Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 21.11.2024 vs Rajesh Kumar Alias Raju on 29 November, 2024
Author: Vivek Singh Thakur
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur
2024:HHC:12713-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 4021 of 2013
Reserved on: 21.11.2024
Date of Decision: 29.11.2024
State of Himachal Pradesh …Appellant.
Versus
Rajesh Kumar alias Raju ...Respondent.
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellant/State: Mr. Pawan K. Nadda, Additional
Advocate General.
For the Respondent : Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate,
with Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 17.01.2013 passed by learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court,
Shimla, District Shimla (learned Trial Court) vide which the
respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘ND&PS
Act’). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as
they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal
are that ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8), HC Yashwant Singh, HC Manoj
Kumar (PW6), Constable Anil Kumar, Constable Pawan Kumar and
Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) left Shimla on 16.06.2011 towards
Rohru, Jubbal etc for patrolling. They were patrolling on Tiuni,
Hatkoti road towards Tiuni on 16.06.2011 at about 4:30 PM at a
lonely place when they saw the accused coming towards them. The
accused returned after seeing the police party and tried to throw
away the bag (Ext.P3). The police apprehended him based on
suspicion. The police checked the bag and found black sticks
(Ext.P4) inside the bag. ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) checked the
sticks and found them to be charas. The place was lonely and
deserted and no independent witness could be found despite
efforts; hence, ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) associated HC Yashwant
Singh and HC Manoj Kumar (PW6) as witnesses. He enquired about
the name and address of the accused who revealed his name as
Rajesh, resident of Uttrakhand. The police weighed the charas with
the help of a weighing scale and found its weight to be 3 kg 250
grams. The charas was put in the bag. The bag was put in a cloth
parcel (Ext.P2) and the parcel was sealed with seven impressions of
seal ‘T’. ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) searched the accused and found
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a purse (Ext.P7) containing currency notes worth ₹260/- (Ext.P8),
passport-size photographs (Ext.P9) and a Nokia mobile (Ext.P6).
These were put in another parcel (Ext.P5) and the parcel was sealed
with five impressions of seal ‘T’. NCB-1 Form (Ext.PW8/A) was
filled in triplicate. A seal impression was put on the Form. The
sample seal (Ext.PW8/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth and
the seal was handed over to HC Yashwant Singh after the use. The
parcel was seized vide memo (Ext. PW6/A). Rukka (Ext.PW8/C) was
prepared and handed over to Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) along
with the case property with the directions to carry it to Police
Station Jubbal. ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) conducted the
investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW8/D) and recorded
the statements of witnesses as per their version. He arrested the
accused vide memo (Ext.PW8/E). The case property and the rukka
were produced before ASI Rikhi Ram (PW5) who was officiating as
SHO at Police Station Jubbal. He got the FIR (Ext.PW4/A) registered
based on the rukka. He put the parcel containing charas in another
parcel and sealed the outer parcel with three seals of seal
impression ‘R’. He filled the relevant columns of the NCB-1 Form
and put the seal impression on the form. He issued a certificate
(Ext.PW5/A). He obtained the seal impression (Ext.PW5/B) on a
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separate piece of cloth. He handed over the case property, sample
seals and other documents to Head Constable Pyare Lal (PW4) who
made an entry in the register No. 19 at Sl. No. 265 (Ext.PW4/B) and
deposited the case property in Malkhana. He handed over the
parcel containing charas to Constable Jagdeep Singh (PW1) on
18.06.2011 along with the documents, and sample seal with a
direction to carry them to SFSL, Junga vide R.C. No. 14/11
(Ext.PW4/C). Constable Jagdeep (PW1) deposited all the articles at
SFSL, Junga and handed over the receipt to HC Piyare Lal (PW4). A
special report (Ext.PW3/A) was prepared on 17.06.2011 which was
handed over to LC Babita (PW2) with the direction to carry it to
SDPO Rohru. LC Babita (PW2) handed over the special report to
Constable Kedar Singh (PW3) Assistant Reader to SDPO, Rohru. He
endorsed one copy and handed it over to LC Babita. He produced
the second copy before SDPO, Rohru, who made the endorsement
on the same. Constable Kedar Singh (PW3) made an entry in the
register (Ext.PW3/A) and retained the special report on record. The
result of analysis (Ext.PW5/C) was issued in which it was shown
that the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas
which contained 30.50 per cent w/w resin in it. The statements of
the remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version and
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after the completion of the investigation the challan was prepared
and presented before learned Sessions Judge Shimla, who assigned
it to learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Shimla
(learned Trial Court).
3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the
ND&PS Act to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to
be tried.
4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its
case. Constable Jagdeep Singh (PW1) carried the case property to
SFSL Junga. LC Babita (PW2) carried the special report to Dy.
