Supreme Court of India
Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. Lrs vs Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. Lrs on 14 November, 2024
Author: Sanjay Karol
Bench: Sanjay Karol, C.T. Ravikumar
2024 INSC 868 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3034 OF 2012
RAMACHANDRA REDDY (DEAD)
THR. LRS. & ORS. … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAMULU AMMAL (DEAD) THR. LRS. …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras dated 22nd April, 2009 passed in S.A.No.10 of 2005.
The judgment impugned in turn was passed in a first appeal preferred against
judgment and decree dated 3rd December, 2003 passed by the Additional
District Court-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fast Track Court No.V,
Chengalpattu in A.S.No.35 of 2001 which confirmed the judgment and decree
dated 13th September, 2001 of the Subordinate Judge, Tiruvallur in O.S.No.89
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by Dr.
Naveen Rawal
Date: 2024.11.14
12:43:41 IST
Reason:
of 1995.
1| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
2. The brief facts, putting the controversy in context are :-
2.1 One Balu Reddy, was survived by his three sons viz., Venkatarama
Reddy, Venkata Reddy @ Pakki Reddy1 and Chenga Reddy2. They
enjoyed the property in question as coparceners to Hindu joint family
property. The first of the three siblings, Venkatarama Reddy died leaving
behind his son Markandeya Reddy as legal heir; the second, Venkata
Reddy @ Pakki Reddy died leaving behind his daughter Govindammal as
legal heir; and the third brother Chenga Reddy died issueless, with each of
them having 1/3rd share in the undivided property. Chenga Reddy
transferred his share in favour of Govindammal in the year 1963 by way
of a settlement deed dated 5th May, 1963. It is urged that thereafter,
Govindammal, enjoyed uninterrupted possession of the property to the
extent of 2/3rd.
2.2 In 1986 the original settlement deed in favour of Govindammal
was given to Markandeya Reddy to bring into effect the 2/3 rd share of
Govindammal in the official records since at that time no partition by
metes and bounds was effected and without prejudice to their rights, they
had been cultivating random, separate portion(s) of the land. Such change
1
In certain places the record reflects alias of Venkata Reddy as Bachi Reddy Or Bakki Reddy
2
In certain places the record reflects alias of Chenga Reddy as Renga Reddy
2| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
was, allegedly never effected and neither were the documents returned toher. As such the suit for partition was filed on 30th March, 1995.
2.3. Plaint
In the plaint following prayers were made :-
“ … … ….
(9) The plaintiffs therefore pray that this Hon’ble Court may be
pleased to pass a decree.
(a) for partition and separate possession of 2/3rd share from out
of the suit properties in favour of the plaintiffs and to put
the plaintiffs in possession of the same.
(b) directing the defendant to pay cost of the suit and
(c) such other reliefs as this Honourable court may deem fit
proper in the circumstances of the case and render justice
accordingly.”2.4 Written Statement
❖ In the written statement filed by the original defendants, it has
been averred that in the year 1984 the Panchayat decided on
a division between the parties giving one-half of the property
to both. Patta was not separated for 48-78 acres. His right
and title extend to 25½ acres.
❖ Survey No.201/1 was incorrectly included in the name of the
defendant, and when change thereof, was applied for by
Govindammal, the same was carried out without any
objection. Survey Nos.201/L and 201/B were incorrectly
3| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
shown against the name of Govindammal and actually
belonged to the defendant.
❖ There is a lake on the property to which the defendant had
half right.
❖ The plaintiff is not in joint possession of properties and is not
entitled to the relief of partition.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
3. The Trial Court framed the following issues:
“1. Whether the marking of the suit properties are correct or not?
2. Whether the suit properties are properties of the plaintiff?
3. Whether the settlement deed executed in the year 1963 have been
brought into force?
4. Whether the partition made in the year 1964 is genuine?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition as prayed?
