). Status Reports indicate that during the course
of Investigation, the police interrogated the bail petitioner
Manoj Kumar, other tenants of the same building and
other neighbourers. Pursuant to such investigation,
police arrested the bail petitioner and a women, namely
Galema on 26.6.2020 and another woman, Reshma,
who was Galema’s daughter in law on 27.6.2020. During
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investigation, police recorded the statements of other
witnesses, which included other tenants residing in the
same building and other neighbors, namely Sarita aged
14 years, Sarita’s mother Muni Devi, the brother-in-
law of deceased Promila namely another Manoj Kumar,
and father of deceased Promila, namely, Hari Ram besides
other witnesses. The Status Report also narrates that
the statement of Sarita Kumari was recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the jurisdictional Magistrate
on 6.7.2020, who deposed that on 22.6.2020, at about
2.15 PM, both Galema and Reshma entered the room
of the deceased, Promila, whereafter Promila was heard
crying for help and was trying to get away from illegal
acts of Galema and Reshma. However, the statement
of Sarita Kumari under Section 164 does not attributes
any accusation against the bail petitioner except to
the extent that the bail petitioner and deceased Promila
used to quarrel with each other. The Status Reports
indicate that co-accused Reshma, was arrested on
27.6.2020, who being pregnant, was enlarged on bail
on 27.6.2021 and after being released on bail, Reshma
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has evaded the trial despite having been declared as
proclaimed offender also. Status Reports further indicate
that under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, at the
instance of co-accused Galema, the police recovered an
amount of Rs 7000/- from the room of Galema, which
Galema had stolen from Promila after murdering her. The
Status Reports further indicate that at the instance
of co-accused Reshma {daughter in law of Galema}, the
police recovered an amount of Rs 4600/-which was
stated to be stolen by Galema and then handed over
to Reshma.
4(iv). After narrating the details of investigation, the
Status Report further indicates that the police presented
the Challan-Police Report before jurisdictional Magistrate
on 19.09.2020 whereafter, the matter was forwarded to
the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Una for further
proceedings.
4(v). Status Reports further reveal that the samples
collected from the spot of occurrence were sent to the
Regional Forensic Science Laboratory and no poison
was detected in samples but the RFSL Report indicates
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that the offence was committed by using a peeler, knife
and stone. The Status Reports candidly indicate that
as on day, out of 28 PWs witnesses only 11 PWs have
been examined in the trial.
In the backdrop of the above details, the
Learned State Counsel has prayed for dismissal of the
bail application.
5. Heard Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate, for
the petitioner and Mr. Hemant K. Verma, Learned Deputy
Advocate General for the Respondent-State.
6. Before dealing with the present application,
it is necessary to take note of the provisions of Sections
299, 300, 302 and 120-B of the IPC, which reads as
under:-
“299. Culpable homicide-
Whoever causes death by doing an act with
the intention of causing death, or with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge
that he is likely by such act to cause
death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.
300. Murder-
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted,
culpable homicide is murder, ff the act by
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which the death is caused is done with
the intention of causing death, or-
Secondly.- If it is done with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as the offender
knows to be likely to cause the death of
the person to whom the harm is caused,
or-
Thirdly.- If it is done with the intention of
causing bodily injury to any person and
the bodily injury intended to be inflicted
is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death, or-
Fourthly- If the person committing the act
knows that it is so imminently dangerous
that it must, in all probability, cause death,
or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, and commits such act without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as aforesaid.
302. Punishment for murder-
Whoever commits murder shall be punished
with death, or imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine.
120 B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy-
(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal
conspiracy to commit an offence punishable
with death, [imprisonment for life] or rigorous
imprisonment for a term of two years or
upwards, shall, where no express provision
is made in this Code for the punishment
of such a conspiracy, be punished in the
same manner as if he had abetted such
offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy
other than a criminal conspiracy to commit
an offence punishable as aforesaid shall
be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term not exceeding six
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months, or with fine or with both.
7. Notably, the claim of the suspect-accused for
post arrest bail-regular bail, in general is to be examined
/tested within the parameters prescribed of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and broad para-meters mandated
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regulating grant of bail
in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia versus State of Punjab
(1980) 2 SCC 565, Ram Govind Upadhyay versus
Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 ; Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar versus Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528;
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar versus Ashish Chatterjee,
(2010) 14 SCC 496; reiterated in P. Chidambaram
versus Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24,
mandating that the bail {anticipatory or regular} is to
be granted where the case is frivolous or groundless
and no prima facie or reasonable grounds exists which
lead to believe or point out towards accusation; and
these parameters for regular bail have been reiterated
in Sushila Aggarwal versus State-NCT Delhi, (2020 5
SCC 01.
7(i). While dealing with the case for grant of
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bail, the three judges bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court,
after reiterating the broad parameters has held in
Deepak Yadav versus State of Uttar Pradesh, (2022)
8 SCC 559, in Para 25, that the nature of the crime
has huge relevancy, while considering claim for bail.
