Delhi High Court
Mohd Sabuddin vs Mohd Zakir on 8 October, 2024
Author: Chandra Dhari Singh
Bench: Chandra Dhari Singh
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on : 12th July, 2024
Pronounced on: 8th October, 2024
+ MAC.APP. 763/2016
MOHD SABUDDIN .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Manpreet Kaur, Advocate
versus
MOHD ZAKIR .....Respondent
Through: Mr. S.D. Wadhwa, with respondent
in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH
JUDGMENT
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.
1. The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 (hereinafter as the “Act/ MV Act”) has been filed on behalf of the
appellant challenging the judgment dated 20th February, 2016 (hereinafter
as the “impugned order”) passed by the learned Motor Vehicles Claims
Tribunal, South East District, Saket Court, New Delhi (hereinafter as the
“Tribunal”) in Suit No. 335/14, seeking the following reliefs –
“a) Call for the Trial Court records.
b) Set aside the judgment and order dated 20.02.2016 passed
by Ms. Madhu Jain, Presiding Officer, Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, South East District/ Saket Courts, New
Delhi in suit no.33/ 14 in FIR case no.406/ 04 PS Sangam
Vihar, New Delhi.
b) Pass any such order(s) which this Hon’ble Court deems fit
and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case
and in the interest of justice.”
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Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN
KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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FACTUAL MATRIX
2. On 1st June, 2004, at about 9:45 AM, Mr. Mohd. Zakir, the
respondent no. 1 herein/claimant before the learned Tribunal, was riding
his Chetak Scooter bearing registration number DL-3S-D-6493 along
with his brother-in-law, Mr. Mohd. Usman, from Sangam Vihar to
Subhash Camp. When the claimant reached near one shop namely Munna
Auto Welder, Shanny Bazar, Devli, New Delhi, one scooter bearing
registration number DNF-7071 (hereinafter as the “offending vehicle”),
allegedly being driven in a rash and negligent manner, coming from the
opposite direction, collided with the claimant‟s vehicle. As an effect, the
claimant and the pillion rider fell from the scooter and the claimant
sustained grievous head injuries. Consequently, the claimant was
immediately moved to the Batra Hospital, Delhi for his medical
treatment.
3. Thereafter, an FIR bearing number 406/2004 was registered with
Police Station Sangam Vihar and upon completion of the investigation,
charge-sheet was filed against the appellant/driver under sections 279/338
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
4. Subsequently, the claimant filed a claim petition bearing Suit no.
335/14 before the learned Tribunal seeking compensation for the grievous
injuries sustained by him in the accident. In its impugned order, the
learned Tribunal held that the appellant/driver was driving in a rash and
negligent manner, thereby, causing grievous injuries to the respondent
no.1/claimant, and awarded a compensation of Rs.2,72,922/- with an
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KUMAR BABBAR
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interest @ 9% to be payable by the appellant/driver from the date of filing
of the said claim petition till its realisation.
5. Aggrieved by the impugned award, the appellant has filed the
instant appeal seeking setting aside of the impugned order.
PLEADINGS BEFORE THE COURT
6. By way of filing this instant appeal, the respondent no. 1/claimant
has challenged the impugned award on the following grounds:
“C. Because the respondent filed his complaint on
4.8.2008 after a period of 4 years and 2 months 3 days
and as per document filed by the respondent, respondent
was admitted in the Batra Hospital on 1.6.2004 and
discharge on 12.06.2004 and no treatment was taken by
the respondent after the discharge, respondent first visit
to OPD of “Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied
Science” on 27th January 2010 and submitted before the
doctor that respondent has filed an accident case in the
court against the petitioner, further it is pertinent to
mention that all the Medical bill are from 2010 onward
for the disease diagnosed with abdominal tuberculosis,
which has no relation with any kind of physical disability
or accidental injuries the same is due to bacterial
infection., which was proved in chief of PW-5 dated
29.08.2014 by Dr. Pradeep Gupta Sr. Resident HAH
Centenary Hospital, Hamdard Nagar, New Delhi.
D. Because it is also admitted by the respondent that
respondent was driving the Scooter without driving
License, it can be said that respondent did not have any
driving license even the scooter of the respondent was
also not insured if said scooter is insured respondent
could have claim the damages from the insurances
company but his scooter was not insurance further he has
failed to produce the same even failed to give any
information about his driving license moreover he was
driving the scooter without helmet and in rash andSignature Not Verified
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negligent manner as he has admitted that there is no
traffic on the road at the time of accident and respondent
had noticed the petitioner and his scooter at a distance of
about 10 fit for the first time before the accident”, it
means that he was driving the scooter in rash and
negligent manner because of high speed he cannot able to
see the other traffic and he did not see the petitioner and
falsely involved his name because he knows the petitioner,
otherwise in general case when the road is open person
can see the other side traffic more than 30 to 40 fit easily.
Hence it is clear case of gross negligence on the part of
respondent driving without driving license, without
insurance, without helmet and falsely involved the
petitioner name in the accident who has no knowledge
about the same, hence, respondent is not entitled for any
claim as prayed in the claim petition.
***
G. Because petitioner was working with Deepak Ray who
is running business of manufacturing of spare parts for
submersible motor and pump under the name and style of
M/s Deepak Engineering works at Shop No.2/20
Dakshinpuri and respondent join the job of Deepak Rai in
January 2004 and worked up to 2006, it is also admitted
by the Deepak Rai that petitioner was working as
plumber but Deepak Rai has failed to produce the
documents about the worker’s salary and other registered
which are necessary to maintained as company Act and
as claimed by Deepak Rai that he had sold the scooter to
petitioner in the year 1998 is wrong because petitioner
has joined the service of Deepak Rai in January 2004 and
receipt was prepared by Deepak Rai in his handwriting
himself and obtained the signature of petitioner only after
2004, further it is matter of record that Deepak Rai has
stated in their xxx that he sold the scooter for the sum of
Rs.10,000/- is also wrong as no receipt was produced by
Deepak Rai for the said amount and said scooter was
used by the petitioner and other workers for attending the
complaint. Further, it is also matter of record thatSignature Not Verified
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petitioner is poor person and residing in Jhuggi and did
not have such big amount to pay in the 1998. Hence
subject scooter ownership is in the name of Deepak Rai
only.
***
I. Because as the claim filed by the respondent it was
admitted by the respondent that both the scooter heated
from the front was head on collusion hence it is a case of
contributory negligence on the part of respondent and
petitioner.
J. Because the respondent was driving scooter without
having the valid driving license even respondent did not
have the insurance of the said scooter in the year 2004,
he has contributed to the accident, his act are to be taken
as contributory negligence, hence he is not entitled for
the same.
***
L. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the
fact that respondent during his cross examination has
categorically admitted as under:-
‘He further stated that he had a driving license at the
time of accident but the same has been misplaced. He
does not have the copy of the said driving license.”
Which clearly shows that the respondent was not having
any valid driving license at any point of time. Without
prejudice it is submitted that the alleged accident, if any,
was caused due to the negligence of the respondent. The
appellant herein has been unnecessarily dragged in false
and frivolous case. Further it is highly improbable that in
case the respondent holding any valid license, the same
ought to have been brought before the Ld. Trial Court by
the respondent. The respondent is trying to become enrich
illegally for his own fault.
