Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Amar Singh vs State And Ors on 14 November, 2024
Author: Kuldeep Mathur
Bench: Kuldeep Mathur
[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1971/2017
Amar Singh son of Bagtawar Singh Ji, aged about 58 years
resident of Ward No.1, Near Power House, Gajsinghpur District
Shri Ganganagar
---Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Principal Secretary, Personnel
(Ka 3/Jach) Department, Government of Rajasthan
Secretariat Jaipur.
2. State of Rajasthan through Deputy Secretary, Personnel
(Ka 3/Jach) Department, Government of Rajasthan
Secretariat Jaipur.
3. Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Anil Vyas, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Manoj Bhandari, Sr. Adv. assisted
by Mr. Aniket Tater, Advocate
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP MATHUR
JUDGMENT
Reserved on : 13/08/2024
Pronounced on : 14/11/2024
Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, J.
The petitioner seeks to challenge the punishment of
compulsory retirement awarded to him which was issued on
18th September 2015 by the order of the Governor of Rajasthan;
under the signature of Deputy Secretary, Administration. In the
departmental inquiry, the charge found proved against the
petitioner was that he had entertained 2nd bail petition and
granted bail to the accused Satyanarayan who was facing murder
trial, though he had knowledge that the bail petition filed by the
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said accused was dismissed by the High Court and a transfer
petition seeking transfer of Sessions Case No.25 of 2009 was
pending before the High Court. The petitioner has challenged the
very basis of instituting the disciplinary proceeding against him
and has raised manifold grounds to assail the punishment order
dated 18th September 2015.
2. Briefly stated, the petitioner at the relevant time was posted
as Additional District & Sessions Judge at Sangaria and was seized
with Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No.87 of 2010 filed by
accused Satyanarayan seeking bail pending the trial in Sessions
Case No.25 of 2009. Previously, he had rejected the bail petition
filed by the said accused vide order dated 23 rd January 2010. This
order refusing bail to him was taken to the High Court by
Satyanarayan in S.B Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.981 of
2010 and that was dismissed on 11 th May 2010. The complainant
appeared in the proceeding of 2nd bail petition and sought
adjournment on the ground that he had moved a petition in the
High Court for transfer of the sessions case from the petitioner’s
Court. The petitioner however heard and allowed 2 nd bail petition
and granted bail to Satyanarayan on 4th June 2010. This order
granting bail to Satyanarayan was challenged by the complainant
in S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Cancellation Application No.26 of 2010
and the bail granted to Satyanarayan was cancelled by the High
Court vide order dated 23rd November 2011 and this bail
cancellation order was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice.
Later on, File No. Estt. B2(iii)138/2013 was moved for an inquiry
against the petitioner on the direction of the then Hon’ble Chief
Justice of the Rajasthan High Court and an inquiry was caused in
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the matter. According to the petitioner, the preliminary inquiry
conducted by the Registrar (Vigilance) was improper and illegal
and was conducted behind his back. Before the competent
authority, the petitioner therefore raised an objection that no
preliminary inquiry as contemplated under Rule 16 of the
Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1958 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1958’) was conducted and he was
not supplied any information that an inquiry officer has been
appointed to inquire into the complaint against him. However, the
explanation offered by the petitioner was found to be not
satisfactory by the disciplinary authority and a memorandum of
charge was served upon him on 26th September 2013. In the
disciplinary inquiry, the allegation levelled against the petitioner
was that of committing gross misconduct, judicial indiscipline and
impropriety. He was further alleged to have failed to maintain
absolute integrity and dignity of the office. The imputation in
connection to the charge of extraneous consideration was to the
effect that there was no substantial change in the circumstances
after the dismissal of 1st bail petition vide Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No.10 of 2010 and he allowed 2 nd bail petition for
improper motives and granted bail to Satyanarayan who was
facing charge under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code in
Sessions Case No.25 of 2009. On these allegations, two charges
were framed against the petitioner and, in support thereof, the
complainant Atma Ram was produced in the domestic inquiry and
a few documents were laid in evidence to support the charges so
framed. Those charges were framed in the following language :-
“1. That you, Shri Amar Singh while posted as Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Sangaria had granted bail to the accused(Downloaded on 18/11/2024 at 09:44:22 PM)
[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (4 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]Mr. Satyanarayan just within three weeks after dismissal of S.B.
Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No.981 of 2010 by Hon’ble
Rajasthan High Court ignoring that a Transfer Application had
also been filed by the complainant and same was pending before
the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court.
2. That you, Shri Amar Singh, while working as Presiding Officer
in the capacity of Additional District & Sessions Judge, Sangaria,
malafidely and by extraneous reason granted bail to accused
Mr. Satyanarayan in offence under Section 302/34 of Indian
Penal Code vide order dated 4.6.2010 in Criminal Misc.
Application No. 87/2010 (Sessions Case No. 25/2009) despite
knowledge that earlier on 23.1.2010, this bail application has
been rejected by you and also by Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court
on 11.5.2010 and also knowingly that there were no substantial
change in circumstances.
Thus, your above mentioned act and conduct on your part
tantamount to gross misconduct, judicial indiscipline and
impropriety and thus, you failed to maintain absolute integrity,
dignity of the office, which is punishable under rule 16 of
Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules,
1958.”
3. In the disciplinary inquiry, the petitioner denied the
allegation that he had passed the bail order under any fear or
favour. He endeavoured to justify his action in taking up 2 nd bail
petition on the ground that till 6 th May 2010 when the transfer
petition was filed in the High Court there was no complaint against
him, co-accused Savitri Devi was already enlarged on bail and the
bail petition was to be dealt with and decided expeditiously. He
further pointed out that the bail petition of Satyanarayan was
dismissed as not pressed and it was not an order passed on merits
by the High Court. Secondly, the complainant was granted
opportunities on 7th May 2010, 24th May 2010 and 25th May 2010
but he did not produce any order of the High Court passed in the
transfer petition.
