Himachal Pradesh High Court
Decided On : 15.10.2024 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 15 October, 2024
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
1 2024:HHC:9713
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CrMP(M) No. : 2230 of 2024
Decided on : 15.10.2024
Sunil Chauhan ...Applicant
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the applicant : Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Legal Aid
Counsel.
For the respondent : Mr. Mohinder Zharaick, Additional
Advocate General, assisted by ASI
Pawan Kumar, I/O, Police Station
Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P.
Virender Singh, Judge. (Oral)
Applicant-Sunil Chauhan, has filed the present
application, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as the ‘BNSS’),
seeking the relief of bail, during the pendency of the trial,
in case FIR No. 168 of 2022, dated 15th July, 2022,
registered with Police Station Sadar, District Bilaspur,
1
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2 2024:HHC:9713
under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as the
‘NDPS Act’).
2. According to the applicant, he has falsely been
implicated, in this case, by the police. As per him, the
contraband has not been recovered from his conscious
possession.
3. As per the applicant, the investigation, in the
present case, is complete and conclusion of the trial
against him, will take sufficient long time, as, out of 24
prosecution witnesses, 19 witnesses have been examined
and, as such, no fruitful purpose would be served by
keeping him in judicial custody for indefinite period.
4. Applicant has also tried his luck before this
Court by filing similar bail application, i.e. CrMP (M) No.
3028 of 2023, however, the same has been dismissed, by
this Court, vide order, dated 14th December, 2023.
5. Apart from this, Mr. Sandeep Sharma, learned
Legal Aid Counsel, appearing for the applicant, has given
certain undertakings, on behalf of the applicant, for which,
3 2024:HHC:9713
the applicant is ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be
released, on bail, during the pendency of the trial.
6. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has
been made to allow the bail application.
7. When put to notice, police has filed the status
report, disclosing therein that on 15 th July, 2022, ASI
Ashok Kumar, alongwith other police official, was present
at NH 205, on Fire Station link road, near Police Station
Bilaspur. At about 09.00 a.m., one pick up, A/F No. T0722
HP 1082 F, came there, being driven by its driver, from
Mandi side. The said vehicle was signalled to be stopped
by them. Two persons were found sitting in the said
vehicle.
7.1. On inquiry, the driver disclosed his name as
Thakur Dass, whereas, the other occupant of the vehicle,
disclosed his name as Pawan Kumar. The police was
having the secret information regarding the said vehicle.
After five minutes, one white coloured Alto, bearing
registration No. T0721CH 8036 A, being driven by its
driver, also reached there. The said vehicle, was also
stopped by the police. Three persons were found sitting in
4 2024:HHC:9713
it. On inquiry, the driver disclosed his name as Sonu, the
person sitting on the front seat of the vehicle, disclosed his
name as Krishan Chand and the person, who was sitting
on the rear seat, disclosed his name as Sunil Chauhan
(applicant).
7.2. Thereafter, one Seema Devi, w/o Vijay Singh,
who was found coming from the link road, was associated
in the investigation of the case. Apart from this, efforts
were also made by the Investigating Officer to associate the
drivers of the vehicles, but, all of them had shown their
inability to be the independent witnesses, in the
investigation of the case. Consequently, HHC Kulbir Singh,
Constable Kapil Jamwal and Seema Devi were associated
in the investigation of the case and the search of the jeep
was conducted. Nothing objectionable or narcotic
substance was found in it. Thereafter, the Alto Car was
searched. Underneath, the driver seat, a carry bag,
containing a black substance, in the shape of sticks, was
found. On smelling and checking, the said substance was
found to be charas. On weighment, the said charas was
found to be 2.936 kilograms. Other codal formalities were
5 2024:HHC:9713
completed on the spot and all the five accused were
arrested, in this case. The charas, so recovered, was sent
to FSL Junga, for chemical analysis.
7.3. It is the further case of the police that during
the investigation, the CDRs of the mobile phones of the
accused persons, so arrested, in this case, were obtained
and perusal of the same shows that accused Krishan
Chand, who was having the mobile phone bearing No.
901513149 was in touch with accused Thakur Dass, on
his mobile Number 7807792036.
