Jharkhand High Court
Basant Vishwakarma vs The State Of Jharkhand on 20 December, 2024
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No.314 of 2023
-----
Basant Vishwakarma, S/o Late Harihar Vishwakarma, resident
of Golpar, P.O. Ramgarh Cantt., P.S. Ramgarh, District
Ramgarh.
…… Petitioner.
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Secretary, Revenue
and Land Reforms Department, Government of
Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi.
2. The Divisional Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur
Division, Hazaribagh.
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh.
4. The Sub Divisional Officer-cum-Jharkhand Building Lease,
Rent & Control Officer, Ramgarh.
5. Ayub Khan, S/o Late Khalil Khan, Village Main Road,
Ramgarh Cantt., P.O. Ramgarh Cantt., P.S. Ramgarh,
District Ramgarh.
……Respondents.
—–
With
W.P.(C) No.79 of 2023
—–
Md. Bashir, son of Md. Ibrahim, village Naisarai, P.O.
Ramgarh, P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh. Having his shop at
Sunderbagh Tand, Raja Bangla, Main Road, Ramgarh, P.O.,
P.S. & District Ramgarh.
…… Petitioner.
-Versus-
Ayub Khan, S/o Late Khalil Khan, resident of Dusadh Tola,
Ramgarh Cantt., P.O.& P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh.
……Respondent.
—–
With
W.P.(C) No.665 of 2023
—–
Pravesh Vishwakarma, S/o Lakhan Vishwakarma, Village
Dharmu, P.O. Ichak, P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribagh. Having
his shop at Sunderbagh Tand, Raja Bangla, Main Road,
Ramgarh, P.O., P.S. & District Ramgarh.
…… Petitioner.
-Versus-
Ayub Khan, S/o Late Khalil Khan, resident of Dusadh Tola,
Ramgarh Cantt., P.O.& P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh.
……Respondent.
—–
With
W.P.(C) No.850 of 2023
—–
Md. Pravez @ Sugnu, S/o Safique, Village Naisarai, P.O. &
P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh. Having his shop at
Sunderbagh Tand, Raja Bangla, Main Road, Ramgarh, P.O.,
P.S. & District Ramgarh.
…… Petitioner.
-Versus-
Ayub Khan, S/o Late Khalil Khan, resident of Dusadh Tola,
Ramgarh Cantt., P.O.& P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh.
……Respondent.
—–
With
W.P.(C) No.1096 of 2023
—–
Md. Ashraf, S/o Md. Anwar Sah, Village Golpar, Purani
Mandap, P.O. & P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh. Having his
shop at Sunderbagh Tand, Raja Bangla, Main Road,
Ramgarh, P.O., P.S. & District Ramgarh.
…… Petitioner.
-Versus-
Ayub Khan, S/o Late Khalil Khan, resident of Dusadh Tola,
Ramgarh Cantt., P.O.& P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh.
……Respondent.
—–
With
W.P.(C) No.1211 of 2023
—–
Lala Khan @ Zafir Khan @ Zafiruddin Ahmad, S/o Hazi
Razauddin, Village Golpar, Purani Mandap, P.O. & P.S.
Ramgarh, District Ramgarh. Having his shop at Sunderbagh
Tand, Raja Bangla, Main Road, Ramgarh, P.O., P.S. & District
Ramgarh.
…… Petitioner.
-Versus-
Sairun Nisha, W/o Abdul Satar, D/o Late Taj Mohammad,
Village Koiri Tola, P.O. & P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh.
……Respondent.
—–
With
W.P.(C) No.1249 of 2023
—–
Md. Nashim, S/o Late Abbu Wakar, Village Naisarai, P.O. &
P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh. Having his shop at
Sunderbagh Tand, Raja Bangla, Main Road, Ramgarh, P.O.,
P.S. & District Ramgarh.
…… Petitioner.
2
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
-Versus-
Ayub Khan, S/o Late Khalil Khan, resident of Dusadh Tola,
Ramgarh Cantt., P.O.& P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh.
……Respondent.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
—–
For the Petitioners : Mr. Pradip Modi, Advocate
Mr. Sarvendra Kumar, Advocate
[In W.P.(C) No.314 of 2023]
Mr. Prashant Pallav, Advocate
Mrs. Monalisa Singh, Advocate
Ms. Shivani Jaluka, Advocate &
[In rest of the cases]
For the Respondent-State : Mrs. Surabhi, A.C. to A.A.G.II
For Private Respondents : Mr. A. K. Sahani, Advocate
Mr. Ajit Kumar, Advocate
——
Order No.45 Date: 20.12.2024
1. The present batch of writ petitions have been preferred for
quashing the common order dated 06.12.2022 passed in
J.B.C.R. No.22 of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.14 of 2020, J.B.C.R.
No.17 of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.23 of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.12 of
2020, J.B.C.R. No.25 of 2020, and J.B.C.R. No.19 of 2020,
whereby the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division,
Hazaribagh- respondent no.2 has set aside the orders dated
14.10.2019 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh-
respondent no.3 in Eviction Appeal No.26 of 2019, Eviction
Appeal No.28 of 2019, Eviction Appeal No.24 of 2019,
Eviction Appeal No.18 of 2019, Eviction Appeal No.25 of
2019, Eviction Appeal No.29 of 2019 & Eviction Appeal No.16
of 2019 and has restored the orders dated 11.02.2019 passed
in Eviction Suit No.20 of 2018 & Eviction Suit No.19 of 2018;
orders dated 19.01.2019 passed in Eviction Suit No.07 of
3
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
2018 & Eviction Suit No.17 of 2018; orders dated 09.02.2019
passed in Eviction Suit No.15 of 2018 & Eviction Suit No.41 of
2018; and the order dated 19.01.2019 passed in Eviction Suit
No.10 of 2018 by the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O.,
Ramgarh-respondent no.4. Further prayer has been made for
quashing and setting aside the said orders passed in Eviction
Suit No.20 of 2018, Eviction Suit No.19 of 2018, Eviction Suit
No.07 of 2018, Eviction Suit No.17 of 2018, Eviction Suit
No.15 of 2018, Eviction Suit No.41 of 2018 & Eviction Suit
No.10 of 2018 by the respondent no.4, whereby the
petitioners were directed to pay arrears of rent to the
respondent no.5 (respondent-Sairun Nisha in JBCR No.25 of
2020) and to vacate the respective shops which were in their
possession.