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4. The first charge was held proved by the Hon’ble Enquiry
Judge but the charge of acting with malafide intention and for
extraneous reasons in granting bail to the murder accused
Satyanarayan in Sessions Case No.25 of 2009 could not be
substantiated against the petitioner. A copy of the inquiry report
dated 25th March 2015 was furnished to the petitioner through
letter dated 8th May 2015 whereby he was offered an opportunity
to submit his explanation/reply under Rule 16(10) of the Rules of
1958 within a period of 15 days. The ‘majority’ of the Full Court of
the Rajasthan High Court did not find any substance in the
explanation submitted by the petitioner against the findings
recorded by the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge and, he was awarded the
punishment of compulsory retirement from service under Rule
14(v) of the Rules of 1958. The punishment order dated 18 th
September 2015 issued under the order of the Governor of
Rajasthan is reproduced as under :-
“jktLFkku ljdkj
dkfeZd ¼d&3@tkap½ foHkkx
Øekad ia-1¼198½ dkfeZd@d&3@tkWp@2015 t;iqj fnukad% 18 SEP 2015
vkns”k
jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; tks/kiqj ds eq[; U;k;k/kh”k egksn; }kjk Jh vej flag
rRdkyhu ,-Mh-ts- ¼gky fo”ks’k ty ,l-lh@,l-Vh dslst dksVZ chdkusj½] ds
fo#) jktLFkku flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k ,oa vihy½ fu;e] 1958 ds
fu;e&16 ds vUrxZr vuq”kklfud dk;Zokgh izkjEHk dj Kkiu Øekad%& LFkk-
ch&2 ¼iii½ 138@2013@13854 fnukad 26-09-2013 ds }kjk vkjksi&i=@vkjksi
fooj.k i= tkjh fd;s x;sA
Jh vej flag ij fuEu vkjksi vf/kjksfir fd, x,%&
1. That you, Shri Amar Singh, while posted as Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Sangaria had granted bail to the
accused Mr. Satyanarayan just within three weeks after dismissal
of S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 981/2010 by Hon’ble
Rajasthan High Court ignoring that a Transfer Application had
also been filed by the complainant and same was pending before
Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court.
2. That you, Shri Amar Singh, while working as Presiding
Officer in the capacity of Additional District & Sessions Judge,(Downloaded on 18/11/2024 at 09:44:22 PM)
[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (6 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]Sargaria, malafidely and by extraneous reason granted bail to
accused Mr. Satyanarayan in offence under Section 302/34 of
Indian Penal Code vide order dated 4-6-2010 in Criminal Misc.
Application No. 87/2010 (Sessions Case No. 25/2009) despite
knowledge that earlier on 23-01-2010, this bail application has
been rejected by you and also by Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court
on 11-05-2010 and also knowingly that there were no substantial
change in circumstances.
Thus, your above mentioned act and conduct on your part
tantamount to gross misconduct, judicial indiscipline and
impropriety and thus, you failed to maintain absolute integrity,
dignity of the office, which is punishable under rule 16 of
Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules,
1958.
Jh vej flag us mDr vkjksiksa ds laca/k esa viuk fyf[kr dFku fnukad 21-
06-2014 dks izLrqr fd;kA Jh flag ls izkIr fyf[kr dFku dk vfHkys[k ds lkFk
ijh{k.k fd;k ,oa lUrks’ktud ugha ik;s tkus ij Jh fot; fo”uksbZ] ekuuh;
U;k;k/kh”k dks tkap vf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k x;kA
The Hon’ble Enquiry Judge conducted the enquiry in
accordance with the law and submitted report dated 25.03.2015.
rRi”pkr~ Jh flag dks i= Øekad 7576 fnukad 08-05-2015 ds }kjk tkap
izfrosnu dh izfr izsf’kr dj vH;kosnu izLrqr djus dk volj iznku fd;k x;kA
ftlds Øe esa Jh flag }kjk viuk vH;kosnu fnukad 23-05-2015 ds }kjk izLrqr
fd;k x;kA
In accordance with the Hon’ble Full Court resolution the
report/recommendation was submitted before the Full Court for
consideration in its meeting held on 08.08.2015. After
considering the report/recommendation of the Hon’ble Enquiry
Judge, Hon’ble the Full Court resolved as Follows:-
“Considered the explanation.
Considering the nature of the charges found proved against
the officer, it is RESOLVED with majority to impose upon him
penalty of compulsory retirement from service, on proportionate
pension.”
vr% ekuuh; jkT;iky] Jh vej flag rRdkyhu ,-Mh-ts- ¼gky fo”ks’k tt
,l-lh-@,l-Vh dslst dksVZ chdkusj½ ds fo#) izekf.kr vkjksiksa ds fy, ekuuh;
jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; dh iw.kZ ihB ds fu’d’kZ ,oa izLrkfor n.M ls iw.kZr;k
lger gksrs gq, Jh vej flag dks jktLFkku flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k ,oa
vihy½ fu;e] 1958 ds fu;e 14¼V½ ds vUrxZr lsok ls vuqikfrd isa”ku ij
vfuok;Z lsokfuo`r djus ds n.M ls nf.Mr djus ds ,rn~}kjk vkns”k iznku djrs
gSA
jkT;iky dh vkKk ls]
–sd–
¼dkupUn cqudj½
“kklu mi lfpo”
5. Mr. Anil Vyas, the learned counsel for the petitioner assailed
the punishment of compulsory retirement passed against the
petitioner by referring to the decisions in (i) “Smt. Bimla Devi v.