7(ii). In the case of Ansar Ahmad versus State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC Online SC 974, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court had expanded the horizon of
the broad parameters, which are to be primarily taken
into account, for considering the claim for regular bail
or anticipatory bail as under:
“11. Mr. R. Basant, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for one of the private respondents
that the Court while granting bail is not
required to give detailed reasons touching
the merits or de-merits of the prosecution
case as any such observation made by
the Court in a bail matter can unwittingly
cause prejudice to the prosecution or
the accused at a later stage. The settled
proposition of law, in our considered
opinion, is that the order granting bail
should reflect the judicial application
of mind taking into consideration the
well-known parameters including:
(i) The nature of the accusation weighing
in the gravity and severity of the
offence;
(ii) The severity of punishment;
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(iii) The position or status of the accused,
i.e. whether the accused can exercise
influence on the victim and the
witnesses or not;
(iv) Likelihood of accused to approach or
try to approach the victims/witnesses;
(v) Likelihood of accused absconding from
proceedings;
(vi) Possibility of accused tampering with
evidence;
(vii) Obstructing or attempting to obstruct
the due course of justice;
(viii) Possibility of repetition of offence if
left out on bail;
(ix) The prima facie satisfaction of the
court in support of the charge
including frivolity of the charge;
(x) The different and distinct facts of
each case and nature of substantive
and corroborative evidence.
12. We hasten to add that there can be
several other relevant factors which,
depending upon the peculiar facts and
circumstances of a case, would be required
to be kept in mind while granting or
refusing bail to an accused. It may be
difficult to illustrate all such circumstances,
for there cannot be any straight jacket
formula for exercising the discretionary
jurisdiction vested in a Court under
Sections 438 and 439 respectively of
the CrPC, as the case may be.”
8. This Court is also conscious of the fact that
as per the mandate of law, in Criminal Appeal No 3840
of 2023, titled as Saumya Churasia versus Directorate
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of Enforcement, decided on 14.12.2023, while considering
the prayer for bail, though a Court is not required to
weigh the evidence collected by the Investigating Agency
meticulously, nonetheless, the Court should keep in mind
nature of accusation ; nature of evidence collected in
support thereof ; severity of punishment prescribed for
alleged offences ; character of accused ; circumstances which
are peculiar to accused ; reasonable possibility of securing
presence of accused during trial ; reasonable apprehension
of witnesses being tampered with and larger interests
of the public/state.
In this background, while testing the claim for
bail, the Court is required to form a prima-facie opinion
in the context of the broad-parameters referred to above,
without delving into the evidence on merits, as it may
tend to prejudice the rights of the accused as well as
the prosecution.
ANALYSIS OF CLAIM IN INSTANT CASE:
9. Notwithstanding, the dismissal of earlier bail
application by the Learned Trial Court, Additional Sessions
Judge-1, Una (HP) on 05.01.2024 [Annexure P-1], yet
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this Court, proceeds to examine the prayer of petitioner,
for bail, in the instant case.
10. After taking into account the entirety of facts
and circumstances which are borne out from the
voluminous Status Reports dated 17.04.2024, 02.05.2024,
3.7.2024 and dated 29.7.2024 and Fresh Status Report
dated 12.09.2024 and the Statutory Provisions and the
mandate of law, this Court is of the considered view
that the bail petitioner [Manoj Kumar], is entitled to be
released on bail, for the following reasons:-
10(i). The material on record, including the Status
Reports and the Statements recorded during Investigation
under Section 161 and 164 Cr PC and the statements
of 11 PWs recorded before the Learned Trial Court as
on 11.9.2024, this Court is of the considered view, that
no reasonable grounds exit to believe the accusation
against the petitioner, at this stage.
Material on record indicates that the version
of the bail petitioner is that he is a laborer with a
contractor named Rahul, for performing tarring work
of road and as usual, he left his home for work
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at about 7.00 AM on 20.6.2020 and while at work,
contractor Rahul received a call from someone in the
evening that petitioners wife namely, Promila was not
well. After receiving this information in late evening,
the bail petitioner reached back home at 7.00 PM and
found her wife, Promila, lying dead in a pool of blood
with injuries on his head and neck. Thereafter, the
petitioner took her deceased wife, Promila to the hospital
leading to complaint and registration of F.I.R.
In this backdrop, once the bail petitioner,
Manoj Kumar was not at home, from 7 AM onwards
till his return at 7.00 PM in the evening as usual}
on the fateful day i.e. 22.06.2020 then, the accusation
no reasonable grounds exit to believe the accusation
against the petitioner, at this stage.
10(ii). Further, once the Statement of Sarita Kumari
recorded under Section 164 Cr PC before jurisdictional
Magistrate does not attributes any accusation against
the bail petitioner except that the bail petitioner and the
deceased Promila at times used to quarrel but the
statement of Sarita casts accusation against Galema
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and Reshma, who were alleged to have entered the
room of deceased Promila, who was heard to be crying
for help while trying to get away from illegal acts
of Galema and Reshma. Mere quarrel of petitioner with
wife, cannot reasonably lead to believe the accusation
against the bail petitioner, at this stage.