Superintendent of Police, Rohru. Constable Kedar Singh (PW3) was
working as an Assistant Reader to SDPO Rohru. Head Constable
Piyare Lal (PW4) was officiating as MHC with whom the case
property was deposited. ASI Rikhi Ram (PW5) was officiating as
SHO in Police Station, Jubbal who resealed the parcels and signed
the FIR. HC Manoj (PW6) and Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) are the
official witnesses to recovery. ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) effected
the recovery and conducted the initial investigation.
5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He stated
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that he was innocent and police planted a false case upon him. He
was taken to the Police Station from his house. He did not lead any
defence evidence.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the recovery was
effected from the Bag and there was no requirement to associate
independent witnesses. However, the Court has to see the
testimonies of official witnesses with due care and caution. There
were many discrepancies in the statements of official witnesses.
The incident had taken place near a heavily populated area and no
independent witness was associated. This made the prosecution
case doubtful. The special report was handed over to Assistant
Reader who claimed that he had produced it before SDPO Rohru.
However, there is no endorsement regarding this fact in the special
report and it was highly doubtful that the report was produced
before SDPO. The Investigating Officer had only prepared the
NCB-1 Form and the arrest memo. The witnesses were unable to
tell who had prepared the other documents. All these
circumstances made the prosecution case highly suspect and it was
difficult to rely upon the prosecution case. Consequently, the
accused was acquitted.
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7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting
that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the
material on record in its proper perspective. Learned Trial Court
had set unrealistic standards to evaluate the direct and cogent
prosecution evidence. The reasoning of the learned Trial Court is
unreasonable and unsustainable. The testimonies of official
witnesses were discarded without any reason. There was no
evidence of any enmity between the police and the accused. Minor
discrepancies do not affect the prosecution case and learned Trial
Court erred in acquitting the accused based on minor
discrepancies. A huge quantity of 3.250 kgs of charas was recovered
from the accused. The accused was found at a lonely and deserted
place and it was not possible to associate any independent witness.
The members of the police team stated that particular documents
were scribed by the Investigating Officer and the remaining
documents were scribed by one or other member of the team. The
failure to mention the name of the scribe of other documents is not
fatal. The discrepancies were bound to come with time. Therefore,
it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
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8. The Division Bench of this Court held vide judgment
dated 16.07.2013 that the report of the analysis issued by SFSL,
Junga was not sufficient to prove that the substance recovered by
the police was charas. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of
Sunil Kumar versus State of H.P. Latest HLJ (2010) HP, 207 and other
judgments. Hence, the appeal was allowed and the accused was
acquitted.
9. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by this
Court, the State filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the judgment of Sunil
Kumar (supra) was not a good law, in view of the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hira Singh versus Union of India (2020)
SCC Online SC 382; hence, the matter was remitted to this Court for
a fresh decision.
10. We have head Mr Pawan K. Nadda, learned Additional
Advocate General for the appellant-State and Mr Ajay Kochhar,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr Vivek Sharma, learned
counsel for the respondent/accused.
11. Mr. Pawan K. Nadda, learned Additional Advocate
General for the appellant-State submitted that the learned Trial
Court erred in rejecting the testimonies of official witnesses. They
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2024:HHC:12713-DB
had consistently stated about the apprehension of the accused and
recovery of 3.250 kgs of charas. The police could not have planted
such a huge quantity upon the accused. There was no evidence of
any enmity between the accused and the police. It was a case of
chance recovery and there was no requirement to associate
independent witnesses. Learned Trial Court erred in holding that
the police officials were under an obligation to associate
independent witnesses from a distance of more than ½ km away;
therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the
judgment passed by learned Trial Court be set aside.
12. Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Advocate for the
respondent/accused submitted that the contradictions in the
testimonies of the police officials are not minor and learned Trial
Court had rightly held that these are fatal to the prosecution case.
The contradictions highlighted by the learned Trial Court showed
that police officials modulated their version to support the
prosecution case. It is highly unlikely that the witnesses were not
aware of the name of the person who had prepared the various
documents except the NCB-1 Form and arrest memo. This shows
that the memories of the witnesses were not trustworthy or they
were not present on the spot, both of these possibilities are fatal to
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2024:HHC:12713-DB
the prosecution case. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable
view while deciding the matter and this Court should not substitute
its view merely because an alternative view is possible. Therefore,
he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
13. We have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
14. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of
acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544: 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 130 that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High
Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated on
record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is illegal or
affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether the view
taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, which could have been
taken based on the material on record. The Court will not lightly
interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was observed:
“25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the
scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the
foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of
criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The
presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally
culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The
presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case
ends in acquittal. It is so because once the trial court, on
11
2024:HHC:12713-DBappreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the
accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened
and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in
appeal.
26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal and
there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in
the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the
High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record.
However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order
under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost
question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly
appreciated the evidence on record and gave due
consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second
point for consideration is whether the finding of the trial
court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not,
the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial
court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not
meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What
is required is an illegality or perversity.
