Supreme Court of India
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz vs Government Of Karnataka on 2 January, 2025
Author: B.R. Gavai
Bench: B.R. Gavai
2025 INSC 3 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10338 of 2023)
BERNARD FRANCIS JOSEPH VAZ
AND OTHERS …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal takes exception to the final judgment and
order dated 22nd November 2022 in Writ Appeal No. 678 of
2022 (LA-KIADB) passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bengaluru, whereby the Division Bench of the High Court
dismissed the writ appeal filed by the appellants herein
against the judgment and order dated 18th April 2022 in Writ
Signature Not Verified Petition No. 1627 of 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2025.01.02
of the High Court dismissing their writ petition.
12:39:14 IST
Reason:
1
FACTS:
3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as
follows:
3.1. From 1995 to 1997, the appellants herein purchased
various residential sites at Gottigere Village, Uttarahalli Hobli,
Bengaluru South Taluk, Karnataka vide registered sale deeds
and became absolute owners of their respective sites.
3.2. On 3rd April 1997, a Framework Agreement (hereinafter,
“FWA”) was executed between Government of Karnataka
(Respondent No. 1) and Nandi Infrastructure Corridor
Enterprise Ltd. (hereinafter, “NICE”) (Respondent No. 6)
envisaging the Infrastructure Corridor Project connecting
Bengaluru-Mysuru (hereinafter, “Bengaluru-Mysuru
Infrastructure Corridor Project” or “BMICP”). As per the FWA,
the State Government undertook to acquire about 13,237
acres of land from private persons and about 6,956 acres of
Government land. In all 20,193 acres of land was agreed to be
conveyed and transferred in favour of Respondent No. 6 (NICE)
for implementation of the BMICP.
3.3. On 14th October 1998, Respondent No. 6 applied to
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (hereinafter,
2
“KIADB”) (Respondent No. 2) to make available the lands forthe project.
3.4. On 29th January 2003, a preliminary notification was
issued by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) under sub-section (1) of
Section 28 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act,
1966 (hereinafter, “KIAD Act”) for acquiring lands for the
BMICP. Notices were issued under sub-section (2) of Section
28 of KIAD Act seeking objections from the land-owners. The
appellants also submitted their objections.
3.5. On 5th July 2003, upon consideration of the objections to
the Preliminary Notification, the Final Notification was issued
by Special Deputy Commissioner KIADB (Respondent No. 3).
3.6. On 22nd November 2005, the possession of the
appellants’ land was taken over by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB)
and subsequently handed over to Respondent No. 6 (NICE)
and its sister concern Nandi Economic Corridor Enterprises
Ltd. (NECE) (Respondent No. 7). However, no Award was
passed immediately for such acquisitions.
3.7. In 2009-10, the land-owners filed Writ Petitions before
the High Court of Karnataka with a prayer to quash the
acquisition notifications insofar as it relates to their lands. In
3
the alternative, the land-owners sought a direction to theconcerned authorities to allot residential sites of equal
dimension.
3.8. Vide judgment and order dated 15th June 2011, a
Division Bench of the High Court held that the acquisition
notifications cannot be quashed at such a belated stage and
that there cannot be any direction for allotment of alternative
sites to the land-owners. In the result, the batch of Writ
Petitions filed by the land-owners were dismissed, however,
liberty was reserved to approach the concerned authorities if
any rehabilitation programme is specifically worked out or if
any welfare programme is generally available.
3.9. On 12th February 2016, in terms of the judgment and
order of the High Court dated 15th June 2011, some of the
land-owners submitted a representation inter-alia to the
Government of Karnataka, KIADB and NICE to frame a
rehabilitation scheme as mandatorily required under the FWA
and to allot alternative sites along with benefits under the
scheme at the earliest.
3.10. On non-consideration of their representation, the
landowners filed Writ Petitions before the High Court being
4
W.P. Nos. 49812-49863 of 2016 (LA-KIADB), with a prayer todirect the State of Karnataka and KIADB to implement the
request made in the representation dated 12th February 2016
at the earliest
3.11. Vide order dated 24th March 2017, a learned Single
Judge of the High Court disposed of the Writ Petitions filed by
the land-owners by directing the State of Karnataka and
KIADB to consider their representation and pass appropriate
orders, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.
3.12. Alleging non-compliance of the order of the learned
Single Judge dated 24th March 2017, Contempt Petitions being
C.C.C. No. 2434 of 2018 and C.C.C. No. 18-65 of 2019 came
to be filed by the land-owners.
3.13. During the pendency of the Contempt Petitions, the
Special Land Acquisition Officer-1, KIADB (BMICP), Bengaluru
(hereinafter, “SLAO”) (Respondent No. 4), on 22nd April 2019,
passed an Award for payment of compensation in respect of
lands belonging to the erstwhile land-owners. In terms of the
legal opinion given by the Advocate General, Respondent No.
