Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Md. Jamil & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 13 January, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 3244 of 2023
Md. Jamil & Ors.
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
With
CRR 4421 of 2023
Sisir Saha & Anr.
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
With
CRR 1947 of 2024
Akbar Ali & Anr.
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
With
CRR 1950 of 2024
Wakil Ahamed & Anr.
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Pawan Kr. Gupta
(in CRR 3244 of 2023) Ms. Sofia Nesar,
Mr. Santanu Sett.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Sekhar Kr. Basu, Sr. Adv.
(in CRR 4421 of 2023) Mr. Antarikhya Basu,
Mr. Sayan Mukherjee,
Ms. Madhumita Basak.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Kishore Mukherjee.
(in CRR 1947 & 1950 of 2024)
2
For the State (in CRR 3244 & : Mr. Debasish Roy, ld.PP
4421 of 2023) Mr. Bitasok Banerjee,
Ms. Subhasree Patel.
For the State (in CRR 1947 & : Mr. Debasish Roy, ld.PP
1950 of 2024) Mr. Bitasok Banerjee,
For the Private Opposite Party : Mr. Amarta Ghose,
(in CRR 1947 & 1950 of 2024) Mr. Vijay Verma.
For the Opposite Party No. 2 : Mr. Soumya Nag.
(in CRR 4421 of 2023)
For the Victim : Mr. Prosenjit Mukherjee,
(in CRR 4421 of 2023) Mr. Samrat Banerjee.
Hearing concluded on : 18.12.2024
Judgment on : 13.01.2025
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The present revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of entire proceedings, being G.R. Case No. 304 of 2023
arising out of Serampore P.S. Case No. 53 of 2023 dated 08.02.2023
under Sections 420/467/468/409/120B/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Serampore, Hooghly.
2. The petitioner’s case is that the on 26.05.2015, one Seema Singh
lodged a complaint before the Serampore Police Station, alleging
inter alia that:-
3
“……a piece of land measuring about 49 cottahs
comprising Plot nos. 7141, 7142 and 7143 (L.R) in L.R.
Khatian NO. 4317 under Mouza-Mahesh-15 under
Serampore Municipality known as Laalmath adjacent to
Serampore Housing Estate at R.K. Road belonging to
Bangeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. is lying vacant 30/35 years
since closure of the Mills, i.e. 1975 or before. As the factory
is closed forever, as per prevailing law the said plots are
vested with Government and in porcha there is nothing
corresponding to L.R. Khatian 4317 as u/s 6(3) of WBEA
Act and Section 4(1) of WBLR Act. Showing Subedar Khan
and Mastu Mia as absolute owner of the said plots, a
Power of Attorney has been executed in the names of (1)
Wakil Ahmed, (2) Mohammad Shamim and (3) Mohammad
Nayeem being No. 05541 executed on 07.08.2014 ARA-III,
Kolkata. On physical verification she came to know
that those two persons showing as owners do not live
at the mentioned addresses in Kamarhati and the
power of attorney is fabricated one. On the strength of
said power of attorney the aforesaid three persons have
been selling the said plots to laymen @ Rs.7 lakhs per
cottah at ARA-III, Kolkata by showing RS and CS plot nos.
On the basis of such complaint, Serampore Police Station
initiated a criminal case against the aforesaid three
persons namely (1) Wakil Ahmed, (2) Mohammad Shamim
Anwar and (3) Mohammad Nayeem, being Serampore
Police Station case No. 236 of 2015 dated 26.05.2015
under Sections 467/468/406/420/120B of the Indian
Penal Code and the said case ended up in Charge Sheet
being Charge Sheet No. 153 of 2016 dated 17.05.2016
under Sections 467/468/406/420/120B of the Indian
Penal Code against the aforesaid three persons (1) Wakil
Ahmed, (2) Samim Anowar @ Munna and (3) Mohammad
Nayeem…..”
3. One Aftab Alam also filed an application under Section 156(3) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court of learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate at Serampore, Hooghly on 01.02.2023
being C.R. Case NO. 51 of 2023 with a prayer to direct the
4
Serampore Police Station to treat the said application as complaint
and initiate an FIR.