10(iii). Moreover, the evidence of 11 PWs recorded
during trial, at this stage, do not reveal anything to
connect the petitioner with the alleged offence. Even,
on facts, the version of co-accused Galema and Reshma,
recorded under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act does
not points out anything to support accusation against
the bail petitioner. Even otherwise, the statements of
co-accused under Section 27 of IEA cannot ipso facto
“qualify as fact discovered” unless its admissibility and
credibility is tested during the trial which is yet to
be undertaken, in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal 1030 of 2023,
Manoj Kumar Soni versus The State of Madhya Pradesh,
11.08.2023, in the following terms :
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21. Can disclosure statements per se,
unaccompanied by any supporting
evidence be deemed adequate to secure a
conviction ? We find it implausible.
Although disclosure statements hold
significance as a contributing factor in
unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are
not so strong a piece of evidence
sufficient on its own and without anything
more to bring home the charges beyond
reasonable doubt.
23. The law on the evidentiary value of
disclosure statements of co-accused too
is settled; the courts have hesitated to
place reliance solely on disclosure
statements of co-accused and used them
merely to support the conviction or,
as Sir Lawrence Jenkins observed in
Emperor vs. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty,
to “lend assurance to other evidence
against a co-accused”. In Haricharan
Kurmi vs. State of Bihar, this Court, speaking
through the Constitution Bench, elaborated
upon the approach to be adopted by
courts when dealing with disclosure
statements:
13. …In dealing with a criminal case
where the prosecution relies upon the
confession of one accused person
against another accused person, the
proper approach to adopt is to
consider the other evidence against
such an accused person, and if
the said evidence appears to be
satisfactory and the court is inclined
to hold that the said evidence may
sustain the charge framed against the
said accused person, the court turns
to the confession with a view to
assure itself that the conclusion
which it is inclined to draw from the
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other evidence is right. (1911) ILR
38 Cal 559, page 588 AIR 1964 SC
1184
24. In yet another case of discrediting a flawed
conviction under Section 411, IPC, this
Court, in Shiv Kumar vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh overturned the conviction
under Section 411, declined to place
undue reliance solely on the disclosure
statements of the co-accused, and
held:
24. …the disclosure statement of one
accused cannot be accepted as a proof
of the appellant having knowledge of
utensils being stolen goods. The
prosecution has failed to establish any
basis for the appellant to believe that
the utensils seized from him were
stolen articles. The factum of selling
utensils at a lower price cannot,
by itself, lead to the conclusion
that the appellant was aware of the
theft of those articles. The essential
ingredient of mens rea is clearly not
established for the charge under
Section 411 IPC. The prosecution’s
evidence on this aspect, as they
would speak of the character Gratiano
in Merchant of Venice, can be
appropriately described as, “you speak
an infinite deal of nothing.” [William
Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice,
Act 1 Scene 1.]
25. Coming to the case at hand, there is not
a single iota of evidence except the disclosure
statements of Manoj and the co-accused,
which supposedly led the I.O. to the
recovery of the stolen articles from Manoj and
Rs.3,000.00 from Kallu. At this stage,
we must hold that admissibility and
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credibility are two distinct aspects and
the latter is really a matter of evaluation
of other available evidence. The
statements of police witnesses would have
been acceptable, had they supported the
prosecution case, and if any other credible
evidence were brought on record. While
the recoveries made by the I.O. under
Section 27, Evidence Act upon the
disclosure statements by Manoj, Kallu and the
other co-accused could be held to have
led to discovery of facts and may be
admissible, the same cannot be held to
be credible in view of the other evidence
available on record.
10(iv). Further, the version of the prosecution story
vis-à-vis cross version of the bail petitioner who had
gone for work as usual and in whose absence his
wife was murdered, coupled with the fact that the
available material does not points out anything against
the petitioner but names Galema and Reshma as the
aggressors or main accused. Further, the factum as
to whether the petitioner had intention to murder
{Section 302 IPC} or had conspired {Section 302 IPC}
with anyone for causing injury and death are to be
tested, examined and proved during the trial.
In these circumstances, based on the Status
Reports and materials available on record, though the
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accusation levelled is serious {Section 302 IPC and 120-B
of IPC} but in the peculiar fact situation of this case
and in the absence of any material either in the status
reports or in statements of material witness recorded
during investigation or evidence of 11 PWs recorded by
the Learned Trial Court at this stage, this Court is of
the considered view, that no reasonable grounds exists
to believe the accusation against the bail petitioner and
therefore, the prayer of the petitioner for bail, deserves
to be accepted, which is accordingly granted.
NOTHING RECOVERABLE FROM BAIL PETITIONER:
11. The Status Reports filed by the State Authorities
do not indicate that any recovery is still attributable
to the petitioner in the aforesaid incident.
NOTHING ADVERSIAL REGARDING TAMERING WITH
EVIDENCE OR WITNESSES ETC:
12. The Status Reports filed by State Authorities
have neither pointed out any adversarial circumstances
nor placed any material on record, at this stage, to
infer that after release on bail, the petitioner is likely
to tamper with evidence or may cause any inducement,
threat or promise to any person or persons acquainted
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with the facts of the case. However, the apprehension
if any, of the State Authorities can be safeguarded,
at this stage by imposing stringent conditions in this
bail order.
NOTHING ADVERSIAL REGARDING OBSTRUCTING OR
ATTEMPTING TO THRAWTLING JUSTICE:
13. The Status Reports filed by State Authorities
have neither pointed out any adversarial circumstances
nor placed any material on record, at this stage, to infer
that after release on bail, the petitioner may obstruct
or thwart the cause of justice in any manner. However,
the apprehension if any, of the State Authorities are
taken care of, by imposing stringent bail conditions as
mandated herein, in the instant case.
