Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 22.11.2024 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 29 November, 2024
2024:HHC:12722
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2554 of 2024
Reserved on: 22.11.2024
Date of Decision: 29.11.2024.
Rohit ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Deepak Kaushal, Senior
Advocate, with Mr. Abhishek
Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General,
with ASI Rameshwar Singh, IO,
Police Station Paonta Sahib,
District Sirmour, H.P.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking
regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested
by the police vide FIR No. 22 of 2024, dated 7.2.2024, registered at
Police Station Paonta Sahib for the commission of offences
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2024:HHC:12722
punishable under Sections 363, 376DA of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act (POCSO). It has been asserted that the
petitioner was falsely implicated just to harass and frame him in a
false case. He had earlier filed a bail application before this Court
bearing Cr.MP(M) No. 460 of 2024, which was dismissed by the
Court on 2.7.2024. The victim and her parents denied the
prosecution case during the trial, which proves that the petitioner
was falsely implicated. The prosecution has relied upon the report
of FSL; however, the report is not admissible in view of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manoj Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2023) 2 SCC 353. The co-accused was granted
bail. The petitioner is being detained based on suspicion and there
is no material against him. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the victim’s mother made a complaint to the police
stating therein that the victim had gone to her friend’s house on
05.02.2024; however, she did not return during the night. The
victim returned on 06.02.2024 at 8:00 A.M. She revealed on
enquiry that when she was returning to her home, present
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petitioner asked her to board the vehicle. He told her that he
would drop her at her home, but he took her to some other place.
One person accompanied the petitioner and both of them raped
her. The police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the
investigation. The police seized the vehicle identified by the
victim. The police recovered one blanket and pillow. The police
arrested the petitioner and co-accused. The petitioner’s clothes
were seized by the police. As per the date of birth certificate, the
victim was born on 12.09.2010. She was aged 13 years, 4 months
and 26 days on the date of the incident. The mobile phone of the
petitioner and the co-accused were seized. The clothes were
preserved by the Medical Officer and these were sent to SFSL,
Junga. As per the report of the analysis, human semen was
detected on the underwear of the victim, the undergarments of
present petitioner and co-accused Rajesh Kumar, the T-shirt of
co-accused Rajesh Kumar, the blanket recovered from the vehicle
and the lower of the victim. The challan has been prepared and
presented before the Court. The report of analysis was received
from SFSL, Junga, which shows that the DNA profile obtained
from the underwear of the victim matched with the DNA profile
obtained from the blood sample of the petitioner. Similarly, the
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DNA profile obtained from the lower of the victim matched with
the DNA profile obtained from the blood of co-accused. The DNA
profile obtained from the blanket recovered from the vehicle
matched the DNA profile obtained from the blood sample of the
petitioner. The supplementary charge sheet was filed before the
Court, and the matter was listed for prosecution evidence on
26.11.2024.
3. I have heard Mr Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior
Counsel, assisted by Mr Abhishek Verma, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent-State.
4. Mr Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the victim and her mother have not
supported the prosecution case. The co-accused has been released
on bail and the DNA profile is not sufficient to connect the
petitioner with the commission of crime. He prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rahul Vs. State of Delhi (2023) 1 SCC 83 and Manoj Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2023) 2 SCC 353 in support of his submission.
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5. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that there is no
change in circumstance; rather, the report of the analysis shows
the presence of the DNA of the petitioner in the clothes of the
victim, which prima facie shows the involvement of the petitioner;
therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal
Damuji Meher, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2271, wherein it was observed
as under: –
“19. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider
relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation,
the role ascribed to the accused concerned,
possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or
witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al. Speaking through
Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 974, apropos relevant parameters for
granting bail, observed:
“26. While considering whether bail ought to be granted
in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the
Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the manner in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of
the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of
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2024:HHC:12722the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are
released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being
unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of
obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice
and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail.
(Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525;
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu
Yadav (supra) (2004) 7 SCC 528; Masroor v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 286; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT
of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @
Polia (supra) (2020) 2 SCC 118.
27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought
not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an
unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to
interference by the Superior Court. If there are serious
allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused
the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by
the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be
revoked by a Superior Court if it transpires that the courts
below have ignored the relevant material available on
record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the
impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State
of Madhya Pradesh (supra) (2022), 15 SCR 211 decided by a
three-judge bench of this Court [authored by one of us
(Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that
must be weighed with the Court for interfering in an
order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of
the CrPC in the following words:
“24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for
cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider
whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or
the conduct of the accused post grant of bail
demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial
to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the
concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of
Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put
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2024:HHC:12722it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court
would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the
court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to
be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is
irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny
and interference by the appellate court.” (emphasis
supplied)
20. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1085, speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah,
J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed
and reasoned:
“7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is
warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide
the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496, the
relevant principles were restated thus:
‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting
or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of
this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among
other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind
while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if
released on bail;
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(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.’