4. The petitioners state that in the said application it has been alleged
that:-
“……40 kathas of land comprising R.S. Dag No. 1731
corresponding to L.R. Dag No. 7141 and 7142 in Mouza-
Mahesh, J.L. No. 15, L.R. Khatian No. 4317 adjacent to
Serampore Housing Estate (66, R.K. Road) known as
Lalmaath. The land still recorded in the name of
Bangeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. The land was lying vacant
since 1972 after the closure of the factory. Nasima
Parween who had been Councilor from 2015 to 2022
hatched a conspiracy with her husband Akbar Ali who is
existing Councilor, sold the entire land in fraudulent
manner. They lured Wakil Ahmed and Md. Shamim Anwar
for their nefarious mission and got a fraudulent power of
attorney registered being no. 190305100 dated
28.08.2016 executed at ARA-II, Kolkata in favour of Wakil
Ahmed and Md. Shamim Anwar by Subedar Khan of
Kamarhati. The land is vested to the State. It is noted u/s
6(3) of WBEA Act and Section 4 (c)(1) of WBLR Act
corresponding to L.R. Khatian No. 4317 as such no
individual have right to possess or sell the said land and
the power of attorney is illegal as Subedar Khan is
artificial person and does not live in the address
mentioned. On the basis of the said fraudulent power of
attorney several deeds have been executed at ARA-III,
Kolkata @ Rs.10 to 15 lakhs, about 22 deeds have been
executed and crores have been amassed by the
Councilors. The Councilor has managed to get the land
mutated in the name of purchaser at the municipality but
could not do it in the office of BL & LRO as it is termed as a
Govt. land in ROR……”
5. The petitioners in CRR 3244 of 2023 have signed as identifiers
and witnesses on some deeds which were allegedly executed on
the basis of fabricated power of attorney.
5
6. The petitioners in CRR 3244 of 2023 state that the petitioners
are party workers and on the request of Akbar Ali, the local
councilor, the petitioners became identifiers and witnesses in
the alleged deeds. The petitioners had no knowledge about the
said power of attorney being fake and on good faith and being
requested by the said Akbar Ali, the petitioners signed in the
said alleged deeds as identifiers and witnesses.
7. In CRR 4421 of 2023, the petitioner’s case (Sisir Saha & Imtiaz
Ahamed) is that the petitioner no. 1 is the erstwhile Councilor of
Ward No. 24, under the Serampore Municipality, Hooghly and held
the said office for about 25 years (i.e. from 1990 to 2014). During
his tenure as the Councilor, the integrity and dignity of the
petitioner no. 1 has never been blemished in any manner,
whatsoever. The petitioner no. 2 is self-employed as the proprietor
of M/s Raju Constructions, having his registered office at Premises
No. 13/A, PK Das Lane, Serampore, Post Office-Rishra, P.S.
Serampore, PIN-712248 which operates as Civil and Electrical
Contractor.
8. In CRR 1947 of 2024, the petitioners (Akbar Ali & Nasima
Parween) are the FIR named accused persons. The said petitioners
were the Councilors of the local areas where the land was allegedly
being transferred fraudulently.
9. In CRR 1950 of 2024, the petitioners (Wakil Ahamed & Md.
Shamim Anwar) are the ones who acted on the basis of the fake
power of attorney.
6
10. The State has filed a report on affidavit to the second
supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners in CRR 3244 of
2023.
11. From the materials on record and in the case diaries, it prima facie
appears that a large quantity of land vested with the Government
have been transferred allegedly by way of fake power of attorney
and several documents have been executed fraudulently.
12. The memo of evidence submitted through the State by the Assistant
Commissioner of Police-II, Serampore Sub Division, Chandannagar
Police Commissionerate reads as follows:-
“……that Nasima Parween who had been councilor
from 2015 to 2022 hatched conspiracy with her
husband Akbar Ali who is existing councilor, to sell
this entire land in fraudulent manner. They lured
Wakil Ahmed and Md. Shamim Anwar for their
nefarious mission/design and got fraudulent power of
attorney being no. 190305100, Dt. 28.08.16 executed
at ARA-II, Kolkata in favour of them by Subedar Khan
S/o Salamat Khan of Kamarhati. That it is to be noted
that when a factory is closed for indefinite period,
section 6(3) of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act and
section 4(c)(1) of West Bengal Land Reform Act apply
in respect of all lands and land is deemed to have
been vested to the state. The aforesaid sections are
noted against each plots in Khatian No. 4317 (LR)
that means, no private individuals have any right to
possess or sell it to any one in any way. Thus the
power of attorney is illegal based on fabrication of
facts as Subedar Khan is a artificial person having no
connection with the land. He also does not live at the
address mentioned in the power of attorney. That on
the basis of fraudulent power of attorney several
deeds have been executed at ARA-III, Kolkata @
Rs.10,00,000 to 15,00,000 per Khatha. That the
councilor has managed mutations of this land in
7favour of purchasers with municipality and holding
nos. have been allotted as 66/1 to 66/43 by the
municipality without verifying the authenticity of
power of attorney and deeds. On the basis of
complaint the above reference case has been started
and being endorsed by I/C, Serampore PS, the then
I.O. SI Soumen Kr. Nath took up its investigation……”
13. In Mohammad Wajid & Anr. vs State of U.P. & Ors., in criminal
appeal no. 2340 of 2023 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.