NOTHING ADVERSIAL REGARDING REPITITION OF
OFFENCE AFTER BAIL:
14. The Status Reports filed by State Authorities
have not expressed any apprehension of repetition of
offence after release on bail, which, still is being taken
care of, by imposing stringent bail conditions in later
part of this bail order.
PROLONGED INCARCERATION AND TRIAL TO TAKE
CONSIDERABLE TIME FOR CONCLUSION:
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15. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sanjeev Kumar
Suri, submits that FIR in the instant case was registered
on 23.06.2020 and petitioner is custody for about four
years and two months as on day. After completion
of Investigation and filing of Challan-Police Report and
Framing of Charge on 23.11.2020, Learned Trial Court
started recording statements on PWs from 31.3.2021
and as per the Latest Status Report dated 11.9.2024,
out of total 28 PWs, the evidence of 11 PWs have been
recorded till day.
15(i). While dealing with the claim for bail in
matter borne out from accusation in offence under
Section 302 IPC where there are versions and cross-
versions coupled with the fact that the accused has
suffered incarceration for more than 14 months coupled
with the fact there is no much progress in trial
and trial was to take considerable time, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Mukesh Kumar versus State of
Rajasthan and another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 2025,
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granted bail to the accused therein, in the following
terms:-
2. The petitioner is accused of giving one blow
on the head of the deceased with a
danda (Bamboo). It may also be mentioned
that occurrence took place on 08-06-2020
and the deceased succumbed to his injuries
on 12-06-2020.
5. After cancellation of bail by the High Court,
the petitioner has again surrendered on
16-11-2022 and is in custody.
7. It may be seen that there are cross-versions
and both sides suffered injuries. The
question as to who was the aggressor
will depend upon the appreciation of
evidence and will be decided by the Trial
Court at an appropriate stage. It is not
expedient or desirable for this Court to
express any opinion in relation thereto at
this stage.
8. Suffice to say that the petitioner has
been in custody for more than 14
months, the crucial witnesses have since
been examined and there is no likelihood
of tampering with the evidence. Even
otherwise also, the witnesses are close
family members of both sides, hence there
is no likelihood of winning over the
witnesses.
9. Since conclusion of trial will take
considerable time, we deem it appropriate
to release the petitioner on bail.
11. Consequently, without expressing any views
on the merits of the case, the petitioner
is directed to be released on bail, subject
to his furnishing bail bonds to the
satisfaction of the Trial Court.
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12. The petitioner and his family members as
well as Respondent No. 2 and his family
members will ensure that no untoward
incident takes place again.
15(ii). In similar fact-situation, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Praveen Rathore versus State of Rajasthan
and another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1268 had granted
bail to accused therein, who had been in custody for
more than four and half years under Section 302 read
with Section 120-B of IPC, in the following terms:
2. The above-stated FIR has been lodged
on a complaint made by Mahadev Meena,
who has alleged, inter alia, that his son-
Chetan Prakash got married with Anita
Meena on 21.01.2011. He was, thereafter,
selected as Assistance Intelligence Officer
in the Intelligence Bureau. Anita was
working as a second grade teacher, at that
time, and later on, she got appointment
as First Grade Lecturer in a Senior
Secondary School. He further alleged that
the petitioner (Praveen Rathore) was also
working as an Officer in the Intelligence
Bureau. He came in close contact to his
daughter-in-law (Anita Meena) and when
his son – Chetan Prakash objected to it,
the petitioner threatened him with dire
consequences. The complainant’s son was
found unconscious near railway culvert
on 14.02.2018 and was declared as dead
when he was taken to the hospital. His
nails of hands and legs were found to be
blue.
5. It is not in dispute that the petitioner,
by now, has undergone more than four
– 27 – 2024:HHC:8690
and a half years’ of sentence. The
prosecution intends to examine 76
witnesses, out of whom 53 have already
deposed. All the crucial witnesses have
already been examined. The instant case
was adjourned on few occasions to enable
the prosecution to examine Chauthmal
Kashyap and Manohar Rathore, who were
stated to be the vital witnesses. Their
deposition is also complete.
7. Taking into consideration the period
already spent by the petitioner in custody
coupled with the fact that conclusion
of trial will take some reasonable time
however, without expressing any views
on the merits of the case, we are inclined
to release him on bail.
8. The petitioner is, accordingly, directed to
be enlarged on bail subject to his furnishing
bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial
Court.”
