Supreme Court of India
Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs The State Of Karnataka on 24 January, 2025
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Prashant Kumar Mishra, Dipankar Datta
2025 INSC 105 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4884 OF 2024
[arising out of S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) No. 10082/2019]
MADHUSHREE DATTA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4883 OF 2024
[arising out of S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) No. 10115/2019]
BADRINARAYANA JAGANATHAN … APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
THE APPEAL
1.
Signature Not VerifiedBy a common impugned judgment and order dated 31st July, 20191, a
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.01.24
18:23:59 IST
Reason:
1
impugned order
learned Judge of the High Court of Karnataka2 dismissed Criminal
Petition No. 3961 of 2015 (Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs. State of
Karnataka & Anr.) and Criminal Petition No. 3962 of 2015 (Madhushree
Datta vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.), both filed under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 19733, seeking quashing of the chargesheet
filed under Section 173(2), Cr. PC and the entire proceedings in Case
Crime No. 53073 of 2014, on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bangalore4.
2. The accused appellants5 – Madhushree Datta6 and Badrinarayana
Jaganathan7 – have taken exception to the impugned order by
presenting these appeals.
FACTS
3. The proceedings before the ACMM have, as its genesis, an incident of
25th October, 2013. The second respondent as complainant8 lodged a
complaint dated 26th October, 2013 with the Sub-Inspector of Police,
H.A.L. Police Station, Marathahalli, Bangalore, against M/s Juniper
Networks India Private Limited9 and the appellants. The complainant
asserted that she was employed as a Technical System Analyst at the
2
High Court
3
Cr. PC
4
ACMM
5
appellants
6
first accused
7
second accused
8
complainant
9
Company
2
Company, where she was subjected to ongoing harassment by the
management. She claimed that she was coerced into resigning under
duress, with the threat of immediate termination if she did not comply.
Specifically, the complainant alleged that on October 25, 2013, between
2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the first accused, who held the position of
Human Resources Manager at the Company, demanded that the
complainant resign under threat of immediate dismissal. Furthermore,
the first accused, allegedly instructed the complainant not to return to
work and confiscated her personal belongings, including her laptop, bag,
wallet, money, credit cards et cetera. The complainant further asserted
that the laptop contained proprietary intellectual property, specifically
codes and other work, that she had personally created. In addition, the
complainant alleged that the management ordered her removal from
the premises, with security personnel escorting her out and reportedly
engaging in behaviour amounting to physical harassment, assault and
threatening with dire consequences.
4. Following the above complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report10 was
registered on 26th October, 2013. The NCR states that the employees of
the Company, namely the appellants, subjected the complainant to both
mental and physical harassment by confiscating her laptop, which
contained her data. The complainant subsequently filed a formal
complaint seeking an inquiry and investigation into the matter, following
her forcible termination from employment on October 25, 2013.
10
NCR
3
5. More than 2 (two) months later, a First Information Report11 was lodged
by the complainant accusing the Company and the appellants of having
committed offences punishable under sections 323, 504, 506, 509, 511
of the Indian Penal Code, 186012. The FIR states that the Company,
along with the first accused, subjected the complainant to both physical
and mental torture. They allegedly confiscated the laptop issued to the
complainant and forcibly evicted her from the Company.
6. Following the registration of the FIR, an investigation was conducted
into the alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511
of the IPC. A chargesheet was filed on 23rd April 2014, arraigning the
appellants as accused. The chargesheet alleges that the appellants
physically assaulted the complainant and confiscated the laptop
provided by the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data
stored on it. Additionally, the appellants were accused of scolding the
complainant in “filthy language” and forcibly terminating her
employment. Furthermore, with the assistance of security personnel,
the appellants are said to have had the complainant removed from the
premises of the Company.
7. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants unsuccessfully approached the High
Court as noted above.
IMPUGNED ORDER
8. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the High Court primarily
considered the allegations set forth in the complainant’s complaint and
11
FIR
12
IPC
4
concluded that, prima facie, they meet the necessary elements to
constitute the offences attributed to the appellants. The High Court
rejected the appellants’ objection regarding the procedure followed by
the police in registering FIR No. 823/2013, and observed that the
materials on record suggest that the offences alleged against the
appellants involve both cognizable and non-cognizable offences. The
High Court further held that a mere lapse in the process of investigation,
by itself, would not constitute a valid ground for quashing the
proceedings. Moreover, the records indicate that the investigating officer
had obtained the requisite authorization under Section 155(2) of the Cr.