4 decided to postpone the date of Preliminary Notification from
29th January 2003 to the year 2011 and decided to consider
5
the guideline rates prevailing in the said year and formulatean award. An amount of Rs. 32,69,45,789/- was, accordingly,
awarded for 11 Acre 1.25 Guntas of land.
3.14. In view of the Award dated 22nd April 2019, a
compliance report along with an endorsement came to be filed
by the KIADB in the contempt proceedings initiated by the
land-owners before the High Court. Therefore, a Division
Bench of the High Court, vide order dated 27th November
2019, dismissed as withdrawn the Contempt Petitions with
liberty to challenge the endorsement in accordance with law.
3.15. On 19th June 2019, Respondents No. 6 and 7
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Project Proponents”)
filed Writ Petitions being W.P. No. 26085 of 2019 and W.P. No.
31407 of 2019 before the Karnataka High Court challenging
several Awards passed by the SLAO, including the Award
dated 22nd April 2019. The Project Proponents were aggrieved
by the Award dated 22nd April 2019 inasmuch as, on account
of delay not attributable to them, they are being called upon
to pay higher compensation. It was their contention that the
compensation should be determined on the basis of the
6
market value of land as on the date of the Preliminary
Notification and that the date could not have been shifted.
3.16. On 5th January 2021, the erstwhile land-owners
filed impleadment application in the Writ Petitions filed by the
Project Proponents. The appellants herein, thereafter, filed a
substantive Writ Petition being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 on 1 st
June 2021. The appellants were aggrieved by the Award dated
22nd April 2019 inasmuch as, even though their lands were
acquired in the year 2003, no compensation for such
acquisition has been disbursed to the appellants despite a
lapse of 18 years. It was their contention that the
compensation should be determined as per the current market
value of the lands.
3.17. Vide common judgment and order dated 18th April
2022, a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court at
Bengaluru allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the Project
Proponents. The High Court quashed the Award dated 22nd
April 2019 passed by Respondent No. 4 (SLAO). In view of the
decision in the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents,
the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein was disposed of
as the same did not survive for consideration inasmuch as the
7
Award dated 22nd April 2019 was quashed. Ultimately, the
High Court directed the concerned authorities to pass fresh
awards in accordance with law and after providing sufficient
and reasonable opportunity to the parties as expeditiously as
possible and at any rate within a period of three months.
3.18. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein filed a Writ
Appeal being W.A. No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB). Vide impugned
judgment and order dated 22nd November 2022, the Division
Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal filed by the
appellants herein. Hence, the present appeal by way of special
leave.
4. We have heard Shri R. Chandrachud, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants, Shri Atmaram N. S.
Nadkarni, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents No. 6 and
7, Shri Avishkar Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the State of Karnataka and Shri Purushottam
Sharma Tripathi for Respondents Nos. 2 to 5.
SUBMISSIONS:
5. Shri Chandrachud submitted that the Division Bench of
the High Court erroneously dismissed the Writ Appeal against
the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High
8
Court as “premature”. It is submitted that the Writ Appeal was
not premature as the appellants’ plea to shift the date for
considering the market value of land as on the date of the
Award and not as on the date of the Preliminary Notification
was rejected by the learned Single Judge and thus the issue
stood decided against the appellants. It is further submitted
that more than 21 years have passed since the Preliminary
Notification was passed acquiring the appellants lands and
they have not received any compensation yet for the same.
Relying on the judgments of this Court in Ram Chand and
Others v. Union of India and Others1 and Tukaram Kana
Joshi and Others Through Power-of-Attorney Holder v.
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and
Others2, it is submitted that in exceptional cases, the
authorities must be directed to determine compensation on
the basis of market value of the land as on the date of the
Award by notionally shifting the date of the Preliminary
Notification. It is lastly submitted that the compensation be
determined as per the provisions contained in the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
1
(1994) 1 SCC 44 : 1993 INSC 315
2
(2013) 1 SCC 353 : 2012 INSC 503
9
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter, “2013
LA Act”) inasmuch as in terms of Section 30 of the KIAD Act,
the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter,
“1894 LA Act”) have been made applicable mutatis mutandis
for the purposes of determination and award of compensation.
Reliance in this regard was placed by the learned counsel for
the appellants on the judgment of this Court in Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation v. State of
Maharashtra and Others3.