6. What are the other relief?”
Having considered the first four issues, the Court, in answer to the fifth issue,
concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to 2/3rd share of the property. The
same was awarded with costs.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE COURT
4. The learned First Appellate Court found for its consideration one
solitary issue which was the correctness of the judgment and decree of the Trial
4| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
Court. Having considered the evidence on record, the conclusion arrived at is
as under:-
“… Therefore, for the above said facts, I finally decided that Ex.A1
registered settlement deed was executed for valuable consideration
and as such the deceased Govindammal has got 2/3rd share in the suit
properties on the basis of Ex.A1 registered settlement deed and as
such her legal heirs, i.e. the respondents/plaintiff are entitled to get
2/3rd share in the suit properties as prayed for in the plaint. Earlier,
I decided that the appellant/second defendant has miserably failed to
prove that the suit properties were divided by states and bounds
orally in the year 1964 and mutation of revenue records in the name
of the deceased first defendants. Thiru Markandeya Reddy would
not affect the rights of the respondent/plaintiff over the suit
properties and also in view of the registered settlement deed dated
5.5.1963 the respondent/plaintiff are entitled to get 2/3rd share in the
suit properties as prayed for in the plaint and as such there is no
reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court and also no
merit in this Civil appeal. In view of the above said findings, I come
to the conclusion that this civil appeal is liable to be dismissed and I
answered this point accordingly.”
PROCEEDINGS IN SECOND APPEAL
5. Substantial questions of law, arising in the appeal were recorded in para
6 of the impugned judgment. It reads as under :
“1. Whether the courts below have considered the material evidence
in the case and have properly applied the law relating to
consideration and appreciation of family arrangement while
considering the defence put forward by the defendant in this
regard?
2. Whether the courts below have properly considered the material
evidence in the case namely, Ex.A1, which is a gift (settlement)
deed gifting undivided share in the coparcenary property?
3. Whether the Courts below properly considered the material
evidence, namely Ex.B16 and Ex.B17, which have been brought
into existence by the plaintiffs pending the suit which contain the
admission to lean towards the family arrangement?”
5| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
6. The High Court concluded that, (a) the learned Courts below correctly
concluded that oral partition had indeed not taken place; (b) that the Courts
below committed an error in holding the settlement deed to be valid and thereby
awarding 2/3rd share in favour of the original plaintiffs i.e., heirs of
Govindammal; (c) that Ex.B16 and B17, cannot be taken as sufficient evidence
to prove oral partition. In view of this conclusion, the judgment and decree of
the Courts below were modified to the extent that:-
“…Accordingly, the plaintiffs being the legal representatives/legal
heirs of Venkata Reddy are entitled to one half share and the
defendant being the sole widow of D1 Markandeya Reddy s/o
Venkata Rama Reddy is entitled to another half share in all the suit
properties. Accordingly, preliminary decree shall follow…”RIVAL CONTENTIONS
7. We have heard Mr. Ragenth Basant and Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned
senior counsel for the appellants, and Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned senior counsel
for the respondents. We have also perused the written submissions filed by the
parties.
8. The appellants submit chiefly, as under :
8.1 The Courts have correctly and concurrently rejected the defence
of oral partition; thus, this issue has obtained finality;
8.2 What flows from the above is that the rights under the settlement
deed of 1963 have not been given up and were enforceable. However, the
6| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
High Court holding that this deed was actually a gift deed and not asettlement deed, was a position being not open to the Court. This
instrument and the rights flowing therefrom have been admitted in the
written statement, wherein a specific defence has been taken stating thus :
“The right under the 1963 settlement deed were given up before the
Panchayatdars in view of the family arrangements.”8.3 Once such a defence of family arrangement stood rejected, the
plaintiff has to necessarily succeed. This is more so in the view, that the
High Court would not ordinarily disturb concurrent findings of fact.
8.4 The settlement deed in favour of Govindammal was executed
since she had been looking after the food and shelter needs of her father
and uncle and, subsequently, she would perform charitable work
therewith. Such documents have been repeatedly held to be settlement
deeds and not gift deeds.