15(iii). While dealing with the claim for bail in
a case relating to accusation under Section 302 IPC,
a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in Cr.MP (M) No
2618 of 2023, Jasbir Singh versus State of Himachal
Pradesh, decided on 4.11.2023 has affirmed the right to
bail in view of the prolonged detention of the accused
therein, in the following terms:-
5(ii). ….. In 2021 (3) SCC, 713, Union of India
Versus K.A. Najeeb, Hon’ble Apex Court
considered various judicial precedents
where Article 21 of the Constitution
– 28 – 2024:HHC:8690
of India was invoked in case of gross
delay in disposal of cases of under-
trials and consequential necessity
to release them on bail. The earlier
decisions were reiterated that liberty
granted by Part-III of the Constitution,
would cover within its protective ambit
not only due procedure and fairness,
but also access to justice and speedy
trial. It was held that once it is
obvious that a timely trial would not
be possible and the accused have
suffered incarceration for a significant
period of time, the Courts would
ordinarily be obligated to enlarge
them on bail. Some relevant paras
from the judgments are extracted
hereinafter:-
“10. It is a fact that the High Court in
the instant case has not determined
the likelihood of the respondent being
guilty or not, or whether rigours of
Section 43D(5) of UAPA are alien to
him. The High Court instead appears
to have exercised its power to grant
bail owing to the long period of
incarceration and the unlikelihood of
the trial being completed anytime
in the near future. The reasons assigned
by the High Court are apparently
traceable back to Article 21 of our
Constitution, of course without
addressing the statutory embargo created
by Section 43D (5) of UAPA.
11. The High Court’s view draws
support from a batch of decisions of
this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare
Assn, laying down that gross delay
– 29 – 2024:HHC:8690
in disposal of such cases would
justify the invocation of Article 21
of the Constitution and consequential
necessity to release the undertrial
on bail. It would be useful to quote
the following observations from the cited
case:
“10. Bearing in mind the nature
of the crime and the need to protect
the society and the nation, TADA
has prescribed in Section 20(8)
stringent provisions for granting
bail. Such stringent provisions
can be justified looking to the
nature of the crime, as was held
in Kartar Singh case, on the
presumption that the trial of the
accused will take place without
undue delay. No one can justify
gross delay in disposal of cases
when undertrials perforce remain
in jail, giving rise to possible
situations that may justify
invocation of Article 21.” …
(emphasis supplied)
12. Even in the case of special legislations
like the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (” the NDPS Act”)
which too have somewhat rigorous
conditions for grant of bail, this Court
in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Babba v. State of Maharashtra
and Umarmia alias Mamumia v. State
of Gujarat enlarged the accused on
bail when they had been in jail for
an extended period of time with
– 30 – 2024:HHC:8690
little possibility of early completion
of trial. The constitutionality of harsh
conditions for bail in such special
enactments, has thus been primarily
justified on the touchstone of speedy
trials to ensure the protection of
innocent civilians.
13. We may also refer to the orders
enlarging similarly situated accused
under the UAPA passed by this Court
in Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of
Maharashtra. That was also a case
under Sections 10, 13, 17, 18, 18A,
18B, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40(2) of
the UAPA. This Court in its earnest
effort to draw balance between the
seriousness of the charges with the period
of custody suffered and the likely
period within which the trial could be
expected to be completed took note
of the five years’ incarceration and
over 200 witnesses left to be examined,
and thus granted bail to the accused
notwithstanding Section 43D(5) of UAPA.
Similarly, in Sagar Tatyaram Gorkhe v.
State of Maharashtra, an accused under
the UAPA was enlarged for he had
been in jail for four years and
there were over 147 witnesses still
unexamined.
15. This Court has clarified in numerous
judgments that the liberty guaranteed
by Part III of the Constitution would
cover within its protective ambit not
only due procedure and fairness but
also access to justice and a speedy
trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid
Committee (Representing Undertrial
– 31 – 2024:HHC:8690
Prisoners) v. Union of India, it was held
that undertrials cannot indefinitely be
detained pending trial. Ideally, no person
ought to suffer adverse consequences
of his acts unless the same is
established before a neutral arbiter.
However, owing to the practicalities of
real life where to secure an effective
trial and to ameliorate the risk to
society in case a potential criminal is
left at large pending trial, Courts
are tasked with deciding whether an
individual ought to be released pending
trial or not. Once it is obvious that
a timely trial would not be possible
and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period
of time, Courts would ordinarily be
obligated to enlarge them on bail.
17. It is thus clear to us that the
presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43D (5) of UAPA per se does
not oust the ability of Constitutional
Courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution.
Indeed, both the restrictions under a
Statue as well as the powers exercisable
under Constitutional Jurisdiction can
be well harmonised. Whereas at
commencement of proceedings, Courts
are expected to appreciate the legislative
policy against grant of bail but the
rigours of such provisions will melt
down where there is no likelihood
of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the
– 32 – 2024:HHC:8690
prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility
of provisions like Section 43-D (5) of
UAPA being used as the sole metric
for denial of bail or for wholesale
breach of constitutional right to speedy
trial.”
5(iv). ……A previous bail petition bearing Cr.MP
(M) No.1458/2022 instituted by the petitioner
was dismissed on merit on 02.09.2022.
While deciding the aforesaid bail petition,
considering the fact that FIR in question
pertained to the year 2020, it was hoped
and expected that the learned Trial
Court would make endeavour to expedite
the trial. We are now at the fag end
of 2023. In terms of the status report
filed by the respondent, the prosecution
has examined 16 witnesses thus far.
Statements of 23 prosecution witnesses
still remain to be recorded. The zimni
orders placed on record reflect that the
trial has been deferred time and again
for want of presence of prosecution witnesses.
Considering the fact that at this stage
23 witnesses remain to be recorded,
it is apparent that the trial is not
going to be concluded in near future.
