Supreme Court of India
Beena vs Charan Dass (D) Thr Lrs on 11 September, 2024
Author: Pankaj Mithal
Bench: Pankaj Mithal
2024 INSC 680 NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3190 OF 2014
BEENA AND ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
CHARAN DAS (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. What was once a dispute between landlord and tenant for
the eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute
ended into a consent order way back in the year 1979.
Unfortunately, the said consent order gave rise to a bitter
civil dispute between the parties, which has now landed
in this Court after the suit was dismissed by the court of
first instance which judgment and order was upheld by
the First Appellate Court. However, the decree so passed
was reversed by the High Court in Second Appeal. This is
how the parties are now before this Court.
Signature Not Verified
2.
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Late Bhawani Parshad alias Bhagati Parshad (now
Date: 2024.09.11
17:03:36 IST
Reason:
represented by his legal representatives) was the landlord
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and late Charan Dass (now represented by his legal
representatives) was a tenant in the premises consisting
of a house of two rooms/godown comprised in Khasra
No.1383 situate in Mohalla Charpat, Church Road,
Chamba Town.
3. The landlord applied under Section 14 of the Himachal
Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 19711 for the eviction of
the tenant, late Charan Dass, on the ground that the
house in question was in a dilapidated condition which
required demolition and reconstruction. The suit was
initially contested by the tenant wherein issues were
framed, out of which two issues were relevant and
important; as to whether the house in dispute is in a
dilapidated condition, unfit for habitation and requires
demolition and reconstruction; and whether the landlord
requires the said house for his bona fide personal use.
3A. In the said suit on one of the dates fixed i.e. 05.09.1979,
the landlord appeared in court and stated that there has
been a settlement between the parties and the tenant has
accepted to deposit a sum of Rs.12,500/- before
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hereinafter referred to as “the Act”
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15.12.1979 in the court. In the event the amount is so
deposited on or before the aforesaid date, the application
of the landlord shall be deemed to be dismissed;
otherwise, on failing to do so, the landlord’s application
would be deemed to be allowed. The tenant also appeared
before the court on the said date and accepted the
settlement. He stated that in case he fails to deposit the
aforesaid amount on or before the date fixed, he shall
vacate the house/godown, and in the event of him
depositing the same, the application of the landlord shall
be deemed to be dismissed.
4. In terms of the aforesaid settlement, as per the statement
of both the landlord and tenant, the Court of Rent
Controller, on the very same day, i.e. 05.09.1979 passed
an order allowing the application of the landlord
conditionally; that if the tenant fails to deposit the
aforesaid sum of Rs.12,500/- in court in the name of the
landlord on or before 15.12.1979, the application would
be deemed to be allowed, and the tenant would deliver
vacant possession of the house immediately, otherwise, if
the tenant deposits the amount within the stipulated
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period, the application of the landlord would be deemed
to be dismissed.
5. The tenant, in pursuance of the above consent order
dated 05.09.1979, deposited a sum of Rs.12,500/- in the
Chamba Treasury on 06.09.1979, i.e., on the very next
day. Thus, the application of the landlord under Section
14 of the Act came to be dismissed in terms of the
consent order.
6. The landlord, however, challenged the aforesaid order by
means of Civil Revision No.168/79 before the High Court
which was dismissed on 07.12.1984, observing that in
case the landlord was aggrieved by the dismissal of his
application under Section 14 of the Act, the appropriate
remedy available to him was to file an appeal under
Section 21(1)(b) of the Act.
7. It has come on record that the Special Leave Petition of
the landlord against the above order of the High Court
also stood dismissed, though, nothing in detail to that
effect has been brought on record. In short, the consent
order dated 05.09.1979 between the landlord and the
tenant became final and conclusive.
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8. Despite the fact that there was no eviction order against
the tenant or any positive direction in his favour, he
moved an application for the execution of the consent
order, which came to be allowed by the Rent Controller
on 28.08.1989, wherein it was directed that the name of
the tenant be entered as owner in possession of the
disputed premises by making corrections in the relevant
records. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the executing
court, the landlord preferred a civil revision, contending
that there could have been no execution of the consent
order at the behest of the tenant, as his application for
eviction of the tenant stood dismissed and that the
executing court could not have ordered for recording the
name of the tenant as owner in possession of the
disputed premises. The said civil revision was allowed,
holding that in the meantime, the building had collapsed
and nothing remained on the spot which could be
recorded in the name of the tenant. The court, therefore,
in the end held that the remedy of the tenant was not by
way of an execution petition and the order of the Rent
Controller dated 28.08.1989 was not sustainable in law.
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9. After having lost in the execution proceedings in getting
his name recorded as the owner in possession of the
disputed premises on the basis of the consent order
dated 05.09.1979, the tenant filed a suit for permanent
mandatory injunction, for possession and recovery of
Rs.2,000/- arraying the landlord as the defendant. The
said Civil Suit No.3 of 1990 was dismissed with cost by
the court of first instance vide judgment and order dated
16.07.1994. The appeal of the tenant also met with the
same fate. However, in Second Appeal before the High
Court, the judgment, order and decree passed by the
court of first instance as affirmed by the First Appellate
Court was reversed and the suit was decreed holding that
under the consent order, the tenant had become the
owner of the suit premises and since he became the
owner, and had been dispossessed by the landlord, he
was entitled to a decree of possession. Accordingly, the
suit was decreed in terms of the prayer made by the
tenant.