8.5 In furtherance of the submissions made the appellants have
submitted a compilation of case laws.
9. Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, submitted as under :-
9.1 The nomenclature of the document hardly makes any difference.
It is the contents of the document, that are to be taken into consideration.
7| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
The document although, may be styled as a settlement deed, was, in fact,
a gift deed.
9.2 The intention has been manifested by both express language and
necessary implication. There is no reservation of power of life estate or
vesting rights.
9.3 The appellants have never questioned the nomenclature of the
document and that the document in question, was not a gift deed. The term
‘settlement’ is used in terms of settlement of a dispute.
9.4 There is no element of consideration in Ex.A1 (settlement deed)
and love and affection are not elements of ‘consideration’ under the law.
9.5 Documentary evidence such as separate pattas, kist, receipts,
adangals, drive home the point of oral partition. The exclusive enjoyment
of properties under separate pattas and separate sub- divisions cannot be
‘brushed aside.’
OUR VIEW
10. In the above backdrop, the question for us to decide is whether, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in overturning
the concurrent findings of the Trial as well as the First Appellate Court. The
second question to be considered is whether the deed executed, which gave rise
to the present property dispute, was a gift deed or a deed of settlement.
8| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
11. The settlement deed executed in favour of Govindammal, which is said
to have given her right over 2/3rd of the subject property, is reproduced for
reference:
“DOCUMENT NO.485/1963
Settlement deed for Rs. 5000/- This
settlement deed has been executed on 5th
May 1963 in favor of Govindammal wife of
Thondi Krishna Chettiar resident of
Chengalpattu District, Uthukottai sub
district, Katturamanathapuram panchayat
board area by Pakki Reddi(1) and Chenga
Reddi sons of Boyee Reddi of
Ramanathapuram village that with all of our
consent and good faith and bonafidely
execute this settlement deed that you are the
only daughter of Bagi Reddi and that we do
not have any wife or children or legal heirs
and you happened to be the daughter of our
elder brother Chenga Reddi and that since
we do not have any wife or children and you
happened to have looked after us very well
till now ad that herein after you will look
after our food and shelter needs and in the
belief that you would do all the charitable
workWe execute this settlement deed in respect of properties worth Rs.
5000/- in favor of you and give possession to you today itself and
therefore from today onwards you have the exclusive, right, title and
possession in those properties, you, your heirs, successors and
assigns will have the exclusive rights, title and possession and we
assure that there is no encumbrances in those properties and any
encumbrances find in future, we would settle them at our own
expenses. The properties given to you this settlement deed are, value
of the property at Amayappanpakam village is Rs. 500/-. Out of our
inherited property of 4.32 acres of land in dry survey number 176 in
Amambakkam village, Ammampakkam panchayat board area,
Uthukottai sub district and Chengalpattu district we have two third
share after giving one third share to Markandeyan son of our elder
brother and out 4.39 acres of dry land in survey number 221 with
patta number 558 in Seethanperi Amaran village in Amapakkam
panchayat board area worth Rs. 4000/- we have 2/3rd share leaving
1/3rd share to Markendeyan son of our elder brother and out of 8.41
9| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
acres in survey number 201 we have a right of 2/3rd share leaving
1/3rd share to Markendeyan son of our elder brother. Out of 2.69
acres of land in dry survey number 201, we have 2/3rd right leaving
1/3rd to Markendeyan son of our elder brother and out of 9.89 acres
in Ramanathapuram village in Ramanathapuram panchayat board in
Uthukottai sub-district, Chengalpattu district is Rs.500 /-. 17.74
acres in survey number 163 which is in our possession and
enjoyment. North of the street, east of the housing plot of Subbi
Reddi and Govinda Reddy, west of the dry land of Thondhi Krishna
Reddy and others west of the pattai in the middle, a house with
measurement east to west about 250 feet, north to south about 200
feet in which we have 2.3rd right leaving 1/3rd to Markendeyan son
of our elder brother and out of 2 acre 40 cents in survey number 160
we have 2/3rd right leaving 1/3rd to Markendeyan son of our elder
brother including the standing palm trees, tamarind trees, and neem
trees and other standing palm trees, and neem trees and other
standing trees over which we have 2/3rd right leaving 1/3rd to
Markendeyan son of our elder brother. This settlement deed has
been executed by us with all our consent and good faith and
bonafidely. xxxLeft hand Thumb impression of Baghi Reddy and
Left hand thumb impression of Renga Reddy. Sd.