27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a
criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The
“two-views theory” has been judicially recognised by the
courts and it comes into play when the appreciation of
evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the
controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For,
the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of
the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in
the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the
presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are
possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the
accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also
settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of
acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court
to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such
a course is permissible, it would make it practically
impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the
law.
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28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka [Selvaraj v. State of
Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19]: (SCC pp.
236-37, para 13)
“13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and
on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view,
the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus,
the High Court should not have interfered with the
judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M.
Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N.,
(2002) 9 SCC 639: 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down that
as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court
while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not
permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High
Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by
this Court, thus : (SCC p. 643, para 9)
‘9. … We are constrained to observe that the High Court
was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was
required to deal with various grounds on which
acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds.
It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing
with appeals against acquittal have been overlooked by
the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the
trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none
has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the
order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The
view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable
view and even if by any stretch of imagination, it could
be said that another view was possible, that was not a
ground sound enough to set aside an order of
acquittal.'”
29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6
SCC 294: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522], the Hon’ble Supreme Court
analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the
approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal
from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297,
para 7)
“7. It is well settled that:
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7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the
reasons which had weighed with the trial court in
acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the
appellate court is of the view that the acquittal
rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned
(see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay
Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] and Anwar Ali v. State of
H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ).
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the
normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter
gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State
of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR 1955 SC 807]).
7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on
record, the appellate court must be extremely slow
in interfering with the appeal against acquittal
(see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v.
State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412: 1998 SCC (Cri)
1320]).”
15. This position was reiterated in Ramesh v. State of
Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2581 wherein it
was observed at page 175:
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC
415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], regarding the power of the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal against a
judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: (SCC p. 432,
para 42)
“42. … (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of
14
2024:HHC:12713-DBsuch power and an appellate court on the evidence before
it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”,
“very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail
extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal
than to curtail the power of the court to review the
evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that
in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused
having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court.”
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajendra Prasad v.
State of Bihar, (1977) 2 SCC 205: 1977 SCC (Cri) 308], a three-
judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be
essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal,
to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record
for discarding the reasons of the trial court in order to be
able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It
was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it
would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a
contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is
absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds
it well-nigh impossible for the trial court to reject their
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testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice.”
16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
17. In the present case the police had not associated any
independent witness as it was a case of chance recovery. Learned
Trial Court held that the police were under an obligation to
associate independent witnesses from lower Kuddu village. This
finding cannot be sustained. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh Versus State of Punjab 1999 (1)
SCC 130 that the police party is under no obligation to join
independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty and the
association of any person after effecting the recovery would be
meaningless. It was observed:
“3. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through
the evidence recorded by the prosecution as also the
judgment under appeal. Except for the comment that the
prosecution is supported by two police officials and not by
any independent witness, no other comment against the
prosecution is otherwise offered. This comment is not of any
value since the police party was on patrolling duty and they
were not required to take along independent witnesses to
support recovery if and when made. It has come in the
evidence of ASI Jangir Singh that after the recovery had been
effected, some people had passed by. Even so, obtaining
their counter-signatures on the documents already prepared
16
2024:HHC:12713-DBwould not have lent any further credence to the prosecution
version.”
18. In similar circumstances, it was laid down by this Court
in Chet Ram Vs State Criminal Appeal no. 151/2006 decided on
25.7.2018 that when the accused was apprehended after he tried to
flee on seeing the police, there was no necessity to associate any
person from the nearby village. It was observed:-
“(A)appellant was intercepted and search of his bag was
conducted on suspicion, when he turned back and tried to
flee, on seeing the police. Police officials did not have any
prior information nor did they have any reason to believe
that he was carrying any contraband. They overpowered
him when he tried to run away and suspected that he might
be carrying some contraband in his bag. Therefore, the bag
was searched and charas was recovered. After the recovery of
Charas, there was hardly any need to associate any person from
the nearby village, because there remained nothing to be
witnessed.
It is by now well settled that non-association of independent
witnesses or non-supporting of the prosecution version, by
independent witnesses where they are associated, by itself is
not a ground to acquit an accused. It is also well-settled
that the testimony of official witnesses, including police
officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony
of any other person. The only difference is that Courts have
to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of
official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false
implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is
specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while
scrutinizing the evidence of official witnesses, in a case
where independent witnesses are not associated,
contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of such
witnesses are required to be taken into account and given
due weightage, unless satisfactorily explained. Of course, it
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is only the material contradictions and not the trivial ones,
which assume significance.” (Emphasis supplied)
19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557 : (2023) 2 SCC (Cri)
230: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869 that non-association of the
independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case.
However, the Court will have to scrutinize the statements of
prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed a page 566:
“(C) Need for independent witnesses
19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent
witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution case. [Kalpnath
Rai v. State, (1997) 8 SCC 732: 1998 SCC (Cri) 134: AIR 1998 SC
201, para 9] However, such omissions cast an added duty on
courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinising
the testimonies of the police officers, which if found reliable
can form the basis of a successful conviction.”