7.4. It is the specific case of the police that accused
Thakur Dass and accused Pawan Kumar were moving in
Mahindra Pick Up, just to give information to the other
accused, who were in Alto Car, from which, the contraband
was allegedly recovered, about the picketing, if any, done
by the police.
8. After completion of the codal formalities, the
FIR, in question, was registered, against the applicant as
well as the co-accused.
9. As per the status report, after the investigation
6 2024:HHC:9713
of the case, the challan has been submitted before the
learned trial Court and in the trial, out of total 24
prosecution witnesses, 17 witnesses have been examined
and now, the case has been fixed for 30th November, 2024,
for recording the statements of seven prosecution
witnesses.
10. Apart from this, mentioning the criminal history
of the applicant, it has been stated in the status report,
that a criminal case, vide FIR No. 21, dated 30th March,
2022, under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, has been
registered against the applicant, at Police Station
Kumarsain, District Shimla, H.P.
11. On all these submissions, a prayer has been
made to dismiss the bail application.
12. The contraband allegedly recovered in the
present case falls within the definition of ‘commercial
quantity’, as such, this Court has to comply with the
provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
13. As per the case of the police, applicant Sunil
Chauhan, alongwith accused Sonu and Krishan Chand,
was piloting the car, from which, the contraband was
7 2024:HHC:9713
recovered. The accused/applicant has been arrested
under Section 29 of the NDPS Act. Even, as per the CDR,
applicant was found to be in constant touch with co
accused Thakur Dass.
14. Seriousness of the offence is also one of the
criteria to decide the question of bail.
15. The applicant, in the present case, has been
arrested, under the provisions of NDPS Act. The
legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted this statute to curb
the menace of drug abuse with stringent punishment.
Certain conditions are there in the NDPS Act in the shape
of Section 37 of NDPS Act, which are, in addition to the
conditions, as contained in Section 483 of the BNSS.
Before releasing a person on bail, those conditions, as
enumerated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are to be
fulfilled, if the accused has been arrested for the offence,
involving commercial quantity of contraband.
16. Once, it has been held that the contraband
allegedly recovered from the possession of the accused
(applicant) falls in the category of ‘commercial quantity’, as
per the Notification issued by the Central Government,
8 2024:HHC:9713
then, the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act come into
play. The contraband allegedly recovered from the
applicant admittedly falls within the definition of
‘commercial quantity’. As such, the rigors of Section 37 of
NDPS Act are applicable, in this case.
17. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
have been discussed and explained by a three Judge
Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, way back in the year
2004, in cases, titled as Collector of Customs, New Delhi
versus Ahmadalieva Nodira, reported in (2004) 3
Supreme Court Cases 549, and Narcotics Control
Bureau versus Dilip Pralhad Namade, reported in (2004)
3 Supreme Court Cases 619. The relevant paras 9 to 11
of the judgment in Dilip Pralhad Namade’s case (supra),
are reproduced, as under:
“9. As observed by this Court in Union of India v.
Thamisharasi & Ors. (JT 1995(4) SC 253) clause (b)
of sub-section (1) of Section 37 imposes limitations
on granting of bail in addition to those provided
under the Code. The two limitations are (1) an
opportunity to the public prosecutor to oppose the
bail application and (2) satisfaction of the Court that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
10. The limitations on granting of bail come in only
when the question of granting bail arises on merits.
Apart from the grant of opportunity to the public
9 2024:HHC:9713prosecutor, the other twin conditions which really
have relevance so far the present accused-
respondent is concerned, are (1) the satisfaction of
the Court that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative
and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated
regarding the accused being not guilty has to be
based for reasonable grounds. The expression
“reasonable grounds” means something more than
prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief
contemplated in the provision requires existence of
such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is
not guilty of the alleged offence and he is not likely
to commit any offence while on bail. This nature of
embargo seems to have been envisaged keeping in
view the deleterious nature of the offence,
necessitates of public interest and the normal
tendencies of the persons involved in such network
to pursue their activities with greater vigour and
make hay when, at large. In the case at hand the
High Court seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 and transgressed
the limitations statutorily imposed in allowing bail.