10656 of 2022), on 8 August, 2023, the Supreme Court held:-
“24. An offence under Section 503 has following
essentials:-
1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom
that person is interested.
2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which
that person is legally entitled to do as the means of
avoiding the execution of such threat.
25. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally
insulting a person and thereby provoking such person
insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a
person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted
may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public
peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may
not come within the purview of the section. But, the
words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an
intentional insult provoking the person insulted to
commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any
other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally
and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary
course of events lead the person insulted to break the
peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case
is not taken away from the purview of the Section
merely because the insulted person did not actually
break the peace or commit any offence having
exercised selfcontrol or having been subjected to abject
terror by the offender. In judging whether particular
abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the
8
court has to find out what, in the ordinary
circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive
language used and not what the complainant actually
did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool
temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary
general nature of the abusive language that is the test
for considering whether the abusive language is an
intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted
to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular
conduct or temperament of the complainant.
26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence,
may not amount to an intentional insult within the
meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the
necessary element of being likely to incite the person
insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence
and the other element of the accused intending to
provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the
peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to
commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive
language shall have to be decided in the light of the
facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot
be a general proposition that no one commits an
offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses
abusive language against the complainant. In King
Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78,
a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out
that:-
“To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is
sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause
the other party to lose his temper and say or do
something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry
words as well as deeds.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it
clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation.
Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out,
it must be established that the accused had an
intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
30. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the
Court invoking either the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings
quashed essentially on the ground that such
proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or
instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes
a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more
9
closely. We say so because once the complainant
decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior
motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he
would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well
drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The
complainant would ensure that the averments made in
the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence.
Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint
alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence
are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious
proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many
other attending circumstances emerging from the
record of the case over and above the averments and,
if need be, with due care and circumspection try to
read in between the lines. The Court while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article
226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to
the stage of a case but is empowered to take into
account the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take
for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been
registered over a period of time. It is in the background
of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs
assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge
as alleged.
31. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this
Court elaborated on the types of materials the High
Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a
fine distinction between consideration of materials that
were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such
evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to
prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for
quashing an FIR. The Court held:-
“5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that
authority so as to produce injustice, the court has
power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of
the process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings
10would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the
complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 :
1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some
categories of cases where inherent power can and
should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p.
869, para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report
or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in
their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence,
but there is no legal evidence adduced or the
evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to
prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction
between a case where there is no legal evidence
or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a
case where there is legal evidence which, on
appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would
not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the
function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no
doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
needless harassment. Court should be circumspect
and judicious in exercising discretion and should take
all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument
in the hands of a private complainant to unleash
vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same
time the section is not an instrument handed over to an
accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about
its sudden death…..”
(Emphasis supplied)
11
DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR
32. The alleged incident is said to have occurred
sometime in the year 2021. There is no reference to
any date or time of the incident in the FIR. The
allegations are too vague and general. Had it been the
case of prompt registration of the FIR, probably the
police might have been able to recover Rs. 2 Lakh from
the possession of the accused persons alleged to have
been forcibly taken away from the pocket of the first
informant. The FIR also talks about a document on
which the first informant and his brother were forced to
put their signatures. We wonder, whether the
investigating agency was in a position to collect or
recover any such document from the accused persons
containing their signatures in the course of the
investigation, more particularly when the State says
that the investigation is over and the charge sheet is
also ready. In the absence of all this material, how is
the State going to prove its case against the accused
persons. The FIR in a criminal case is an extremely
vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of
corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial.
The object of insisting upon lodging of the FIR to the
police in respect of commission of an offence is to
obtain early information regarding the circumstances in
which the crime was committed, the names of the
actual culprits and the part played by them as well as
names of the eye witnesses present at the scene of
occurrence.
33. In the aforesaid context, we may clarify that delay
in the registration of the FIR, by itself, cannot be a
ground for quashing of the FIR. However, delay with
other attending circumstances emerging from the
record of the case rendering the entire case put up by
the prosecution inherently improbable, may at times
become a good ground to quash the FIR and
consequential proceedings. If the FIR, like the one in
the case on hand, is lodged after a period of more than
one year without disclosing the date and time of the
alleged incident and further without any plausible and
convincing explanation for such delay, then how is the
accused expected to defend himself in the trial. It is
altogether different to say that in a given case, in the
course of investigation the investigating agency may be
able to ascertain the date and time of the incident, etc.
The recovery of few incriminating articles may also at
times lend credence to the allegations levelled in the
FIR. However, in the absence of all such materials
12
merely on the basis of vague and general allegations
levelled in the FIR, the accused cannot be put to trial.