Witnesses.”
12. Although submissions have been advanced by learned senior counsel for
the parties on a variety of issues, in our considered view, the scope for
interference of this Court is limited only to the question as formulated in para
10.
13. The dispute, as is evident from the above, hinges on whether the deed
executed granting Govindammal 2/3rd share of the property is a gift deed or a
settlement deed. In making such a determination, it is imperative to examine
the meaning of ‘gift’ and ‘settlement’. The Transfer of Property Act, 18823
defines ‘gift’ as: –
122. “Gift” defined.—“Gift” is the transfer of certain existing
moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily and without
3
Hereafter, TPA
10| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the
donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.
Acceptance when to be made.—Such acceptance must be made
during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of
giving.
If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.
The term ‘settlement’ does not find a place in the TPA. It is defined under the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Section 2 (24) reads: –
Settlement.—“Settlement” means any non-testamentary disposition,
in writing, of movable or immovable property made—
(a) in consideration of marriage,
(b) for the purpose of distributing property of the settlor among his
family or those for whom he desires to provide, or for the purpose of
providing for some person dependent on him, or
(c) for any religious or charitable purpose;
‘disposition’ for reference, means a devise “intended to comprehend a mode by
which property can pass, whether by act of parties or by an act of the law” and
“includes transfer and charge of property”.4
14. Disagreeing with the Courts below, the High Court held that the deed
executed was, in fact, a gift deed. The reasoning in this regard is: –
“20. From a conspectus, therefore, of the definitions contained in the
dictionaries and the books regarding a gift or an adequate
consideration, the inescapable conclusion that follows is that
“consideration” means a reasonable equivalent or other valuable
benefit passed on by the promisor to the promise or by the transferor
to the transferee. Similarly, when the word “consideration” is
qualified by the word adequate it makes consideration stronger so as
to make it sufficient and valuable having regard to the facts, and
circumstances of the case. It has also been seen from the discussions
4
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, as referred to in Madras Refineries Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority, Board of Revenue, Madras, (1977) 2 SCC 308
11| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
of the various authorities mentioned above that a gift is undoubtedly
a transfer which does not contain any element of consideration in
any shape or form. In fact, where there is any equivalent or benefit
measured in terms of money in respect of a gift the transaction ceases
to be a gift and acquires a different colour. … Love, affection,
spiritual benefit and many other factors may enter in the intention of
the donor to make a gift but these filial considerations cannot be
called or held to be legal considerations as understood by law. It is
manifest, therefore, that the passing of monetary consideration is
completely foreign to the concept of a gift having regard to the
nature, character and the circumstances under which such a transfer
takes place…
21….In fact, the legislature has made its intention clear that gift is
excluded by qualifying the word “consideration” by the adjective
“adequate.” Assuming that love and affection, spiritual benefit or
similar other factors may amount to consideration for the gift, the
word “adequate” is wholly inapplicable to and inconsistent with the
concept of a gift because it is impossible to measure love and
affection, the sentiments or feelings of the donor by any standard
yardstick or barometer. The words “adequate consideration” clearly
postulate that consideration must be capable of being measured in
terms of money value having regard to the market price of the
property, the value that it may fetch if sold, the value of similar lands
in the vicinity , so on and so forth. In the instant case, the legislature
by using the word “adequate” to qualify the word “consideration”
has completely ruled out and excluded gift from the ambit of clause
(b) of the proviso. In these circumstances, therefore, the argument of
Mr. Kacker that by not expressly excluding gift, clause(b) of the
proviso includes gift cannot be accepted particularly in the face of
the clear and unambiguous language used by clause (b) of the
proviso in describing the nature of transaction as one for adequate
consideration.”