It did not take note of the confessional statement
recorded under Section 67 of the Act.
11. A bare reading of the impugned judgment
shows that the scope and ambit of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act was not kept in view by the High Court.
Mere non-compliance of the order passed for supply
of copies, if any, cannot as in the instant case
entitle an accused to get bail notwithstanding
prohibitions contained in Section 37.”
18. The term ‘reasonable’ has elaborately been
discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as
Union of India versus Shiv Shanker Kesari, reported in
10 2024:HHC:9713
(2007) 7 Supreme Court Cases 798. The relevant paras-
8 to 11 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:
“8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
“7. … In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fourth
Edition, page 2258 states that it would be
unreasonable to expect an exact definition of
the word ‘reasonable’. Reason varies in its
conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the
individual, and the times and circumstances in
which he thinks. The reasoning which built up
the old scholastic logic sounds now like the
jingling of a child’s toy.
(See: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar and another (1987) 4 SCC 497.
and Gujarat Water Supplies and Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. and another
[(1989) 1 SCC 532].
9. “9. …It is often said that “an attempt to give a
specific meaning to the word “reasonable” is trying
to count what is not number and measure what is
not space”. The author of Words and Phrases
(Permanent Edition) has quoted from Nice &
Schreiber 123 F. 987, 988 to give a plausible
meaning for the said word. He says,
‘the expression “reasonable” is a relative term,
and the facts of the particular controversy must
be considered before the question as to what
constitutes reasonable can be determined’.
It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but
certainly something more than that.”
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis it is a
question of fact, whether a particular act is
reasonable or not depends on the circumstances in
a given situation. (See: Municipal Corporation of
11 2024:HHC:9713
Greater Mumbai and another v. Kamla Mills
Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315).
11. The Court while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for
the limited purpose essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail that the
Court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the Court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal
and recording a finding of not guilty.”
19. This view has again been reiterated by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a latest decision, in case, titled
as State of Kerala and others versus Rajesh and others,
reported in (2020) 12 Supreme Court Cases 122. The
relevant paras 18 to 21 of the judgment are reproduced, as
under:
“18. This Court has laid down broad parameters to
be followed while considering the application for
bail moved by the accused involved in offences
under NDPS Act. In Union of India Vs. Ram Samujh
and Ors. 1999(9) SCC 429, it has been elaborated
as under:
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to
and followed. It should be borne in mind that in
a murder case, the accused commits murder of
one or two persons, while those persons who are
dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in
causing death or in inflicting deathblow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard
to the society; even if they are released
temporarily, in all probability, they would
12 2024:HHC:9713continue their nefarious activities of trafficking
and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely.
Reason may be large stake and illegal profit
involved. This Court, dealing with the contention
with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act,
has succinctly observed about the adverse effect
of such activities in Durand Didier v. Chief Secy.,
Union Territory of Goa [(1990) 1 SCC 95)] as
under:
’24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld and
the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction among
a sizeable section of the public, particularly
the adolescents and students of both sexes
and the menace has assumed serious and
alarming proportions in the recent years.
Therefore, in order to effectively control and
eradicate this proliferating and booming
devastating menace, causing deleterious
effects and deadly impact on the society as a
whole, Parliament in its wisdom, has made
effective provisions by introducing this Act 81
of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum
imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs
flooding the market, Parliament has provided
that the person accused of offences under the
NDPS Act should not be released on bail during
trial unless the mandatory conditions provided
in Section 37, namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail
are satisfied. The High Court has not given any
justifiable reason for not abiding by the
aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of
the respondent-accused on bail. Instead of
attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful
13 2024:HHC:9713
socio-economic consequences and health
hazards which would accompany trafficking
illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should
implement the law in the spirit with which
Parliament, after due deliberation, has
amended.”
19. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the
exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to
the limitations contained under Section 439 of the
CrPC, but is also subject to the limitation placed by
Section 37 which commences with non-obstante
clause. The operative part of the said section is in
the negative form prescribing the enlargement of
bail to any person accused of commission of an
offence under the Act, unless twin conditions are
satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application; and the second, is that the Court must
be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that he is not guilty of such offence. If
either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the
ban for granting bail operates.