20. This position was reiterated in Rizwan Khan v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 730, wherein, it
was observed at page 633:
“12. It is settled law that the testimony of the official
witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non-
corroboration by independent witness. As observed and held
by this Court in catena of decisions, examination of
independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement
and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution case [see Pardeep Kumar [State of H.P. v. Pardeep
Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 420] ].
13. In the recent decision in Surinder Kumar v. State of
Punjab [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767], while considering somewhat similar
18
2024:HHC:12713-DBsubmission of non-examination of independent witnesses,
while dealing with the offence under the NDPS Act, in paras
15 and 16, this Court observed and held as under : (SCC p.
568)
“15. The judgment in Jarnail Singh v. State of
Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521 :
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1191], relied on by the counsel for the
respondent State also supports the case of the
prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has
held that merely because the prosecution did not examine
any independent witness, would not necessarily lead to a
conclusion that the accused was falsely implicated. The
evidence of official witnesses cannot be distrusted and
disbelieved, merely on account of their official status.
16. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [State (NCT of
Delhi) v. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248], it was
held as under : (SCC p. 655)
‘It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer
should be approached with initial distrust. It is time
now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions
and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the
court cannot start with the presumption that the
police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of
law, the presumption should be the other way around.
That official acts of the police have been regularly
performed is a wise principle of presumption and
recognised even by the legislature.'”
21. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Balwinder Singh
& Anr. Vs State of H.P., 2020 Criminal L.J. 1684, wherein it was held:-
“3. (iii) Learned defence counsel, contended that in the
instant case, no independent witness was associated by the
Investigating Officer, therefore, the prosecution case cannot
be said to have been proved by it in accordance with
provisions of the Act. Learned defence counsel, in support of
his contention, relied upon titled Krishan Chand versus State
of H.P.,2017 4 CriCC 531
3(iii)(d). It is by now well settled that prosecution case
19
2024:HHC:12713-DBcannot be disbelieved only because the independent
witnesses were not associated.”
22. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of
Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223, wherein it was
held at page 204: –
“17. The issue raised regarding conviction solely relying
upon the testimony of police witnesses, without procuring
any independent witness, recorded by the two courts, has
also been dealt with by this Court in Surinder Kumar
[Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 767] holding that merely because independent wit-
nesses were not examined, the conclusion could not be
drawn that the accused was falsely implicated. Therefore,
the said issue is also well settled and in particular, looking at
the facts of the present case, when the conduct of the ac-
cused was found suspicious and a chance recovery from the
vehicle used by him is made from a public place and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant cannot avail any
benefit on this issue. In our view, the concurrent findings of
the courts do not call for interference..”
23. A similar view was taken in Kehar Singh v. State of H.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine HP 2825 wherein it was observed:
16. As regards non-association of the independent
witnesses, it is now well settled that non-association of the
independent witnesses or non-supporting of the
prosecution version by independent witnesses itself is not a
ground for acquittal of Appellants/accused. It is also well
settled that the testimonies of the official witnesses,
including police officials carry the same evidentiary value as
the testimony of any other person. The only difference is
that the Court has to be most circumspect while appreciating
the evidence of the official witnesses to rule out the
possibility of false implication of the accused, especially
when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence.
20
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Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of the official
witnesses, in cases where independent witnesses are not
associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of such witnesses are required to be taken into
account and given due weightage, unless satisfactorily
explained. However, the contradiction must be material and
not trivial one, that alone would assume significance.
17. Evidently, this is a case of chance recovery, therefore, the
police party was under no obligation to join independent
witnesses while going on patrolling duty and the association
of any person after effecting the recovery would be
meaningless.
Xxxx
19. A similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment
rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Avtar @
Tarri v. State of H.P., (2022) Supreme HP 345, wherein it was
observed as under: —
“24. As regards the second leg of the argument raised by
learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be said to be
of much relevance in the given facts of the case. The fact
situation was that the police party had laid the ‘nakka’
and immediately thereafter had spotted the appellant at
some distance, who got perplexed and started walking
back. The conduct of the appellant was sufficient to raise
suspicion in the minds of police officials. At that stage,
had the appellant not been apprehended immediately,
police could have lost the opportunity to recover the
contraband. Looking from another angle, the relevance of
independent witnesses could be there, when such
witnesses were immediately available or had already been
associated at the place of ‘nakka’. These, however, are
not mandatory conditions and will always depend on the
fact situation of each and every case. The reason is that
once the person is apprehended and is with police, a
subsequent association of independent witnesses, may
not be of much help. In such events, the manipulation, if
any, cannot be ruled out.”
Xxxx
21
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22. A similar reiteration of law can be found in a very recent
judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. A. No.