M. Because the Ld. Trial Court further failed to consider
the act that the respondent in his cross examination has
admitted as under:-
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Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN
KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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“The contents of his Affidavit Exb. PW1/A had not been
read over or explained to him by his counsel and he had
appended his thumb impression on being asked by his
counsel…………….. He cannot recollect about the thumb
impression at point B on the petition Exb. PWl/R-1.”
7. No reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 in
the instant appeal and therefore, this Court is adjudicating the instant
appeal on the basis of the material placed on record.
SUMBISSIONS
(on behalf of the appellant)
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted
that the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal is liable to be set
aside as the same is passed in contravention to the settled principles of
law and facts of the case. It is further submitted that the claim petition
was filed by the claimant after a considerable delay of 4 years, 2 months
and 3 days and therefore, the same has been erroneously decided by the
learned Tribunal.
9. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in not considering the
fact that the claimant failed to stop its vehicle despite seeing the appellant
coming from the opposite direction, which was at a distance of 10 feet.
This only proves that the claimant was driving the vehicle in a high
speed, thereby, being rash and negligent, due to which the accident
occurred.
10. It is further submitted that the claimant did not possess a valid
driving license at the time of the accident, which is a punishable offence
under the Act. Hence, non-possession of driving license amounts to rash
and negligent driving, thereby, contributing to the accident.
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KUMAR BABBAR
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11. It is submitted that the claimant did not have an insurance cover for
his vehicle, which is mandatory as per the provisions of the Act.
Moreover, at the time of the accident, the claimant was driving the
vehicle without paying any adherence to the mandate of wearing of the
helmet, which is another violation of the provisions of the Act. Hence, the
appellant herein has been wrongly held liable to pay the compensation.
12. It is submitted that at the time of accident, the appellant was
working as a plumber with Mr. Deepak Ray/respondent no.2, who was
running a business of manufacturing spare parts for submersible motor
pumps, under the name and guise of M/s Deepak Engineering Works, and
had been employed from the years 2004 to 2006.
13. It is submitted that the respondent no.2 wrongly claimed that the
offending vehicle was sold to the appellant in the year 1998, whereas the
appellant joined the respondent no.2 only in the year 2004. Moreover, the
respondent no.2 falsely testified that he had obtained the signature of the
appellant on a handwritten receipt, which was prepared by the respondent
no.2 and that the offending vehicle was sold to the appellant for a sum of
Rs. 10,000/-.
14. It is submitted that since the sale transaction between appellant and
respondent no.2 has not taken place, the ownership of the offending
vehicle lies with the respondent no.2 and hence, the learned Tribunal has
wrongly held that the appellant is liable to pay the compensation amount
despite the respondent no.2 being the owner of the offending vehicle.
Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
15. It is submitted that the appellant is economically and socially
underprivileged, who is dwelling in a Jhuggi cluster and works as a
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KUMAR BABBAR
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plumber, which makes it difficult for him to make his two ends meet on a
daily basis.
16. Therefore, in view of the foregoing submissions, it is submitted
that the instant appeal may be allowed, and the impugned order may be
set aside.
(on behalf of the respondent no. 1)
17. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent no.1/claimant before the learned Tribunal vehemently
opposed the instant appeal submitting to the effect that the same is liable
to be dismissed being bereft of any merits.
18. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal was right in holding the
appellant liable for rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. It
is also submitted that the submissions advanced by the learned counsel
for the appellants are incorrect as both the claimant and the pillion rider
were wearing helmets at the time of the accident, despite which the
claimant incurred grievous head injury. Furthermore, the respondent no.1
was a valid holder of driving license when the accident took place.
19. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to make respondent
no. 2 liable for paying the compensation along with the appellant, as the
former is a registered owner of the offending vehicle as per the records of
Registering Authority, and therefore, he is liable to be made jointly and
severally liable to pay the compensation amount to the claimant.
20. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal has perused the testimonies
of the witnesses in detail in the impugned order, which also includes the
averments made with respect to the liability of registered owner.
However, the said issue on liability has not been discussed by the learned
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KUMAR BABBAR
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Tribunal while passing the impugned order and has failed to make the
respondent no. 2 liable to pay the compensation amount.
21. It is submitted that as per the settled position of law, the registered
owner of a vehicle is bound by law to visit the Registering Authority for
formally transferring the vehicle in the name of the purchaser after the
completion of the sale transaction.
22. It is submitted that the respondent no.2 is jointly and severally
liable along with the appellant to pay the overall compensation awarded
to the respondent no.1/ claimant.
23. Therefore, in view of the foregoing contentions, it is prayed that
the instant appeal may be partly allowed qua the liability of the
respondent no.2 to pay the compensation.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
24. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
25. The instant appeal is admitted.
26. It is the case of the appellant that the learned Tribunal failed in
taking into account the law and facts in determining the negligence of the
respondent no.1/claimant, who was driving his vehicle in a rash and
negligent manner, without possessing a valid driving licence, vehicular
insurance, helmet etc., at the time of the accident, which are a mandate as
per the provisions of the Act.
27. In rival submissions, it is contended by the respondent no.1/
claimant that the learned Tribunal rightly held that the appellant herein
was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, thereby
causing severe injuries to the claimant and there arises no contributory
negligence on his part. It is contended that the respondent no.2 is the
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KUMAR BABBAR
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rightful owner of the offending vehicle as his name appears as a
registered owner in the records of the Registering Authority. Hence, it is
prayed that the instant appeal may be partly allowed qua the liability of
respondent no.2 in paying the compensation.
28. Taking into consideration the aforesaid arguments, the following
issues arise before this Court for adjudication:-
I. Whether the respondent no.1/ claimant was driving the vehicle in
a rash and negligent manner?
II. Whether Mr. Deepak Ray/respondent no. 2, allegedly being a
registered owner of the offending vehicle, be made jointly and
severally liable to pay the compensation to the claimant?
29. Before delving into the issues at hand, this Court deems it apposite
to peruse the findings and reasons recorded by the learned Tribunal in the
impugned order. The relevant portion of the same is reproduced as
follows –
“Issue no. 1 (Negligence)
20. PW1 Mohd. Zakir in his affidavit of evidence
(Ex.PW1/A) categorically stated that he got injuries due to
the rash and negligent driving of respondent no. 1. Nothing
came in his cross examination to disbelieve his version. His
version is duly corroborated by police investigation. Police
during investigation also found respondent no.1 accused of
rash and negligent driving, hence chargesheeted him for
commission of offence under section 279/338 of Indian
Penal Code.
21. To determine the negligence of the driver of the
offending vehicle, I am being guided by the judgment of
Hon’ble High Court (MP) in case titled as “Basant Kaur &
Ors Vs. Chattar Pal Singh and Ors” [2003 ACJ 369 MPSignature Not Verified
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(DB)], wherein it has been held that registration of a
criminal case against the driver of the offending vehicle is
enough to record the finding that the driver of offending
vehicle is responsible for causing the accident. Further it
has been held in catena of cases that the proceedings under
the Motor Vehicles Act are not akin to the proceedings as in
civil suit and hence strict rules of evidence are not required
to be followed in this regard. I am also being guided by the
judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in “National
Insurance Company Limited V5. Pushpa Rana” (2009 ACJ
287), wherein it was held that in case the petitioner files the
certified copy of the criminal record or the criminal record
showing the completion of the investigation by the police or
the issuance of charge sheet under Section 279/304 A IPC or
the certified copy of the FIR or in addition the recovery
memo or the mechanical inspection report of the offending
vehicle, these documents are sufficient proof to reach to the
conclusion that the driver was negligent. It is also settled
law that the term rashness and negligence has to be
constructed lightly while making a decision on a petition for
claim for the same as compared to the word rashness and
negligence as finds mention in the Indian Penal Code. This
is because the chapter in the Motor Vehicle Act dealing with
compensation is a benevolent legislation and not a penal
one.