20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision requires existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of
the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High
Court seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to
the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any
other law for the time being in force, regulating the
grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of
bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.
21. We may further like to observe that the learned
Single Judge has failed to record a finding
mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act which
is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused
under the NDPS Act.”
14 2024:HHC:9713
20. In a recent decision, in case, titled as Narcotics
Control Bureau versus Mohit Aggarwal, reported in AIR
2022 SC 3444, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated
the earlier view regarding compliance of the conditions, as
enumerated in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The relevant
paras 10 to 15 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:
“10. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
read as follows:
“[37. Offences to be cognizable and non-
bailable.-(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974)-
(a) every offence punishable under this Act
shall be cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence
punishable for [offences under section 19 or
section 24 or section 27A and also for offences
involving commercial quantity] shall be
released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes
the application, the court is satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such offence and
that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time
being in force, on granting of bail.
15 2024:HHC:9713
11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-
obstante clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the
conditions imposed in subsection (2) of Section 37
that there are certain restrictions placed on the
power of the Court when granting bail to a person
accused of having committed an offence under the
NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations imposed
under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 to be kept in mind, the restrictions
placed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section
37 are also to be factored in. The conditions
imposed in sub-section (1) of Section 37 is that (i)
the Public Prosecutor ought to be given an
opportunity to oppose the application moved by an
accused person for release and (ii) if such an
application is opposed, then the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the person accused is not guilty of
such an offence. Additionally, the Court must be
satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to
commit any offence while on bail.
12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come
up for discussion in several rulings of this Court.
In “Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira”, (2004) 3 SCC 549, a
decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this
Court, it has been held thus:
“7. The limitations on granting of bail come in
only when the question of granting bail arises
on merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity
to the Public Prosecutor, the other twin
conditions which really have relevance so far
as the present accused respondent is
concerned, are: the satisfaction of the court
that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the
alleged offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. The
conditions are cumulative and not alternative.
The satisfaction contemplated regarding the
accused being not guilty has to be based on
reasonable grounds. The expression
“reasonable grounds” means something
more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes
for believing that the accused is not
16 2024:HHC:9713guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision requires existence of such facts
and circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.” [emphasis added]
13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up
for discussion in “State of Kerala and others Vs.
Rajesh and others” (2020) 12 SCC 122 and this
Court has observed as below:
“20. The expression “reasonable grounds”
means something more than prima facie
grounds. It contemplates substantial probable
causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable
belief contemplated in the provision
requires existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. In the case on hand, the High Court
seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 that in
addition to the limitations provided under the
CrPC, or any other law for the time being in
force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal
approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS
Act is indeed uncalled for.” [emphasis added]
14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable
grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1)
of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible
and grounds for the Court to believe that the
accused person is not guilty of the alleged
offence. For arriving at any such conclusion,
such facts and circumstances must exist in a
case that can persuade the Court to believe
that the accused person would not have
committed such an offence. Dove-tailed with
the aforesaid satisfaction is an additional
consideration that the accused person is
unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
15. We may clarify that at the stage of
examining an application for bail in the
17 2024:HHC:9713
context of the Section 37 of the Act, the Court
is not required to record a finding that the
accused person is not guilty. The Court is also
not expected to weigh the evidence for arriving
at a finding as to whether the accused has
committed an offence under the NDPS Act or
not. The entire exercise that the Court is
expected to undertake at this stage is for the
limited purpose of releasing him on bail. Thus,
the focus is on the availability of reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the offences that he has been
charged with and he is unlikely to commit an
offence under the Act while on bail.”
21. In view of the above, there is nothing on the
record to give an occasion for this Court to hold that the
twin conditions, as enumerated in Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, are in favour of the applicant, in the present case.
22. So far as the argument of the learned counsel
appearing for the applicant, qua the fact that no
contraband has been recovered from the possession of the
applicant, is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a
recent decision, in case, titled as Union of India through
Narcotics Control Bureau, Lucknow versus Md. Nawaz
Khan, reported in (2021) 10 Supreme Court Cases 100,
has elaborately discussed the term ‘conscious possession’.