6. Per contra, Shri Nadkarni for Respondents No. 6 and 7
submitted that between 2009 and 2012, the Project
Proponents wrote several letters to Respondent No. 2 (KIADB)
requesting for awards to be passed. It is further submitted that
as no awards were passed by the SLAOs, the Project
Proponents were constrained to file Writ Petition before the
High Court seeking direction to pass awards which was
allowed in 2013, thereafter, on non-compliance the Project
Proponents initiated contempt proceedings in 2015 as no
awards were still passed. It was, therefore, submitted that if
this Court is inclined to grant any relief in the form of
3
(2003) 4 SCC 200 : 2003 INSC 137
10
additional compensation or direct shifting of date as sought
for, it may be seen that there was no error or delay on part of
the Project Proponents, who have deposited compensation
with Respondent No.2 (KIADB) as per the agreement and
therefore any additional liability should fall on the State
Government and/or the KIADB. Relying on the judgment of
this Court in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute
Factory and Others4, it is submitted that shifting of date can
only take place in very rare circumstances. It is further
submitted that there is no question of awarding compensation
under the 2013 LA Act and a completely new case has been
sought to be made out before this Court, which was not
contended before the learned Single Judge or Division Bench
of the High Court. It is lastly submitted that the appellants
never sought directions to the State Government/SLAO to
pass awards and that steps in that regard were taken only in
the year 2021 which was pursuant to the various proceedings
initiated by the Project Proponents.
7. Shri Singhvi for Respondent No. 1 submitted that the
appellants’ claims are premature and speculative, as they have
4
(2005) 13 SCC 477 : 2005 INSC 585
11
yet to exhaust remedies available under the ongoing award
proceedings. It is further submitted that the Division Bench of
the High Court in the impugned judgment and order, expressly
held that the issue of shifting the date of acquisition
notification can only be examined after the award has been
passed by the SLAO. It was, therefore, submitted that present
appeal is untenable at this stage.
8. Shri Purushottam Sharma Tripathi for Respondent Nos.
2 to 5 submitted that the SLAO passed the Award dated 22nd
April 2019, on the basis of specific opinion tendered by the
learned Advocate General with regard to shifting of the date. It
is submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court,
upon consideration of the material placed before it, has
quashed the Award and directed the SLAO to pass fresh
awards within a stipulated timeframe. It is further submitted
that pursuant to the directions by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court, the SLAO has now passed fresh awards for the
acquired lands and if the appellants are aggrieved by the
compensation awarded, they may take such steps as are
permissible in law. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court
should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the
12
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS:
9. To consider the case of the appellants, it would be
appropriate to refer to the prayer clause of their Writ Petition
before the High Court. The appellants herein had filed Writ
Petition being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 (LA-KIADB) with the
following prayers:
“WHEREFORE, the Petitioners most respectfully
prays that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to:
a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ
of the same nature to quash and setting
aside the Impugned Award dated
22.04.2019 passed by the Respondent No.
4 bearing No. LAQ, SR/39 (26B, 10, 13,
14)/1998-99, 39 (30, 31, 37, 38,
40)/2002-03 SLAO-1, produced at
ANNEXURE – A;
b. Consequent to prayer (a) issue a writ of
mandamus or any other writ of the same
nature to direct the Respondents to issue
notice to Petitioners for determining
compensation and pass the Award as per
market value of land closest to date of
passing the Award;
c. Grant such other reliefs as this Hon’ble
Court deems fit in the above
circumstances of the case, in the interests
of justice and equity.”
13
10. It is relevant to note that prior to the appellants herein
Respondents No. 6 and 7 (Project Proponents) had also filed
Writ Petitions before the High Court. From a perusal of the
judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 18th
April 2022, it is clear that the Project Proponents by way of
Writ Petitions being W.P. No. 26085 of 2019 and W.P. No.
31407 of 2019 had also challenged the awards. Therefore, in
the three writ petitions before the learned Single Judge, a
common question with regard to the legality, validity and
correctness of the Award dated 22nd April 2019 was raised.
11. Before adverting to the findings of the learned Single
Judge on the legality of the Award dated 22nd April 2019, it
would be appropriate to reproduce certain extracts from the
Award, as under:
“14. Valuation of land:
In the notification dated: 29/01/2003 issued under
Section 28(1) of the Survey number lands, based on
the above sales figures, the value is Rs. 2,90,532/-
per acre and the guidance value is Rs. 6.00 lakhs.
Therefore, if the guidance value is Rs. 6.00 lakhs
including all other allowances, this rate will be found
to be real and fair. Accordingly, it was decided and
declared the award on 05/07/2018 and submitted
for approval.
Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member
wrote a letter vide No. KIADB/CEO&EM/16/2019-
20 dated 16/04/2019. Along with the said letter,14
Government’s letter and Advocate General’s opinion
are attached, it is suggested to prepare the revised
award as per the opinion given by the Advocate
General and submit it for approval. In this regard,
this office letter No.