The petitioner, who has already spent
about three years and five months in
custody, in my considered opinion has
made out a case for his enlargement on
regular bail at this stage. There is no
criminal history of the petitioner. The
apprehension expressed by the prosecution
about the likelihood of petitioner’s tampering
with the evidence or winning over remaining
witnesses, can be taken care of by imposing
stringent conditions and also granting
liberty to the respondent/State to seek
cancellation of the bail in case the
– 33 – 2024:HHC:8690
conditions are violated by the petitioner. In
view of all the aforesaid reasons and
without expressing any opinion on the
merits of the case, the present petition
is allowed. Petitioner is ordered to be
released on bail in the aforesaid FIR
…..”
Keeping in view the material on record, as
borne out from the Status Reports and the statements
recorded during Investigation and the evidence of PWs
adduced at this stage, and the law referred to above
coupled with the fact that no reasonable grounds exist
to believe the accusation against the bail petitioner at
this stage coupled with the fact that the trial is likely
to take considerable time for its conclusion ; with another
added fact that delay in trial was not attributable
to the bail petitioner therefore, further detention certainly
amounts to implicating the petitioner on mere accusation
or conjectures-suspicion, by way of punishment, defeating
the very intent and object of bail; by making petitioner
to be incarcerated for 4 years and 2 months now ;
and in these circumstances, the plea for bail carries
weight and the same is accordingly granted.
– 34 – 2024:HHC:8690
PROLONGED INCARCERATION AND INFRINGMENT
OF PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA:
16. While reiterating the principle that bail is a
rule and jail is an exception and no accused can be
deprived of personal liberty on mere accusation and
an accused is to be treated as innocent in the eyes of
law, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has outlined the object
of bail in Guddan alias Roop Narayan Versus State
of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1242, in the
following terms:-
“11. In the case of Sanjay Chandra V. Central
Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40, while
hearing a bail Application in a case of an
alleged economic offence, this court held
that the object of bail is neither punitive
nor preventative. It was observed as under:
“21. In bail applications, generally, it has
been laid down from the earliest
times that the object of bail is to
secure the appearance of the accused
person at his trial by reasonable
amount of bail. The object of
bail is neither punitive nor
preventative. Deprivation of liberty
must be considered a punishment,
unless it is required to ensure that
an accused person will stand his trial
when called upon. The courts owe
more than verbal respect to the
principle that punishment begins
after conviction, and that every
– 35 – 2024:HHC:8690
man is deemed to be innocent until
duly tried and duly found guilty.
23. Apart from the question of prevention
being the object of refusal of
bail, one must not lose sight of
the fact that any imprisonment
before conviction has a substantial
punitive content and it would be
improper for any court to refuse
bail as a mark of disapproval
of former conduct whether the
accused has been convicted for
it or not or to refuse bail to
an unconvicted person for the
purpose of giving him a taste
of imprisonment as a lesson.
25. The provisions of Cr PC confer
discretionary jurisdiction on criminal
courts to grant bail to the accused
pending trial or in appeal against
convictions; since the jurisdiction
is discretionary, it has to be
exercised with great care and
caution by balancing the valuable
right of liberty of an individual
and the interest of the society
in general. In our view, the reasoning
adopted by the learned District
Judge, which is affirmed by the
High Court, in our opinion, is a
denial of the whole basis of our
system of law and normal rule
of bail system. It transcends
respect for the requirement that
a man shall be considered
innocent until he is found guilty.
If such power is recognised, then
it may lead to chaotic situation
and would jeopardise the personal
liberty of an individual.
– 36 – 2024:HHC:8690
27. This Court, time and again, has
stated that bail is the rule and
committal to jail an exception. It
has also observed that refusal
of bail is a restriction on the
personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution.”
12. Further, in the case of Sandeep Jain v.
National Capital Territory of Delhi, (2000)
2 SCC 66, this Court, while hearing a
bail application held that conditions for
grant of bail cannot become so onerous
that their existence itself is tantamount
to refusal of bail. This Court held as
under:
“We are unable to appreciate even the
first order passed by the Metropolitan
Magistrate imposing the onerous
condition that an accused at the FIR
stage should pay a huge sum of Rs.
2 lakhs to be set at liberty. If he had
paid it is a different matter. But the
fact that he was not able to pay
that amount and in default thereof
he is to languish in jail for more
than 10 months now, is sufficient
indication that he was unable to make
up the amount. Can he be detained
in custody endlessly for his inability
to pay the amount in the range of
Rs.2 lakhs? If the cheques issued by
his surety were dishonoured, the Court
could perhaps have taken it as a
ground to suggest to the payee of
the cheques to resort to the legal
remedies provided by law.
Similarly if the Court was dissatisfied
with the conduct of the surety as for
his failure to raise funds for honouring
– 37 – 2024:HHC:8690
the cheques issued by him, the Court
could have directed the appellant to
substitute him with another surety.
But to keep him in prison for such
a long period, that too in a case
where bail would normally be granted
for the offences alleged, is not only
hard but improper. It must be
remembered that the Court has not
even come to the conclusion that the
allegations made in the FIR are true.
That can be decided only when the
trial concludes, if the case is charge-
sheeted by the police.”
