Supreme Court of India
Ashok Verma vs The State Of Chhattisgarh on 19 December, 2024
Author: C.T. Ravikumar
Bench: C.T. Ravikumar, Sanjay Karol
2024 INSC 1011
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 815 of 2022
Ashok Verma …. Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Chhattisgarh …Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the
High Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No.845 of
2013 whereby and whereunder it confirmed the
conviction of the appellant under Sections 300 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the “IPC”) punishable
under Section 302, IPC, 201 and 498A of the IPC, in
Sessions Trial No. 147 of 2012 and the sentences imposed
therefor.
2. Shortly stated, the prosecution case is as
hereunder: –
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by Dr.
Naveen Rawal
Date: 2024.12.19
16:18:03 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 19
The marriage between the appellant-convict and
the deceased Smt. Pushpa was solemnised in the year
2006. The incident which led to the conviction of the
appellant in connection with the death of Smt. Pushpa
occurred on 26.01.2012 at his house, which is the
matrimonial home of the deceased. The paternal home
of the deceased is also proximately situated viz., around
50 meters from her matrimonial home. The appellant is
addicted to gambling and to lash out money therefor, he
used to torture her physically and mentally. He had
even mortgaged the jewellery of the deceased for the
said purpose. The deceased used to share such
sorrowful incidents with PW-8 Aarti, who is her own
sister. On 26.01.2012, also when PW-8 went to the house
of the deceased she told that she was thrashed by the
appellant-husband. At about quarter to 7 pm on
26.01.2012, the appellant went to his in-laws’ house and
informed them that Pushpa hanged herself and
thereupon, he along with her parents gone back home
where Pushpa was seen on bed on her knees and still
knotted by dupatta around the neck, which in turn, was
tied to a piece of wood near the ceiling fan. Despite the
opposition, the appellant cut the noose and took her in a
vehicle to Sector-9 Hospital, where the doctor checkedPage 2 of 19
and declared her as dead. Autopsy on her body was
conducted by PW-11, Dr. P. Akhtar. In fact, initially a
case was registered only under Section 174 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the “Cr.P.C.”) but,
later FIR No.269/12 was registered on 07.04.2012 under
Sections 302, 201 and 498A, IPC against the appellant.
On being tried, the trial Court convicted him as noted
above and for the conviction under Section 300, IPC, he
was sentenced under Section 302, IPC, to undergo life
imprisonment and also with a fine of Rs.1000/-, for the
conviction under Section 201, IPC, he was sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine
of Rs.500/- and for the conviction under Section 498A,
IPC, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs.500/-. Default
sentences were also passed in case of payment of fine
imposed for the conviction under the aforesaid sections.
The corporeal sentences were ordered to be run
concurrently. In the appeal viz., in Criminal Appeal
No.845 of 2013, the High Court confirmed the conviction
under the aforesaid sections and also the sentences
imposed therefor.
Page 3 of 19
3. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State.
4. The facts expatiated earlier would reveal that the
appellant was convicted concurrently for the aforesaid
offences and there is concurrency even with respect to
the sentences imposed therefor. In such circumstances,
there is, in fact, very little scope for interference in an
appeal by Special Leave. In such cases, overlooking of
a vital piece of evidence which would tilt the balance in
favour of the convict-appellant or that the finding is
based and built on inadmissible evidence, which if
eschewed from evidence, the prosecution case would be
substantially discredited or it would impair the
prosecution case, are some such situations where this
Court may interfere with. When the contentions raised
are pitted against the evidence on record, they would
reveal no such circumstances. Still, we will proceed to
consider the contentions raised to find out any other
tenable grounds are raised by the appellant which may
persuade us to entertain this appeal against the
concurrent conviction.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended
that the plea of ‘alibi’ was not properly appreciated and
Page 4 of 19
considered, especially with reference to the oral
testimony of DW-1. Despite the non-rupture of the hyoid
bone the Courts wrongly concluded that the nature of the
death was homicide. It is also contended that no
circumstances which irresistibly pointing to the guilt of
the appellant-convict were established by the
prosecution though the conviction was based on
circumstantial evidence.
6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State would submit that the circumstances
that led to the finding of guilt against the appellant were
discussed in detail by the trial Court and the High Court
as the Appellate Court reappreciated and concurred
with them besides adding additional reasons for
confirming the conviction as also the sentence. In short,
it is submitted that the cumulative effect of such
circumstances relied on by the Courts do not brook any
hypothesis other than the one irresistibly leading to the
guilt of the appellant-convict, no interference with the
concurrent conviction as also sentence, is invited in this
case.