34. The learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the State vehemently submitted that
considering the gross criminal antecedents of the
appellants before us, the criminal proceedings may not
be quashed. The learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the State in her written submissions has
furnished details in regard to the antecedents of the
appellants. A bare look at the chart may give an
impression that the appellants are history sheeters
and hardened criminals. However, when it comes to
quashing of the FIR or criminal proceedings, the
criminal antecedents of the accused cannot be the sole
consideration to decline to quash the criminal
proceedings. An accused has a legitimate right to say
before the Court that howsoever bad his antecedents
may be, still if the FIR fails to disclose commission of
any offence or his case falls within one of the
parameters as laid down by this Court in the case of
Bhajan Lal (supra), then the Court should not decline to
quash the criminal case only on the ground that the
accused is a history sheeter. Initiation of prosecution
has adverse and harsh consequences for the persons
named as accused. In Directorate of Revenue and
another v. Mohammed Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370,
this Court explicitly recognises the right to not to be
disturbed without sufficient grounds as one of the
underlying mandates of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Thus, the requirement and need to balance the law
enforcement power and protection of citizens from
injustice and harassment must be maintained. It goes
without saying that the State owes a duty to ensure
that no crime goes unpunished but at the same time it
also owes a duty to ensure that none of its subjects are
unnecessarily harassed.
35. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced
that the continuation of the criminal case arising from
the FIR No. 224 of 2022 registered at Mirzapur Police
Station, Saharanpur will be nothing but abuse of the
process of the law. In the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case, we are inclined to accept
the case put up on behalf of the appellants herein.
36. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The
criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 224 of 2022
dated 19.09.2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur,
Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed.
13
37. It is needless to clarify that the observations made
in this judgment are relevant only for the purpose of
the FIR in question and the consequential criminal
proceedings. None of the observations shall have any
bearing on any of the pending criminal prosecutions or
any other proceedings.”
14. The Supreme Court in Daxaben Vs The State of Gujarat & Ors.,
Criminal Appeal No……of 2022, on July 29, 2022, held that:-
“14. The proposition of law enunciated
and/or re-enunciated in the judgments cited
above are well settled. Whether the acts
alleged would constitute an offence, would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of
the case. Each case has to be judged on its
own merits.
16. It is not necessary for this Court to go
into the question of whether there was any
direct or indirect act of incitement to the
offence of abetment of suicide, since the
High Court has not gone into that question.
Suffice it to mention that even an indirect
act of incitement to the commission of
suicide would constitute the offence of
abetment of suicide under Section 306 of
the IPC.
20. In the aforesaid judgment, the High
Court referred to an order dated 6 th
December 2019 passed by a three Judge
Bench of this Court in Crl. Appeal No.1852
of 2019 (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Krishna Kumar Pandey) where this Court
held that in a revision arising out of
conviction, the High Court could not have
sealed the right of the employer to take
disciplinary action against the accused for
misconduct in accordance with the Service
Rules.
21. In Krishna Kumar Pandey (supra)
this Court referred with approval, to the
judgment of this Court in State of Punjab
v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors.
where this Court held that the High Court
was not denuded of inherent power to recall
a judgment and/or order which was
without jurisdiction, or in violation of
14principles of natural justice, or passed
without giving an opportunity of hearing to
a party affected by the order or where an
order was obtained by abusing the process
of Court which would really amount to its
being without jurisdiction. Inherent powers
can be exercised to recall such orders.
24. Be that as it may, since the initial order
dated 20th October 2020 is also under
challenge in these appeals, it is really not
necessary for this Court to delve deeper into
the question of whether a final order passed
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. quashing
an FIR could have, at all, been recalled by
the High Court, in the absence of any
specific provision in the Cr.P.C. for recall
and/or review of such order. The High
Court has, in effect, held that in exceptional
circumstances, such orders can be recalled,
in exercise of the inherent power of the High
Court, to prevent injustice.
25. The only question in this appeal is
whether the Criminal Miscellaneous
Applications filed by the accused under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could have been
allowed and an FIR under Section 306 of
the IPC for abetment to commit suicide,
entailing punishment of imprisonment of ten
years, could have been quashed on the
basis of a settlement between the
complainant and the accused named in the
FIR. The answer to the aforesaid question
cannot, but be in the negative.
28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of
U.P., this Court held that inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C
has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down
in the section itself.
29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse
of the process of the Court, the High Court
might in exercise of its inherent powers
under Section 482 quash criminal
proceedings. However, interference would
only be justified when the complaint did not
disclose any offence, or was patently
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held
15by this Court in Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R.
Prasanna Kumar.
30. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others., a
three-Judge Bench of this Court held:-
“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of
the present Code is the ad verbatim copy of
Section 561- A of the old Code. This
provision confers a separate and
independent power on the High Court alone
to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases
where grave and substantial injustice has
been done or where the process of the court
has been seriously abused. It is not merely
a revisional power meant to be exercised
against the orders passed by subordinate
courts. It was under this section that in the
old Code, the High Courts used to quash the
proceedings or expunge uncalled for
remarks against witnesses or other persons
or subordinate courts. Thus, the scope,
ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is
now Section 482) is quite different from the
powers conferred by the present Code
under the provisions of Section 397. It may
be that in some cases there may be
overlapping but such cases would be few
and far between. It is well settled that the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the
present Code can be exercised only when
no other remedy is available to the litigant
and not where a specific remedy is provided
by the statute. Further, the power being an
extraordinary one, it has to be exercised
sparingly. If these considerations are kept
in mind, there will be no inconsistency
between Sections 482 and 397(2) of the
present Code.
7. The limits of the power under Section 482
were clearly definedby this Court in Raj
Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J.
observed as follows : [SCC para 10, p. 47 :
SCC (Cri) p. 76]
“Even so, a general principle pervades this
branch of law when a specific provision is
made : easy resort to inherent power is not
right except under compelling
circumstances. Not that there is absence of
16jurisdiction but that inherent power should
not invade areas set apart for specific
power under the same Code.”
8. Another important consideration which is
to be kept in mind is as to when the High
Court acting under the provisions of Section
482 should exercise the inherent power
insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings
are concerned. This matter was gone into in
greater detail in Smt. Nagawwa v.
Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3
SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 : 1976 Supp
SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where the
scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the
present Code was considered and while
laying down the guidelines and the grounds
on which proceedings could be quashed this
Court observed as follows : [SCC para 5, p.
741 : SCC (Cri) pp. 511-12]
“Thus it may be safely held that in the
following cases an order of the Magistrate
issuing process against the accused can be
quashed or set aside:
(1) where the allegations made in the
complaint or thestatements of the witnesses
recorded in support of the same taken at
their face value make out absolutely no
case against the accused or the complaint
does not disclose the essential ingredients
of an offence which is alleged against the
accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the
complaint are patentlyabsurd and
inherently improbable so that no prudent
person can ever reach a conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the
Magistrate inissuing process is capricious
and arbitrary having been based either on
no evidence or on materials which are
wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from
fundamental legaldefects, such as, want of
sanction, or absence of a complaint by
legally competent authority and the like.
The cases mentioned by us are purely
illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines
17
to indicate contingencies where the High
Court can quash proceedings.”
9. Same view was taken in a later decision
of this Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha v.
State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505 : 1977
SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri
LJ 1146] where Bhagwati, J. speaking for
the Court observed as follows : [SCC para 2,
p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
“It is now settled law that where the
allegations set out in the complaint or the
charge-sheet do not constitute any offence,
it is competent to the High Court exercising
its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the
order passed by the Magistrate taking
cognizance of the offence.
10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that
proceedings against an accused in the
initial stages can be quashed only if on the
face of the complaint or the papers
accompanying the same, no offence is
constituted. In other words, the test is that
taking the allegations and the complaint as
they are, without adding or subtracting
anything, if no offence is made out then the
High Court will be justified in quashing the
proceedings in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 of the present Code.”
31. As held by this Court in State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Gourieshetty
Mahesh, the High Court, while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C,
would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry into whether the evidence is reliable
or not or whether there is reasonable
possibility that the accusation would not be
sustained.
32. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttrakhand, this Court held:–
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code the High Court has
to be cautious. This power is to be used
sparingly and only for the purpose of
preventing abuse of the process of any court
or otherwise to secure ends of justice.
Whether a complaint discloses a criminal
offence or not depends upon the nature of
facts alleged therein. Whether essential
18ingredients of criminal offence are present
or not has to be judged by the High Court.
…”
33. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, a
three Judge Bench of this Court
summarized the law with regard to
quashing of criminal proceedings under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:–
“7. The legal position is well settled that
when a prosecution at the initial stage is
asked to be quashed, the test to be applied
by the court is as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made prima
facie establish the offence. It is also for the
court to take into consideration any special
features which appear in a particular case
to consider whether it is expedient and in
the interest of justice to permit a prosecution
to continue. This is so on the basis that the
court cannot be utilised for any oblique
purpose and where in the opinion of the
court chances of an ultimate conviction are
bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is
likely to be served by allowing a criminal
prosecution to continue, the court may while
taking into consideration the special facts of
a case also quash the proceeding even
though it may be at a preliminary stage.”
34. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, this Court observed:–
“46. The court must ensure that criminal
prosecution is not used as an instrument of
harassment or for seeking private vendetta
or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the
accused. On analysis of the aforementioned
cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down an
inflexible rule that would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section
482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when it is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the statute itself
and in the aforementioned cases. In view of
the settled legal position, the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained.”
19
35. It is a well settled proposition of law
that criminal prosecution, if otherwise
justified, is not vitiated on account of
malafides or vendetta. As said by Krishna
Iyer, J. in State of Punjab v. Gurdial
Singh “if the use of the power for the
fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation
or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”
36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay
Sharma & Others, this Court observed
that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed
to achieve the purpose of ensuring that
criminal proceedings are not permitted to
degenerate into weapons of harassment.
37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of
abetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-
compoundable offence. Of course, the
inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and can
even be exercised to quash criminal
proceedings relating to non-compoundable
offences, to secure the ends of justice or to
prevent abuse of the process of Court.
Where the victim and offender have
compromised disputes essentially civil and
personal in nature, the High Court can
exercise its power under Section 482 of the
CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings. In
what cases power to quash an FIR or a
criminal complaint or criminal proceedings
upon compromise can be exercised, would
depend on the facts and circumstances of
the case.
38. However, before exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash
an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal
proceedings, the High Court, as observed
above, has to be circumspect and have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. Heinous or serious crimes, which
are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society cannot be quashed on the
basis of a compromise between the offender
and the complainant and/or the victim.
Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity
and even abetment to commit suicide are
neither private nor civil in nature. Such
crimes are against the society. In no
circumstances can prosecution be quashed
20
on compromise, when the offence is serious
and grave and falls within the ambit of
crime against society.
39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or
complaints relating to grave and serious
offences only on basis of an agreement with
the complainant, would set a dangerous
precedent, where complaints would be
lodged for oblique reasons, with a view to
extract money from the accused.
Furthermore, financially strong offenders
would go scot free, even in cases of grave
and serious offences such as murder, rape,
brideburning, etc. by buying off
informants/complainants and settling with
them. This would render otiose provisions
such as Sections 306, 498A, 304-B etc.
incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with
a specific social purpose.
40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position
of the complainant isonly that of the
informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal
complaint is lodged and a criminal case is
started by the State, it becomes a matter
between the State and the accused. The
State has a duty to ensure that law and
order is maintained in society. It is for the
state to prosecute offenders. In case of
grave and serious noncompoundable
offences which impact society, the
informant and/or complainant only has the
right of hearing, to the extent of ensuring
that justice is done by conviction and
punishment of the offender. An informant
has no right in law to withdraw the
complaint of a noncompoundable offence of
a grave, serious and/or heinous nature,
which impacts society.
41. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab,
this Court discussed the circumstances in
which the High Court quashes criminal
proceedings in case of a non-compoundable
offence, when there is a settlement between
the parties and enunciated the following
principles:-
“58. Where the High Court quashes a
criminal proceeding having regard to the
fact that the dispute between the offender
and the victim has been settled although
21the offences are not compoundable, it does
so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal
proceedings will be an exercise in futility
and justice in the case demands that the
dispute between the parties is put to an end
and peace is restored; securing the ends of
justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No
doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful
effect on the public and consist in
wrongdoing that seriously endangers and
threatens the well-being of the society and it
is not safe to leave the crime-doer only
because he and the victim have settled the
dispute amicably or that the victim has been
paid compensation, yet certain crimes have
been made compoundable in law, with or
without the permission of the court. In
respect of serious offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of
mental depravity under IPC or offences of
moral turpitude under special statutes, like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity, the settlement
between the offender and the victim can
have no legal sanction at all. However,
certain offences which overwhelmingly and
predominantly bear civil flavour having
arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial,
financial, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony, particularly relating to dowry,
etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong
is basically to the victim and the offender
and the victim have settled all disputes
between them amicably, irrespective of the
fact that such offences have not been made
compoundable, the High Court may within
the framework of its inherent power, quash
the criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the
face of such settlement, there is hardly any
likelihood of the offender being convicted
and by not quashing the criminal
proceedings, justice shall be casualty and
ends of justice shall be defeated. The above
list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each
case will depend on its own facts and no
hard-and-fast category can be prescribed”.
22
42. In Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, this Court held that in case of
heinous and serious offences, which are
generally to be treated as crime against
society, it is the duty of the State to punish
the offender. Hence, even when there is a
settlement, the view of the offender and
victim will not prevail since it is in the
interest of society that the offender should
be punished to deter others from committing
a similar crime.
43. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram
Anantrai Doshi, this Court held:-
“26. … availing of money from a
nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged
by the investigating agency, vividly exposits
fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial
fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in
the charge-sheet cannot be put in the
compartment of an individual or personal
wrong. It is a social wrong and it has
immense societal impact. It is an accepted
principle of handling of finance that
whenever there is manipulation and
cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of
these kinds of benefits it cannot be
regarded as a case having overwhelmingly
and predominatingly civil character. The
ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a
hazard in the financial interest of the
society. The gravity of the offence creates a
dent in the economic spine of the nation. …”
44. In CBI v. Maninder Singh, this Court
held:-
“17. … In economic offences the Court must
not only keep in view that money has been
paid to the bank which has been defrauded
but also the society at large. It is not a case
of simple assault or a theft of a trivial
amount; but the offence with which we are
concerned was well planned and was
committed with a deliberate design with an
eye on personal profit regardless of
consequence to the society at large. To
quash the proceeding merely on the ground
that the accused has settled the amount
with the bank would be a misplaced
sympathy. If the prosecution against the
economic offenders are not allowed to
23continue, the entire community is
aggrieved.”
45. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R.
Vasanthi Stanley, this Court held:-
“14. … Lack of awareness, knowledge or
intent is neither to be considered nor
accepted in economic offences. The
submission assiduously presented on
gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence
under the criminal law is an offence and it
does not depend upon the gender of an
accused. True it is, there are certain
provisions in CrPC relating to exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein
but that altogether pertains to a different
sphere. A person committing a murder or
getting involved in a financial scam or
forgery of documents, cannot claim
discharge or acquittal on the ground of her
gender as that is neither constitutionally nor
statutorily a valid argument. The offence is
gender neutral in this case. We say no more
on this score.
15. … A grave criminal offence or serious
economic offence or for that matter the
offence that has the potentiality to create a
dent in the financial health of the
institutions, is not to be quashed on the
ground that there is delay in trial or the
principle that when the matter has been
settled it should be quashed to avoid the
load on the system. …”
46. In Parbatbhai Aahir Alias
Parbathbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and
Others v. State of Gujrat and Another, a
threeJudge Bench of this Court quoted
Narinder Singh (supra), Vikram
Anantrai Doshi (supra), CBI v. Maninder
Singh (supra), R. Vasanthi Stanley
(supra) and held:-
“16. The broad principles which emerge
from the precedents on the subject, may be
summarised in the following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent
powers of the High Court to prevent an
abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision
does not confer new powers. It only
24recognises and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of
the High Court to quash a first information
report or a criminal proceeding on the
ground that a settlement has been arrived
at between the offender and the victim is
not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding
an offence. While compounding an offence,
the power of the court is governed by the
provisions of Section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to
quash under Section 482 is attracted even if
the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a
criminal proceeding or complaint should be
quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482, the High Court must evaluate
whether the ends of justice would justify
the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High
Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has
to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of
justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the
process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a
complaint or first information report should
be quashed on the ground that the offender
and victim have settled the dispute,
revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be
formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under
Section 482 and while dealing with a plea
that the dispute has been settled, the High
Court must have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the offence. Heinous and
serious offences involving mental depravity
or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed
though the victim or the family of the victim
have settled the dispute. Such offences are,
truly speaking, not private in nature but
have a serious impact upon society. The
decision to continue with the trial in such
cases is founded on the overriding element
25of public interest in punishing persons for
serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious
offences, there may be criminal cases which
have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a
distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the
inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences
which arise from commercial, financial,
mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour
may in appropriate situations fall for
quashing where parties have settled the
dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may
quash the criminal proceeding if in view of
the compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would
cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the
principle set out in propositions 16.8. and
16.9. above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the
State have implications which lie beyond
the domain of a mere dispute between
private disputants. The High Court would
be justified in declining to quash where the
offender is involved in an activity akin to a
financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or
economic system will weigh in the balance.”
47. In State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Laxmi Narayan & Ors., a three-Judge
Bench discussed the earlier judgments of
this Court and laid down the following
principles:-
“15. Considering the law on the point and
the other decisions of this Court on the
point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed
and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under
Section 482 of the Code to quash the
criminal proceedings for the non-
compoundable offences under Section 320
of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil
26
character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes
and when the parties have resolved the
entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in
those prosecutions which involved heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society;
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be
exercised for the offences under the special
statutes like the Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the
offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and
the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category
of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against
the society and not against the individual
alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section
307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which
have a serious impact on the society cannot
be quashed in exercise of powers under
Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that
the parties have resolved their entire
dispute amongst themselves. However, the
High Court would not rest its decision
merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be
open to the High Court to examine as to
whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is
there for the sake of it or the prosecution
has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to framing the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by
the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used,
etc. However, such an exercise by the High
Court would be permissible only after the
evidence is collected after investigation and
27
the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed
and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not
permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate
conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the
decision of this Court in Narinder Singh
[(2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54]
should be read harmoniously and to be
read as a whole and in the circumstances
stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under
Section 482 of the Code to quash the
criminal proceedings in respect of
noncompoundable offences, which are
private in nature and do not have a serious
impact on society, on the ground that there
is a settlement/compromise between the
victim and the offender, the High Court is
required to consider the antecedents of the
accused; the conduct of the accused,
namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding,
how he had managed with the complainant
to enter into a compromise, etc.”