2. The factum of the case, as stated in the writ petitions, is that
the petitioners have constructed their respective shops over
the land situated at Mouza Ramgarh Cantt., P.S. Ramgarh,
P.S. No. 82 under Khata No. 26, plot no. 748, total area 1.44
acres (hereinafter referred as the said land) and are in
possession of the said shops for the last 25-30 years. Guduwa
Sheikh was the Khatiyani raiyat of the said land who died in
the year 1926 living behind one son namely Sahdul Mian and
three daughters, namely, Fatima Khatoon, Rahiman Khatoon
and Bhuini Khatoon. Guduwa Sheikh had orally partitioned his
entire land including the said land among his legal heirs in the
4
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
year 1921 i.e. prior to his death and the said land was in
exclusive possession of his son, namely, Sahdul Mian.
Subsequently, Sahdul Mian died living behind two legal heirs,
namely, Ashraf Miyan and Taj Mohammad.
3. One Ayub Khan-respondent no.5 filed eviction suits before
the respondent no. 4 for eviction of the petitioners (except
the petitioner Lala Khan) from their respective shops on the
ground of default in making payment of rent, personal
necessity etc. claiming that legal heirs of the recorded tenant
had executed powers of attorney dated 29.08.2013,
04.09.2013 and 19.07.2018 in his favour. Sairun Nisha filed
Eviction Suit no.41 of 2018 against the petitioner Lala Khan.
The petitioners appeared in the said suits and filed their
respective reply to the show cause notices denying tenant-
landlord relationship between them and the respondent no.5/
legal heirs of the recorded tenant. The respondent no.4
allowed the eviction suits in favour of the respondent no.5 as
well as Sairun Nisha holding that there was oral tenancy
between the petitioners and the legal heirs of the recorded
tenant. It was further held that the respondent no.5 was the
powers of attorney holder of the said legal heirs and hence,
the petitioners were liable to pay monthly rent to him. The
petitioners were defaulters in making payment of rent since
January 2014. It was also held that the respondent no.5 as
well as Sairun Nisha had bonafide personal necessity of the
5
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
premises in question for which the petitioners were held liable
to be evicted under section 19(i)(b)(c)(d) of the
Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011
(in short ‘the Act, 2011’). The respondent no.4 further
directed the petitioners to pay arrears of rent.
4. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners preferred their respective
appeals before the respondent no. 3 under section 36 of the
Act, 2011 vide Eviction Appeal No. 26 of 2019, Eviction
Appeal No.28 of 2019, Eviction Appeal No.24 of 2019,
Eviction Appeal No.18 of 2019, Eviction Appeal No.25 of
2019, Eviction Appeal No.29 of 2019 & Eviction Appeal No.16
of 2019 and the said appeals were dismissed by the
respondent no.3 vide orders dated 14.10.2019 remanding the
matter to the respondent no. 4 to pass fresh order after
hearing the parties taking into consideration maintainability of
the said eviction suit under section 4 of the Act, 2011.
Aggrieved by the said orders, the respondent no.5 filed
revision cases being J.B.C.R. No.22 of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.14 of
2020, J.B.C.R. No.17 of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.23 of 2020,
J.B.C.R. No.12 of 2020 and J.B.C.R. No.19 of 2020 as well as
Sairun Nisha filed revision case being J.B.C.R. No.25 of 2020
before the respondent no.2 under section 37 of the Act,
2011, which were allowed vide separate orders dated
10.09.2020 by setting aside the orders dated 14.10.2019
passed in the said eviction appeals and affirming the orders
6
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
passed by the respondent no.4 in Eviction Suit No.20 of 2018,
Eviction Suit No.19 of 2018, Eviction Suit No.07 of 2018,
Eviction Suit No.17 of 2018, Eviction Suit No.15 of 2018,
Eviction Suit No.41 of 2018, Eviction Suit No.10 of 2018. The
petitioners, thereafter, filed writ petitions being W.P.(C) No.
3427 of 2020, W.P.(C) No. 3931 of 2020, W.P.(C) No. 3474 of
2020, W.P.(C) No. 3444 of 2020, W.P.(C) No. 3983 of 2020,
W.P.(C) No. 3468 of 2020 and W.P.(C) No. 3135 of 2020,
which were disposed of by common order dated 13.06.2022,
directing the respondent no.2 to rehear the said revision
cases filed by the respondent no.5 as well as Sairun Nisha.
Finally, the respondent no.2 vide impugned order dated
06.12.2022 again allowed the aforesaid revision cases and set
aside the orders dated 14.10.2019 passed by the respondent
no.3 in respective appeals of the petitioners and restored the
orders passed by the respondent no.4 in the aforesaid
eviction suits.