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State of Bihar & Ors.”1 (ii) “P.C. Joshi v. State of UP and Ors.”2 (iii)
“Ramesh Chander Singh v. State of Allahabad and Anr.”3 and (iv)
“Babu Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.”4, and put forth a submission
that the petitioner could not have been subjected to disciplinary
proceeding and was not liable to be awarded the punishment of
compulsory retirement on the allegation of granting bail to the
under-trial prisoner even though it was 2nd bail petition filed on his
behalf and he was facing murder charge. Mr. Anil Vyas, the
learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the
disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner was conducted contrary
to Rule 16 of Rules of 1958 and in breach of Article 311 of the
Constitution of India inasmuch as the memorandum of charge vide
Exhibit-2 was issued on 26th September 2013 and the Registrar
(Administration) provided him the list of documents and list of
witnesses about one year thereafter through letter dated 20 th
September 2014. It was contended that the documentary
evidence laid in the disciplinary inquiry did not include (a) the
order sheet of the transfer petition and (b) the petition for
cancellation of bail which were necessary to examine the truth or
otherwise in the complaint made against the petitioner and
therefore a serious prejudice was caused to him.
6. The judicial service is not service in the sense of employment
and the judicial officers are not employees of the State 5. If such is
the status accorded to the judicial officers, this is expected at all
times from them that they should remain honest, impartial and
maintain integrity in their actions and decisions and that must be
1 [1999] 2 SCC 8.
2 [2001] 6 SCC 491.
3 [2007] 4 SCC 247.
4 [1978] 1 SCC 591.
5 “All India Judges Association and Others v. Union Of India & Ors.” : [1993] 4 SCC 288.
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beyond any doubt. The very nature of judicial service is such that
it cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of the persons of
doubtful integrity. Lopes, C.J. once remarked that if a servant
conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge
of duty in the service that would amount to misconduct and justify
immediate dismissal from service.6 The High Court is the sole
custodian of control over the subordinate judiciary and the control
vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution of
India includes disciplinary jurisdiction and it is complete control
subject only to the powers of the Governor. The powers under
Article 235 of the Constitution are exercised wherever there is
prima facie material indicating an accusing finger to the judicial
officer of misconduct in the discharge of duty inasmuch as he
unduly favored a litigant or had passed an order actuated by
corrupt motive. In “Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah”7,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court’s control over
the subordinate judiciary would comprehend within its fold taking
a decision of punishment including the punishment of compulsory
retirement but the exercise of power even in such a situation must
be a rarity and not a common feature in the name of exercising
supervisory superintendence over the subordinate judiciary.
7. The gravamen of allegation against the petitioner was that
within three weeks after S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.
981 of 2010 was dismissed by the Rajasthan High Court and a
transfer petition was pending before the High Court
notwithstanding that, he proceeded to hear 2nd bail petition and
granted bail to the murder accused. However, in S.B. Criminal
6 Pearce v. Foster : [1866] 17 QBD 536-542.
7 [1988] 3 SCC 211.
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Misc. Transfer Petition No.3 of 2010 the complainant did not
express any apprehension of wrongdoing by the petitioner. That
transfer petition was filed on the ground that the petitioner
granted bail to Savitri Devi wife of Ramchandra within three days
after her arrest in the pending sessions trial. The other reason for
seeking transfer of Sessions Case No. 25 of 2009 from the
petitioner’s Court was that the petitioner had allegedly declared in
the open Court that it was a case of acquittal. The relevant
pleadings in the transfer petition read as under :-
“A. That it is pertinent to mention here that the petitioner is a
poor person and resident of Rasuwala, Tehsil Sangaria, District
Hanumangarh. The Presiding Officer of learned Addl. Sessions
Judge, Sangaria is under the influence of the respondent no. 3
and he has granted the bail to the respondent no. 3 within 3
days after arrest and addressed in the open court that it is a
clear cut case of acquittal of the respondent no. 2 and 3,
therefore, the petitioner has no hope of justice from the
Presiding Officer of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sangaria.”
8. Quite apparently, a doubt was raised by the complainant
against the petitioner for the reason that the petitioner had
allegedly made a comment in the open Court about the
prosecution’s case. May be it was a mistake on part of the
petitioner to comment upon the prosecution’s case but if such
mistake of a judicial officer is held against him to hold that he
was pre-determined or had made up his mind to grant bail to the
murder accused or that he was acting with corrupt motive then no
judicial officer can act freely. For one thing, it would be really
impossible to ascertain the truth in the allegation made by the
complainant that some comment was made by the judicial officer
while conducting the case before him. Secondly, a judicial
proceeding is not conducted in an iron-cast manner and this is
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quite common and natural that the judicial officer would pose
questions and make comments while hearing the arguments in a
case. In the order dated 23rd November 2011 by which bail
granted to Satyanarayan was cancelled by the High Court, there is
no discussion on the merits of the matter. There is not even an
observation by the High Court that the order granting bail to
Satyanarayan does not satisfy the requirements in law as laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments. It
seems that it was the observation made by the High Court in the
said bail cancellation petition and not any complaint made by the
complainant which prompted an inquiry against the petitioner. For
easy reference, we would reproduce the order dated 23rd
November 2011 passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Cancellation
Application No.26 of 2010 hereunder :-
“I have heard the arguments advanced at the bar and have
perused the impugned order.
The question involved in this matter is not whether the bail
of the accused respondent no.2 should be cancelled or not on the
ground that there exists reasons so as to show that the accused
respondent no.2 has misused the liberty granted to him but the
question is whether the propriety demands that such bail should
be cancelled. As has been observed above that this Court
rejected the bail application filed by the accused respondent no.2,
which was pending since 3.2.2010 just on 11.5.2010. Obviously,
this Court was not inclined to grant bail to the accused
respondent no.2 and thus, counsel for the accused respondent
no.2 chose not to press the said bail application. The ground of
delay in trial, if at all available to the accused respondent no.2,
was very much available to him on that date as well. No change
of circumstances occurred between 11.5.2010 and 4.6.2010
whereby any occasion could have arisen for the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Sangaria for even considering the bail
application of the accused respondent no.2.