The primary reason, as it appears from the above extract for the High Court
holding that the deed in question was in fact a gift deed and not one of
settlement, is that it found that the element of ‘adequate consideration’ was
missing and instead, the transfer was effected out of love and affection for
Govindammal.
12| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
15. Since the point which the High Court in its wisdom found to be the
determining factor qua the nature of the deed is the element of consideration
and its adequateness, let us consider the same.
15.1 It shall be useful to refer to certain provisions of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872. The relevant part of the interpretation clause thereof says –
“2…
(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other
person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from
doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such
act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the
promise;
(e) Every promise and every set of promises, forming the
consideration for each other, is an agreement;
(f) Promises which form the consideration or part of the
consideration for each other are called reciprocal promises;…”
15.2 The discussion regarding the meaning of the word ‘consideration’
made in CIT v. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority,5 is relevant
for our purposes here:
“165. The term “consideration” however is broader. The plain
meaning is a monetary payment, for something obtained, in the form
of goods, or services. In CCE v. Fiat India (P) Ltd. [CCE v. Fiat
India (P) Ltd., (2012) 9 SCC 332 : (2012) 12 SCR 975] this Court
explained the meaning of that term : (SCC pp. 360-61, paras 68-73)
“68. … Consideration means something which is of value in the eye
of the law, moving from the plaintiff, either of benefit to the plaintiff
or of detriment to the defendant. In other words, it may consist either
in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party, or
some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered
or undertaken by the other, as observed
in Currie v. Misa [Currie v. Misa, (1875) LR 10 Exch 153] .
5
(2023) 4 SCC 561
13| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
69. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged)
defines, “consideration” thus:
‘Something that is legally regarded as the equivalent or return given
or suffered by one for the act or promise of another.’
70. In Vol. 17 of Corpus Juris Secundum (pp. 420-21 and 425) the
import of “consideration” has been described thus:
‘Various definitions of the meaning of “consideration” are to be
found in the textbooks and judicial opinions. A sufficient one, as
stated in Corpus Juris and which has been quoted and cited with
approval is “a benefit to the party promising or a loss or detriment to
the party to whom the promise is made….”
At common law every contract not under seal requires a
consideration to support it, that is, as shown in the definition above,
some benefit to the promisor, or some detriment to the promisee.’
71. In Salmond on Jurisprudence, the word “consideration” has been
explained in the following words:
‘A consideration in its widest sense is the reason, motive or
inducement, by which a man is moved to bind himself by an
agreement. It is for nothing that he consents to impose an obligation
upon himself, or to abandon or transfer a right. It is in consideration
of such and such a fact that he agrees to bear new burdens or to
forego the benefits which the law already allows him.’
xxx xxx xxx
73. From a conspectus of decisions and dictionary meaning, the
inescapable conclusion that follows is that “consideration” means a
reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit passed on by the
promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee.
Similarly, when the word “consideration” is qualified by the word
“sole”, it makes consideration stronger so as to make it sufficient and
valuable having regard to the facts, circumstances and necessities of
the case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15.3 Chidambara Iyer & Ors. v. P.S. Renga Iyer6 which cites similar
authorities is also important for our consideration.