PC prior to registration of the FIR. Additionally, the High Court noted
that the alleged offences were committed by employees of the
Company, that is, the appellants, and not by the Company itself, without
the Company’s consent. Consequently, non-inclusion of the Company as
an accused in the chargesheet did not entitle the appellants to seek
quashing of the chargesheet.
CONTENTIONS
9. Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellants argued that the
High Court erred in failing to exercise its inherent power under Section
482 of the Cr. PC, and to quash the chargesheet filed against the
appellants. He contended that the following points warrant consideration
by this Court:
A. Firstly, the FIR and the chargesheet filed by the first respondent fail
to disclose a prima facie case against the appellants. The
5
chargesheet, according to the appellants, does not disclose any ofthe essential elements of the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506,
509, and 511 of the IPC even if accepted as true.
B. Secondly, the offences alleged in the complaint are of a general
nature and do not specify the appellants’ involvement in the
commission of the alleged offences. Categorical assertion is that the
second accused was not present in the office on the date of the
alleged incident and, therefore, no specific role has been attributed
to him in relation to the alleged offences.
C. Thirdly, the issues pertaining to resignation and termination are civil
in nature. Criminal proceedings have been initiated by the
complainant solely to exert pressure on the Company and the
appellants, with the intent of coercing them to settle the matter, and
thereby enabling complainant to gain an undue monetary advantage.
D. Fourthly, the allegations levelled in the FIR are so absurd and
inherently improbable that no reasonable person could, based on
these allegations, conclude that there are sufficient grounds to
proceed against the appellants.
E. Fifthly, the allegations made in the FIR and reiterated in the
chargesheet are inconsistent.
F. Sixthly, initially, a NCR was registered against the appellants, and
despite the investigation, no new material has been placed on record
to substantiate the commission of a punishable offence under
Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC.
6
G. Seventhly, in criminal proceedings, the appellants cannot be held
liable for the actions of a third party. The complainant has alleged
that it was the security guard who harassed and assaulted her,
threatening her with dire consequences.
H. Eighthly, no medical examination was conducted by the first
respondent on the complainant to ascertain any injury resulting from
an alleged assault by the appellants, thereby leading to a serious
miscarriage of justice.
I. Finally, it was contended that no FIR based on the complaint dated
26th December, 2013 ought to have been registered on the face of
the NCR.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for both sets of respondents supported the
High Court’s order dismissing the appellants’ petitions under Section
482 of the Cr. PC. They vehemently refuted the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the appellants and presented the following
arguments:
A. Firstly, the allegations made in the complaint, prima facie, disclose
the essential ingredients of criminal offences. A plain reading of the
complaint, the FIR, and the chargesheet clearly establishes a case
against the appellants under Sections 323, 504, 506, and 511 of the
IPC.
B. Secondly, the Company and its employees, namely the appellants,
subjected the complainant to harassment and humiliation. They
7
issued life threats, engaged in criminal intimidation, committedphysical assault, inflicted mental torture, insulted her, and unlawfully
seized her intellectual property, including code, data, and other
related materials. Furthermore, during the act of forcibly taking her
laptop, she was inappropriately touched and handled, thereby
subjecting her to physical harassment.
C. Thirdly, the complainant was coerced into tendering her resignation,
and when she protested, force was used to compel her to return the
laptop. Additionally, she was physically assaulted and threatened
with severe consequences.
CONSIDERATION
11. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for all the parties at
length and examined the materials on record.
12. The points for determination that emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether, based on the materials on record, prima facie,
ingredients of the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506,
509, and 511 of the IPC are made out, even if the allegations
are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety?
(ii) Whether the chargesheet and the related criminal
proceedings against the appellants, are liable to be quashed?
13. At the outset, we record that none of the two complaints lodged by the
complainant – the first on 26th October, 2013 and the next on 23rd
December, 2013 – does with any degree of clarity and certainty suggest
the presence of the second accused at the time of the alleged occurrence
8
in the office premises of the Company. In fact, when this was pointed
out to learned counsel for the complainant, he had no answer. Even
though it is admitted that the second accused was not present, we are
minded to proceed on the premise as if the second accused too was
present. What would be the effect of arraigning him as an accused
though not present shall, however, be dealt with at a later stage of this
judgment.
14. While considering the first point, we need to examine in brief the
relevant provisions of the IPC.
SECTION 323, IPC
15. To determine what are the ingredients of the offence under Section 323
of the IPC, it is important to read Sections 319, 321 and 323 together.
16. What emerges on a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions
is that, for a conviction under Section 323 of the IPC, there must be a
voluntary act of causing hurt, i.e., bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to
another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused.
17. Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint merely states that the
complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company’s office by security
personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and
threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the complaint does not
directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant
by any of the two accused.
18. Furthermore, the chargesheet reiterates the similar version set forth in
the complaint, stating that the complainant was forcibly thrown out of
9
the office by the security personnel. While the actions of the security
personnel could potentially constitute an offence of causing hurt, they
are neither named in the complaint nor figure as accused in the
chargesheet. Having said that, the appellants cannot be said to have
foreseen or anticipated the actions of the security personnel in such a
manner that would render them co-perpetrators of the offence. Hence,
there is no basis for the prosecution to set forth the concept of liability
of the employer or for the overt acts of its employees in this matter.
19. In the light of the abovementioned discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that the ingredients of offence under Section 323 of the IPC
have not been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the
chargesheet.
SECTIONS 504 AND 509, IPC
20. The next question for determination is, whether the mere assertion of
“filthy language” allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the
complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under
Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC.
21. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions
contained in Section 504 of the IPC.
22. A perusal of Section 504 of the IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting
someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such a
nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace
or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of
Section 504 of the IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available
10
material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge
that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or
the commission of any other offence.
23. We may, at this juncture, profitably refer to the decision of this Court in
Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.13, wherein
Section 504 of the IPC came up for interpretation and it was held as
under:
“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients,
viz., (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to
give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused
must intend or know that such provocation would cause
another to break the public peace or to commit any other
offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that
should provoke a person to break the public peace or to
commit any other offence. The person who intentionally
insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give
provocation to any other person and such provocation will
cause to break the public peace or to commit any other
offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are
satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the
offence is that there should have been an act or conduct
amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the
accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by
itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.
14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual
words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to
read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the
Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has
been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to
break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that
is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section
504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim
reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other
person to commit any other offence. The background facts,
circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are
used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the
time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such
actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while13
AIR 2014 SC 201311
examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under
Section 504 IPC.”(emphasis supplied)
24. In the instant case, the chargesheet states that the appellants used
“filthy language” while scolding the complainant; however, no such
allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore,
it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting
the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the complainant to
commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence.
Therefore, from the materials on record, the ingredients of the offence
under Section 504 of the IPC, as explained in the abovesaid decision,
are not satisfied.
25. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509 of
the IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of
the term “modesty”, to determine whether modesty has been insulted.
While modesty is not explicitly defined in the IPC, this Court has
addressed the essence of a woman’s modesty in the decision in
Ramkripal v. State of Madhya Pradesh14. Excerpts from the decision
read as under:
“12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is
nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman’s modesty
is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux
of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant,
but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this
Section is an attribute associated with female human beings14
(2007) 11 SCC 26512
as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to
her sex…”(emphasis supplied)
26. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty
of a woman under Section 509 of the IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v.
Kanwar Pal Singh Gill15, observed as under:
“15. In State of Punjab vs. Major Singh (AIR 1967 SC 63) a
question arose whether a female child of seven and a half
months could be said to be possessed of ‘modesty’ which
could be outraged. In answering the above question
Mudholkar J., who along with Bachawat J. spoke for the
majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence
of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the
common notions of mankind that must fall within the
mischief of Section 354 IPC. Needless to say, the `common
notions of mankind’ referred to by the learned Judge have
to be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other
learned Judge (Bachawat J.) observed that the essence of a
woman’s modesty is her sex and from her very birth she
possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex.
From the above dictionary meaning of ‘modesty’ and the
interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major
Singh’s case (supra) it appears to us that the ultimate test
for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is, is
the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one
which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a
woman…”(emphasis supplied)
27. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be
essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in
order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the
intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the
modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was
15
(1995) 6 SCC 194
13
intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a
woman.
28. The term “filthy language,” when examined in isolation, and without any
contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to
insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall within the purview of
Section 509 of the IPC. Had there been references to specific words
used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding,
succeeding, or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate a
criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the
prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants.
29. In considering the term “filthy language” objectively, in the overall
conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants’ actions
do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would
reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such
a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to a woman’s
modesty.
30. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be
assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not only
of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in the alleged
incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the appellants were
positioned as an employee and senior officials, respectively. Moreover,
it is evident from the case presented by both parties that a dispute
existed between them with regard to the employment in question.
14
31. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that
the appellants used language towards the complainant that would
warrant an offence under Section 509 of the IPC. However, the
chargesheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant using
“filthy language.” Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR.
32. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants
and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the
employment; the absence of any references to specific words used,
contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or
succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any
“filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is
only found in the chargesheet: there are serious concerns regarding the
claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants.
Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that
prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC have
not been disclosed.
SECTION 506, IPC
33. This brings us to the offence under Section 506 of the IPC, which the
High Court has found to be prima facie disclosed against the appellants.
Section 506 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of
criminal intimidation, while Section 503 defines the offence of criminal
intimidation.
15
34. This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503
and 506 of the IPC in Manik Taneja and Another v. State of
Karnataka & Anr.16, where it was observed as follows:
“11. xxxxxxxxxxxx A reading of the definition of ‘criminal
intimidation’ would indicate that there must be an act of
threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the
person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or
to the person in whom the threatened person is interested
and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the
person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is
not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is
legally entitled to do.”
35. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute any
threats or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore, ingredients of
Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not made out against him. The
argument that the first accused acted at the behest of the second
accused is untenable, as Section 34 of the IPC, which imposes vicarious
liability in criminal matters, has not been applied in this case.
36. However, the complainant has stated in her complaint that she was
threatened by the first accused, as detailed below:
“Then on 25-10-2013 at about 2.00 P.M. and 3-00 P.M. one
MADHUSHIREE DUTTA (HR) asked me to forcefully resign or
otherwise I will be sent out immediately. Further she
abruptly asked me not to come for my work henceforth”.
37. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against the
first accused, it must be established that she had the intention to cause
alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat reveals that
the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which
16
(2015) 7 SCC 423
16
constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation. It is also
the appellants’ case, which has not been disputed by the complainant,
that the complainant has filed a reference before the labour court
challenging her termination and seeking reinstatement along with back
wages. Given these circumstances and the materials on record, the
ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not disclosed
against the first accused too.
38. After a thorough examination of the matter, including a review of the
materials on record: viz., the complaint, the FIR, and chargesheet, we
are of the view that none of the ingredients of Sections 323, 504, 506,
and 509 of the IPC are present, even if they are taken at face value and
accepted in their entirety. The complaint is bereft of even the basic
facts, which are absolutely necessary for making out an offence.
39. Since the ingredients of the offences under the aforementioned sections
have not been made out, the charge under Section 511 of the IPC
cannot stand.
40. To sum up, after the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was
registered. It indicated that no cognizable offence was initially believed
to have been committed against the complainant. Subsequently, an FIR
was lodged on 23rd December, 2012, i.e., 58 (fifty-eight) days after the
initial complaint was filed, under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511
of the IPC. It is pertinent to note that only Section 509 constitutes a
cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504, and 506 are non-
cognizable offences. Furthermore, the FIR does not contain any
17
allegations that would substantiate a charge under Section 509 of the
IPC. Additionally, the chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the
use of “filthy language” by the appellants in scolding the complainant.
The discrepancies and variations outlined above, suggest a deliberate
attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable
to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter,
potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute
with the complainant.
41. Notwithstanding this, and as asserted by the appellants, there are
certain facts that strongly suggest that the criminal proceedings were
initiated by the complainant against the appellants with mala fide
intentions, specifically to wreak vengeance, cause harm, or coerce a
settlement. The presence of the second accused cannot by any stretch
of imagination be visualised, if one were to barely read the complaints
– initial and subsequent – and treat the contents as true; yet, the
complainant alleged acts against him which, according to her, amounted
to criminal offence. We are reminded of the maxim res ipsa loquitur and
leave the discussion at that.
42. The legal principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr. PC for quashing complaints and criminal proceedings have
been formulated by this Court in a plethora of decisions. We see no
reason to burden this judgment of ours by referring to the same.
However, we are fully convinced that allowing the criminal proceedings
18
to proceed against the appellants would amount to an abuse of the legal
process and result in a travesty of justice.
43. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are also of the view that the
arguments advanced by Mr. Luthra on the permissibility of the police to
register the FIR on 23rd December, 2013 need not be examined in this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
44. We, therefore, answer point (i), referred to in paragraph 12 (supra) in
the negative while point (ii) of the same paragraph is answered in the
affirmative.
45. Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court, dated 31.07.2019,
cannot be sustained and, consequently, stands set aside. The
chargesheet and the entire proceedings in Case Crime No. 53073 of
2014, on the file of the ACCM, Bangalore, against the appellants also
stand quashed.
46. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.
47. We, however, make it clear that the findings/observations
recorded/made herein shall have no bearing on the pending reference
between the parties before the Labour Court.
……………………….…………….J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
…………..………………………….J.
[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 24, 2025.
19