The relevant paras 25 and 26 of the judgment are
reproduced, as under:
18 2024:HHC:9713
“25. We shall deal with each of these
circumstances in turn. The respondent has been
accused of an offence under Section 8 of the NDPS
Act, which is punishable under Sections 21, 27-A,
29, 60(3) of the said Act. Section 8 of the Act
prohibits a person from possessing any narcotic
drug or psychotropic substance. The concept of
possession recurs in Sections 20 to 22, which
provide for punishment for offences under the Act.
In Madan Lal v. State of H.P. [Madan Lal v. State
of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664]
this Court held that : (SCC p. 472, paras 19-23 &
26)
“19. Whether there was conscious
possession has to be determined with
reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the
evidence on record are that all the
accused persons were travelling in a
vehicle and as noted by the trial court
they were known to each other and it
has not been explained or shown as to
how they travelled together from the
same destination in a vehicle which was
not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of
contraband articles an offence. Section
20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act
which relates to offences for possession
of such articles. It is submitted that in
order to make the possession illicit, there
must be a conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the
possession was coupled with the
requisite mental element i.e. conscious
possession and not mere custody
without awareness of the nature of such
possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a
polymorphous term which assumes
different colours in different contexts. It
may carry different meanings in
contextually different backgrounds. It is
impossible, as was observed in Supt. &
19 2024:HHC:9713
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. &
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4
SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] to work
out a completely logical and precise
definition of “possession” uniform[ly]
applicable to all situations in the context
of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means
awareness about a particular fact. It is a
state of mind which is deliberate or
intended.
***
26. Once possession is established, the
person who claims that it was not a
conscious possession has to establish it,
because how he came to be in
possession is within his special
knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a
statutory recognition of this position
because of the presumption available in
law. Similar is the position in terms of
Section 54 where also presumption is
available to be drawn from possession
of illicit articles.”
26. What amounts to “conscious possession” was
also considered in Dharampal Singh v. State of
Punjab [Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2010) 9 SCC 608 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1431] ,
where it was held that the knowledge of
possession of contraband has to be gleaned from
the facts and circumstances of a case. The
standard of conscious possession would be
different in case of a public transport vehicle with
several persons as opposed to a private vehicle
with a few persons known to one another. In
Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Mohan Lal v.
State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222 : (2015) 3
SCC (Cri) 881] , this Court also observed that the
term “possession” could mean physical possession
with animus; custody over the prohibited
substances with animus; exercise of dominion and
control as a result of concealment; or personal
knowledge as to the existence of the contraband
and the intention based on this knowledge.”
20 2024:HHC:9713
23. In the light of the aforesaid decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the argument of the learned
counsel for the applicant, that nothing has been recovered
from the possession of the applicant, is devoid of merit and
the same is accordingly rejected.
24. The another ground, upon which, the relief of
bail, has been sought, by the applicant, in that the
investigation, in the present case, is complete and in the
trial, pending against him, before the learned trial Court,
out of 24 prosecution witnesses, 19 witnesses have been
examined. According to him, the conclusion of the trial,
against him, will take sufficient long time, as such, no
useful purpose would be served, by keeping him, in the
judicial custody, for indefinite period.
25. FIR, in the present case, has been registered on
15th July, 2022 and the police has submitted the challan,
before the learned trial Court. Thereafter, charges have
been framed against the accused persons. Since, out of 24
prosecution witnesses, 17 witnesses have already been
examined and the case has now been fixed for 30 th
November, 2024, for recording the statements of remaining
21 2024:HHC:9713
7 witnesses. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can
be said that there is any delay in the trial.
26. Considering all these facts, there is nothing on
the file, on the basis of which, it can be said, at this stage,
that the applicant has not committed the offence or while
on bail, he will not commit any offence. As such, no case
to pass any order in favour of the applicant, under Section
483 of the BNSS, is made out. Consequently, the bail
application is dismissed.
27. Any of the observations, made herein above,
shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the
merits of the case, as these observations, are confined,
only, to the disposal of the present bail application.
( Virender Singh )
Judge
October 15, 2024
( rajni )
Digitally signed by RAJNI
Date: 2024.10.15 15:06:48 IST