202 of 2020, titled Dillo Begum v. State of H.P., decided on
27.03.2024.”
24. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of this Court
and Hon’ble Supreme Court, the non-association of independent
witnesses is not fatal and the prosecution case cannot be discarded
due to the non-association of independent witnesses. However,
the Court will have to carefully scrutinize the testimonies of the
police officials.
25. It was a specific case of the prosecution as mentioned in
the rukka (Ext.PW8/C), FIR (Ext.PW4/A) and the special report
(Ext.PW3/A) that the police party started from Shimla on
16.06.2011. However, the police officials changed this version in the
Court. HC Manoj Kumar (PW6) and Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7)
stated in their cross-examination that they went by Bus to Rohru
from Shimla on 15.06.2011. Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) stated in
his cross-examination that they went by bus from Shimla to Rohru
on 15.06.2011. ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) stated in his
examination-in-chief that the police party started from Shimla on
a bus and stayed at Rohru on 15.06.2011. It is apparent from the
statements of the police officials that they have changed their
initial version as recorded in the rukka and the FIR that they had
22
2024:HHC:12713-DB
started from Shimla on 16.06.2011 and had apprehended the
accused on the date of their departure from Shimla. This assumes
significance in view of the statement of ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8)
in the cross-examination that they started from Jubbal at 9 AM
and reached Shimla at 10 PM which shows that it took more than 12
hours to cover the distance between Jubbal and Shimla; thus, they
could not have travelled from Shimla on 16.06.2011 and
apprehended the accused at 4:30 PM on the same day. Hence, they
changed the date of their departure to suit the prosecution case. It
was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Badri v. State of
Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 442: 1976 SCC (Cri) 60 that where a witness
can modulate his version to suit the prosecution case, his
testimony is suspect. It was observed at page 448:
“19…. The trial court has noted that Patram was “compelled
to change his version a little” because of the doctor’s
opinion after the post-mortem examination was held on the
spot the following morning. If a witness, who is the only
witness against the accused to prove a serious charge of
murder, can modulate his evidence to suit a particular
prosecution theory for the deliberate purpose of securing a
conviction, such a witness cannot be considered a reliable
person and no conviction can be based on his sole
testimony.”
26. Therefore, the testimonies of the official witnesses
were highly suspect and the learned Trial Court had rightly
observed that it was essential to produce the entry in the daily
23
2024:HHC:12713-DB
diary to explain the change in the date in the statements of the
official witnesses.
27. Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) stated in his
examination-in-chief that they started from Police Station, Rohru
on 16.06.2011 at 11:00 AM and went towards Sawara Kainchi road.
They went towards the Kuddu barrier and reached at the spot at
about 4 PM. He explained in his cross-examination that they
stayed at Hatkoti for more than two hours and Sawara Kainchi for
half an hour. HC Manoj Kumar (PW6) has not mentioned the time
of departure or the place of stay at Rohru. He simply stated that
they started from Rohru on a bus, stayed at Hatkoti for one hour
and thereafter went to Kuddu. ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) stated
that they conducted patrolling at Rohru Bazar. They went to
Hatkoti and remained at Hatkoti for about one hour and thereafter
went towards Kuddu. They went towards Tiuni on foot.
28. These statements show that the prosecution witnesses
have tried to explain the time spent by them before reaching the
spot in different manners. These witnesses consistently stated
about their halt at Hatkoti but they gave different times of their
stay at Hatkoti. They have also given a different version regarding
what transpired before they went towards Hatkoti. ASI Yoginder
24
2024:HHC:12713-DB
Singh (PW8) stated that they patrolled Rohru Bazaar whereas
Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) stated that they went from Police
Station Rohru at 11 AM. He tried to cover the distance by expanding
the time spent at Hatkoti and also created a halt at Sawra Kainchi.
The statements of the prosecution witnesses show that they gave
different versions regarding the time spent before the incident.
29. HC Manoj (PW6) stated in his cross-examination that
the parcel was prepared on the spot. He admitted that the parcel
(Ext.P2) was stitched by a machine from two sides. He further
stated that he could not name the words and the details on the
parcel or who had put the FIR number on the parcel. The police
party was not carrying any sewing machines. Constable Rajiv
Kumar (PW7) also stated in his cross-examination that the police
party did not carry any sewing machine. He did not know who had
mentioned the words and details on the parcel or the FIR number
on the parcel.
30. Thus, it is admitted that the police party was not
carrying any sewing machine with them. The police officials also
admitted that the parcel was machine stitched from two sides. No
explanation was given by the police official as to how the parcel
could have been machine stitched on the spot without any sewing
25
2024:HHC:12713-DB
machine. This shows that either the parcel was already lying with
the police official or the proceedings were not conducted on the
spot and the testimonies of the police officials regarding the fact
that the proceedings were conducted on the spot is highly suspect.