16(i). While dealing with the concept of bail and
personal liberty of an accused under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
Criminal Appeal No.2787 of 2024, titled as Javed Gulam
Nabi Shaikh Versus State of Maharashtra and Another,
as under:-
“18 Criminals are not born out but made. The
human potential in everyone is good and so,
never write off any criminal as beyond
redemption. This humanist fundamental is
often missed when dealing with
delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed,
every saint has a past and every sinner a
future. When a crime is committed, a
variety of factors is responsible for making
the offender commit the crime. Those
factors may be social and economic, may be,
the result of value erosion or parental
neglect; may be, because of the stress
of circumstances, or the manifestation of
– 38 – 2024:HHC:8690
temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted
with indigence or other privations.
19. If the State or any prosecuting agency
including the court concerned has no
wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have
a speedy trial as enshrined under Article
21 of the Constitution then the State
or any other prosecuting agency should
not oppose the plea for bail on the ground
that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies
irrespective of the nature of the crime.
20. We may hasten to add that the petitioner
is still an accused; not a convict. The over-
arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence
that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be
brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent
the penal law may be.
21 We are convinced that the manner in which
the prosecuting agency as well as the Court
have proceeded, the right of the accused
to have a speedy trial could be said to
have been infringed thereby violating
Article 21 of the Constitution.
22 In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds
and is hereby allowed. The impugned
order passed by the High Court is set
aside.”
16(ii). While dealing with a matter relating to the
prolonged incarceration and the right to speedy trial
and right of liberty to be sacrosanct right and while
deprecating that the bail is not to be withheld as
punishment so as to operate de hors the principle that
– 39 – 2024:HHC:8690
bail is rule and jail is an exception, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in Manish Sisodia vs Directorate of Enforcement,
SLP (Criminal) No.8781 of 2024, decided on 09.08.2024,
has held as under :-
“49. We find that, on account of a long
period of incarceration running for around
17 months and the trial even not having
been commenced, the appellant has been
deprived of his right to speedy trial.
50. As observed by this Court, the right to
speedy trial and the right to liberty are
sacrosanct rights. On denial of these
rights, the trial court as well as the High
Court ought to have given due weightage
to this factor.
52. The Court also reproduced the observations
made in Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra),
which read thus:
“10. In the aforesaid context, we may
remind the trial courts and the High
Courts of what came to be observed
by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu
v. Public Prosecutor, High Court
reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240. We
quote:
“What is often forgotten, and therefore
warrants reminder, is the object to
keep a person in judicial custody
pending trial or disposal of an
appeal. Lord Russel, C.J., said [R
v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]:
“I observe that in this case bail
was refused for the prisoner. It
cannot be too strongly impressed
on the, magistracy of the country
that bail is not to be withheld
as a punishment, but that the
requirements as to bail are merely
– 40 – 2024:HHC:8690
to secure the attendance of the
prisoner at trial””
53. The Court further observed that, over a
period of time, the trial courts and the
High Courts have forgotten a very well-
settled principle of law that bail is not to
be withheld as a punishment. From our
experience, we can say that it appears that
the trial courts and the High Courts attempt
to play safe in matters of grant of bail.
The principle that bail is a rule and
refusal is an exception is, at times, followed
in breach. On account of non-grant of
bail even in straight forward open and
shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge
number of bail petitions thereby adding
to the huge pendency. It is high time
that the trial courts and the High
Courts should recognize the principle that
“bail is rule and jail is exception”.
55. As observed by this Court in the case of
Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), the objective
to keep a person in judicial custody
pending trial or disposal of an appeal
is to secure the attendance of the prisoner
at trial.
56. In the present case, the appellant is having
deep roots in the society. There is no
possibility of him fleeing away from the
country and not being available for facing
the trial. In any case, conditions can be
imposed to address the concern of the
State.
57. Insofar as the apprehension given by the
learned ASG regarding the possibility of
tampering the evidence is concerned, it is
to be noted that the case largely
depends on documentary evidence which
is already seized by the prosecution. As
such, there is no possibility of tampering
with the evidence. Insofar as the concern
with regard to influencing the witnesses
is concerned, the said concern can be
addressed by imposing stringent conditions
upon the appellant.”
- 41 - 2024:HHC:8690 16(iii). While adjudicating the claim for bail, even under Special Enactments, like PMLA [akin to NDPS
Act], the Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No._____
of 2024 [Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 10778
of 2024], titled as Kalvakuntla Kavitha Versus
Directorate of Enforcement and connected matter has
mandated that fundamental right of liberty provided under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India is superior to
the statutory restrictions, in the following terms:-
“13. We had also reiterated the well-established
principle that “bail is the rule and refusal
is an exception”. We had further observed
that the fundamental right of liberty
provided under Article 21 of the Constitution
is superior to the statutory restrictions.”
Keeping in view the factual matrix that
no reasonable grounds exist against the bail petitioner,
as referred to above, coupled with the fact the bail
petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than
four years and two months now [since 26.06.2020] and
even trial is likely to take considerable time then,
further detention shall certainly amount to depriving
and curtailing the personal liberty of the petitioner on
– 42 – 2024:HHC:8690
mere accusation or conjectures or surmises, which are
yet to be tested, examined and proved during the trial.
