Supreme Court of India
Banwari vs Haryana State Industrial And … on 10 December, 2024
Author: B.R. Gavai
Bench: B.R. Gavai
2024 INSC 951 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13348 OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.12221 of 2022)
BANWARI AND OTHERS …APPELLANTS(S)
VERSUS
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL
AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED (HSIIDC)
AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated
25th November 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
CWP No. 19814 of 2021 (O&M), whereby the writ petition
filed by respondent No.1 under Articles 226/227 of the
Signature Not Verified
Constitution of India praying for a writ of certiorari for
Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
quashing the order passed by the District Revenue Officer-
Date: 2024.12.10
14:11:44 IST
Reason:
1
cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Jhajjar (hereinafter referred
to as “LAC”) dated 15th September 2020, came to be allowed.
3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are
as under:
3.1 By a notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “1894 Act”)
dated 17th November 2004, the land of the appellants
admeasuring 8 Kanal 17 Marla of village Majri, Tehsil
Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar was acquired for Kundli
Manesar Palwal Expressway. By an award dated 1st March
2006, a compensation of Rs.12,50,000/- per acre was
determined.
3.2 Aggrieved by the said award, similarly circumstanced
land-owners preferred a reference for enhancement of
compensation before the learned Additional District Judge,
Jhajjar under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. Vide order dated
17th January 2012, the said reference was dismissed.
3.3 The said land-owners preferred a Regular First Appeal
(RFA) being No. 429 of 2013 before the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana. Vide judgment and order dated 2nd May 2016,
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana allowed the said RFA
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and enhanced the compensation to Rs.19,91,300/- alongwith statutory benefits.
3.4 Immediately thereafter the appellants on 30th June 2016
filed an application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act
before the LAC, Jhajjar as reference was not filed by the
appellants.
3.5 Vide order dated 15th September 2020, the LAC held
that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the
judgment and order of the High Court in RFA No. 429 of
2013 dated 2nd May 2016 and enhanced the compensation
payable to the appellants to Rs.19,91,300/- per acre along
with statutory benefits as awarded by the High Court to the
similarly circumstanced land-owners.
3.6 Being aggrieved thereby, respondent No.1 preferred a
writ petition before the High Court. The High Court vide
impugned judgment and order, relying on its earlier
judgment in CWP No. 8456 of 2020 titled “Haryana State
Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation
Limited v. Smt. Shanti and Others” decided on 6th
September 2021, allowed the writ petition and set aside the
order dated 15th September 2020 passed by the LAC. In its
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earlier judgment, the High Court has placed reliance on the
judgments of this Court including the case of Ramsingbhai
(Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat and
Another1, whereby this Court has held that the application
under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act can only be filed within a
period of three months from any judgment of the Reference
Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, arising from the
same acquisition but not from the date of judgment of this
Court or the High Court.
3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants have
approached this Court.
4. We have heard Shri Piyush Sharma, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants and Shri Rajat Sangwan,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the
High Court has erred in relying on the judgment of this
Court in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai)
Jerambhai (supra), inasmuch as the said judgment does
not take into consideration the earlier judgment of this Court
in the case of Union of India and Another v. Pradeep
1
(2018) 16 SCC 445 : 2018 INSC 405
4
Kumari and Others2. He, therefore, submits that the appeal
be allowed.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would
submit that the High Court has rightly relied on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Ramsingbhai
(Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra). He, therefore, submits
that the appeal be dismissed.
7. This Court, speaking through a bench of three learned
Judges, in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai)
Jerambhai (supra), has observed thus:
“3. It is clear from the opening words of the
provision that the redetermination under Section
28-A is available only in respect of an “award”
passed by the “court” under Part III of the Act,
comprising Sections 18 to 28-A (both inclusive). The
“Court” referred to in Section 28-A of the Act is the
Court as defined under Section 3(d) to mean “… a
Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction …”.
Thus, the judgment of the appellate court is not
within the purview of Section 28-A. It is also to be
noted that the appellate courts under Section 54 are
under Part VIII of the Act whereas the
redetermination is only in respect of the award
passed by the Reference Court under Part III of the
Act. [See Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v.
LAO [Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. LAO,
(1996) 6 SCC 746] ]. In its recent judgment in
Bharatsing v State of Maharashtra [Bharatsing v.
State of Maharashtra, (2018) 11 SCC 92 : (2018) 5
SCC (Civ) 44] , this Court has surveyed the
2
(1995) 2 SCC 736 : 1995 INSC 180
5
decisions on this issue and reiterated the legal
principle.