48. In Arun Singh and Others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh Through its Secretary
and Another, this Court held:-
“14. In another decision in Narinder Singh
v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014)
3 SCC (Cri) 54] it has been observed that in
respect of offence against the society it is
the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even
where there is a settlement between the
offender and victim the same shall not
prevail since it is in interests of the society
that offender should be punished which
acts as deterrent for others from committing
similar crime. On the other hand, there may
be offences falling in the category where the
correctional objective of criminal law would
have to be given more weightage than the
theory of deterrent punishment. In such
cases, the court may be of the opinion that a
settlement between the parties would lead
to better relations between them and would
resolve a festering private dispute and thus
may exercise power under Section 482
CrPC for quashing the proceedings or the
complaint or the FIR as the case may be.
28
15. Bearing in mind the above principles
which have been laiddown, we are of the
view that offences for which the appellants
have been charged are in fact offences
against society and not private in nature.
Such offences have serious impact upon
society and continuance of trial of such
cases is founded on the overriding effect of
public interests in punishing persons for
such serious offences. It is neither an
offence arising out of commercial, financial,
mercantile, partnership or such similar
transactions or has any element of civil
dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing.
In such cases, settlement even if arrived at
between the complainant and the accused,
the same cannot constitute a valid ground
to quash the FIR or the charge-sheet.
16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to
be unjustified inrefusing to quash the
charge-sheet on the ground of compromise
between the parties.”
49. In exercise of power under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine
the correctness of the allegation in the
complaint except in exceptionally rare cases
where it is patently clear that the
allegations are frivolous or do not disclose
any offence.
50. In our considered opinion, the Criminal
Proceeding cannot be nipped in the bud by
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Cr. P.C. only because there is a
settlement, in this case a monetary
settlement, between the accused and the
complainant and other relatives of the
deceased to the exclusion of the hapless
widow of the deceased. As held by the
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi
Narayan & Ors. (supra), Section 307 of the
IPC falls in the category of heinous and
serious offences and are to be treated as
crime against society and not against the
individual alone. On a parity of reasoning,
offence under section 306 of the IPC would
fall in the same category. An FIR under
Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be
quashed on the basis of any financial
settlement with the informant, surviving
29
spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-
givers or anyone else. It is clarified that it
was not necessary for this Court to examine
the question whether the FIR in this case
discloses any offence under Section 306 of
the IPC, since the High Court, in exercise of
its power under Section 482 CrPC, quashed
the proceedings on the sole ground that the
disputes between the accused and the
informant had been compromised.”
15. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2012
SC (Cri) 1796, it was held:-
“57. The position that emerges from the
above discussion can be summarised thus:
the power of the High Court in quashing a
criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given
to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no
statutory limitation but it has to be
exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to
secure the ends of justice or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any
Court. In what cases power to quash the
criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R
may be exercised where the offender and
victim have settled their dispute would
depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of
such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the
crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly
quashed even though the victim or victim’s
family and the offender have settled the
dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like
30Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working
in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any
basis for quashing criminal proceedings
involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and pre-
dominatingly civil flavour stand on different
footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership or such like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony relating to
dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the
wrong is basically private or personal in
nature and the parties have resolved their
entire dispute. In this category of cases,
High Court may quash criminal proceedings
if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak
and continuation of criminal case would put
accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case
despite full and complete settlement and
compromise with the victim. In other words,
the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal
proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends
of justice, it is appropriate that criminal
case is put to an end and if the answer to
the above question(s) is in affirmative, the
High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding.”
16. In the cases before this Court, Bank account details of the accused
persons have been collected. Statements of purchasers of the said
lands recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. shows that prima facie
there has been transaction of money in the present case, (allegedly)
31
fraudulently transferring land vested with the Government and the
investigation in this case is required to be an extensive one
considering the huge transfer of Government land on the basis of
prima facie false and fabricated documents and as such
interfering in such a proceedings/investigation will be sheer abuse
of the process of law.
17. CRR 3244 of 2023 with CRR 4421 of 2023 with CRR 1947 of
2024 with CRR 1950 of 2024 are thus dismissed.
18. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.
19. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
20. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for
necessary compliance.
21. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties expeditiously after due compliance.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)