It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. vs Nand Lal Latest HLJ
2018(1) (HP) 388: 2018 (1) Him L.R. 506 that when a parcel was
stated to be prepared on the spot but it was machine stitched, it
made the prosecution case doubtful. The Court speaking through
one of us (Vivek Singh Thakur J) observed:
“36. There is another flaw in prosecution evidence as when
the parcel was shown to PW-8 in the Court, he admitted that
the same was found to be stitched on two sides with a sewing
machine and with a hand only on one side, indicating that
the said parcel was prepared with the help of sewing
machine, which could be possible only in the shop of a tailor
but not on the spot as there was no tailor available on the
spot. It also falsified the story of prosecution regarding
preparation of cloth parcel and seizure of contraband on the
spot.”
31. It was specifically mentioned in the rukka that the
charas was weighed with the help of the weighing scale with a
weight of 500-50 grams. A simple calculation shows that 3.250 kgs
of charas can be weighted in 11 lots (500×6 + 5×50). HC Manoj
Kumar (PW6) stated in his cross-examination that charas was
weighed with the help of a traditional scale in six lots. Constable
Rajiv Kumar (PW7) stated that charas was weighed in 3-4 lots. The
26
2024:HHC:12713-DB
statements of these witnesses do not show how it was possible to
weigh 3.250 kgs of charas in 3 to 4 lots or 6 lots with weights of 500
and 50 grams. This also shows that the testimonies of the police
officials regarding the proceedings having been conducted on the
spot are highly suspect or the memories of the police officials are
not trustworthy.
32. ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) stated in his cross-
examination that except for the NCB-1 Form and arrest memo, all
other documents including the sample seal, and writing on the
parcel are not in his hand. He did not remember who had written
those documents. He had not filled the FIR number in any of the
documents or the statements. Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) stated
in his cross-examination that he was not aware of who had put the
FIR number on the parcel or other documents. He did not
remember whether the Investigating Officer had completed the
formalities on the spot or whether the seizure memo was prepared
in his presence or not. HC Manoj Kumar (PW6) stated in his cross-
examination that the statements of Yashwant and Rajiv Kumar are
not in the handwriting of the ASI. He denied that all the documents
were prepared at the Police Station. He did not know who put the
FIR number on the various documents.
27
2024:HHC:12713-DB
33. The ignorance of the witnesses regarding all of the
documents except the NCB-1 Form and the arrest memo fortifies
the conclusion that the memories of the police officials cannot be
trusted or the investigation was not conducted in their presence.
The fact that Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) stated that the seizure
memo was not prepared in his presence shows that he cannot be
called to be a witness to the seizure memo.
34. ASI Rikhi Ram (PW7) stated in his examination-in-
chief that the accused was apprehended at an isolated place, hence
no independent witness was available. He stated in his cross-
examination that he did not send any police official to nearby
village or locality to arrange for independent witnesses. Constable
Rajiv Kumar (PW7) and HC Manoj (PW6) also stated in their cross-
examination that no efforts were made to join any independent
witness. This is contrary to the prosecution case as unfolded in
rukka (Ext.PW8/C) where it was mentioned that no independent
witness could be found despite efforts ( बबावजजद पपरयबास). This shows
that a wrong statement was made in the rukka that efforts were
made to join independent witnesses whereas no such efforts were
made.
28
2024:HHC:12713-DB
35. ASI Yoginder Singh (PW8) stated in his cross-
examination that they reached Police Station Jubbal at 11:15 PM and
stayed in the private houses known to the police official. They
started from Jubbal at 9 AM and reached Shimla at 10 PM.
Constable Rajiv Kumar (PW7) stated in his cross-examination that
they returned from Shimla to Jubbal on 17.06.2011. Even though the
report was entered regarding their departure on 16.06.2011. They
could not return on 16.06.2011 because there was no bus service
during the night time. They stayed at different places and boarded
a bus on 17.06.2011. They returned to Shimla after conducting
patrolling at different places. He did not remember the time of
their arrival at Shimla. HC Manoj (PW6) stated that they returned
from Jubbal to Shimla on 17.06.2011 in the morning.
36. Thus, it is apparent that the prosecution witnesses have
given different versions regarding the circumstances surrounding
the recovery. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577: 2003 SCC
OnLine SC 756 that the evidence of the prosecution must be tested
for its inherent consistency: consistency with the account of other
witnesses and consistency with undisputed facts. It was observed:
“21. …. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of
justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of
29
2024:HHC:12713-DBthe trial process. Eyewitnesses’ accounts would require a
careful independent assessment and evaluation for its
credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making
any other evidence, including the medical evidence, as the
sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence
must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent
probability of the story; consistency with the account of
other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with
the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the witnesses; their
performance in the witness box; their power of observation
etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes
eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative
evaluation.”