4. What the appellant seeks is redetermination of
compensation under the Act in terms of the
judgment in Ramsingbhai v. State of Gujarat
[Ramsingbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2014 SCC OnLine
Guj 5840 : 2015 AIR CC 1046] of the High Court
passed under Section 54 of the Act. In view of the
settled legal position which we have explained
above, the appellant is not entitled to such a relief;
his entitlement, if any, is only in terms of Section
28-A of the Act based on the award of the Reference
Court.”
8. It can thus be seen that, this Court has held that as the
appellant therein was seeking redetermination of
compensation on the basis of the judgment of the High Court
passed under Section 54 of the 1894 Act, he was not entitled
to such a relief. It was held that the application under
Section 28-A of the 1894 Act had to be made within a period
of three months from the date of the award passed by the
Court under Part-III of the Act and the appellate courts are
not within purview of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act.
9. It, however, appears that this Court in the case of
Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has not
noticed an earlier judgment rendered by this Court in
Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra).
10. In the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra),
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though the award of LAC therein was not challenged by
Pradeep Kumari, the similarly circumstanced persons whose
land was acquired had made references. In one of the
references, an award was made on 21st February 1987.
Immediately within a period of three months, the said
Pradeep Kumari filed an application under Section 28-A of
the 1894 Act before LAC for claiming the benefit of the said
award. On the said application, the Collector made an order
dated 14th March 1988 awarding an additional amount of
compensation on the basis of the award of the Reference
Court dated 21st February 1987. Feeling aggrieved by the
said order of Collector, the Union of India filed a writ petition
before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The High Court
dismissed the writ petition. Civil Appeals were filed before
this Court, challenging the judgment of the High Court. The
same were dismissed. Aggrieved still, Review Petitions were
filed. This Court, speaking in a combination of three learned
Judges, observed thus:
“8. We may, at the outset, state that having regard
to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, referred to
earlier, the object underlying the enactment of
Section 28-A is to remove inequality in the payment
of compensation for same or similar quality of land
arising on account of inarticulate and poor people
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not being able to take advantage of the right of
reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the
Act. This is sought to be achieved by providing an
opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is
covered by the same notification to seek
redetermination once any of them has obtained
orders for payment of higher compensation from the
reference court under Section 18 of the Act. Section
28-A is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent
provision intended to remove inequality and to give
relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are
not able to take advantage of right of reference to
the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. In
relation to beneficent legislation, the law is well-
settled that while construing the provisions of such
a legislation the court should adopt a construction
which advances the policy of the legislation to
extend the benefit rather than a construction which
has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by
it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore,
be construed keeping in view the object underlying
the said provision.
9. A perusal of the provisions contained in sub-
section (1) of Section 28-A of the Act would show
that after an award is made under Part III whereby
the court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount awarded by
the Collector under Section 11, a right accrues to a
person interested in the other land covered by the
same notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4
who is also aggrieved by the award of the Collector
but who had not made an application to the
Collector under Section 18, to move an application
before the Collector for redetermination of the
amount of compensation payable to him on the
basis of the amount of compensation awarded by
the court. This application for redetermination of
the compensation is required to be made within
three months from the date of the award of the
court. The right to make the application under
Section 28-A arises from the award of the court on
the basis of which the person making the
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application is seeking redetermination of the
compensation. There is nothing in sub-section (1) of
Section 28-A to indicate that this right is confined
in respect of the earliest award that is made by the
court after the coming into force of Section 28-A. By
construing the expression “where in an award
under this Part” in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A to
mean “where in the first award made by the court
under this Part”, the word ‘first’, which is not found
in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A, is being read
therein and thereby the amplitude of the said
provision is being curtailed so as to restrict the
benefit conferred by it. In the matter of construction
of a beneficent provision it is not permissible by
judicial interpretation to read words which are not
there and thereby restrict the scope of the said
provision.