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The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bimla Devi
(Smt.) vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (1994) 2 SCC 8,
has observed as under:-
“2. In view of the fact that the Judicial Magistrate at a later
stage has himself cancelled the bail, it is not necessary for us to
pass any order with regard to the petitioner’s prayer for
cancellation of bail but the disturbing feature of the case is that
though two successive applications of the accused for grant of bail
were rejected by the High Court yet the learned Magistrate granted
provisional bail. The course adopted by the learned Magistrate is
not only contrary to settled principles of judicial discipline and
propriety but also contrary to the statutory provisions. The manner
in which the learned Magistrate dealt with the case can give rise to
the apprehensions which were expressed by the complainant in
her complaint, which was treated by this Court as a writ petition
and is being dealt with as such. In the course that we are
adopting, we would not like to comment upon the manner in which
the learned Magistrate dealt with the case any more at this stage.
We, in the facts and circumstances stated above, direct that a copy
of this order be sent to the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court
for taking such action on, the administrative side as may be
deemed fit by him.”
As the learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out to
this Court that a transfer application filed by the
petitioner/complainant making aspersions against the Presiding
Officer of the Court below was already pending before this Court.
Accordingly, the apprehension of the complainant regarding bail
having been granted for extraneous consideration cannot be said
to be unfounded and cannot be said to be unjustified by any
stretch of imagination.
This Court had called for explanation of the Presiding
Officer who granted bail to the accused and the explanation has
been sent by letter no.11/2010 dated 28.9.2010. I have carefully
considered the explanation.
This Court is of the firm opinion that the explanation which
has been submitted by the Presiding Officer for justifying the
grant of bail to the accused respondent no.2 is absolutely
unacceptable and unconvincing. It is apparent that in the
explanation, the learned Presiding Officer has tried to justify his
order despite the fact that aspersions had been made against him
by the complainant. Neither the order passed by the Presiding
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Officer nor the explanation given by him for justifying the said
order can be appreciated.
Thus, this Court feels that imperative in the interest of
justice, the registry be directed to place a copy of this order
before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for information.
The upshot of the above discussion is that this bail
cancellation application is allowed, the order dated 4.6.2010
whereby the respondent no.2 was granted bail is set aside. The
bail bonds of the accused respondent no.2 are cancelled and the
learned trial court is directed to take the respondent no.2 in
custody and proceed with the trial of the case in accordance with
law. The order dated 20.8.2010 passed by this Court staying the
proceedings of the trial court is vacated.”
9. The disciplinary inquiry is a quasi-judicial proceeding and it is
held to ascertain the substance in the allegations. The role of an
inquiry officer in a departmental inquiry is to investigate the truth
or otherwise in the imputations of misconduct and to prepare a
report that recommends whether the charges are proven or not.
The inquiry officer is not the prosecutor and it is not his duty to
somehow hold the charge proved. It is not for him to assume that
the delinquent government employee is guilty of misconduct and
his duty and objective should be confined to sift the evidence with
a view to arrive at the truth. This is also an established norm that
the inquiry officer while writing his report should rely only on the
evidence adduced during the inquiry and he should not make use
of any material based on his personal knowledge against which
the delinquent government employee had no opportunity to
defend himself.
10. Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 enumerates the penalties that
may be imposed on the delinquent government employee and one
of the penalties is the penalty of compulsory retirement on
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proportionate pension that can be imposed on a government
employee for good and sufficient reasons. Rule 16 lays down the
procedure for imposing major penalty and envisages sufficient
opportunity to the delinquent government employee to defend
himself in the disciplinary inquiry against him. It provides that the
disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of
the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. For the
purpose of preparing his defence, the government employee shall
be permitted to inspect and take extract of the documents from
the official records subject to relevancy of the document in the
opinion of the disciplinary authority. Under sub-rule(6), the
government employee shall be provided the list of witnesses and
documents and he may also submit the list of documents in his
defence. The powers vested in the inquiry officer are so vast that
he may summon only a few of the witnesses and give permission
for laying only such document and evidence which are relevant in
his opinion. The report of the inquiry officer is intended to serve
the basis on which the disciplinary authority has to take a decision
as to whether or not the imposition of any penalty on the
government employee is called for. The inquiry officer should
therefore take into consideration all the circumstances and facts of
the case as a rational and prudent man and should draw his
conclusions as to whether the charges are proved or not and each
conclusion should be based on proper reasoning and logic. In
“Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.N. Mehta, Assistant Collector for Customs
& Anr.”8, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for correct
8 [1970] 2 SCC 530.
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (14 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
assessment of evidence through an objective analysis based on
cast-iron logic. Having in our mind the importance of inquiry
report and the duty of the inquiry officer, we would now examine
the findings recorded in the inquiry report dated 25th March 2015.
11. The Hon’ble Enquiry Judge did not accept the petitioner’s
stand that the complainant was causing delay in the progress of
the sessions trial and held that the complainant would have little
control over the sessions trial. The transfer petition remained
pending in the High Court for about six months but such delay was
brushed aside on the ground that the complainant might have lost
the interest in the transfer petition because the accused was
already granted bail on 04th June 2010. It was further observed by
the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge that in view of the order passed by the
High Court in the bail cancellation application staying further
proceedings in Sessions Case No.25 of 2009 there was no reason
or occasion for the complainant to press the transfer petition
before the High Court. For holding the first charge proved, the
Hon’ble Enquiry Judge referred to the statement of the
complainant given in the domestic inquiry wherein he took a stand
that he had objected to hearing of 2 nd bail petition. The Hon’ble
Enquiry Judge further observed that the petitioner had knowledge
about the order dated 11th May 2010 rejecting the bail petition of
Satyanarayan and he was also aware about the pending transfer
petition in the High Court. The Hon’ble Enquiry Judge finally held
that the Sessions Court has jurisdiction to grant bail to an accused
during the pendency of trial but the manner in which the
petitioner exercised such jurisdiction established that he had failed
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to observe the procedure and judicial propriety. The Hon’ble
Enquiry Judge incidentally commented also on the conduct of the
petitioner because some aspersion was raised on his conduct by
the High Court while cancelling the bail granted to Satyanarayan.