7. In view of the rival contentions, we have bestowed
careful consideration of the said contentions with
reference to the materials on record. As noted earlier,
Page 5 of 19
the incident which led to the death of Smt. Pushpa, the
wife of the appellant-convict, had occurred admittedly in
her matrimonial home. The case of the appellant-convict
is that a careful scanning of the evidence on record
would reveal that the prosecution had failed to establish
that it is a case of homicide and in fact, it is a case of
suicide. Adding to the above contentions, the learned
counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant
was implicated in this case and was convicted without
any satisfactory evidence much less any clinching
evidence and also disregarding the fact that it was he
who attempted to save her life and in that regard after
cutting the noose of the ligature he took her to the
hospital. While considering the contention, we shall not
lose sight of the fact that more often criminals would try
to dub a murder as suicidal or accidental death. The
identification of the nature of the death is, therefore,
always an important medico-legal problem. In that
regard, the Courts concerned have to study the total
evidence to discern whether death is a case of homicide
or suicide or accidental. The concurrent finding in the
case on hand with reference to the evidence on record is
that it is a case of homicide. Presumption is only a rule
in the realm of burden of proof and the trial Court and
Page 6 of 19
the High Court concurrently weighed the circumstances
and gave sturdy reasons to conclude that death of
Pushpa is homicidal in nature and not suicidal. In such
circumstances, we are not persuaded to entertain the
concurrently repelled contention of the appellant that
the death of Pushpa was not homicidal.
8. Now, the question is about the sustainability of the
concurrent finding on the culpability of the appellant. Of
course, various contentions have been raised by the
appellant to assail the finding of guilt against him
concurrently referred to in the judgments of the trial
Court and the High Court. There can be no doubt that
while dealing with the such a question creation of fake
scene by the appellant, absence of explanation by the
accused despite being bound by virtue of Section 106 of
the Evidence Act are also to be taken into consideration.
In the context of the case on hand, the case established
by the oral testimony of PW-8, Arti who is the own sister
of the deceased would show that at about 7 pm on the
fateful day the appellant came to the paternal home of
the deceased and informed that Smt. Pushpa hanged
herself and immediately thereupon, herself, her mother
and sister went along with him to his house viz.,
matrimonial home of the deceased. The further fact
Page 7 of 19
established through the mouth of the said prosecution
witness is that upon reaching there Pushpa was seen on
her knees on bed and still knotted by dupatta around the
neck which, in turn, tied to a wood near the ceiling fan.
As per PW-8, despite the opposition of their mother
when he attempted to cut the noose of the ligature and
request to wait for the arrival of their relatives, he cut it
immediately and took her to a nearby hospital at Sector
9. Soon on check-up, the doctor declared that she was
dead. In this context, it is also worthy to note the oral
evidence of DW-1, Subhash Rao. DW-1 had deposed
that on that day, he along with the appellant went to
Maitri Garden and from there returned home between 6
pm and 7 pm and he got down near the lane leading to
his house. Thereafter, the appellant came to him and
informed that Pushpa had hanged herself. According to
him, thereupon, he along with the appellant went to the
latter’s house and thereafter, he cut the noose of the
ligature and took Pushpa to the hospital where she was
checked and declared as dead. In this context it is also
relevant to note that there is no scintilla of evidence
suggesting that she was alive when the noose was cut or
that she breathed her last enroute to the hospital. We
have referred to the evidence of DW-1 to show that the
Page 8 of 19
cutting of the noose of the ligature, as per the version of
prosecution witness as also that of DW-1 was done only
after the appellant went to the witness(es) and informed
of seeing Pushpa hanged herself. In short, going by the
case of the prosecution or that of the defence even after
seeing Pushpa hanged using her dupatta, he did not care
to cut the noose then and there and had chosen to do so,
only after witness(es) were brought to the scene of
occurrence.
9. In the above context, it is also relevant to note the
absence of self-inflicted injuries like scratches on the
body of the deceased, going by the necroscopical
evidence consisting of the oral evidence of PW-11, Dr. P.
Akhtar with his report. When this be the evidence on
record how can the appellant contend that he made a bid
to save the life of the deceased wife Pushpa and in that
regard cut the noose of the ligature and took her to the
hospital. Had it been a bona fide, genuine attempt on his
part to save her life, he would have cut the noose of the
ligature then and there itself upon seeing her hanged,
before going to inform the aforesaid witness(es) that she
had hanged herself. We are of the considered opinion
that the contention of the counsel for the appellant as
Page 9 of 19
aforesaid regarding the lifesaving attempt, will be of no
assistance in the face of evidence of the facts established.