22. In view of the above discussion, petitioner is able to
prove that he suffered injuries due to rash and negligent
driving of the respondent no. 1. Accordingly the issue no. 1
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Issue no. 2 (Compensation)
23. In injury cases, the claimants are entitled to pecuniary
as well as non pecuniary damages. Apex court in Raj Kumar
Vs. Ajay Kumar 2011 (1) SCC 343 held that compensation
awarded must be “just compensation” means to the extent
possible Tribunal fully and adequately restore the claimant
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to the position which he/she was having prior to the
accident. The person is not only to be compensated for
physical injury, but also for loss which he /she suffered as a
result of such injury. Apex court in R.D.Hatangadi Vs Press
Control (India) Pvt Ltd (1995) 1 SCC 551 held that
pecuniary and non pecuniary compensation to be assessed
separately. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim
has actually incurred, which are capable of being calculated
in terms of money, whereas non pecuniary damages are
those which are not capable of being assessed by
arithmetical calculation, however no amount of
compensation can restore the physical frame of the victim,
therefore object to compensate such injury is “so far as
money can compensate”, because it is impossible to equate
money with the human suffering or personal deprivation. To
compute compensation involved some guess work, some
hypothetical considerations, some amount of sympathy
linked with the nature of disability caused. In Nagppa Vs
Gurdayal Singh 2003 (2) SCC 274 apex court observed that
while calculating such damages Tribunal required to have
some guess work taking into account the inflation factor.
24. In the light of aforesaid guidelines and parameters, this
Tribunal has to assess the compensation to-be awarded to
the claimant/petitioner.
25. Medical Expenses: PW1 petitioner in his affidavit of
evidence stated that after accident, he was immediately
removed to Batra Hospital, New Delhi in an unconscious
state where O/E, he was found to be drowsy, restless and
incontinent by the M/E as per the detail inscribed on the
enclosed Medico Legal Report of dated 01.06.2004 at
10.59am. He further stated that he remained under treatment
in Batra hospital from 01.06.2014 to 12.06.2014. He further
stated that thereafter, he was admitted in IHBAS from
09.04.2010 to 06.05.2010. Discharge summary of Batra
hospital (Mark X) shows that petitioner admitted on
01.06.2004 and discharged on 12.06.2004 and diagnosed to
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have suffered ”head injury-left temporal contusion”. Medical
Board Report of Patient Mohd. Zakir ( Ex. PW2/B)
mentioned that “Patient Mohd. Zakir was examined by the
Medical Board at IHBAS on 31.03.2010. The board opines
that patient needs inpatient evaluation for resolving some
clinical issues and for other relevant investigations for final
medical board opinion. The patient will be taken up for
review Medical Board after 4-6 weeks Another Medical
Board Report of Patient Mohd. Zakir says that ” patient
Mohd. Zakir was examined by the Medical Board at IHBAS
on 05.05.2010. The board opined that based on evidence
from clinical history and ward behavior observation,
neuropsychological assessment and neuro imaging findings
the patient is diagnosed as a case of “post traumatic
cognitive impairment”. Discharge summary of IHBAS shows
that petitioner admitted on 09.04.2010 and discharged on
06.05.2010. In the discharge summary mentioned that
“patient sustained significant head injury. Remained in coma
for 3 weeks and had to be operated. After gaining
consciousness, he c/o memory impairment/inability to plan a
head/ADL &dys function in work”. During proceedings,
petitioner was examined for disability. Discharge card of
HAH Centernary hospital shows that petitioner admitted on
16.05.2013 and discharged on 22.05.2013 and final
diagno.sis is ”Tuberculosis ABD”. Disability certificate
dated 28.02.2012 issued by the medical board of Pandit
Madan Mohan Malviya hospital opined that petitioner
suffered 75% permanent disability in relation to his whole
body. This condition is non progressive, not likely to
improve and reassessment is not recommended. Petitioner
for claiming expenses relied upon medical bills (Ex. PW1/C)
of Rs. 16,764/-. Nothing material has come in his in cross
examination to dispute the veracity of these bills. Hence a
sum of Rs. 17,000/- is granted to the petitioner towards
medical expenses.
26. Compensation for Pain & Sufferings: Petitioner has
suffered 75% permanent disability in relation to his whole
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body, therefore, keeping in view the nature of injuries,
duration of treatment and trauma of accident, a sum of Rs.
5,000/- is granted to the petitioner towards pain and
sufferings.
27. Loss of Amenities and enjoyment of Life: Petitioner
suffered permanent disability in relation to his whole body,
this injury will definitely hamper his daily activities and
enjoyment in every walk of life. Hence, a sum of Rs. 10,000/-
is granted towards loss of amenities and enjoyment of life.
28. Loss of income/leaves during treatment:- Petitioner in
his affidavit of evidence stated that at the time of accident,
he had been engaged /occupied in the trade of selling meat
by running a shop in Subhash Camp, Dakshinpuri, New
Delhi-62 and earning about one lac a year with the co-
operation and active assistance of his wife prior to his
involvement in RTA but since the date of accident, he is
totally unemployed and his family is being fed by his father,
four brothers and his in laws. In his cross examination, he
stated that he was having his own meat shop. He has not
filed any document regarding his ownership on the said
shop. He further stated that it is correct that there is no
document filed on record regarding his meat business. He
further stated that it is also correct that there is no document
filed on record regarding his monthly income. He did not file
any documentary evidence regarding his salary. In these
circumstances, income of the petitioner is to be assessed
under minimum wages act applicable for unskilled on the
date of accident i.e 01.06.2004 is Rs. 2862.90/–(round
figure as Rs. 2863/-). Keeping in view the nature of injuries
and duration of treatment a lump sum amount of Rs 2863X6
=Rs. 17,178/- is granted to the petitioner towards loss of
income during treatment.
29. Loss of future income: In the claim petitioner, age of
injured and disability certificate is mentioned as 30 years. In
the ration card , age of injured is mentioned as 45 years. In
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the election I card , age of injured is mentioned as 25 years
as on 01.01.1994, therefore, he is around 39 years at the
time of accident i.e. 01.06.2004. The age of injured is taken
as 39 years on the basis of election I card. Due to the
present injuries his entire carrier is ruined. It is natural that
with this disability and injuries the petitioner entire future
career/earning capacity has been destroyed. However,
present injury will somehow diminish his earning capacity.
As per disability certificate, petitioner suffered 75%
permanent disability in relation to his whole body, in view of
the judgment of Delhi High Court titled as “Laxmi Narain
Vs. Trilochan Singh & Ors., FAO No. 289/99, dated
04.05.2009, Delhi”, the total functional disability towards
whole body is assessed around 38%.