Submission on behalf of Petitioner-Basant
Vishwakarma
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
respondent no. 5 is not the landlord as defined u/s 2(g)
of the Act, 2011 as he is neither the owner of the premises in
question nor he was ever entitled to receive rent from the
petitioner. In fact, the petitioner had categorically denied the
alleged rent agreement dated 27.08.2008 and had stated that
7
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
he had never paid any rent to the respondent no.5 or to any
other person after execution of “Panchnama” Sale Deed
dated 13.07.2005 with Razia Khatoon, wife of Late Taj
Mohammad and thus the burden was upon the respondent
no. 5 to establish the Landlord-Tenant relationship between
the parties, however, he failed to discharge the said burden
by adducing any cogent evidence. It is further submitted that
the respondent no.5 in the eviction suit had nowhere
mentioned any ground under which he was seeking eviction
of the petitioner, rather he had merely mentioned the
provision of law that the eviction suit was being filed under
Section 19 of the Act, 2011. However, the respondent no.4
observed in the order dated 11.02.2019 passed in Eviction
Suit No.20 of 2018 that same was filed under Section
19(1) (b), (c) and (d) of the Act 2011. Further, no evidence
was led by the respondent no.5 showing that the condition of
the building had deteriorated owing to the acts of the
petitioner.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case
of Rajendra Tiwary Vs. Basudeo Prasad reported in
(2002) 1 SCC 90, wherein it has been held that for granting
the relief in the suit under the Act, 2011 it is sine qua non
that there should exist landlord-tenant relationship between
the plaintiffs and the defendant.
8
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
7. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 5 filed Eviction
Suit no.20 of 2018 against the said petitioner on the basis
of powers of attorney dated 29.08.2013, 04.09.2013 and
19.07.2018 executed by legal heirs of the recorded tenant
and on bare perusal of the same, it would appear that the
same was given to the respondent no.5 to negotiate with
prospective purchasers for sale of the mentioned property.
The power of attorney nowhere mentions that several
shops/garages of different tenants are established on the said
property and the respondent no.5 is empowered to take
recourse of their eviction. As such, the respondent no.5
cannot claim himself to be the landlord of the said land as per
Section 2(g) of the Act 2011.
8. As per Section 4 of the Act, 2011, the tenancy agreement
must be in writing and if the tenancy was created prior to the
year 2011 without any written agreement, then either of the
parties should inform the concerned Collector giving
particulars of tenancy within two years. However, in the
present case the provision of section 4 of the Act, 2011 has
not been complied which creates serious doubt over the
tenancy.
9. It is also submitted that Razia Khatoon-widow of Taj
Mohammad had sold 3 decimals land of her share out of the
land appertaining to Khata no.26, plot no.749, measuring
total area of 1.44 acres to the petitioner-Basant Vishwakarma
9
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
by executing a “Panchnama” sale deed on non-judicial stamp
paper on 13.07.2005 after receiving consideration of
Rs.25,000/- and, thereafter, the said petitioner renovated his
shop/garage by putting asbestos sheet roof on “Kutcha” wall
of the same which he was running since 1989 in the name of
Basant Auto Works without any hindrance made by any of
the alleged legal heirs.
10. It is further submitted that the “Panchnama” sale deed dated
13.07.2005 executed by Razia Khatoon in favour of the
petitioner-Basant Vishwakarma was filed by him during the
trial and the same was a vital piece of evidence to establish
that the relationship of tenant-landlord, if any, had come to
an end after execution of the said “Panchnama” sale deed as
well as the petitioner had been occupying the said property
as its owner since 13.07.2005, however such vital piece of
evidence was ignored by the respondent no.4. The
respondent no.2 also did not take note of the said
“Panchnama” sale deed after remand of the case by this
Court, thereby failed to take into consideration a vital piece of
evidence so as to demolish the story set up by the
respondent no.5.
11. It is also submitted that the respondent no. 5 had filed the
eviction suits in his personal capacity and as such the same
were liable to be dismissed on this score alone. In support of
the said contention the learned counsel for the petitioner puts
10
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
reliance on a judgment of the Full Bench of Allahabad High
Court rendered in the case of Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs.
Hasan Raza Khan & 6 others, reported in 2016 SCC
Online All 175, wherein it has been held that when a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is instituted
through a power of attorney holder, the holder of the power
of attorney does not espouse a right or claim personal to him
but acts as an agent of the donor of the instrument. The
petition which is instituted, is always in the name of the
principal who is the donor of the power of attorney and
through whom the donee acts as his agent.
Submissions on behalf of the petitioners- Md. Basir,
Pravesh Vishwakarma, Md. Parvez, Md. Ashraf, Lala
Khan and Md. Nashim:
12. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, the
respondent no.2 has erred in observing that the petitioners
have failed to bring on record any document establishing
their title since suits were filed under the Act, 2011 in which
the question of title is merely incidental. It is a settled
principle of law that while deciding a suit for eviction of a
tenant, the primary issue that is to be looked into is the
existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties
and the question of title of the respective parties with respect
to the suit premises is not relevant having regard to the width
of the definition of the terms ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ as given
11
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
in clauses (g) and (l), respectively, of section 2 of the Act,
2011.
13. It is further submitted that the respondent no.4-House
Rent Controller-cum-Sub Divisional Officer, Ramgarh
miserably failed to frame and decide the issue relating to the
existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the
petitioners and the respondent- Ayub Khan. It is also
submitted that not even a single document was brought on
record by the said respondent which could establish the
existence of tenancy between him and the petitioners.