37. It was held in David Piper vs. Mark Hales 2013 EWHC B1
(QB) that the Court has to see whether the statement of the witness
is consistent or not. It was observed: –
34. The guidance about how courts approach this is given in
the extra-judicial writing of the late Lord Bingham of
Cornhill approved by the courts is apposite. In “The Judge as
Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues” published
in “The Business of Judging”, Oxford 2000, reprinted from
Current Legal Problems, vol 38, 1985 p 1-27, he wrote:
“. . . Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue
substantially affecting the outcome of an action, often
knowing that a decision this way or that will have
momentous consequences on the parties’ lives or
fortunes, how can and should the judge set about his
task of resolving it? How is he to resolve which
witness is honest and which dishonest, which reliable
and which unreliable?
The normal first step in resolving issues of primary
fact is, I feel sure, to add to what is common ground
between the parties (which the pleadings in the action
should have identified, but often do not) such facts as
are shown to be incontrovertible. In many cases,
letters or minutes written well before there was any
30
2024:HHC:12713-DBbreath of dispute between the parties may throw a
very clear light on their knowledge and intentions at a
particular time. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks,
debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To
attach importance to matters such as these, which are
independent of human recollection, is so obvious and
standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable,
that no prolonged discussion is called for. It is
nonetheless worth bearing in mind, when vexatious
conflicts of oral testimony arise, that these fall to be
judged against the background not only of what the
parties agree to have happened but also of what
plainly did happen, even though the parties do not
agree.
The most compendious statement known to me of the
judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of
an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech
of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v
Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at p 431. In this, he
touches on so many of the matters which I wish to
mention that I may perhaps be forgiven for citing the
relevant passage in full:
”Credibility’ involves wider problems than mere
‘demeanour’ which is mostly concerned with
whether the witness appears to be telling the
truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility
covers the following problems. First, is the
witness a truthful or untruthful person?
Secondly, is he, though a truthful person telling
something less than the truth on this issue, or
though an untruthful person, telling the truth
on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful
person telling the truth as he sees it, did he
register the intentions of the conversation
correctly and, if so has his memory correctly
retained them? Also, has his recollection been
subsequently altered by unconscious bias or
wishful thinking or by over much discussion of
it with others? Witnesses, especially those who
31
2024:HHC:12713-DBare emotional, and who think that they are
morally in the right, tend very easily and
unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that
did not exist. It is a truism, often used in
accident cases, that with every day that passes
the memory becomes fainter and the
imagination becomes more active. For that
reason, a witness, however honest, rarely
persuades a Judge that his present recollection is
preferable to that which was taken down in
writing immediately after the accident occurred.
Therefore, contemporary documents are always
of the utmost importance. And lastly, although
the honest witness believes he heard or saw this
or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance
more likely that he was mistaken? On this point,
it is essential that the balance of probability is
put correctly into the scales in weighing the
credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect
of probability. All these problems
compendiously are entailed when a Judge
assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all
part of one judicial process. And in the process,
contemporary documents and admitted or
incontrovertible facts and probabilities must
play their proper part.”
Every judge is familiar with cases in which the conflict
between the accounts of different witnesses is so gross
as to be inexplicable save on the basis that one or some
of the witnesses are deliberately giving evidence
which they know to be untrue . . .. more often
dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the
hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or
misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. The
main tests needed to determine whether a witness is
lying or not are, I think, the following, although their
relative importance will vary widely from case to case:
32
2024:HHC:12713-DB
(1) the consistency of the witness’s evidence
with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other
evidence, to have occurred;
(2) the internal consistency of the witness’s
evidence;
(3) consistency with what the witness has said
or deposed on other occasions;
(4) the credit of the witness in relation to
matters not germane to the litigation;
(5) the demeanour of the witness.
The first three of these tests may in general be
regarded as giving a useful pointer to where the truth
lies. If a witness’s evidence conflicts with what is
clearly shown to have occurred or is internally self-
contradictory, or conflicts with what the witness has
previously said, it may usually be regarded as suspect.
It may only be unreliable, and not dishonest, but the
nature of the case may effectively rule out that
possibility.
The fourth test is perhaps more arguable. . . .”
35. The following guidance of Lord Goff in Grace Shipping
v. Sharp & Co [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Law Rep. 207 at 215-6 is also
helpful.
“And it is not to be forgotten that, in the present case,
the Judge was faced with the task of assessing the
evidence of witnesses about telephone conversations
which had taken place over five years before. In such a
case, memories may very well be unreliable; and it is
of crucial importance for the Judge to have regard to
the contemporary documents and the overall
probabilities. In this connection, their Lordships wish
to endorse a passage from a judgment of one of their
number in Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas S.A. (The Ocean
Frost), [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, when he said at p. 57: –
“Speaking from my own experience, I have found it
essential in cases of fraud, when considering the
credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by
33
2024:HHC:12713-DBreference to the objective facts proved independently
of their testimony, in particular by reference to the
documents in the case, and also to pay particular
regard to their motives and the overall probabilities. It
is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is
telling the truth or not; and where there is a conflict of
evidence such as there was in the present case,
reference to the objective facts and documents, to
the witnesses’ motives, and the overall probabilities,
can be of very great assistance to a Judge in
ascertaining the truth.” [emphases added].