30. Petitioner’s income is assessed at the rate of Rs. 2863/-
per month. Petitioner being aged around 39 years, also
entitled for 50% increase in income towards future prospect
[relied upon Sanjay verma Vs Haryana Roadways 2014 ACJ
692 (SC), Mirajuddin Vs Shonki Ram & Ors MAC App
604/2011 dated 03.12.2013 (Delhi), Reliance General
Insurance Company Litimed Vs Haresh Kumar @ Harish
Kumar MAC App no. 399/12 dated 27.05.2014 (Delhi),
Uttranchal Transport Corporation Vs. Navneet Jerath 2013
ACJ 1966 (Delhi), Neerupam Mohan Mathur Vs New India
Assurance Company 2013 (14) SCC 15J. Therefore, his
monthly income is assessed around (Rs. 2863/-+ Rs.50% of
Rs.2863/-= Rs.4294.5/-). Apex court in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay
Kumar 2011(1) SCC 343, mandated multiplier method for
calculation of compensation for future loss of earning
capacity which is as follows:
(a) Annual income= Rs.4294.5/-X12=Rs. 51,534/-
(b) loss of future earning per annum (38% of the prior
annual income) =Rs.
Rs. 51,534/-X 38% =Rs 19,582.92/-
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(c) Petitioner is found to be around 39 years of age at the
time of accident, Therefore, applicable multiplier as per
Sarla Verma Case is 15.
(d) Loss of future earnings= Rs 19,582.92/- X 15= Rs.
2,93,743.8/-(round figure as Rs. 2,93,744/-
Thus sum of Rs. 2,93,744/- is granted towards loss of
future income.
31. Attendant Charges: Petitioner suffered disability
injuries and will require attendant for most number of
occasions throughout entire life. Hence a lump sum amount
of Rs.10,000/- is granted towards attendants charges.
32. Special Diet and Conveyance Charges:- Keeping in view
the nature of injuries and duration of treatment, a sum of Rs.
5,000/- each is granted towards special diet and conveyance
charges. Total sum of Rs. 10,000/- is granted under this
head.
33. Disfigurement: Petitioner suffered permanent disability
in relation to his whole body which causes disfigurement of
the body, therefore a sum of Rs.10,000/- granted to him
towards disfigurement.
34. The total compensation is assessed for injured as under:-
1 Compensation for Rs.17,000/-
Medical expenses
2 Compensation for Rs.5,000/-
pain &suffering
3 Compensation for Rs.10,000/-
special diet&
conveyance
4 Loss of future Rs.2,93,744/-
earning capacity
/future income
5 Compensation for Rs. 10,000/-
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loss of amenities
and
enjoyment of life
6 Attendant Charges Rs. 10,000/-
7 Compensation for Rs. 10,000/-
disfigurement
8 Loss of income Rs. 17,178/-
during treatment
Total Rs.3,72,922/-
Interim Award Rs. 25,000/-
Net Total Rs.3,47,922/-
35. The petitioner is hereby awarded a sum of Rs. 3,47,922/-
(Rupees Three lacs forty seven thousand nine hundred
twenty two only) with interest @ 9% per annum from the
date of filing of the present petition, till the date of
realization of the amount in favour of petitioner and against
the respondent no. 1 Mohd. Sabuddin on account of their
liability being joint and several.
36. The driver R-1 Mohd. Sabuddin is the principal tort
feasor as well as fully liable for his act as he is the owner of
the vehicle also and the offending vehicle is not insured also.
37. In view of the above discussion, the respondent Mohd.
Sabuddin is directed to discharge the liability of the award
amount within a period of 30 days from today along with the
interest @9% per annum, failing which interest @12% per
annum shall be charged for the period of delay.”
30. At the outset, the learned Tribunal categorically dealt with the issue
of negligence as well as the compensation to be awarded to the claimant.
While determining the issue of negligence, the learned Tribunal has
placed reliance on the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the material
on record and concluded its findings based on the principle of
preponderance of probabilities that the appellant/ driver was driving the
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offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, which caused grievous
injuries to the claimant/respondent no.1 herein.
31. In order to determine the compensation for the injuries sustained by
the claimant/respondent no.1, the learned Tribunal assessed various
documents placed on record such as the medico-legal report, discharge
summaries, medical board report, election identity card, disability
certificate etc. Upon consideration of the aforesaid documents and
situational difficulties surrounding the claimant/respondent no.1, the
learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.2,72,922/- as compensation to the
claimant, which is to be payable by the driver/appellant. However, out of
the said total compensation, the respondent no.2/ Mr. Deepak Ray paid
Rs. 25,000/- as interim relief.
ISSUE – 1: Whether the respondent no.1/ claimant was driving the
vehicle in a rash and negligent manner?
32. It is the case of the appellant that the claimant/respondent no.1 was
driving his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner as he failed to see the
appellant‟s vehicle coming from the opposite direction, despite being at a
reasonable distance of 10 feet, indicating that the claimant was driving his
vehicle in a high speed, thereby contributing to the accident.
33. Before going into the merits of the case, it is imperative for this
Court to delve into the concept of contributory negligence, especially in
motor vehicle accidents. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court specifically deals
with the concept of negligence and contributory negligence in the case of
Prem Lal Anand v. Narendra Kumar1, wherein it was observed as under:
1
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1900.
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“11. At this stage, it would be appropriate to consider
pronouncements of this Court on contributory negligence.
11.1 In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v.
Laxman Iyer1, this Court discussed the concept of
negligence and its types, i.e., composite and contributory, in
the following terms:–
“6. …. Negligence is omission of duty caused either by an
omission to do something which a reasonable man guided
upon those considerations, who ordinarily by reason of
conduct of human affairs would do or be obligated to, or by
doing something which a prudent or reasonable man would
not do. Negligence does not always mean absolute
carelessness, but want of such a degree of care as is required
in particular circumstances. Negligence is failure to observe,
for the protection of the interests of another person, the
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. The idea of negligence and duty are strictly
correlative. Negligence means either subjectively a careless
state of mind, or objectively careless conduct. Negligence is
not an absolute term, but is a relative one; it is rather a
comparative term. No absolute standard can be fixed and no
mathematically exact formula can be laid down by which
negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given
case. What constitutes negligence varies under different
conditions and in determining whether negligence exists in a
particular case, or whether a mere act or course of conduct
amounts to negligence, all the attending and surrounding
facts and circumstances have to be taken into account. It is
absence of care according to circumstances. To determine
whether an act would be or would not be negligent, it is
relevant to determine if any reasonable man would foresee
that the act would cause damage or not. The omission to do
what the law obligates or even the failure to do anything in a
manner, mode or method envisaged by law would equally
and per se constitute negligence on the part of such person.
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If the answer is in the affirmative, it is a negligent act. Where
an accident is due to negligence of both parties,
substantially there would be contributory negligence and
both would be blamed. In a case of contributory negligence,
the crucial question on which liability depends would be
whether either party could, by exercise of reasonable care,
have avoided the consequence of the other’s negligence. …
Contributory negligence is applicable solely to the conduct
of a plaintiff. It means that there has been an act or omission
on the part of the plaintiff which has materially contributed
to the damage, the act or omission being of such a nature
that it may properly be described as negligence, although
negligence is not given its usual meaning. …. It is now well
settled that in the case of contributory negligence, courts
have the power to apportion the loss between the parties as
seems just and equitable.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11.2 This Court in Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v.