Further, the respondent has nowhere stated in the
examination or cross-examination, regarding execution of any
rental agreement or issuance of any rent receipt. Despite this
fact, the respondent no.4 came to a conclusion that the
petitioners were the tenants of the said respondent. In fact,
the said respondent examined himself as witness and could
not bring any independent witness in support of his case. The
present case has also been brought by the said respondent
for eviction on the ground of bonafide necessity of the suit
premises for which the landlord is required to show that
he/she is the owner of the suit premises and the same is
required either for his/her necessity or for any of
his/her family members dependent upon them and they have
no other reasonable suitable accommodation. However, the
present eviction suits (except Eviction Suit no.41 of 2018)
12
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
have been brought by the power of attorney holder of the
legal heirs of the recorded tenant whereas Explanation I to
the clause (c) of section 19 (1) of the Act, 2011 excludes
agents from the meaning of landlord. Therefore, the case of
the respondent- Ayub Khan seeking eviction of the petitioners
from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide necessity
fails on this sole ground.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioners puts reliance on the
judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court rendered in the
case of Ranjay Kumar Vs. The State of Jharkhand &
Ors. [W.P.(C) No.6050 of 2022], wherein the Court by
considering Section 33 of the Act, 2011 has held that the
evidence has to be recorded during trial of the suit under the
said Act.
Argument on behalf of the respondent no.5 with
respect to the petitioner-Basant Vishwakarma
15. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 submits that
the present writ petition is not maintainable in view of
concurrent findings of facts recorded by the respondent no.4
on the basis of the pleadings of the parties coupled with both
oral and documentary evidences adduced by them which has
been affirmed twice by the revisional authority. It is further
submitted that the petitioner- Basant Vishwakarma has
deliberately suppressed the fact that as far back as on
22.12.1994, he entered into a tenancy agreement with Razia
13
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
Khatun, the then land-lady and mother of Sairun Nisha (one
of the power of attorney executors of the Respondent No.5)
agreeing to pay rent of Rs.100/- per month in respect of the
shop-in-question and on the basis of such agreement the
relationship of landlord and tenant created between the
parties. The said agreement was duly notarised by the Notary
Public, Ramgarh on 05.01.1995. It is also submitted that on
27.08.2008, the petitioner- Basant Vishwakarma again
entered into a tenancy agreement with Sairun Nisha,
daughter of Taj Mohammad for a period of 24 months i.e. for
the period from 27.08.2008 to 27.08.2010 agreeing to pay a
sum of Rs.2,500/- per month as rent. The petitioner had
admitted in the cross-examination that there was execution
of a rental agreement in the year 1994 between him and
Razia Khatoon. Thus, the fact that the petitioner became
tenant on the basis of said rental agreement cannot be
questioned. The “Sada Panchnama” which is said to be a sale
deed dated 13.07.2005 is a frivolous and manufactured
document, which would be evident from the fact that
subsequent to the alleged “Panchnama”, a rental agreement
dated 27.08.2008 was executed between the said petitioner
and Sairun Nisha who granted the Power of Attorney in
favour of the respondent no.5. It would further be evident
that from Para-4 of the deed of Power of Attorney that the
Respondent No.5 was delegated power to file any case and to
14
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
take all steps before the concerned court or the authority on
behalf of the owners of the land.
16. It is also submitted that transfer of an immovable property
valued more than Rs.100/- cannot be made through
unregistered document. The so-called “Panchnama” dated
13.07.2005 is an unregistered document showing
consideration amount of Rs.25,000/-, which is inadmissible in
law. The thumb impression said to be of Razia Khatoon
appearing on the said “Panchnama” sale deed is forged one
and the said document does not bear the signature of the
petitioner which has been rightly negated by the respondent
no.4. The petitioner has tried to mislead the Court by placing
reliance upon such forged and doubtful document in support
of his false claim.
17. It is further submitted that the respondent No.5 comes within
the purview of the definition of ‘landlord’ defined under the
Act, 2011 and, thus, the submission made on behalf of the
petitioner that the actual owner of the premises in question
was entitled to bring an eviction suit, is against the settled
principle of law. Moreover, pursuant to an order as contained
in Memo No. 332 dated 13.04.2023 issued by the respondent
no.4, the order of eviction has been executed by two
Magistrates deputed thereunder and the premises in question
has been handed over to the landlord on 18.04.2023 itself.
15
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
Argument of respondent no.5 in other cases:
18. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 submits that
the respondent no. 5 had brought eviction suits against the
petitioners being the Powers of Attorney Holder of the legal
heirs of the recorded tenant and the said powers of attorney
contains specific clause i.e. Clause (4) which empowers the
said respondent to file suit for the said land in the concerned
court. In fact, the respondent no.5 comes within the
definition of “landlord” as defined under section 2(g) of the
Act, 2011. Moreover, the petitioners had entered into the rent
agreements with Sairun Nisha with respect to the suit
premises and had paid monthly rent for some time, however,
subsequently stopped paying rent.
19. Learned counsel further puts reliance on the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Radha
Devi Vs. Deep Narayan Mandal & Others, reported in
(2003) 11 SCC 759, wherein it has been held that the Bihar
Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act was a special
Act providing for speedy disposal of eviction suit on certain
grounds enumerated therein. It has further been held that
under the said Act, eviction suit was required to be tried
under summary procedure and to succeed in the same, the
landlord was required to prove contract of tenancy between
her and the tenant and also the ground on which the eviction
was sought. It has also been held that in such a suit, the
16
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
Rent Controller was not required to go into the serious
question of title, otherwise the purpose of the Act would
stand frustrated.
20. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials available on record.