The Hon’ble Enquiry Judge held as under :-
“It is also noticed that while granting the bail application to
the accused- Satyanarayan vide order dated 04.06.2010, the
delinquent officer has blamed the complainant for delaying the
trial but it is to be appreciated that the complainant has little
control over the conduct of trial of a sessions case and it is the
duty of the prosecution to produce the witnesses and to
cooperate with the trial court for early disposal of the case.
Though in the written arguments and during the course of
oral arguments, it is contended on behalf of the delinquent officer
that one of the grounds for granting bail to the accused-
Satyanarayan was that the co-accused-Savitri was already
granted bail on 07.05.2010, however, from perusal of the order
dated 04.06.2010, it is clear that the delinquent officer had not
granted bail to the accused-Satyanarayan on the ground that the
co-accused has already been released on bail. The bail was
granted to the accused-Satyanarayan mainly on the ground that
the complainant is delaying the trial and is not cooperating with
the trial.
It is also noticed that the transfer petition filed by the
complainant before the Hon’ble High Court was first listed on
21.05.2010 and on that date, the learned Single Judge has
ordered for listing the transfer petition on 26.05.2010 on the
prayer made by the counsel for the complainant. On 26.05.2010,
none was present on behalf of the complainant and the court,
after noticing the same, had ordered for listing the transfer
petition after summer vacation. Thereafter, the registry had fixed
the next date in the transfer petition as 07.07.2010 and
thereafter on several dates, the case was adjourned and
ultimately, the transfer petition was dismissed on 16.11.2011 as
having become infructuous.
It seems that the complainant had filed the transfer
petition before the Hon’ble High Court with a prayer for transfer
the trial of the Sessions Case No.25/2009 to any competent court
of jurisdiction while apprehending that the delinquent officer(Downloaded on 18/11/2024 at 09:44:22 PM)
[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (16 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]would grant the bail to accused-Satyanarayan or would pass an
order in favour of the accused-persons but after the delinquent
officer had granted bail to the accused- Satyanarayan on
04.06.2010, he might have lost the interest in pressing the
transfer application and instead preferred an application for
cancellation of bail granted to the accused-Satyanarayan and
Single Judge of Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 20.08.2010
in S.B. Cr. Misc. Bail Cancellation Application No. 26/2010 had
stayed the further proceedings and therefore, after 20.08.2010,
there was no reason or occasion for the complainant to press the
transfer petition before the Hon’ble High Court.
It is true that a court conducting trial of a sessions case
has jurisdiction to grant bail to an accused during the pendency
of trial, however, the manner in which such jurisdiction is
exercised can also be scrutinised if some aspersions are raised as
has been done in this case by the Single Judge of Hon’ble High
Court while cancelling the bail of accused-Satyanarayan.
In the overall facts and circumstances as noted above, it is
clear that the delinquent officer had granted bail to the accused-
Satyanarayan ignoring established judicial procedure and thedelinquent officer has failed to maintain judicial propriety. ”
12. The gist of the findings recorded by the Hon’ble Enquiry
Judge is that the petitioner was required to wait for the outcome
of the transfer petition filed by the complainant and it was a gross
misconduct on his part to take up for hearing and deal with 2 nd
bail petition. A question, therefore, arises as to how long the
petitioner should have waited for an order from the High Court to
be produced before him by the complainant and as to how many
times the hearing of 2nd bail petition could have been adjourned or
it could have been adjourned till the disposal of the transfer
petition. Another connected issue that would arise is whether the
petitioner would have been acting against the direction for
expeditious disposal of the bail petition had he adjourned the
hearing of 2nd bail petition for an indefinite period; the transfer
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petition was pending in the High Court for about six months. This
is well remembered that timeline for disposal of bail petitions has
been fixed by the High Courts and time and again the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed9 that the bail petitions in subordinate
Courts should ordinarily be decided within one week and in the
High Courts within two or three weeks as far as practicable. In
“Chunni Lal Gaba v. Assistant Director, Directorate of
Enforcement”9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the
accused has a right of hearing of the bail petition and the denial of
hearing is an infringement of his right and liberty under the
Constitution. That was a case where the bail petition was not
listed for quite a long time and the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that non-listing of a bail petition defeats the
administration of justice. Years before that, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court had observed in “Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public
Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh”10 that the personal liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is too precious a value
that a curial power to negate it must be exercised judiciously and
not casually.
13. The information tendered by the complainant during the
proceedings of 2nd bail petition in the petitioner’s Court was that
the transfer petition vide S.B. Criminal Misc. Transfer Petition No.3
of 2010 was likely to be listed for hearing in the High Court on
12th May 2010; hearing of the bail petition was adjourned for
24th May 2010. The complainant gave further information to the
Court that the transfer petition was to be listed in the High Court
9 Chunni Lal Gaba v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement : [S.L.P. (Criminal) Diary
No.11581/2021]; order dated 15th June 2021.
10 [1978] 1 SCC 240.
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (18 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
for hearing on 26th June 2010; but that was not a working day. On
25th May 2010, the hearing of the bail petition was again
adjourned for 29th June 2010. On the other hand, the proceedings
in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Transfer Petition No.3 of 2010
reveal that the transfer petition was not seriously prosecuted by
the complainant, no notice was issued in that proceeding to the
opposite party and, in fact, on a few dates no one appeared for
the complainant. For the sake of fullness, we record that the
transfer petition was listed for hearing on as many as 21 occasions
between 21st May 2010 and 16th November 2011 when it was
eventually dismissed as infructuous. However, the Hon’ble Enquiry
Judge did not accept the stand taken by the petitioner that a
departmental proceeding could not have been initiated against
him merely because he granted bail to the accused and that there
were subsequent developments and substantial change in the
circumstances.