Detention of the petitioner can neither be punitive nor
preventative, so as to make the petitioner to taste
imprisonment as a lesson. Denial of bail shall certainly
violates the principle that “bail is rule and jail is
an exception”. Even, the State Authorities, have failed
to ensure speedy trial and still considerable time is
likely to be taken for conclusion of trial, then, in view
of mandate of law in the cases of Guddan alias
Roop Narayan, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh, Manish
Sisodia and Kalvakuntla Kavitha [supra], the petitioner
deserves to be released on bail.
NO PAST CRIMINAL ANTECEDENTS:
17.. The Status Reports do not indicate any past
criminal incident against the bail petitioner and once
no cogent reasons-material and evidence exists against
him, at this stage, therefore, prolonging the detention
shall certainly violate the personal liberty of the
petitioner mandated under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
– 43 – 2024:HHC:8690
CONTENTION BY LEARNED STATE COUNSEL :
18. Learned State Counsel submitted that the
bail petitioner belongs to village Kolhuwa in Deoria, in
Uttar Pradesh and since one of the co-accused Reshma,
who enlarged on bail in July 2021 has fled away and
has failed to participate in trial thereafter, then, there
is every likelihood that the petitioner may also flee
away. The apprehension expressed by the State Authorities
cannot be made the basis for further detention and
curtailing the personal liberty of the bail petitioner. However,
the apprehension, if any, can be adequately addressed
and safeguarded by imposing stringent conditions in the
bail order, which this Court hereby imposes, in latter
part of this order.
19. Taking into account the entirety of the facts
and the material on record and the mandate of law,
as referred to above, the instant petition is allowed,
and the State Authorities are directed to release the
petitioner [Manoj Kumar] on bail, subject to observance
of the following conditions:-
(i) Respondent-State Authorities shall release
bail petitioner [Manoj Kumar] on furnishing
– 44 – 2024:HHC:8690
personal bond of Rs 75000/- {Rs Seventy
Five Thousand} with two sureties on furnishing
similar bond amount each, to the satisfaction
of the Learned Trial Court concerned ; out
of which one surety should be a resident
of place where the petitioner resided at the
time of alleged offence Una [Himachal Pradesh]
and the second surety should be resident
of Deoria [Uttar Pradesh] ;
(ii) Petitioner shall undertake and shall also appear
on every date of trial hereinafter;
(iii) Petitioner shall abide by all or any other
condition(s), which may be imposed by the
Learned Trial Court, in view of this order ;
(iv) Petitioner shall neither involve himself nor shall
abet the commission of any offence hereinafter.
Involvement in any offence whatsoever or abetting
thereof shall entail automatic cancellation of
bail granted in terms of this order ;
(v) Petitioner shall disclose his functional E-Mail
IDs/WhatsApp number and that of his surety
to the Learned Trial Court.
(vi) Petitioner after release, shall report to the
Investigating Officer of Police Station {at Una
or place nearest to his native place in Deoria}
on 2nd Sunday of every month at 8.00 AM,
only for having an update on good conduct
and behaviour ;
(vii) Petitioner shall not jump over the bail and
also shall not leave the country without the
prior information of the Court;
(viii) Petitioner shall not tamper with the evidence
in any manner;
(ix) Petitioner shall not cause any inducement,
threat or promise {directly or indirectly} to
witnesses of any other person acquainted with
the case ;
- 45 - 2024:HHC:8690
(x) Petitioner is free to seek modification of
any condition contained hereinabove, if need
arises;
(xi) State Authorities are free to move this Court
for seeking alteration/modification of any of
the condition contained in this order or any
condition imposed by the Learned Trial Court
as a sequel to this order, in fact situation
of instant case or circumstances so necessitate,
at any time herein-after.
(xii) State Authorities are free to move this Court
for seeking cancellation of the concession of
bail, in case, the petitioner violates any of
the conditions contained in this order ;
20. Observations made in this judgment shall
not be construed in any manner as an indictive of
findings, for or against the parties herein, either for
the purpose of investigation or for trial, which shall
proceed in-accordance with law, irrespective of any of
the observation contained hereinabove.
21. Petitioner is permitted to produce/use copy
of this order, downloaded from the web-page of the
High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities
concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist for
production of a certified copy, but if required, may
verify about the passing of this order from the Website
of this Court.
- 46 - 2024:HHC:8690 22. The Registry is directed to forward a copy
of this order to Superintendent of Police (Deoria), Uttar
Pradesh and Superintendent of Police (Una), Himachal
Pradesh, for information and necessary action in terms
of this order.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(Ranjan Sharma)
Judge
September 17, 2024
[tm]
Digitally signed by TARUN MAHAJAN
TARUN
DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, OU=HIGH COURT OF
HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA, Phone=
887aba774dfe8f4f3e95a41c7aa2abacb4ecee8f82efd8f56ec39f8e6b442b68, PostalCode=
171001, S=Himachal Pradesh, SERIALNUMBER=
3ff6ebe501e8d7c8d73d0e5a5294bacca3f198d7d66b105bbf507179673109f5, CN=TARUN
MAHAJAN
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Location: 12345678
Date: 2024.09.17 19:07:14+05’30’
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