21. For better appreciation of the matter, factual matrix as has
been stated in the present batch of writ petitions, is being
reproduced hereunder in tabular chart:-
W.P.(C) J.B.C.R No. Eviction Appeal Eviction Suit The petitioner-Basant
No. 314 22 of 2020, No.26 of 2019, No.20 of 2018, Vishwakarma constructed a
of 2023 order dated order dated order dated shop/garage over the said
6.12.2022 14.10.2019 11.02.2019 land and has been running his
car repairing shop since 1989
W.P.(C) J.B.C.R No. Eviction Appeal Eviction Suit The petitioner-Md. Basir
No. 79 of 14/2020, No. 28 of No.19 of 2018, claimed that he constructed a
2023 order dated 2019, order order dated shop/garage over the said
6.12.2022 dated 11.02.2019 land and is in possession of
14.10.2019 the same for more than 25
years
W.P.(C) J.B.C.R No. Eviction Appeal Eviction Suit The petitioner-Pravesh
No. 665 17 of 2020, No.24 of 2019, No.7 of 2018, Vishwakarma claimed that he
of 2023 order dated order dated order dated had constructed a
6.12.2022 14.10.2019 19.01.2019 shop/garage over the said
land in which he has been
doing car repairing work for
the last 30 years
W.P.(C) J.B.C.R No. Eviction Appeal Eviction Suit Petitioner-Lala Khan claimed
No. 1211 25 of 2020, No.29 of 2019, No.41 of 2018, that Pradeep Belthariya had
of 2023 order dated order dated order dated constructed a shop over the
6.12.2022 14.10.2019 09.02.2019 said land in the year 1981 and
the petitioner being his
servant is in possession of the
same for more than 32 years
W.P.(C) J.B.C.R No. Eviction Appeal Eviction Suit Petitioner-Md. Pravez @
No. 850 23 of 2020, No.18 of 2019, No.17 of 2018, Sugnu claimed that he had
of 2023 order dated order dated order dated constructed a car repairing17
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
6.12.2022 14.10.2019 19.01.2019 shop over the said land and
has been running it for more
than 20 years
W.P.(C) J.B.C.R No. Eviction Appeal Eviction Suit Petitioner-Md. Ashraf claimed
No. 1096 12 of 2020, No.25 of 2019, No.15 of 2018, that mechanic shop over the
of 2023 order dated order dated order dated said land was built by his
6.12.2022 14.10.2019 09.02.2019 father in the year 2000 and
since then the petitioner/his
father is in possession of the
same.
W.P.(C) J.B.C.R No. Eviction Appeal Eviction Suit Petitioner- Md. Nashim runs a
No. 1249 19 of 2020, No.16 of 2019, No.10 of 2018, tyre shop over the said land
of 2023 order dated order dated order dated and he is in possession of the
6.12.2022 14.10.2019 19.01.2019 same for more than 25 years.
22. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that the petitioners have been carrying on their
respective businesses on the said land since long by
constructing shops/garage over it without any disturbance
from any corner. As such they have acquired title over the
respective land on the ground of adverse possession. The
respondent nos.2 and 4 have failed to appreciate the fact that
there was no landlord tenant relationship between the
petitioners and the owner of the premises.
23. Further contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is
that though the respondent no. 5 claims himself to be the
power of attorney holder of the landlord/landlady, however,
he filed the aforesaid eviction suits in his personal capacity
and as such, the said suits were not maintainable.
18
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
24. To appreciate the question of maintainability of the present
suits as has been raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, this Court has perused the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Kasthuri
Radhakrishnan Vs. M. Chinniyan, reported in (2016) 3
SCC 296, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under: –
“36. The law relating to power of attorney is governed
by the provisions of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1982.
It is well settled therein that an agent acting under a
power of attorney always acts, as a general rule, in the
name of his principal. Any document executed or thing
done by an agent on the strength of power of attorney
is as effective as if executed or done in the name of
principal i.e. by the principal himself. An agent,
therefore, always acts on behalf of the principal and
exercises only those powers, which are given to him in
the power of attorney by the principal. Any act or thing
done by the agent on the strength of power of attorney
is, therefore, never construed or/and treated to have
been done by the agent in his personal capacity so as to
create any right in his favour but is always construed as
having done by the principal himself. An agent,
therefore, never gets any personal benefit of any
nature. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court
in [Suraj Lamp and Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of
Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656] held in paras 20 and 21 as
under: (SCC pp. 666-67)“20. A power of attorney is not an instrument
of transfer in regard to any right, title or
interest in an immovable property. The power
of attorney is creation of an agency whereby
the grantor authorises the grantee to do the
acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor,
which when executed will be binding on the
grantor as if done by him (see Section 1-A and
Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act,
1882). It is revocable or terminable at any
time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner
known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney
does not have the effect of transferring title
to the grantee.
21. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata,
(2005) 12 SCC 77] this Court held : (SCC pp.
90 & 101, paras 13 & 52)
’13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially
governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By
reason of a deed of power of attorney, an
agent is formally appointed to act for the
19
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
principal in one transaction or a series of
transactions or to manage the affairs of the
principal generally conferring necessary
authority upon another person. A deed of
power of attorney is executed by the principal
in favour of the agent. The agent derives a
right to use his name and all acts, deeds and
things done by him and subject to the
limitations contained in the said deed, the
same shall be read as if done by the donor. A
power of attorney is, as is well known, a
document of convenience.
***
52. Execution of a power of attorney in terms
of the provisions of the Contract Act as also
the Powers of Attorney Act is valid. A power
of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is
executed by the donor so as to enable the
donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases
where power of attorney is coupled with
interest, it is revocable. The donee in exercise
of his power under such power of attorney
only acts in place of the donor subject of
course to the powers granted to him by
reason thereof. He cannot use the power of
attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a
fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or
breach of trust is a matter between the donor
and the donee.’