10. We will now consider the question whether the
contention of the appellant that the plea of alibi was
considered perversely, especially without properly
appreciating the evidence of DW-1. In the decision in
Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar1, this Court took
note of the meaning of the Latin word ‘alibi’ as
‘elsewhere’ and observed and held that the said plea
would be available only if that ‘elsewhere’ is a place
which is that much far off making it extremely impossible
or improbable for the person concerned to reach the
place of occurrence and participate in the offence
concerned on the relevant date and time. Paragraph 22
and 23 of the said decision which is relevant for the
purpose reads thus: –
“22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not
an exception (special or general) envisaged in
the Penal Code, 1860 or any other law. It is only
a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11 of
the Evidence Act that facts which are
inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant.
1
AIR 1997 SC 322 ; 1996 INSC 1260
Page 10 of 19
Illustration (a) given under the provision is
worth reproducing in this context:
“The question is whether A committed a crime
at Calcutta on a certain date; the fact that on that
date, A was at Lahore is relevant.”
23. The Latin word alibi means “elsewhere”
and that word is used for convenience when an
accused takes recourse to a defence line that
when the occurrence took place he was so far
away from the place of occurrence that it is
extremely improbable that he would have
participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in
a criminal case, in which the accused is alleged
to have inflicted physical injury to another
person, the burden is on the prosecution to
prove that the accused was present at the scene
and has participated in the crime. The burden
would not be lessened by the mere fact that the
accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The
plea of the accused in such cases need be
considered only when the burden has been
discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily.
Page 11 of 19
But once the prosecution succeeds in
discharging the burden it is incumbent on the
accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove
it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the
possibility of his presence at the place of
occurrence. When the presence of the accused
at the scene of occurrence has been
established satisfactorily by the prosecution
through reliable evidence, normally the court
would be slow to believe any counter-evidence
to the effect that he was elsewhere when the
occurrence happened. But if the evidence
adduced by the accused is of such a quality and
of such a standard that the court may entertain
some reasonable doubt regarding his presence
at the scene when the occurrence took place,
the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the
benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that
purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be
laid down that, in such circumstances, the
burden on the accused is rather heavy. It
follows, therefore, that strict proof is required
for establishing the plea of alibi. This Court has
observed so on earlier occasions (vide DudhPage 12 of 19
Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC
166; State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao
Gangaram Pimple [(1984) 1 SCC 446.”
11. In the context of the afore-extracted paragraphs, it
is relevant to note that in the case on hand, the appellant
was bound to explain what happened on that day at his
house by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act since
the appellant and the deceased were man and wife and
the incident had occurred in the house where they were
residing. Therefore, he was bound to explain and
establish the same as it is a fact, exclusively within his
knowledge, by concrete evidence, if he fails to establish
the plea of ‘alibi’.
12. In the case on hand, the appellant convict took up
the plea of alibi on the ground that he was in a nearby
garden to the place of occurrence at the relevant point of
time. DW-1 deposed that the appellant was with him
during that period in the nearby Maitri Garden and
returned from there between 6 pm and 7 pm and he got
down near the lane of his house. Furthermore, he would
depose that thereafter, the appellant came back and told
him that Pushpa hanged herself and then he proceeded
Page 13 of 19
to the house of the appellant and the noose was cut and
she was taken to hospital.
13. As held in Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra), strict
proof is required to establish the plea of alibi. There is
absolutely no evidence establishing that DW-1 was there
in the garden during the said period. Then, how his
version could be relied on by the appellant to establish
the plea of alibi. That apart, the very fact is that the
appellant took up the plea of alibi on the ground that he
was in a nearby garden itself would be sufficient to throw
the case put forth by him as defence, in the light of Binay
Kumar Singh’s case (supra). The plea of alibi, in the
light of the decision in Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra)
can be applied only if the ‘elsewhere place’ is far away
from the place of occurrence so that it was extremely
improbable or impossible for the person concerned to
reach the place of occurrence and to participate in the
crime on the relevant date and time of occurrence. In
such circumstances, we are of the considered view that
the said contention was rightly rejected by the Courts
below.
Page 14 of 19
14. The effect of false plea of alibi was considered by
this Court in Babudas v. State of M.P.2 and in G.
Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka3. In G.