Karamasey Kunvargi Tak2 observed:
“9. Subject to non-requirement of the existence of duty, the
question of contributory negligence is to be decided on the
same principle on which the question of the defendant’s
negligence is decided. The standard of a reasonable man is
as relevant in the case of a plaintiff’s contributory negligence
as in the case of a defendant’s negligence. But the degree of
want of care which will constitute contributory negligence,
varies with the circumstances and the factual situation of the
case. The following observation of the High Court of
Australia in Astley v. Austrust Ltd. [(1999) 73 ALJR 403] is
worthy of quoting:
“A finding of contributory negligence turns on a factual
investigation whether the plaintiff contributed to his or her
own loss by failing to take reasonable care of his or her
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circumstances of the case. In many cases, it may be proper
for a plaintiff to rely on the defendant to perform its duty. But
there is no absolute rule. The duties and responsibilities of
the defendant are a variable factor in determining whether
contributory negligence exists and, if so, to what degree. In
some cases, the nature of the duty owed may exculpate the
plaintiff from a claim of contributory negligence; in other
cases, the nature of the duty may reduce the plaintiff’s share
of responsibility for the damage suffered; and in yet other
cases the nature of the duty may not prevent a finding that
the plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for the safety of
his or her person or property. Contributory negligence
focuses on the conduct of the plaintiff. The duty owed by the
defendant, although relevant, is one only of many factors
that must be weighed in determining whether the plaintiff
has so conducted itself that it failed to take reasonable care
for the safety of its person or property.
(Emphasis supplied)”
34. Upon perusal of the aforementioned extracts, it is observed that
negligence cannot be determined by way of a strict formula, rather the
same is determined by looking into the facts and circumstances of the
case. Moreover, in case of contributory negligence it is necessary for the
Courts to determine whether both the parties had the means to exercise
reasonable care, thereby avoiding the accident.
35. It was testified by PW-1/claimant, in his cross examination that on
the day of accident, at around 10:30 AM, he was going from his house on
his scooter along with his brother-in-law, Mr. Usman, who was a pillion
rider, to purchase certain articles and that the offending vehicle hit the
claimant‟s vehicle from the left side. It is further stated that he noticed the
appellant only when he was at a distance of 10 feet from the offending
vehicle, which was coming from the opposite side of his scooter. PW-1
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further stated that by the time he tried to apply brakes upon seeing the
offending vehicle coming from the opposite direction, the same hit him
with great force and he became unconscious thereafter.
36. Additionally, this Court has also perused the site plan produced on
record, however, the same barely reflects how the accident occurred and
therefore, the same cannot assist this Court in determining the instant
issue.
37. It is further the case of the appellant that the claimant was not
holding a valid driving licence, vehicular insurance, and was not wearing
a helmet at the time of the accident, thereby, amounting to contributory
negligence.
38. In light of the aforementioned contention, this Court finds it
pertinent to mention the case of Mohd. Siddique vs. National Insurance
Co.2, in which the Hon‟ble Supreme Court draws a correlation between
the violation of the provisions of the MV Act and its impact on the
accident or the victim. The relevant extracts of the same are as follows:
“12. But the above reason, in our view, is flawed. The fact
that the deceased was riding on a motorcycle along with the
driver and another, may not, by itself, without anything
more, make him guilty of contributory negligence. At the
most, it would make him guilty of being a party to the
violation of the law. Section 128 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, imposes a restriction on the driver of a two-wheeled
motorcycle, not to carry more than one person on the
motorcycle. Section 194-C, inserted by Amendment Act 32 of
2019, prescribes a penalty for violation of safety measures
for motorcycle drivers and pillion riders. Therefore, the fact
that a person was a pillion rider on a motorcycle along with
the driver and one more person on the pillion, may be a
2
(2020) 3 SCC 57.
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violation of the law. But such violation by itself, without
anything more, cannot lead to a finding of contributory
negligence, unless it is established that his very act of riding
along with two others, contributed either to the accident or
to the impact of the accident upon the victim. There must
either be a causal connection between the violation and the
accident or a causal connection between the violation and
the impact of the accident upon the victim. It may so happen
at times, that the accident could have been averted or the
injuries sustained could have been of a lesser degree, if there
had been no violation of the law by the victim. What could
otherwise have resulted in a simple injury, might have
resulted in a grievous injury or even death due to the
violation of the law by the victim. It is in such cases, where,
but for the violation of the law, either the accident could
have been averted or the impact could have been minimised,
that the principle of contributory negligence could be
invoked. It is not the case of the insurer that the accident
itself occurred as a result of three persons riding on a
motorcycle. It is not even the case of the insurer that the
accident would have been averted, if three persons were not
riding on the motorcycle. The fact that the motorcycle was
hit by the car from behind, is admitted. Interestingly, the
finding recorded by the Tribunal that the deceased was
wearing a helmet and that the deceased was knocked down
after the car hit the motorcycle from behind, are all not
assailed. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that 2
persons on the pillion of the motorcycle, could have added to
the imbalance, is nothing but presumptuous and is not based
either upon pleading or upon the evidence on record.
Nothing was extracted from PW 3 to the effect that 2 persons
on the pillion added to the imbalance.
13. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to show that
the wrongful act on the part of the deceased victim
contributed either to the accident or to the nature of the
injuries sustained, the victim could not have been held guilty
of contributory negligence. Hence, the reduction of 10%
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towards contributory negligence, is clearly unjustified and
the same has to be set aside.”
39. In view of the aforementioned extracts, it is pertinent to look into
the deposition of PW-1/claimant, wherein he testified that he held a valid
driving licence at the time of the accident. However, he also stated that he
is not aware of the whereabouts of his driving license, especially after the
occurrence of the accident.
40. It is pertinent for this Court to mention that driving a vehicle
without a licence is punitive as per the MV Act provisions. However, the
same itself does not lead in finding negligence with respect to the
accident. The said view has been discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sudhir Kumar Rana v. Surinder Singh3,. The
relevant paragraphs of the said judgement are reproduced herein below:
“7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident,
and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other
driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies
negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was
negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the
injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was
solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of
his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence.
Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the
principle of ‘composite negligence’ will not apply nor can
there be an automatic inference that the negligence was
50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought
to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the
appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite
negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has
failed to correct the said error.”
3
(2008) 12 SCC 436.
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8. If a person drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits
an offence. The same, by itself, in our opinion, may not lead
to a finding of negligence as regards the accident. It has
been held by the courts below that it was the driver of the
mini-truck which was being driven rashly and negligently. It
is one thing to say that the appellant was not possessing any
licence but no finding of fact has been arrived at that he was
driving the two-wheeler rashly and negligently. If he was not
driving rashly and negligently which contributed to the
accident, we fail to see as to how, only because he was not
having a licence, he would be held to be guilty of
contributory negligence.
9. The matter might have been different if by reason of his
rash and negligent driving, the accident had taken place”
41. This Court has perused the record and found that no driving license
or insurance of the claimant‟s vehicle were placed on record. Therefore,
applying the aforementioned case laws Mohd. Siddique vs. National
Insurance Co. (Supra) as well as Sudhir Kumar Rana v. Surinder
Singh, (Supra), this Court is of the view that mere absence of driving
license and vehicular insurance does not amount to contributory
negligence on the part of the claimant despite being a punishable offence
under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as the same has no impact on the
accident and the grievous injuries caused to the claimant.