An attorney-holder may however execute a
deed of conveyance in exercise of the power
granted under the power of attorney and
convey title on behalf of the grantor.”
This was followed by this Court in Church of Christ
Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable
Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC
706.”
25. Thus, the law is well settled that an agent always acts on
behalf of the principal and exercises only those powers which
are given to him in the power of attorney by the principal.
Any act or thing done by the agent on the strength of power
of attorney is, therefore, never construed or/and treated to
have been done by the agent in his personal capacity so as to
create any right in his favour, but is always construed as
having been done by the principal himself. He acts in a
fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a
20
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
matter between the donor and the donee of power of
attorney.
26. In the present case, the respondent no. 5 is the power of
attorney holder of the owner of the premises who has been
empowered to do various works including the work to look
after the said premises and to file any case on behalf of the
owner of the said premises. Therefore, though the said
eviction suits except Eviction Suit No.41 of 2018 (filed by
Sairun Nisha) were filed by the respondent no.5- Ayub Khan
in his name, the same were filed in a fiduciary capacity under
the power given in the deed of powers of attorney. Thus, the
question of maintainability as raised by the petitioners is not
legally sustainable and the same is hereby rejected.
27. So far as the case of petitioner-Basant Vishwakarma is
concerned, he has claimed that the land in question had been
sold to him by Razia Khatoon, wife of Late Taj Mohammad by
way of “Panchnama” dated 13.07.2005 after making payment
of Rs.25,000/- and as such, according to him, there was no
landlord-tenant relationship between him and the legal heirs
of Guduwa Seikh after 13.07.2005.
28. It is further claimed that though the said “Panchnama” was
not registered, the possessory right of the petitioner under
the said document was bound to be protected. In support of
the said contention, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner- Basant Vishwakarma has relied upon the
21
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case
of Ghanshyam Vs. Yogendra Rathi, reported in
(2023)7 SCC 361, wherein it has been held that legally an
agreement for sale may not be regarded as a transaction of
sale or a document transferring the proprietary rights in an
immovable property but the prospective purchaser having
performed his part of contract and being lawfully in
possession, acquires possessory title, which is required to be
protected in view of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882.
29. To counter the said argument made on behalf of the
petitioner-Basant Vishwakarma, the respondent no. 5 has
contended that the suit premises in question had been leased
to the petitioner by way of lease agreement dated
22.12.1994 executed between the him and Razia Khatoon
and thereafter on 27.08.2008, a fresh lease agreement was
also executed between him and Sairun Nisha (daughter of
Razia Khatoon) for 24 month i.e. for the period from
27.08.2008 to 27.08.2010 in which monthly rent was fixed at
Rs.2,500/- per month. Thus, there was landlord-tenant
relationship between the said petitioner and Sairun Nisha.
Since the alleged “Panchanama” was not registered, the
petitioner is debarred from enforcing the said document in
view of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It
is further contended that the respondent no.5 being the
22
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
power of attorney holder of Sairun Nisha has every right to
evict the petitioner- Basant Vishwakarma from the said
premises on the ground of non-payment of rent as well as
personal necessity.
30. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, this Court
perused the lower court records, which were called for from
the court of respondent no.4 vide order dated 27.07.2023. It
is evident from cross examination of the petitioner-Basant
Vishwakarma recorded in the proceeding before the
respondent no.4 that he had admitted the fact that an
agreement was executed between him and Razia Khatoon in
the year 1994. The “Panchnama” which has been heavily
relied upon by the petitioner-Basant Vishwakarma is an
unregistered document that too without any signature made
by him.
31. Here, it would be appropriate to mention relevant provisions
of the Registration Act, 1908. Section 17 of the said Act reads
as under:-
“17. Documents of which registration is compulsory —
(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the
property to which they relate is situate in a district in
which, and if they have been executed on or after the
date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian
Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act,
1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act
came or comes into force, namely:–
(a) instruments of gift of immovable property;
(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport
or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right,
title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the
value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in
immovable property;
23
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
(c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge
the receipt or payment of any consideration on account
of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or
extinction of any such right, title or interest; and
(d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or
for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly
rent;
(e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or
assigning any decree or order of a Court or any award
when such decree or order or award purports or
operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,
whether in present or in future, any right, title or
interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of
one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable
property:
Provided that the State Government may, by order
published in the Official Gazette, exempt from the
operation of this sub-section any lease executed in any
district, or part of a district, the terms granted by which
do not exceed five years and the annual rents reserved
by which do not exceed fifty rupees.
(1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer
for consideration, any immovable property for the
purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been
executed on or after the commencement of the
Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act,
2001 (48 of 2001) and if such documents are not
registered on or after such commencement, then, they
shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section
53A.