10. It is possible to visualise a situation where in
the first award that is made by the court after the
coming into force of Section 28-A the enhancement
in the amount of compensation by the said award is
not very significant for the reason that the person
who sought the reference was not able to produce
adequate evidence in support of his claim and in
another reference where the award was made by the
court subsequently such evidence is produced
before the court and a much higher amount is
awarded as compensation in the said award. By
restricting the benefit of Section 28-A to the first
award that is made by the court after the coming
into force of Section 28-A the benefit of higher
amount of compensation on the basis of the
subsequent award made by the court would be
denied to the persons invoking Section 28-A and the
benefit of the said provision would be confined to
redetermination of compensation on the basis of
lesser amount of compensation awarded under the
first award that is made after the coming into force
of Section 28-A. There is nothing in the wordings of
Section 28-A to indicate that the legislature
intended to confer such a limited benefit under
Section 28-A. Similarly, there may be a situation, as
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in the present case, where the notification under
Section 4(1) of the Act covers lands falling in
different villages and a number of references at the
instance of persons having lands in different villages
were pending in the court on the date of coming into
force of Section 28-A and awards in those references
are made by the court on different dates. A person
who is entitled to apply under Section 28-A
belonging to a particular village may come to know
of the first award that is made by the court after the
coming into force of Section 28-A in a reference at
the instance of a person belonging to another
village, after the expiry of the period of three months
from the date of the said award but he may come to
know of the subsequent award that is made by the
court in the reference at the instance of a person
belonging to the same village before the expiry of the
period of three months from the date of the said
award. This is more likely to happen in the cases of
inarticulate and poor people who cannot be
expected to keep track of all the references that
were pending in court on the date of coming into
force of Section 28-A and may not be in a position
to know, in time, about the first award that is made
by the court after the coming into force of Section
28-A. By holding that the award referred to in
Section 28-A(1) is the first award made after the
coming into force of Section 28-A, such persons
would be deprived of the benefit extended by
Section 28-A. Such a construction would thus
result in perpetuating the inequality in the payment
of compensation which the legislature wanted to
remove by enacting Section 28-A. The object
underlying Section 28-A would be better achieved
by giving the expression “an award” in Section 28-A
its natural meaning as meaning the award that is
made by the court in Part III of the Act after the
coming into force of Section 28-A. If the said
expression in Section 28-A(1) is thus construed, a
person would be able to seek redetermination of the
amount of compensation payable to him provided
the following conditions are satisfied:
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(i) An award has been made by the court
under Part III after the coming into force
of Section 28-A;
(ii) By the said award the amount of
compensation in excess of the amount
awarded by the Collector under Section
11 has been allowed to the applicant in
that reference;
(iii) The person moving the application
under Section 28-A is interested in other
land covered by the same notification
under Section 4(1) to which the said
award relates;
(iv) The person moving the application did
not make an application to the Collector
under Section 18;
(v) The application is moved within three
months from the date of the award on the
basis of which the redetermination of
amount of compensation is sought; and
(vi) Only one application can be moved
under Section 28-A for redetermination of
compensation by an applicant.
11. Since the cause of action for moving the
application for redetermination of compensation
under Section 28-A arises from the award on the
basis of which redetermination of compensation is
sought, the principle that “once the limitation
begins to run, it runs in its full course until its
running is interdicted by an order of the court” can
have no application because the limitation for
moving the application under Section 28-A will
begin to run only from the date of the award on the
basis of which redetermination of compensation is
sought.”
11. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that the
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object underlying the enactment of Section 28-A of the 1894
Act is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation
for same or similar quality of land arising on account of
inarticulate and poor people not being able to take
advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under
Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It was held that this is sought to
be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved
parties whose land is covered by the same notification to
seek redetermination once any of them has obtained orders
for payment of higher compensation from the Reference
Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It was held that
while construing the provisions of such a legislation, the
Court should adopt a construction which advances the
policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a
construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit
conferred by it.
12. It has further been held by this Court that under
Section 28-A of the 1894 Act, a right accrues to a person
interested in the other land covered by the same notification
under sub-section (1) of Section 4, where the Court allows a
higher compensation to the similarly circumstanced persons
12
who are covered by the said notification. It has been held
that the application for redetermination of the compensation
is required to be made within three months from the date of
the award by the Court. It has been held that the right to
make an application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act
arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the
person making the application is seeking redetermination of
the compensation. The Court further held that there is
nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act to
indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest
award that is made by the Court after coming into force of
Section 28-A of the 1894 Act. This Court held that Section
28-A of the 1894 Act if read in such a manner, it will be
contrary to the principles of construction of a beneficial
provision. It is further held that by judicial interpretation, the
Court could not read the words which are not there and
thereby restrict the scope of a provision.
13. In paragraph 10 of the said case, this Court had
referred to various eventualities that may occur if such a
restrictive interpretation is given to the provision of Section
28-A of the 1894 Act. The Court observed that it has to be
13
seen from the point of view of inarticulate and poor people.
The Court held that the object underlying Section 28-A of the
1894 Act would be better achieved by giving the expression
“an award” in Section 28-A of the 1894 Act, its natural
meaning as meaning the award that is made by the Court in
Part III of the 1894 Act after coming into force of Section
28-A.
14. This Court has laid down the conditions which are
required to be satisfied for invoking the provisions of Section
28-A(1) of the 1894 Act as follows:
(i) An award has been made by the Court under Part III
of the Act after coming into force of Section 28-A;
(ii) By the said Award, the amount of compensation in
excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under
Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that
reference;
(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-
A is interested in other land covered by the same
notification under Section 4(1) to which the said
award relates;
(iv) The person moving the application did not move the
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application under Section 18;
(v) The application is moved within three months from
the date of the award on the basis of which
redetermination of amount of compensation is
sought; and
(vi) Only one such application can be moved under
Section 28-A for redetermination of the compensation
by the applicant.