42. As far as the argument of not wearing a helmet at the time of the
accident is concerned, this Court acknowledges that the same plays a
significant role in the instant case as the claimant suffered grievous head
injuries in the said accident.
43. In light of the same, it is pertinent to state that in the deposition of
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the time of the accident. However, the said deposition has not been
contradicted in the appellant‟s affidavit.
44. Therefore, at this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to state that
the strict principles of evidence are inapplicable to the claims filed under
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and that the requirement of standard of
proof is one of „preponderance of probabilities‟, rather than „beyond
reasonable doubt‟. This principle has been reiterated in a plethora of
cases, including Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand4.
45. Therefore, with respect to the aforesaid contentions of the appellant
as to the issue of contributory negligence herein, this Court, after relying
on Prem Lal Anand v. Narendra Kumar, (Supra) as well as the
testimonies of the witnesses, opines that the claimant cannot be said to be
rash and negligent in driving his vehicle as per the principle of
preponderance of probabilities. This Court has further perused the
impugned order and is of the view that the learned Tribunal rightly
adjudicated the issue of negligence thereby holding the appellant rash and
negligent in driving the offending vehicle.
46. Accordingly, the issue no. 1 stands decided in favour of the
claimant/respondent no. 1.
ISSUE – 2: Whether Mr. Deepak Ray/respondent no. 2, allegedly
being a registered owner of the offending vehicle, be made jointly and
severally liable to pay the compensation to the claimant?
47. Now adverting to the second issue at hand, it is imperative to
reiterate that after addressing the issues on negligence and compensation4
AIR 2011 SC 1504.
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award, the learned Tribunal directed the driver/respondent no.1 to pay the
compensation amount to the claimant.
48. However, a contention has been raised before this Court by the
respondent no.1/claimant that the registered owner of the offending
vehicle, the respondent no.2 herein, must be held jointly and severally
liable to pay the compensation amount.
49. Before delving into the issue of ascertaining the liability of
respondent no.2, it is appropriate to firstly determine whether the
respondent no.2 is the rightful owner of the offending vehicle. In light of
the same, it is apposite to delve into the statutory provisions pertaining to
„ownership‟.
50. As per the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the definition of the term
“owner” is enumerated in Section 2(30), which is as follows:
“2. Definitions
xxxxx
(30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor
vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor,
the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor
vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement,
or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation,
the person in possession of the vehicle under that
agreement”
51. The bare perusal of the provision indicates that the term “owner”
refers to the person in whose name the motor vehicle is registered. It can
be observed that the legislature intended that the registered owner as
reflected in the records of the Registering Authority will primarily be
considered as the “owner” for the purposes of this Act, except in cases of
minor or an agreement of hire-purchase, lease, or hypothecation, as
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explicitly stated in the latter part of the Section 2(30) of the Act, wherein
mere possession of the vehicle is sufficient to fall within the ambit of the
provision.
52. The distinction between the definition of the “owner” of the
erstwhile Act of 1939 and that of the new Act of 1988 was discussed by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar v. Vijay
Kumar5, wherein the former did not include the registration of the owner,
which came into existence only with the enactment of the Act of 1988.
This distinction clearly sheds light on the legislative intent behind the
specific change brought forth by the new Act of 1988, which gives
primacy to the registered owner rather than the possessory owner.
53. The said legislative intent has also been discussed in the case of
Surendra Kumar Bhilawe vs. The New India Assurance Company
Limited6, where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
“35. The National Commission overlooked the definition of
‘owner’ in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. In
Section 2(30) ‘owner’ has been defined to mean “a person in
whose name a motor vehicle stands registered and, where
such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in
relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire
purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an
agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the
vehicle under that agreement”. Even assuming that
Mohammad Iliyas Ansari was in possession of the said truck
at the time of the accident, such possession was not under
any agreement of lease, hire purchase or hypothecation with
ICIC Bank.
5
(2018) 3 SCC 1.
6
2020 INSC 434.
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36. It would also be pertinent to note the difference between
the definition of owner in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 and the definition of owner in Section 2(19) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which has been repealed and
replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under the old Act
‘owner’ meant the person in possession of a motor vehicle.
The definition has undergone a change. Legislature has
consciously changed the definition of ‘owner’ to mean the
person in whose name the motor vehicle stands.”
54. The introduction of „registered owner‟ within the ambit of Section
2(30) of the Act establishes that it is presumed that the person whose
name is reflected in the records of the Registering Authority is to be
regarded as the owner of the vehicle. The position of law has been further
discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa alias
Leela and Ors. v. Shakuntala and Ors7, wherein for the purposes of
liability, the Hon‟ble Court addressed the question of who shall be
considered as the owner of the offending vehicle. The relevant paragraphs
of the same are as follows:
“9. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of the
vehicle has to be examined under different provisions of the
Act. Section 2(30) of the Act defines “owner” in the following
terms:
2(30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor
vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor,
the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor
vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or
an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the
person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;
(Emphasis added)
7
(2011) 2 SCC 240.
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10. Then, Section 50 of the Act lays down the procedure for
transfer of ownership. It is a long section and insofar as
relevant it is reproduced below:
50. Transfer of ownership.
(1) Where the ownership of any motor vehicle registered
under this Chapter is transferred,-
(a) the transferor shall,-
(i) in the case of a vehicle registered within the same State,
within fourteen days of the transfer, report the fact of
transfer, in such form with such documents and in such
manner, as may be prescribed by the Central Government to
the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the
transfer is to be effected and shall simultaneously send a
copy of the said report to the transferee; and
(ii) xxxx
(b) the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer,
report the transfer to the registering authority within whose
jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where
the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, and shall
forward the certificate of registration to that registering
authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the
report received by him from the transferor in order that
particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in
the certificate of registration.
(2) xxxx
(3) xxxx
(4) xxxx
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(5) xxxx(6) On receipt of a report under Sub-section (1), or an
application under Sub-section (2), the registering authority
may cause the transfer of ownership to be entered in the
certificate of registration.
(7) A registering authority making any such entry shall
communicate the transfer of ownership to the transferor and
to the original registering authority, if it is not the original
registering authority.
11. It is undeniable that notwithstanding the sale of the
vehicle neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor the
transferee Salig Ram took any step for the change of the
name of the owner in the certificate of registration of the
vehicle. In view of this omission Jitender Gupta must be
deemed to continue as the owner of the vehicle for the
purposes of the Act, even though under the civil law he
ceased to be its owner after its sale on February 2, 1993.
12. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of a
vehicle after its sale to another person was considered by
this Court in Dr. T.V. Jose v. Chacko P.M.
MANU/SC/1691/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 748. In paragraphs 9
and 10 of the decision, the Court observed and held as
follows:
9. Mr. Iyer appearing for the Appellant submitted that the
High Court was wrong in ignoring the oral evidence on
record. He submitted that the oral evidence clearly showed
that the Appellant was not the owner of the car on the date of
the accident. Mr. Iyer submitted that merely because the
name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. did
not mean that the ownership of the vehicle had not been
transferred. Mr. Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car
was Mr. Roy Thomas. Mr. Iyer submitted that Mr. Roy
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Appeals. He pointed out that an Advocate had filed
appearance on behalf of Mr. Roy Thomas but had then
applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance.