(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1)
applies to–
(i) any composition deed; or
(ii) any instrument relating to shares in a joint stock
Company, notwithstanding that the assets of such
Company consist in whole or in part of immovable
property; or
(iii) any debenture issued by any such Company and
not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or
extinguishing any right, title or interest, to or in
immovable property except in so far as it entitles the
holder to the security afforded by a registered
instrument whereby the Company has mortgaged,
conveyed or otherwise transferred the whole or part of
its immovable property or any interest therein to
trustees upon trust for the benefit of the holders of
such debentures; or
(iv) any endorsement upon or transfer of any
debenture issued by any such Company; or
(v) any document other than the documents specified
in sub-section (1A) not itself creating, declaring,
assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or
interest of the value of one hundred rupees and24
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
upwards to or in immovable property, but merely
creating a right to obtain another document which will,
when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish any such right, title or interest; or
(vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or
order expressed to be made on a compromise and
comprising immovable property other than that which
is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding; or
(vii) any grant of immovable property by Government;
or
(viii) any instrument of partition made by a Revenue-
Officer; or
(ix) any order granting a loan or instrument of
collateral security granted under the Land
Improvement Act, 1871, or the Land Improvement
Loans Act, 1883; or
(x) any order granting a loan under the Agriculturists,
Loans Act, 1884, or instrument for securing the
repayment of a loan made under that Act; or
(xa) any order made under the Charitable Endowments
Act, 1890 (6 of 1890), vesting any property in a
Treasurer of Charitable Endowments or divesting any
such Treasurer of any property; or
(xi) any endorsement on a mortgage-deed
acknowledging the payment of the whole or any part of
the mortgage-money, and any other receipt for
payment of money due under a mortgage when the
receipt does not purport to extinguish the mortgage; or
(xii) any certificate of sale granted to the purchaser of
any property sold by public auction by a Civil or
Revenue-Officer.
Explanation–A document purporting or operating to
effect a contract for the sale of immovable property
shall not be deemed to require or ever to have required
registration by reason only of the fact that such
document contains a recital of the payment of any
earnest money or of the whole or any part of the
purchase money.
(3) Authorities to adopt a son, executed after the 1st
day of January, 1872, and not conferred by a will, shall
also be registered.
32. Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 reads as under:-
“49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to
be registered.
No document required by section 17 or by any provision
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be
registered shall
(a) affect any immovable property comprised therein,
or
(b) confer any power to adopt, or
25
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
(c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting
such property or conferring such power, unless it has
been registered:
Provided that an unregistered document affecting
immovable property and required by this Act, or the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be
registered may be received as evidence of a contract in
a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the
Specific Relief Act, 1877 or as evidence of any collateral
transaction not required to be effected by registered
instrument.”
33. In the case of Shankar & Others Vs. Surendra Singh
Rawat (Dead) through Legal Representatives &
Another, reported in (2021) 20 SCC 425, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under:-
“12. In this case too, the title of the respondent-
plaintiffs was not in question. The appellants raised
alternative defences of title pursuant to unregistered
sale document and also of adverse possession. It was
not the case of the appellants that they were tenants.
The civil court rightly found that an unregistered sale
deed could not confer title. The plea of adverse
possession is a plea in desperation, since the plea of
title pursuant to a sale document defeats the plea of
adverse possession.”
34. In the case of K.B. Saha & Sons (P) Ltd. Vs.
Development Consultant Ltd. reported in (2008) 8
SCC 564, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“34. From the principles laid down in the various
decisions of this Court and the High Courts, as referred
to hereinabove, it is evident that:
1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered
is not admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the
Registration Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used as
an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the
proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or
divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law
required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not
itself required to be effected by a registered document,
that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or
interest in immovable property of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards.
26
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of
registration, none of its terms can be admitted in
evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of
proving an important clause would not be using it as a
collateral purpose.”
35. Thus, it is now well settled that if a document which is
required to be registered but not registered, is not admissible
into evidence under Section 49 of the Act, 1908. Thus, the
claim of the petitioner- Basant Vishwakarma that the
premises under his possession was sold to him by Razia
Khatoon in the year 2005 is not legally sustainable. Moreover,
the respondent no.5 had placed a new rent agreement
executed in the year 2008 between Sairun Nisha and the
petitioner-Basant Vishwakarma in the said eviction
proceeding before the respondent no.4, which was executed
after the said “Panchnama” as relied by the said petitioner. In
the said agreement, the petitioner and Sairun Nisha have
made their respective signature/thumb impression. During
examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination, the
respondent no.5 has specifically stated the fact that a rent
agreement was executed in the year 2008, however, the
petitioner failed to controvert the said claim of the
respondent no.5.
36. Another argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner-
Basant Vishwakarma is that powers of attorney were
executed only to negotiate with any prospective purchaser for
sale of the property in question and it was nowhere
mentioned in the same that there were shops/garage of
27
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
several tenants over the said property for which respondent
no.5 was empowered to take recourse of eviction.
37. Since in the present batch of cases, the general powers of
attorney were executed by the legal heirs of recorded tenant,
whereby several powers related to the said land were given
to the respondent no.5 including the power to institute any
case in the Court through his signature and to file affidavit on
their behalf and that all the works done by him was deemed
to be done by the said legal heirs of the property in question,
this Court does not find any substance in the contentions of
the petitioners that the respondent no.5 was not empowered
to institute the said eviction suits against them.
38. So far as the case of the petitioner-Md. Ashraf is concerned,
he has claimed that his father has been running a shop over
the land in question for more than 30 years and he has also
been running the same for four years. The respondent no. 5
in his examination-in-chief had claimed that in the year 2000,
the said land was given to the said petitioner for running a
garage over the same on payment of monthly rent of
Rs.3,000/- which was subsequently enhanced to Rs.6,000/-,
however, the petitioner failed to pay the rent since 2016.
During cross-examination, Md. Ashraf had admitted that he
had no document of title pertaining to the said land. He had
further stated that, in fact, his father had the knowledge as to
whether he was running the shop as an owner or tenant.
28
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
Thus, the petitioner-Md. Ashraf himself was unaware of the
real fact and his father who was knowing the real fact was
not examined in the case so as to controvert the claim of the
respondent no.5 that the premises in question was initially let
out on monthly rent of Rs.3000/-.