15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the First
Appeal which was allowed by the High Court vide judgment
and order dated 2nd May 2016 was in respect of the land
which was covered by the same notification under which
notification the appellants’ land is also covered. It is also not
in dispute that the amount awarded by the High Court in the
said First Appeal is in excess of the amount awarded by the
Collector under Section 11 of the 1894 Act in the case of the
land of the appellants. It is also not in dispute that the
appellants had not made an application to the Collector
under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It is also not in dispute
that the application made by the appellants under Section
28-A of the 1894 Act to the Collector was within a period of
15
three months from the date of the judgment and order of the
High Court.
16. From the perusal of the judgment of this Court in the
case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra), it is clear that
the limitation for moving the application under Section 28-A
of the 1894 Act will begin to run only from the date of the
award on the basis of which redetermination of the
compensation is sought. The appellants are seeking
redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the
judgment and order of the High Court in First Appeal No.429
of 2023 dated 2nd May 2016. It is not disputed that the
application of the appellants under Section 28-A of the 1894
Act is within a period of three months from 2nd May 2016.
17. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the case of
the appellants is fully covered by the judgment of this Court
in the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra).
18. It is further to be noted that the cases of Pradeep
Kumari and Others (supra) and Ramsingbhai
(Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), both have been decided
by a Bench strength of three learned Judges of this Court.
The case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra) is decided
16
on 10th March 1995, whereas Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai)
Jerambhai (supra), has been decided on 24th April 2018.
19. A perusal of the judgment rendered in Ramsingbhai
(Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), would reveal that the
said case does not take note of the earlier view taken by three
learned judges of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari
and Others (supra).
20. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the
observations of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay
Sethi and Others3. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment
read as under:
“27. We are compelled to state here that in Munna
Lal Jain , the three-Judge Bench should have been
guided by the principle stated in Reshma Kumari
which has concurred with the view expressed in
Sarla Verma or in case of disagreement, it should
have been well advised to refer the case to a larger
Bench. We say so, as we have already expressed the
opinion that the dicta laid down in Reshma Kumari
being earlier in point of time would be a binding
precedent and not the decision in Rajesh.
28. In this context, we may also refer to Sundeep
Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra [Sundeep
Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16
SCC 623 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 558] which correctly
lays down the principle that discipline demanded by3
(2017) 16 SCC 680 : 2017 INSC 106817
a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of
a decision on the application of the per incuriam
rule is of great importance, since without it,
certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity
of courts would become a costly casualty. A decision
or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a
statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought
to the notice of the court. A decision or judgment
can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to
reconcile its ratio with that of a previously
pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench.
There can be no scintilla of doubt that an earlier
decision of co-equal Bench binds the Bench of same
strength. Though the judgment in Rajesh case was
delivered on a later date, it had not apprised itself of
the law stated in Reshma Kumari but had been
guided by Santosh Devi . We have no hesitation that
it is not a binding precedent on the co-equal
Bench.”
21. It can thus be seen that, this Court in unequivocal
terms has held that an earlier decision of a Bench of
particular strength would be binding on the subsequent
Benches of this Court having the same or lesser number of
judges.
22. While considering the rule of per incuriam, the
Constitution Bench of this Court has held that a decision or
judgment can be said to be per incuriam if it is not possible to
reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced
judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench.
23. In any case, the judgment in Pradeep Kumari and
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Others (supra) has been rendered by three learned Judges of
this Court after considering the relevant provisions of the
Statute and the principles of interpretation. However, the
judgment in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai)
Jerambhai (supra) is a short judgment only referring to the
text of Section 28-A(1) of the 1894 Act.
24. As already discussed hereinabove, the provisions of
Section 28-A(1) of the 1894 Act have been elaborately
considered by a three Judges Bench of this Court in the case
of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra). In the said case, it
has been held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
Section 28-A would reveal that the object underlying the
enactment of the said provision is to remove inequality in the
payment of compensation for same or similar quality of land.
It has been held that the said provision is for giving benefit to
inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage
of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of
the Act. It has been held that this is sought to be achieved
by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose
land is covered by the same notification to seek
redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for
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payment of higher compensation from the reference court
under Section 18 of the Act. The same benefit would be
available to the other landholders under Section 28-A. It has
been held that Section 28-A being a beneficent legislation
enacted in order to give relief to the inarticulate and poor
people, the principle of interpretation which would be
required to be adopted is the one which advances the policy
of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a
construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit
conferred by it.
25. We are, therefore, inclined to allow the appeal. The
impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 25th
November 2021 is quashed and set aside and the order of the
LAC dated 15th September 2020 is upheld.
26. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
…………………………..J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 10, 2024.
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