14. This is one of the canons of judicial ethics that the judicial
officers perform their duties without unnecessary delays and
ensure that the justice is not delayed. Mere knowledge of the
pendency of the transfer petition in the High Court was not such a
compelling reason for the petitioner not to deal with 2 nd bail
petition. In “Hussain & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.”11, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that denial of speedy justice is a threat
to public confidence in the administration of justice and timely
delivery of justice is a part of human rights. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court further observed that the deprivation of personal liberty
11 (2017) 5 SCC 702
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (19 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
without ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21 of
the Constitution. On merits, we observe that there is hardly any
material forthcoming against the petitioner to conclude that
entertaining 2nd bail petition was an act of misconduct. There
cannot be any exhaustive parameters for considering the bail
petitions and the grant of bail depends on the contextual facts of
the case and may vary from case to case. Indeed, this does not
require a reference of any case law that the grant of bail is a
discretionary relief. We have gone through the records and find
that the order granting bail on 2nd bail petition to Satyanarayan
was a reasoned order with foundations in law. The under-trial
prisoner Satyanarayan was accused of running over Suchit @
Sanjeev by a tractor. He was arrested on 14 th June 2009 and the
charge of murder was framed against him on 22 nd September
2009 but no witness was produced in the trial for about one year.
In the order granting bail, the petitioner made a mention that
bailable warrants and arrest warrants were issued for production
of the witnesses and the complainant was not co-operating and he
filed an application on 07th May 2010 in his Court for deferring the
hearing of 2nd bail petition on the ground that he had filed a
transfer petition in the High Court. The defence taken by
Satyanarayan was that four persons had tried to stop the tractor
but he did not stop the tractor fearing that they would kill him and
in the ensuing confusion Suchit @ Sanjeev came in front of the
tractor and got hit while the other three persons had retreated. To
set up this defence, the statement of four witnesses recorded by
the police was referred to by the learned counsel appearing for
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (20 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
Satyanarayan. The decisions in “Chhinder Singh v. State of
Rajasthan”12 and “Satnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan”13 were also
cited on his behalf to support his defence that the offence
committed by him would at the best fall under section 304-A of
the Indian Penal Code. In our opinion, this is one thing to say that
the view taken by the petitioner was not correct but to attribute
any motive to him in dealing with 2nd bail petition while a transfer
petition was pending in the High Court is definitely a different
matter and that shall require some definite evidence in support
thereof. In “Ramesh Chander Singh”3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that if the High Court were to initiate disciplinary proceedings
based on a judicial order there must be strong grounds to suspect
the officer’s bona fides and the order itself should have been
actuated with malice, bias or illegality. Pertinently, the charge of
granting bail for improper motive was not found substantiated in
the disciplinary inquiry and the petitioner was exonerated of that
charge.
15. 2nd bail petition filed by Satyanarayan was dealt with by the
petitioner in the following manner :-
English Translation from the operative portion of the order dated
04th June 2010 passed in Misc. Criminal Case No.87/2010:
“Satyanarayan v. State of Rajasthan ” in Sessions Case No.25 of
2009:
“6. After hearing both the parties, I have perused the file and
carefully examined the judicial precedents. In the case of
Tejveer v. State of Rajasthan 1989 Criminal Law Reporter
(Raj) page 227, the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court, without
delving into the facts and circumstances of the case,
considered the time required for the trial and deemed it just
to release the accused on bail. I have carefully observed the12 1986 [1] W.L.N. 464
13 2000 Crl. L. J. 584(Downloaded on 18/11/2024 at 09:44:22 PM)
[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (21 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]facts and circumstances of the present case. In this case, the
alleged offence against the accused-Satyanarayan is of
running his tractor over the complainant’s nephew Suchit
alias Sanjeev at 4:00 PM on 12.06.09, resulting in his death.
The accused-Satyanarayan has been in judicial custody for
over a year, and according to his arrest memo, he was
arrested on 14.06.09 and the case was committed to this
Court on 17.09.09. On the very next hearing, on September
22, 2009, charges were framed against the accused, and all
witnesses were summoned. However, despite issuing bail
warrants and even arrest warrants, the complainant has
failed to present any of their witnesses in court, although the
complainant’s counsel has been consistently present in the
court. The delay in this case is solely due to the conduct of
the complainant and his witnesses. On 07.05.10 the
complainant filed an application in the Court that his transfer
petition bearing Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 03/10 is
pending in the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court. Therefore no
action should be taken in the case. When co-accused Savitri
appeared in court on 07.05.10, the complainant requested
that no further action be taken in this case, and that charges
under Section 302 of the IPC be framed against the accused,
rather than Section 304-A. The learned advocate of the
accused agreed that he has no objection to the charge of
Section 302 IPC. In light of the judicial decorum, the
complainant was directed to present the order of the Hon’ble
Rajasthan High Court on the next hearing i.e. 24.05.2010,
but no such order has been submitted by the complainant till
date. In view of the overall examination of the case and
looking at the facts and circumstances, in my humble opinion
the delay in this case is caused by the complainant and not
by the accused. The learned advocates of the accused are
prepared to assist the Court in every possible manner.
Furthermore, it has been requested that the complainant
should not demand any substantial action from the Court at
this stage, and the only task for now should be the recording
of statements after framing the charges. The arguments will
reach the final stage after some time. However, in my
humble opinion the complainant is not adopting a co-
operative attitude with the Court. I have perused the case file
once again. The learned advocate for the accused has
referred to the judicial precedents in the State of Gujarat v.
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (22 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
Haider Ali Kalubhai (1976 Criminal Law Reporter (Supreme
Court) Page 114) in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined
that the elements of Section 279, Section 300, and Section
304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) are different. In that
case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorized the matter
under Section 304A, not Section 304 (Part II). Similarly, the
learned advocate referred to the case of Satnam Singh v.