6
1965 SCC OnLine SC 293
14| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
15.4 What flows from the above-cited judgments as also provisions of
law, is that ‘consideration’ need not always be in monetary terms. It can
be in other forms as well. In the present case, it is seen that the transfer of
property in favour of Govindammal was in recognition of the fact that she
had been taking care of the transferors and would continue to do so while
also using the same to carry out charitable work. Although the deed stands
reproduced supra, for immediate recollection the relevant extract is once
again reproduced hereinbelow:
“…execute this Settlement deed that you are the only daughter of
Bagi Reddi and that we do not have any wife or children or legal
heirs and you happened to be the daughter of our elder brother
Chenga Reddi and that since we do not have any wife or children
and you happened to have looked after us very well till now and that
herein after you will look after our food and shelter needs and in the
belief that you would do all the charitable work.”15.5 In that view of the matter, the High Court has erred in taking such
a constricted view of ‘consideration’, especially taking note of the fact that
this settlement was between the members of a family.
16. The above conclusion apart, it was also to be demonstrated by the High
Court that the reversal of concurrent findings by the Courts below was justified.
The jurisdiction to interfere in findings where the Courts below have been ad
idem, is limited and such limitation is well expounded. We may only refer to
a few authorities.
15| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
16.1 Dalveer Bhandari J. in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki7 referred to various
earlier judgments in the following manner-
“55. This Court again reminded the High Court in Commr.,
HRCE v. P. Shanmugama [(2005) 9 SCC 232] that the High Court
has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of
facts.
56. Again, this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi [(2005) 10
SCC 139] has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not
justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This
Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond
the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
…
73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890
stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the
ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable
the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no
court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified
in Section 100.
…
81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this
Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of
Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the
High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and
circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure
findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in
1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering
with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the
amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is
clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain
terms clearly violates the legislative intention.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7
(2007) 1 SCC 546
16| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
16.2 A Bench of three learned Judges in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v.
Ramalingam Chettiar8, as recently followed in Nazir Mohammed v. J.
Kamala9, observed :-
“11. It is well known that as early as 1890, the Privy Council had
occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in Mussummai Durga
Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri [17 IA 122] . In that case, it
was urged before the Privy Council, relying upon the decision of the
Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts in Futtehma
Begum v. Mohamed Ausur [ILR 9 Cal 309] and Nivath
Singh v. Bhikki Singh [ILR 7 All 649] respectively, that the High
Court would be within its jurisdiction in holding that where the lower
appellate court has clearly misapprehended what the evidence before
it was, and has been led to discard or not give sufficient weight to
other evidence to which it is not entitled, the High Court can interfere
under Section 100. This contention was rejected by the Privy Council
and it was observed that an erroneous finding of fact is a different
thing from an error or defect in procedure, and that there is no
jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an
erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error
may seem to be. Their Lordships added that nothing can be clearer
than the declaration in the Code of Civil Procedure that no second
appeal will lie except on the grounds specified in Section 584
(corresponding to Section 100 of the present Code), and they uttered
a word of warning that no court in India or elsewhere has power to
add to or enlarge those grounds. Since 1890, this decision has been
treated as a leading decision on the question about the jurisdiction of
the High Court in dealing with questions of facts in second appeals.”16.3 The principles regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under Section
100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have been recently summarised
by this Court in Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau. Sumanbai Pandurang
Petkar10. Referring to Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari11 it was
8
1962 SCC OnLine SC 155
9
(2020) 19 SCC 57
10
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1210
11
(2001) 3 SCC 179
17| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012
held that a substantial question of law, which is sine qua non for themaintainability of a second appeal, shall be so, if:-
“a) Not previously settled by law of land or a binding precedent.
b) Material bearing on the decision of case; and
(c) New point raised for the first time before the High Court is not
a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter.
Therefore, it will depend on facts of each case.”
16.4 In our considered view, none of the aspects referred to above appear
to be met in this case, justifying the High Court’s overturning of
concurrent findings. Govindammal (now her heirs) is indeed entitled to
2/3rd share in the property.
17. In light of the above discussion, the appeal succeeds and is, accordingly,
allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the
findings of the Court below, are restored.
Pending applications if any, shall stand disposed of.
….……………………J.
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
….……………….…..J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
New Delhi;
November 14, 2024.
18| Civil Appeal 3034 of 2012