39. So far as the cases of the petitioners, namely, Md. Basir,
Pravesh Vishwakarma and Md. Nashim are concerned, the
respondent no.5 has put much reliance upon the agreements
dated 09.09.2017 and 27.09.2017, whereby the respective
petitioners had received Rs. 30,000/-, Rs. 30,000/- and
Rs.15,000/- from the respondent no.5 for vacating the
premises over which they were running their shops/garage.
The said petitioners have questioned the authenticity of the
said agreements, however they have admitted that they had
received the said amounts which were paid to them on
account of closure of the committee run by them along with
respondent no.5 and many other persons. Though the
petitioners have claimed that the said agreements do not
contain the fact that they are tenants of the landlord,
however, on bare perusal of contents of the said agreements,
it is evident that the same contain the narration that the
petitioners were running shops/garages over on the said land
on rent. The petitioners have not disputed their respective
signatures put on the said agreements. Since the petitioners
themselves had admitted that they were running shops/
29
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
garages on rent, there is no question of doubting the
authenticity of the said agreements. Even if no rent
agreement or rent receipt was filed by the respondent no.5
before the respondent no.4, the self-admission of the
petitioners that they are tenants of the respective premises,
is sufficient to establish the tenant-landlord relationship
between the petitioners and the owner of the said land.
40. So far as the case of the petitioner- Lala Khan is concerned,
he has claimed that though he has no right upon the said
land, but one Pradeep Beltharia is the owner of the said land
and the said petitioner being the servant of Pradeep Beltharia
is in possession of the same. The petitioner in support of the
said claim, however, failed to bring on record any evidence
before the concerned courts below. In the said case, Sairun
Nisha had produced a rent agreement executed between her
and Lala Khan on 31.07.1999 to establish the landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties. The petitioner-Lala Khan
has, however, disputed his signature made on the said
agreement. In the case of petitioner-Md. Pravez, the
respondent no.5 had also produced before the respondent
no.4 a rent agreement executed between Sairun Nisha and
Md. Pravez on 27.07.2013. The said petitioner in his cross
examination had also disputed his signature made on the said
agreement. However, both the petitioners-Lala Khan and Md.
Pravez had failed to file any application before the respondent
30
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
no.4 for sending the deed of agreements to the handwriting
expert.
41. In the case of Rahimal (dead) by LRS and Another Vs.
Dy. Director of Consolidation & Others, reported in
(2002) 10 SCC 94, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
“3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants urged
that from the very inception the appellants have
challenged the compromise memo on the ground that it
did not bear their signatures and, therefore, the Deputy
Director of Consolidation on his own initiative ought to
have given an opportunity to them to get their
purported signatures on the compromise memo
examined by a handwriting expert. We do not find any
merit in the contention. It was for the appellants to
have requested the Deputy Director of Consolidation
for getting their signatures examined by a handwriting
expert. No such prayer was made either by the
appellants or by their counsel to the Deputy Director of
Consolidation. Further, the appellants failed to point
out any infirmity in the compromise memo. The Deputy
Director of Consolidation, after looking into the original
compromise memo found that there was nothing to
doubt the genuineness of the compromise. The
aforesaid finding recorded by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation affirmed by the High Court, is a finding of
fact and cannot be assailed in this appeal.”
42. This Court is of the view that once the respondent no.5 as
well as Sairun Nisha had brought the rent agreements on
record, the burden had shifted to the petitioners- Md. Pravez
and Lala Khan to prove that their signatures were forged,
however, they failed to discharge the said burden.
43. Another argument of the learned counsel for the respective
petitioners is that since the provisions of section 4 of the Act,
2011 has not been complied in the present batch of cases,
there is a serious doubt over the factum of tenancy.
31
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
44. This Court has perused section 4 of the Act, 2011, which
reads as follows:-
4. Tenancy Agreement to be in writing
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 107
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act 4 of
1882), no person shall, after the commencement of this
Act let or take on rent any building except by an
agreement in writing.
(2) Where in relation to a tenancy created before the
commencement of this Act, and where no agreement in
writing was entered into, the landlord and the tenant
shall enter into an agreement in writing with regard to
the tenancy including the amount of rent and the
period of tenancy; and deposit a copy thereof before
the Controller concerned within two years as described
in Sec 13C of this act.
Provided that where the landlord and the tenant fail to
present jointly a copy of the tenancy agreement under
this sub-section, such landlord and tenant shaII
separately file the particulars about such tenancy with
the Controller concerned in such form and in such
manner and within two years as may be prescribed
45. The aforesaid provision provides that the tenancy agreement
must be in writing and a copy of the same should be sent to
the House Rent Controller within two years as described in
section 13C of the Act, 2011. Nonetheless, the same does not
provide the consequence of non-compliance of the same.
This Court is of the view that since the landlord-tenant
relationship between the petitioners and the owner of the
premises in question has sufficiently been proved in the
present case, the petitioners cannot be allowed to take the
ground of non-compliance of section 4 of the Act, 2011 as
their defence.
46. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court does not find
any reason to interfere with the common order dated
32
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023
06.12.2022 passed by the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur
Division, Hazaribagh in J.B.C.R. No.22 of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.14
of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.17 of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.23 of 2020,
J.B.C.R. No.12 of 2020, J.B.C.R. No.25 of 2020, and J.B.C.R.
No.19 of 2020.
47. These writ petitions being devoid of merit are, accordingly,
dismissed.
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
Sanjay/AFR
33
W.P.(C) Nos.314, 79, 665, 850,
1096, 1211 & 1249/2023