That observation is, in their Lordships’ opinion, equally
apposite in a case where the evidence of the witnesses is
likely to be unreliable; and it is to be remembered that in
commercial cases, such as the present, there is usually a
substantial body of contemporary documentary evidence.”
In that context, he was impressed by a witness described in
the following terms.
“Although like the other main witnesses, his evidence
was a mixture of reconstruction and original
recollection, he took considerable trouble to
distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent
which I found convincing and reliable.”
That is so important, and so infrequently done.”
36. This approach to fact-finding was amplified recently
by Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal in Wetton (as
Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v. Ahmed and others [2011]
EWCA Civ 610, in paragraphs 11, 12 & 14:
11. By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what
impressed the judge most in his task of fact-finding
was the absence, rather than the presence, of
contemporary documentation or other independent
oral evidence to confirm the oral evidence of the
respondents to the proceedings.
12. There are many situations in which the court is
asked to assess the credibility of witnesses from their
oral evidence, that is to say, to weigh up their evidence
to see whether it is reliable. Witness choice is an
34
2024:HHC:12713-DBessential part of the function of a trial judge and he or
she has to decide whose evidence, and how much
evidence, to accept. This task is not to be carried out
merely by reference to the impression that a witness
made by giving evidence in the witness box. It is not
solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or
other factors that might generally be called the
‘demeanour’ of a witness. The judge should consider
what other independent evidence would be available to
support the witness. Such evidence would generally be
documentary but it could be other oral evidence, for
example, if the issue was whether a defendant was an
employee, the judge would naturally consider whether
there were any PAYE records or evidence, such as
evidence in texts or e-mails, in which the defendant
seeks or is given instructions as to how he should
carry out work. This may be particularly important in
cases where the witness is from a culture or way of life
with which the judge may not be familiar. These
situations can present particular dangers and
difficulties to a judge.
14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written
documentation is of the very greatest importance in
assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant
not only where it is present and the oral evidence can
then be checked against it. It can also be significant if
written documentation is absent. For instance, if the
judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous
documentation is likely to have existed were the oral
evidence correct, and that the party adducing oral
evidence is responsible for its non-production, then
the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence
and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its
absence.
37. Contemporaneity, consistency, probability and motive
are key criteria and more important than demeanour which
can be distorted through the prism of prejudice: how
witnesses present themselves in a cramped witness box
surrounded for the first time with multiple files can be
35
2024:HHC:12713-DB
distorted, particularly elderly ones being asked to remember
minute details of what happened and what was said, and
unrecorded, nearly 4 years later as here. Lengthy witness
statements prepared by the parties’ lawyers long after the
events also distort the accurate picture even though they are
meant to assist the court.”
38. In the present case the statements of the prosecution
witnesses are not consistent. Learned Trial Court had rightly held
that these inconsistencies would assume significance in the
absence of independent witnesses.
39. LC Babita (PW2) stated that she handed over the special
report to Assistant Reader Kedar Singh who returned one copy to
her and submitted another copy to Dy. Superintendent of Police.
Constable Kedar Singh (PW3) stated that he endorsed one of the
copies as a receipt and handed it over to LC Babita (PW2). He placed
another copy before SDPO. The copy of the special report
(Ext.PW3/A) placed on the record shows that it only bears the
endorsement of the Assistant Reader regarding its receipt on
17.06.2011 at 12:25 PM through LC Babita (PW2). It does not contain
any endorsement of the SDPO/Dy.SP. Therefore, the learned Trial
Court had rightly held that there was insufficient compliance with
Section 57 of the ND&PS Act.
40. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the
prosecution case was suspect due to the discrepancies in the
36
2024:HHC:12713-DB
statements of official witnesses and the absence of the
independent witnesses would assume significance in the present
case. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken on the
material placed before the learned Trial Court and this Court will
not interfere with the same even if another view is possible or this
Court would have taken a different view had the matter been tried
before this Court.
41. It was submitted that a huge quantity of charas was
recovered from the accused and the prosecution case should not
have been rejected in the absence of the proof of any enmity. This
submission is only stated to be rejected. The prosecution is
required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt by providing
satisfactory evidence and it cannot insist upon the conviction of a
person merely because the quantity of contraband stated to have
been recovered from the possession of the accused is huge.
42. No other point was urged.
43. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the
same is dismissed.
44. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondent/accused is directed to
37
2024:HHC:12713-DB
furnish his personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar
(Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks,
which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the
event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or
on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused, on receipt of
notice(s) thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
45. A copy of this judgment along with the records of the
learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous
application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
(Vivek Singh Thakur)
Judge
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
29th November, 2024
(Nikita)