Parshwanath’s case, this Court held that when the
accused gave a false plea that he was not present on the
spot, his statement would be regarded as additional
circumstance against him strengthening the chain of
circumstances already found firm.
15. In the decision in Babudas’s case (supra), this
Court held that in a case of circumstantial evidence, a
false plea of alibi set up by the accused would be a link
in the chain of circumstances but then it could not be the
sole link or sole circumstances based on which a
conviction could be passed.
16. In the decision in Paramjeet Singh v. State of
Uttarakhand4, this Court held that the aid of false
defence led on behalf of accused could be used to lend
assurance to the Court when the case of the prosecution
is established on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
17. Now, we will deal with the contention made as a
last-ditch effort against the finding of the Courts below
2
(2003) 9 SCC 86
3
(2010) 8 SCC 593; 2010 INSC 525
4
(2010) 10 SCC 439, 2010 INSC 647
Page 15 of 19
that Pushpa’s death is homicidal, based on the non-
rupture of hyoid bone. Based on the decision in Satish
Nirankari v. State of Rajasthan5, and the relevant text at
page 454 and 456 of Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and
Toxicology, the contention(s) unsuccessfully raised
before the High Court were reiterated before us and in
other words, contended that non-rupture of hyoid bone
would indicate that death of Pushpa is suicidal and not
homicidal in nature. We have already held that sturdy
and sound reasons have been given by two Courts to
conclude that it is a case of homicide. Non-rupture of
hyoid bone of Pushpa would not and should not be taken
as the sole reason to upturn the said concurrent finding
that it is a case of strangulation. In this context, it is to be
noted that in Satish Nirankari’s case, this Court held
even in the absence of non-rupture of hyoid bone cause
of death can be of strangulation. The position and
posture of the body of Pushpa when PW-8 and others
came to the house of the appellant-convict, as deposed
by PW-8, were not challenged in cross-examination.
This was duly taken note of by the Courts. In view of the
said decision and what is stated sin Taylor’s Principles
5
(2017) 8 SCC 497; 2017 INSC 479
Page 16 of 19
and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 13th Edn., Pp 307-
08, which were extracted in paragraph 14 of the
impugned judgment and in view of the position obtained
from the evidence of PW-8, we do not find any reason to
proceed further with the said contention that owing to the
non-rupture of hyoid bone the finding of homicidal death
invites interference.
18. Now, we will consider whether the appellant who
was bound to offer his version as to how the occurrence
had taken place in the circumstances obtained in this
case, had discharged his onus by virtue of Section 106 of
the Evidence Act. Section 106 is an exception to the
general rule laid down in Section 101, that the burden of
proving a fact rest on the party who substantially asserts
the affirmative of the issues and that this Section is not
intended to relieve any person of that duty or burden.
19. If some occurrence happened inside a residence
where the accused is supposed to be, he is bound to offer
his version as to how the occurrence had taken place. In
the case on hand, the prosecution had succeeded in
establishing, rather it is an attempt and undisputed fact
that the deceased and the appellant-convict were
residing in the place of occurrence, which is the house of
the accused. On the death of the wife, the appellant
Page 17 of 19
alone could offer an explanation, though this Section
could not be used so as to shift the onus of proving the
offence from the prosecution to the accused. In the
absence of explanation when other circumstances fasten
the culpability on the appellant’s failure to offer
satisfactory explanation as to the occurrence, the only
possible inference could be that the accused had
participated in the crime. (See the decisions in
Dnyaneshwar v. State of Maharashtra6, and Raj Kumar
Prasad Tamarkar v. State of Bihar and Anr.7).
20. As established by the prosecution, the place of
occurrence is the matrimonial home of the deceased
where the deceased and appellant were living. The
evidence of PW-8, Aarti that the deceased was being
tortured, physically and mentally was also not
controverted while being cross-examined, as held by
the two Courts. The Courts have taken note of the fact
that though PW-8 gave evidence to such effect while
being examined in chief, there was no cross-
examination on such points to make her untrustworthy.
21. The cumulative effect and impact of all such
circumstances explained together with the sturdy
6
(2007) 10 SCC 445; 2007 INSC 323
7
(2007) 10 SCC 433 ; 2007 INSC 3
Page 18 of 19
reasons assigned by the trial Court which got
confirmation from the impugned judgment, constrain us
to hold that this appeal is devoid of merits.
Consequently, the captioned appeal stands dismissed.
……………………, J.
(C.T. Ravikumar)
………..……..……………, J.
(Prashant Kumar Mishra)
New Delhi;
December 19, 2024.
Page 19 of 19