State of Rajasthan (2000 Criminal Law Journal, Page 584),
where the facts were similar to the present case. In that
case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the matter
under Section 304-A, not Section 304 (Part II). Additionally,
the case Chhinder Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986 W.L.N.,
Page 464) was cited by the learned advocate. In this case,
the accused Chhinder Singh was driving a tractor with his
brother Gindar Singh and were sitting on one side of tractor’s
mudguard and a third person Nazar Singh was sitting on the
other side of the tractor’s mudguard. Due to a family dispute
between Sardar Singh and Chhinder Singh, Chhinder Singh
and his brother Gindarsingh deliberately ran tractor over
Sardar Singh, causing his death. The tractor was driven in
such a way that it was deliberately driven over Sardar Singh,
causing him to fall. It was stated that Chhinder Singh
intentionally ran the tractor over Sardar Singh, and a case
was filed under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), and a charge sheet was filed. The
Rajasthan High Court held that despite the false allegations of
provocation and incitement, the accused could only be held
liable under Section 304-A. The facts of the present case, in
my humble opinion, closely resemble the judicial precedent in
Chhinder Singh v. State of Rajasthan. However, it would not
be appropriate for me to comment on the merits and
demerits of the case at this stage. The learned advocate for
the accused has argued that from the examination of the
statements of witnesses Raju son of Mukhram Bawri, Prem
son of Ramchandra Jat, Sandeep son of Atmaram, and
Surjeet, it is clear that when the accused was driving the
tractor, four men attempted to stop him. The accused fearing
that they would harm him if he stopped, continued driving. As
a result, three of the men moved aside but the deceased
Sanjeev did not move in time and was struck by the tractor
leading to his death and the incident could be considered a
case of suicide due to the circumstances. I have carefully
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (23 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
examined the statements of these four witnesses, especially
those of Raju and Surjeet Singh, who are independent
witnesses. After Raju and Surjeet Singh moved their tractor
aside, the accused, Satyanarayan, parked his tractor and
began carrying a tali (a type of tree) with it. According to the
statements of both Raju and Surjeet Singh, they followed
him. Satyanarayan’s tractor was ahead of them. When they
reached the other side of the road, they signaled him to stop
by shouting “Stop, stop!” As the tractor came closer at high
speed, three of them moved aside, but one person remained
in front. This sequence of events was corroborated by the
statements of the witnesses during the investigation. At this
stage, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on the
merits and demerits of the case. However, in my humble
opinion, the principles established in the judicial precedents,
particularly in Chhinder Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986
W.L.N., Page 464) and Satnam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan
(2000 Criminal Law Journal, Page 584), are closely aligned
with the facts of the present case. The accused has a legal
right of speedy disposal of the case. The complainant has not
co-operated with the Court in any manner. The accused has
been in judicial custody for a considerable amount of time.
Despite repeated summons, the complainant has not
presented any evidence after the charges were framed.
Considering the overall circumstances and the past animosity
between the parties, it seems just and fair to grant bail to the
accused.
7. Therefore, the application for bail filed under Section
439 of the Cr.P.C. by the accused-Satyanarayan is hereby
accepted. The accused is granted bail on the condition that he
submits two sureties of ₹25,000 each and a personal bond of
₹50,000 before the Court. It is also important to note that
the observations made in this order are limited to the
disposal of this bail application and should not be considered
as final findings on the merits of the case.”
16. If an order is passed without there being any corrupt motive
the same cannot be made the basis for initiating a disciplinary
proceeding against the judicial officer. No one is infallible and the
Constitution itself provides the hierarchy of Courts and a provision
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (24 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
for review under Article 137. To err is human and it would be
really preposterous to assume that a judicial officer cannot commit
mistake of any kind in passing the judicial orders. A mistake
committed by the judicial officer may some time seem to be an
intolerable error but the right course to deal with such a situation
would be to correct the mistake and to ensure dignity of the
Court. In “Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar”14, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that the higher Courts should convey its
message in the judgment to the officer concerned through the
process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, mellowed and result
oriented but rarely as a rebuke.
17. No doubt it is lawful for the departmental authority to pass
an order of punishment against the delinquent government
employee provided there is some evidence. However, in a case in
which the punishment of compulsory retirement from service has
been passed based on an inquiry report which itself is based on no
evidence then the writ Court must step in and remedy the mistake
committed by the departmental authority. In “K.P. Tiwari v. State
of Madhya Pradesh”15, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that
the judicial officers work under psychological pressure and every
error howsoever gross it may look should not be attributed to
improper motive. In the departmental inquiry against the
petitioner, the complainant could not support the allegation of
extraneous consideration in granting bail to Satyanarayan. The
Hon’ble Enquiry Judge also did not find any material to conclude
that the order passed in 2nd bail petition was actuated by corrupt
14 [1996] 4 SCC 539.
15 AIR 1994 SC 1031.
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (25 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
motive. For a robust and impartial subordinate judiciary, it is
necessary that the High Court remains alive to the ground realities
and should not encourage frivolous complaints. Else, the judicial
officers would be in a state of dilemma in every case dealt with by
them and it would be really difficult for them to discharge their
duty in an independent manner. Indeed, the subordinate judicial
officers look upon the High Court for guidance and protection from
desperate complaints. The order-sheet of the transfer petition was
not produced in the domestic inquiry and the Hon’ble Inquiry
Judge had no material before him to discuss and verify the stand
taken by the petitioner that the complainant was delaying disposal
of 2nd bail petition. This is also a matter of record that the
documents laid in evidence in the departmental inquiry against the
petitioner were not even proved through any witness and there
was hardly any legally admissible material produced before the
Hon’ble Inquiry Judge. May be the genuineness of those
documents were not denied by the petitioner but the petitioner
had no opportunity to elicit any statement with reference to those
documents because no witness was produced by the High Court in
the disciplinary inquiry (refer, “Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National
Bank and Ors.”16). The inquiry report serves a vital purpose in a
disciplinary proceeding inasmuch as the inquiry officer conducts a
fact finding inquiry but the mere ipse dixit of the inquiry officer is
not sufficient to hold the charge proved against the government
employee. In “M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India”17, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that an inquiry officer performs a quasi-
16 [2009] 2 SCC 570.
17 [2006] 5 SCC 88
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (26 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
judicial function and he must arrive at a conclusion upon analysing
the documents that there is a preponderance of probability to
prove the charge on the basis of materials on record.