He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had been duly served
and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that
Mr. Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these Appeals.
He submitted that the liability, if any, was of Mr. Roy
Thomas.
10. We agree with Mr. Iyer that the High Court was not right
in holding that the Appellant continued to be the owner as
the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O.
There can be transfer of title by payment of consideration
and delivery of the car. The evidence on record shows that
ownership of the car had been transferred. However the
Appellant still continued to remain liable to third parties as
his name continued in the records of R.T.O. as the owner.
The Appellant could not escape that liability by merely
joining Mr. Roy Thomas in these Appeals. Mr. Roy Thomas
was not a party either before MACT or the High Court. In
these Appeals we cannot and will not go into the question of
inter se liability between the Appellant and Mr. Roy Thomas.
It will be for the Appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings
against Mr. Roy Thomas if, in law, he is entitled to do so.
(Emphasis added)
13. Again, in P.P. Mohammed v. K. Rajappan and Ors.
(2008) 17 SCC 624, this Court examined the same issue
under somewhat similar set of facts as in the present case. In
paragraph 4 of the decision, this Court observed and held as
follows:
4. These appeals are filed by the Appellants. The insurance
company has chosen not to file any appeal. The question
before this Court is whether by reason of the fact that the
vehicle has been transferred to Respondent 4 and thereafter
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the third person who was injured. This question has been
answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) v. Chacko P.M.
wherein it is held that even though in law there would be a
transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would
not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in
RTO records, from liability to a third person. We are in
agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because
the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the
Appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person.
So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains
liable to a third person.
(Emphasis added)
14. The decision in Dr. T.V. Jose was rendered under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But having regard to the
provisions of Section 2(30) and section 50 of the Act, as
noted above, the ratio of the decision shall apply with equal
force to the facts of the case arising under the 1988 Act. On
the basis of these decisions, the inescapable conclusion is
that Jitender Gupta, whose name continued in the records of
the registering authority as the owner of the truck was
equally liable for payment of the compensation amount.
Further, since an insurance policy in respect of the truck was
taken out in his name he was indemnified and the claim will
be shifted to the insurer, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.”
55. The aforementioned judgment has clearly distinguished the
position of law under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, wherein the latter Act requires the existence of the
transfer, however, mere existence of transfer does not absolve the liability
of the registered owner as required by the former Act. The said
distinguishing requirement has been further dealt in the case of Naveen
Kumar v. Vijay Kumar (supra) by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court,
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interpreting the mandate of Section 2(30) of the Act, which stipulates that
the registered owner is liable to compensate the victim of motor vehicle
accident. The relevant portion is reproduced hereinunder:
12. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from
the above decisions is that in view of the definition of the
expression ‘owner’ in Section 2(30), it is the person in whose
name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the
purposes of the Act, would be treated as the ‘owner’.
However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the
minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle
is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or
hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under
that agreement is treated as the owner. In a situation such as
the present where the registered owner has purported to
transfer the vehicle but continues to be reflected in the
records of the registering authority as the owner of the
vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament
has consciously introduced the definition of the expression
‘owner’ in Section 2(30), making a departure from the
provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier Act of 1939. The
principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that
the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the
legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state
of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be
burdened with following a trail of successive transfers,
which are not registered with the registering authority. To
hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and
purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed
must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the
present case, the First Respondent was the ‘owner’ of the
vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of
Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation stands
fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured.
The High Court has proceeded upon a misconstruction of the
judgments of this Court in Reshma and Purnya Kala Devi.
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13. The submission of the Petitioner is that a failure to
intimate the transfer will only result in a fine Under Section
50(3) but will not invalidate the transfer of the vehicle. In Dr.
T.V. Jose, this Court observed that there can be transfer of
title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. But
for the purposes of the Act, the person whose name is
reflected in the records of the registering authority is the
owner. The owner within the meaning of Section 2(30) is
liable to compensate. The mandate of the law must be
fulfilled.”
56. In light of the above discussions, it is pertinent to examine the
testimony of the witnesses relevant to the said issue. As per the record,
R2W2/respondent no. 2 stated in his examination that he had purchased
the offending vehicle i.e., two-wheeler scooter bearing registration
number DNF-7071, to which he was the owner, up until the year 1998,
and the same was sold to the appellant/driver in the very same year. He
further testified that all the necessary documents pertaining to the vehicle
were handed over to the driver after getting his signature on one delivery
receipt. In his cross-examination, R2W2 also deposed that he sold the
vehicle to the driver/respondent no.1 at a sale consideration of
Rs.10,000/-, however, stated that the receipt of the same has not been
acquired, hence, not placed on record. Further, he deposed that all the
requisite documents have been handed over to the driver, including the
insurance as well as Form nos.29 and 30. However, he admitted that he
neither went to the Registering Authority nor did he attempted to formally
transfer the vehicle in the name of the transferee i.e., driver.
57. The aforementioned transaction of sale has been starkly rejected by
RW1/appellant herein in his deposition stating that the respondent no. 2
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did not sell the vehicle to him and no Form Nos. 29 and 30 were handed
over to him regarding the alleged sale.
58. In view of the foregoing deposition, this Court has further, perused
the relevant documents on record, i.e., the delivery receipt and Certificate
of Registration (Form-G). The contents of the former document reveals
that the offending vehicle bearing number DNF-7071 of 1989 model
along with the registration documents have been delivered to Mr. Mohd.
Sabuddin/appellant by Mr. Deepak Rai/respondent no. 2. The said receipt
bears the signature of the driver/appellant and is dated 19th December,
1998. However, the document in question seems vague as it holds no
authenticity of the contents mentioned therein as there is no other
document on record pertaining to the alleged sale transaction between the
driver/appellant and respondent no. 2. Therefore, in view of the same, the
delivery receipt cannot be taken into consideration for proving the
ownership of the offending vehicle.
59. On the other hand, the latter document i.e., the Certificate of
Registration reveals that the registration of vehicle bearing no. DNF-7071
was transferred from one Mr. Balbir Singh to Mr. Deepak Rai/respondent
no. 2, thereby officiating the respondent no. 2 as the registered owner as
per the records.
60. Since there is no other document on record contradicting the
aforesaid contents of the documents, and placing reliance on the
judgments cited herein, it is evident that respondent no. 2 remains the
registered owner of the offending vehicle as he falls within the definition
of “owner” as per Section 2(30) of the Act.
61. Now adverting to the issue of liability.
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62. It has already been discussed in the aforementioned judgments that
the liability to pay the compensation is fastened upon the registered
owner of the offending vehicle. However, a question arises as to the
extent of liability of the registered owner.
63. Therefore, what needs to be addressed at this stage is whether the
registered owner of the offending vehicle i.e., respondent no. 2 shall be
solely liable or jointly and severally liable along with the driver of the
offending vehicle i.e., appellant.
64. To determine the aforesaid question of liability, it is imperative to
look into the findings of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
Godavari Finance Company vs. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors.8,
wherein it was categorically stated that the person who is in possession
and control over the offending vehicle will be held liable for the payment
of the compensation amount. However, the test mentioned in the said case
law must be construed subject to the factual scenario of each case. For the
purpose of convenience, the relevant paragraph of the judgment is
reproduced as under:
“15. An application for payment of compensation is filed
before the Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Act
for adjudicating upon the claim for compensation in respect
of accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to,
persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages
to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Use of
the motor vehicle is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim
for compensation. Ordinarily if driver of the vehicle would
use the same, he remains in possession or control thereof.