8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118,
this Court opined as under:
’16. The considerations that guide the power of an
appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order
granting bail stand on a different footing from an
assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail.
The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the
anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary
exercise of discretion in the grant of bail. The test is
whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or
unjustified. On the other hand, an application for
cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of
the existence of supervening circumstances or violations
of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has
been granted. …’
9. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @
Depak, 2023 INSC 761, this Court, in view of Dolat
Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Kashmira
Singh v. Duman Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 and X v. State of
Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511, held as follows:
’13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a
prayer is made for the cancellation of the grant of bail,
cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be
present, and bail, once granted, cannot be cancelled in a
mechanical manner without considering whether any
supervening circumstances have rendered it in conducing
to allow fair trial. This proposition draws support from
the Judgment of this Court in Daulat Ram v. State of
Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349, Kashmira Singh v. Duman
9
2024:HHC:12722Singh (1996) 4 SCC 693 and XXX v. State of
Telangana (2018) 16 SCC 511.’
10. In XXX v. Union Territory of Andaman & Nicobar
Islands, 2023 INSC 767, this Court noted that the principles
in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) stood reiterated
in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra (2022) 9 SCC 321.
11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been
elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
565 and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5
SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in
this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila
Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant that liberty is not to be
interfered with easily. More so when an order of pre-arrest
bail already stands granted by the High Court.
12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be
exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by
this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative and
not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on
its own facts and merits.” (emphasis supplied)
21. In Ajwar (supra), this Court also examined the
considerations for setting aside bail orders in terms below:
“28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate Court
for setting aside the bail order on an application being
moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening
circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief
to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any
attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting
in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended
to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the
accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may
add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive.
However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of
granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined,
and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that
may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided.
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Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors
that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to
the accused.
29. In Jagjeet Singh (supra) (2022) 9 SCC 321, a three-
judge bench of this Court has observed that the power to
grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. is of wide amplitude
and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is
bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an
application for bail. But this discretion is not unfettered. The
order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial
mind following well-established principles of law. In
the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with
the order where bail has been granted by the courts below.
But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or
based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate Court
would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the
bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Ram Bilas (2001) 6 SCC 338;
Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC
584)” (emphasis supplied)
8. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
9. It is undisputed that the previous bail petition filed by
the petitioner was dismissed by this Court on the ground that
there was sufficient material on record to connect him with the
commission of crime. It was held in the State of Maharashtra Vs.
Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605 that once a
bail application has been dismissed, subsequent bail application
can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was
observed:
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“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of
granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes which are of little
or no consequence. ‘Between the two orders, there was a gap
of only two days, and it is nobody’s case that during these two
days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release
of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and
comity demanded that the impugned order should not have
been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one
rendered by Puranik, J. only a couple of days before, in the
absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such
cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection
so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and
an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either
successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure
an order which had hitherto eluded him.”
10. Similar is the judgment delivered in State of M.P. v.
Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673, wherein it was observed: –
“8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection
of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No.
2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the
respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are
permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the
change in the circumstances, the second application would be
deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which
is not permissible under criminal law as has been held by this
Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1
SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.”
11. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider
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the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why
the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have
been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of
the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court
will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier
rejection the subsequent bail application should be
granted.”
12. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
“9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of
course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications
without there being any change of circumstances would
lead to bad precedents.”
13. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit
v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for
grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds
on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such
cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds,
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2024:HHC:12722which persuade it to take a view different from the one
taken in the earlier applications.”
14. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551 that successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstance, which means the change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence
of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for
filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in
circumstance. A material change in circumstances settled
by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires
the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier
finding has become obsolete. However, change in
circumstance has no bearing on the salutatory principle of
judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to
be decided by the same Judge on merits, if available at the
place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power
of a judge to consider the application and a person’s right
based on a material change in circumstances. A material
change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an
offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But, the
power to decide such subsequent application operates in a
completely different sphere unconnected with the facts of a
case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially
recognised principle that if successive bail applications on
the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by
different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the
litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order
to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the
confidence of the other side being put in issue and there
would be wastage of Court’s time and that judicial
discipline requires that such matter must be placed before
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2024:HHC:12722the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The
satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to
be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided
the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to
adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as
claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a
subsequent bail application.”
15. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances and it
is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
16. It was submitted that the prosecution witnesses have
turned hostile and this is a material change in the circumstance.
This submission cannot be accepted. The report of analysis clearly
shows that the DNA profile obtained from the blood sample of the
accused matched the DNA sample taken from the clothes of the
victim and the blanket lifted from the spot. It was laid down by
this Court in Padam Singh v. State of H.P., 2012 SCC OnLine HP 5327:
(2013) Cr.LJ 1470 that when the DNA profile matched with the DNA
sample taken from the victim and the victim was incapable of
giving consent, the accused can be held guilty of the commission
of an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC.
“19. The forensic report of DNA Ext. PW12/C clearly
establishes that the DNA profile obtained from the accused was
the contributory source of the DNA profile of the vaginal swabs
of the prosecutrix, which also matches with the salwar of the
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2024:HHC:12722prosecutrix. This fact remained un-assailed. Therefore, it
stands fully proved that the prosecutrix was sexually
assaulted by the accused.
20. The next question remains whether she had consented
for such an act? Keeping in view the mental status of the
prosecutrix, that she was a mentally retarded woman, her
consent for sexual intercourse, therefore, would not
constitute consent for the purpose of Section 376 Penal
Code, 1860. The reading of the provisions of sub-section (5)
of Section 375 Penal Code, 1860 shows that if a person
indulges in sexual intercourse with a women under various
circumstances, would be said to commit rape. In other
words, it very clearly indicates that if a person indulges in
sexual intercourse with a woman even with her consent, when
at the time of giving such consent by reason of unsoundness
mind, she is unable to understand the nature and consequence
of the act of which she has given consent, also falls within the
definition of raps.” ( Emphasis supplied).
17. In the present case, the victim was a minor and
incapable of giving consent, therefore, the report of DNA would
constitute an important piece of evidence against the accused.
18. It was submitted that the victim and her mother have
turned hostile. However, this is not sufficient to cast doubt on the
prosecution case. Learned Trial Court is to appreciate the
prosecution evidence at the time of conclusion of the trial and it
will see the impact of the victim and her mother turning hostile
along with other evidence. It was rightly submitted on behalf of
the State that the Court is not to appreciate the evidence at this
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stage. The evidence is to be appreciated by the learned Trial Court
along with other material on record. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of
Maharashtra, (2012) 8 SCC 795: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1062: 2012 SCC
OnLine SC 704 that the scope of the bail application is limited and
the Court cannot appreciate the evidence while deciding the bail
application. It was observed at page 799:
“10…. Moreover, while considering the application for bail,
the scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on
record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in
critical analysis of the evidence on record…”
19. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the
statement stated to have been made by the victim and her mother
before the learned Trial Court.
20. The judgments cited by learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner is to be appreciated while evaluating evidence and it is
premature for this Court to comment upon the same. Suffice it to
say that they lay down the safeguards for relying upon the report
for DNA, which can only be appreciated when all the evidence
regarding the taking of the samples and their integrity is led.
Further, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parasa
Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of A.P., (2003) 12 SCC 306: 2003 SCC
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OnLine SC 1142 that the doctrine of precedent does not apply to the
criminal law. It was observed at page 312:
“9. Each case, more particularly a criminal case, depends on
its own facts, and a close similarity between one case and
another is not enough to warrant like treatment because a
significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding
such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases
(as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case
against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on
which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to
another case is not at all decisive.”
21. It was submitted that the co-accused was released on
bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Bhavan
Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230: (2021) 2
SCC (Cri) 722: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 335 that while determining the
parity, the role of the accused has to be considered. It was
observed on page 246:-
“Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the
accused. Merely observing that another accused who was
granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not
sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail
on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the
aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their
position in relation to the incident, and the victims is of
utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the
basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above,
which again cannot pass muster under the law.”
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22. This position was reiterated in Tarun Kumar v.
Enforcement Directorate, AIR 2024 SC 169: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486,
wherein it was observed:
“18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr Luthra to grant
bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co-
accused, who were similarly situated as the appellant, have
been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted
that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of
parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached
to the accused whose application is under consideration.”
23. In the present case, the co-accused was released on
bail as his DNA did not match the DNA taken from the spot and the
samples taken from the victim, whereas the DNA of the petitioner
matched the DNA taken from the victim and the vehicle. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim parity with the co-accused.
24. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is
dismissed.
25. The observation made hereinabove shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
29th November, 2024
(Chander)