10. It may be pertinent to note that the building existing on
the tenanted premises was alleged to be in a dilapidated
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condition when the application under Section 14 of the
Act was filed by the landlord in the year 1977 and that it
had collapsed after the consent order was passed during
the pendency of the revision arising from the order of the
executing court. It is admitted to the parties that after the
collapse of the building and its vacation by the tenant,
altogether a new building has been constructed on the
premises in question by the landlord.
11. We have heard Shri Rajesh Gupta, learned counsel for
the appellants-landlord and Shri Rajesh Srivastava,
learned counsel for the respondents-tenants.
12. On the submission of the counsel for the parties, the
moot question which arises for our consideration is as to
whether under the consent order dated 05.09.1979
passed on an application under Section 14 of the Act
moved by the landlord, the tenant can claim himself to be
the owner of the property as he has deposited the
stipulated amount of Rs.12,500/-.
13. The answer to the above issue depends upon the
interpretation of the consent order vis-à-vis the
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statements of the landlord and tenant recorded by the
Rent Controller in passing the aforesaid consent order.
14. There is no dispute to the fact that there existed a
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties
and that the landlord had filed an application for the
eviction of the tenant under Section 14 of the Act on the
ground of dilapidated condition and on bona fide need.
15. In the said proceedings on 05.09.1979, the statement of
the landlord was recorded which is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“Statement of Shri Bhagati Parshad S/o
Sh. Duni Chand Resident of Chamba –
applicant with counsel on Solemn
affirmation.
Stated that I have settled with respondent. As
per the settlement respondent will pay me
Rs.12,500/- before 15.12.1979 as against the
value of Godown and house in dispute. The
manner of making such payment shall only be
one and that is the amount shall have to be
deposited in Court in my name.
As per this settlement, my application shall be
deemed to be allowed in-case the respondent
fails to deposit the said amount on or before
15.12.1979; should the said amount be so
deposited my application shall be deemed to be
dismissed.”8
16. The said statement and the settlement were accepted by
the tenant on the same date who got his statement
recorded as under:
“Statement of Shri Charan Dass son of
Shri Hans Ram – Respondent with counsel
on Solemn Affirmation.
Stated that I the above statement of applicant
has been heard and, accepted. In case I fail to
deposit Rs.12,500/- before 15.12.1979 I shall
vacate the Godown and house in dispute, and
incase I deposit within time, applicant’s
application shall be deemed to be dismissed.”
17. A plain reading of the aforesaid two statements clearly
demonstrates that under the settlement, the tenant had
agreed to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/-, to be deposited in
court in the name of the landlord on or before
15.12.1979, treating it to be the value of the
house/godown. It was further agreed that if the amount
is deposited, the application of the landlord for eviction
would stand dismissed, and in case the tenant fails to
make the deposit, as agreed, the application of the
landlord for eviction would stand allowed. This is also
clearly implicit from the statement of the tenant who
accepted the settlement and stated that in case he fails
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to deposit the stipulated amount on or before15.12.1979, he shall vacate the house/godown and in
case he deposits the sum within time, the application of
the landlord shall be deemed to be dismissed.
18. The aforesaid two statements nowhere provide that the
amount liable to be deposited by the tenant was a sale
consideration of the property, though, it may have been
stated that it is equivalent to the value of the property or
that the tenant, or on deposit of such an amount, he
would become the owner of the property. Therefore, on
the plain reading of the above statements, it cannot be
said by any stretch of imagination that there was any
settlement of transfer of the property on the above sale
consideration. It may also be noted that there is no
document witnessing the transfer of the property in
pursuance of the above statements or the consent order.
19. The Rent Controller in passing the consent order on
05.09.1979 recorded that the dispute between the
landlord and tenant had been compromised. According to
the terms of the compromise contained in the statements
of the parties, on the payment of Rs.12,500/- by the
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tenant as the price of the house, he was to become theowner in possession. This narration of fact that the
tenant would become the owner in possession in the
order of the Rent Controller is obviously against the
record, i.e., the statement of the parties, wherein it has
nowhere been stipulated that the tenant, on deposit
would become the owner of the property. However, in the
end, the Rent Controller himself records that on the price
of Rs.12,500/- being deposited on or before the
15.12.1979, the application of the landlord would be
deemed to have been dismissed and on failure to deposit,
it shall deem to have been allowed. It means the
aforesaid consent order was only with regard to
dismissing and allowing of the application of the landlord
in the eventuality of depositing of the amount and non-
depositing of the amount by the tenant. The settlement
recorded in terms of the statements of the parties and
even the consent order does not in any way provide or
confer right of ownership upon the tenant, nor it could
have been done in a proceeding for eviction of the tenant.
No document, much less a registered instrument, was
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executed between the parties transferring the title of the
suit premises. In its absence obviously no transfer of title
can pass from one party to another. In such a
proceeding, the only option available to the Rent
Controller was either to order eviction or to dismiss the
application for eviction as has been done by him.
20. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are
crystal clear in our mind that the High Court had
patently erred in interpreting the consent order and in
reversing the well-considered judgments and orders of
the court of first instance and the First Appellate Court,
dismissing the suit of the tenant.
21. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the High Court
dated 20.04.2011 is set aside and the appeal is allowed
with costs.
……………….………………………….. J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
………….……………………………….. J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 11, 2024.
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