Owner of the vehicle, although may not have anything to do
with the use of vehicle at the time of the accident, actually he8
(2008) 5 SCC 107.
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may be held to be constructively liable as the employer of the
driver. What is, therefore, essential for passing an award is
to find out the liabilities of the persons who are involved in
the use of the vehicle or the persons who are vicariously
liable. The insurance company becomes a necessary party to
such claims as in the event the owner of the vehicle is found
to be liable, it would have to reimburse the owner inasmuch
as a vehicle is compulsorably insurable so far as a third
party is concerned, as contemplated under Section
147 thereof. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that the possession or control of a vehicle plays
a vital role.”
65. Similarly, in the recent judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
the case of Vaibhav Jain vs. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd9, it was
discussed in length that at the time of the accident, if the person who has
the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose
direction and command the driver is obliged to operate the same, shall be
subjected to the liability to pay the compensation.
66. Keeping in view of the aforementioned principles, this Court
further perused the testimonies of the witnesses, wherein it was testified
by RW1 that he was working as an employee of respondent no.2‟s
proprietary firm i.e., M/s Deepak Engineering Works from the January,
2004 to October, 2006, drawing a salary of Rs. 2,500- 3,000/- per month.
He further testified that he used to work from 10 AM to 5PM as a
plumber and that the respondent no.2 would lend his scooter bearing
number DNF-7071 for attending complaints.
67. The said deposition of RW1 has been patently refuted by R2W2/
respondent no.2 in his testimony. It was stated that the driver/appellant
9
2024 INSC 652.
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was working as an employee of respondent no.2 till the year 1998 and
that the appellant was not working for him in the year 2004. He further
stated that he maintained all the records pertaining to the employment of
the workers, however, later admitted that he is not in possession of
documents such as attendance register, salary slips etc. upto the year
2004. He further denied that the scooter bearing no. DNF-7071 was not
given to the workers for attending the complaints.
68. Upon perusal of the aforesaid testimonies, it is observed that the
employer-employee relationship between appellant/driver and respondent
no.2 cannot be proved as the same has been utterly contradicted by the
parties in its testimonies. Moreover, no such document was placed on
record showing that on the day of the accident, the appellant was driving
in the course of employment or under the direction of the respondent no.
2.
69. Therefore, applying the principles enunciated in the cases of
Godavari Finance Company vs. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors.
(supra) and Vaibhav Jain vs. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd. (supra) to the
facts of the instant case, it is observed that since the driver/appellant was
held liable for the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle, and
in absence of any evidence pertaining to the control of respondent no. 2
on the driver, this Court is of the view that the driver herein is also liable
to pay the compensation amount to the claimant.
70. Although the possession and control of the offending vehicle is
with the driver/appellant, it does not mean that the registered owner is not
liable for the same just on the pretext of non-possession and non-control,
thereby making both the driver as well as the registered owner jointly and
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severally liable. The said stance has been taken by the co-ordinate bench
of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal and Ors. vs. Manish
Kumar and Ors.10, where the Court observed that the registered owner
shall continue to remain liable to pay the compensation to the victim of
motor accident and the mere possession and control of the vehicle shall
not absolve the person from paying the said compensation to the victim.
It further stated that the liability would remain joint and several in such
cases between the registered owner and the person who was in actual
possession of the vehicle at the time of the accident.
71. Keeping in view the foregoing reasoning and findings, this Court is
of the view that both driver/appellant as well as registered owner/
respondent no.2 are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation
amount to the claimant/ respondent no. 1 herein.
72. Accordingly, issue – 2 stands decided in aforesaid terms.
CONCLUSION
73. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 is a beneficial legislation which was brought in force with an intent
to provide relief to the victims or their families, who were subjected to
motor vehicle accidents. Therefore, while determining the issue of
negligence, the Courts are not subjected to apply the strict principles of
evidence to the motor vehicle accident cases as the standard of proof
required in such cases is one of „preponderance of probabilities‟.
74. Moreover, for establishing a case of contributory negligence, the
Courts are to determine whether the parties involved in the accident
exercised reasonable care in ensuring that the accident does not take
10
2023 SCC OnLine Del 5506.
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place. If the said care is exercised, at least by one of the parties therein,
then it is not a case of contributory negligence.
75. It is also discussed that certain acts of the parties such as non-
possession of driving licence, vehicular insurance etc. are violative of the
provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. However, mere violation of the
provisions does not amount to negligence of the parties and in order to
determine the same, a correlation between the violation and the impact of
such violation on the accident must be assessed.
76. As per the settled principles of law, the person whose name reflects
in the records of the Registering Authority will be considered as the
registered owner of the vehicle. However, the extent of liability is
determined based on the possession and control over the offending
vehicle and also differs with the involvement of parties in the accident.
77. Therefore, by way of filing the instant appeal, the appellant sought
for the setting aside of the impugned order as the learned Tribunal has
wrongly held that the appellant is liable for rash and negligent driving,
when it is the respondent no.1 who was driving in a negligent manner,
thereby amounting to contributory negligence. Additionally, it also sought
that the respondent no.2 to be made liable to pay the compensation
amount as he is the registered owner as per the records of the Registering
Authority and that no sale transaction has taken place between the
appellant and respondent no.2.
78. After due consideration and discussion, this Court is of the view
that the learned Tribunal rightly held that the appellant is liable for rash
and negligent driving of the offending vehicle.
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79. It is further held that the respondent no. 2 is a registered owner of
the offending vehicle as per Section 2(30) of the Act and as per the settled
position of law, the respondent no. 2 is liable to pay the compensation to
the claimant. With respect to the extent of liability, this Court has
observed that the possession and control of the offending vehicle, at the
time of the accident, is with the appellant/driver, and therefore, both the
appellant and respondent no. 2 are made jointly and severally liable.
80. Accordingly, the following directions are passed by this Court:
a. The learned Tribunal has rightly assessed that the appellant/driver
was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner
and therefore, there arises no scope of contributory negligence on
the respondent no. 1‟s/claimant‟s part.
b. Further, in terms of the judgment of the even date passed in MAC
APPL. 425/2016, it is held that the respondent no.2 along with the
respondent no.1/driver are jointly and severally liable to pay the
compensation amount of Rs.18,59,466/- to the appellant/victim.
c. Accordingly, the appellant and respondent no. 2 i.e., the driver and
the registered owner of the offending vehicle respectively, are
directed to pay the compensation amount of Rs. 18,59,466/- to the
claimant/ respondent no.1 within the period of four (4) weeks from
the date of receipt of this order, after deducting/adjusting the
amount already paid/deposited.
81. In view of the aforesaid discussions on facts and law, the impugned
order dated 20th February, 2016 passed by the learned Presiding Officer,
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Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, South East District/Saket Court, New
Delhi in suit bearing no. 335/14 is modified to the extent indicated above.
82. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby partly allowed and stands
disposed of along with the pending application(s), if any.
83. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
(CHANDRA DHARI SINGH)
JUDGE
OCTOBER 8, 2024
rk/mk/ryp
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