18. The complainant tendered evidence to the effect that he
apprehended foul play because co-accused Savitri Devi was bailed
out by the petitioner within three days of her arrest and the
petitioner continued to deal with 2 nd bail petition, though the
transfer petition was pending consideration before the High Court.
But in the cross-examination, the complainant accepted the
suggestion that he was not seriously prosecuting the transfer
petition and he admitted that he never visited the High Court after
filing the transfer petition. This is the statement of the
complainant that he did not make any allegation of extraneous
consideration against the petitioner in the bail cancellation
petition. He also admitted that he never made any complaint
against the petitioner before he filed the transfer petition in the
High Court. More importantly, the complainant stated in the
domestic inquiry that the application vide Exhibit-P.11 was
prepared by his counsel for adjournment in the petitioner’s Court
and he had no knowledge about the contents thereunder.
19. The relevant portions of the cross-examination of the
complainant are extracted below :-
English Translation
“I did not read the affidavit Exhibit P. 11 before signing it. I
only told the lawyer to write in it that our hearing is going on in
the High Court, please do not hear the bail application today. I do
not know what else did the lawyer write as I am illiterate. This
lawyer was not appointed by me; he was just a lawyer I
happened to engage that day.
When the transfer application was filed in the High Court, I
had come to the High Court that day, but after that, I would only
visit the lawyer and did not appear in court. The transfer petition
was pending in the High Court for about eight to nine months.
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During this time, I kept in contact with the lawyer but never went
to court. It is true that the matter was pending for nearly one and
a half years, and during this period, I never went to the High
Court. It is also true that I had suspicions that Amar Singh had
accepted a bribe to approve the bail of Savitri Devi, but I never
saw any exchange of money. It is true that both the accused
Satyanarayan and Savitri Devi were charged under Section 302 of
the IPC by Amar Singh. I do not remember for how many days
the file remained under testimony during his tenure. During this
period, we did not produce any witness because our transfer
application was pending in the High Court. It is true that from the
beginning of the case until today, I have not made any
complaints against Amar Singh, I only filed the transfer petition.
It is true that there is my signature on Exhibit P.4 in the file S.B.
Criminal Misc. Transfer Petition No. 3/2010 at all places from A to
B and the affidavit attached with it also has my signature at both
places from A to B. I don’t know why the fact of suspicion of
bribery is not mentioned in transfer application (Exhibit P.4).
The judge had given me two opportunities. He had told me
once, “You bring the stay order from the High Court.” The second
time, he did not accept my petition, so I sent it by post. When
Mr. Amar Singh granted bail to Savitri, I filed a petition in the
High Court to have this order canceled, but it was dismissed. In a
case under Section 302 IPC where a 16-year-old child was
murdered and bail is granted in just four days, it naturally raises
suspicions. It is incorrect to say that I filed a false transfer
petition in the High Court due to the adverse order regarding
Satyanarayan’s bail, and that I am making baseless allegations
against Mr. Amar Singh due to animosity, claiming him to be
someone who influences decisions with bribes.”
20. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 of the Constitution is a plenary jurisdiction but
the High Court exercises this jurisdiction not as an appellate
Court. In one of the earliest judgments, in “State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Shree Rama Rao”18 it was held that the High
Court is not constituted as a Court of appeal in a proceeding under
Article 226 of the Constitution over the decision of the authority
holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant. However,
if the departmental authority fails to take into consideration a
material fact which would change the course of the decision then
that shall be an error in law and the High Court shall be justified in
interfering with the order of punishment. It is also well-settled
that the High Court may interfere with the punishment awarded in
18 AIR 1963 SC 1723.
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (28 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
a departmental proceeding if there was no evidence against the
government employee and the disciplinary authority simply
accepted the inquiry report and based on that passed the order of
punishment. In “Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance
Company Ltd. & Ors.”19, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that
the writ Court shall bear in mind the distinction between some
evidence and no evidence and the real question required to be
posed is whether some evidence adduced in the domestic inquiry
would lead to the conclusion about the guilt of the delinquent
officer. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High
Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction should examine as to
whether the evidence adduced before the inquiry officer had any
nexus with the charge and could or could not lead to the guilt of
the employee. We would also refer to “Kuldeep Singh v.
Commissioner of Police & Ors.”20 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that the High Court has power to interfere in the
matter where the conclusions reached in the disciplinary inquiry
could not have been concluded by an ordinary prudent man. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under :-
“6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or
this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings
recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority
or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit
in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate
authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the
Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High
Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its
stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the
conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support
the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have
19 (2006) 4 SCC 713.
20 [1999] 2 SCC 10.
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[2024:RJ-JD:35400-DB] (29 of 29) [CW-1971/2017]
been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were
perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority. ”
21. Just to recapitulate, the complainant could not support the
allegation that the petitioner had any corrupt motive in hearing 2 nd
bail petition of Satyanarayan, no other witness except the
complainant was produced in the disciplinary inquiry against the
petitioner and merely some documents were produced before the
Hon’ble Enquiry Judge to support the charges framed against the
petitioner. It seems that the Full Court of the Rajasthan High Court
was quite divided and perhaps there were discordant voices and
that was the reason the decision to impose punishment upon the
petitioner was taken by ‘majority’ and it was not a unanimous
decision of the Full Court. In summation, there was no material
produced in the departmental inquiry to connect the petitioner
with the charges framed against him and it was a case of ‘no
evidence’. Therefore, having regard to the admitted facts, we are
inclined to hold that the disciplinary authority failed to take note of
the explanation offered by the petitioner. In our considered
opinion, the punishment order is not sustainable in law and is
liable to be quashed.
22. For the foregoing reasons, the order of punishment dated
18th September 2015 is quashed. This writ petition is allowed and
the petitioner is held entitled to all consequential benefits.
23. No order as to costs.
(KULDEEP MATHUR),J (SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR),J
50-divya/-
Whether fit for reporting:- Yes/No
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