KIADB/BMICP/LAQ(1)/G.I/01/2019-20 dated
22/04/2019 has been written to the Special Deputy
Commissioner, KIADB (BMICP) seeking clarification
on other issues that there is no scope for revising the
current decision. On 22/04/2019 as per the Chief
Executive Officer and Executive Member’s letter No.
KIADB/BMICP/LAQ/CR/31/2013-14 dated
22/04/2019, it is said that it has been suggested to
submit again as per the Advocate General’s opinion
and based on the previous judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in several cases regarding framing of
compensatory rate/award in land acquisition cases
that even for the lands acquired for BMICP scheme,
it has been again instructed to prepare a revised
decision immediately as per the rules and submit it
for the approval of the government. For revising the
award and not considering the preliminary
notification, the Advocate General in his legal
opinion dated 16/04/2019 has given the
following legal opinion:
“KIADB and the State do not have
any choice but to pass the award which
may be passed taking into account and
consideration the market value of the
property as on date.”
As per the opinion given by the present
Advocate General, the award has to be made at
current market rate equal to the current market rate.
In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several
cases has issued preliminary notification, final
notification and handed over the assets to the Claims
Department, but in the case where no award has
been made for ten years, it is appropriate to pay real
and fair land compensation to the land owners to
avoid injustice, in such cases, the date of preliminary
notification should be changed to the date of handing15
over the assets to the Claims Department, which was
prevailing on that date. The order is to create a
judgment considering the market rate. The following
civil appeal cases of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have
been perused to form a award in this regard.
1. CA No. 7015-7018/2005 (Competent
Authority V/s Barangore Jute Factory
and Others)
2. SLP (Civil) No. 1787473/2004 (State of
M.P. V/s Onkar Prasad Patel)
3. CA No. 965/1979 with CA No.
3325/1984, 2185-87/1980,
2381/1980, SLP No. 12352-53/1984,
10572-74/1984 and others (Gauri
Shankar Gaur and others V/s State of
U.P. and others)
4. CA No. 2739/2000 with Nos.
2737/2000, 2738/2000, 2736/2000
Contempt Petition (C) No. 62/1999 (Haji
Saeed Khan and others V/s State of
U.P. and others).
In the above cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has ordered to change the preliminary notification to
the date of handing over of the asset or to an
appropriate date conducive to giving equitable relief
in cases where there is severe delay in adjudication.
Based on the above judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in the present case, the possession
of the land was handed over on 05/04/2004,
22/11/2005 and 25/11/2005, if the award is framed
considering the guideline rates of 2011 (sic), it is not
possible to give real and fair compensation to the
land owner.
Therefore, with a view to providing real and
fair land compensation to the landowners, it was
decided to postpone the date of preliminary
notification to the year 2011 and decided to
consider the guideline rates prevailing in the said
year and formulate an award as per the legal
16
opinion given by the Advocate General.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. It can thus be seen that the learned Advocate General
rendered an opinion on 16th April 2019, wherein it was stated
that while passing the awards, the market value as on date
has to be taken on account of enormous delay in passing the
awards. KIADB forwarded the opinion to the Special Deputy
Commissioner (BMICP) and SLAO directing them to pass the
awards as per the opinion. On 22nd April 2019, the SLAO wrote
letters to the Special Deputy Commissioner (BMICP) raising
certain queries with regard to passing of fresh awards and the
compensation to be calculated in view of awards already
passed by them and sent for approval on 3rd November 2018.
In response to the said letters, the CEO of KIADB once again
addressed a letter dated 22nd April 2019, to the Special Deputy
Commissioner (BMICP) and the SLAO instructing them to pass
the awards as directed in the opinion of the learned Advocate
General.
13. It can further be seen that the opinion of the learned
Advocate General as well as the judgments of this Court
referred to in the Award were the only two factors that were
17
taken into account for the purpose of passing the Award dated
22nd April 2019, by Respondent No. 4 (SLAO) by
shifting/postponing the date of the Preliminary Notification to
the year 2011 and by considering the guideline rates prevailing
in the said year.
14. Aggrieved by the suo-motu shifting/postponing of the
date of the Preliminary Notification, the Project Proponents,
who as a result were called upon to pay higher compensation,
had filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. The appellants
herein filed an impleadment application in the Writ Petition
filed by the Project Proponents so also a substantive Writ
Petition with prayers referred to hereinbefore. Their grievance
was two-fold to quash the Award and to direct passing of an
Award as per market value of land closest to date of passing
the Award.
15. For the common prayer qua quashing of the Award dated
22nd April 2019, it will be profitable to refer to the following
paragraphs of the judgment and order dated 18th April 2022,
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court:
“17.8 A perusal of the impugned awards will indicate
that the opinion of the learned Advocate General as
well as the judgments of the Apex Court referred to18
in the awards were the only two factors that were
taken into account for the purpose of passing the
awards by the SLAOs. As stated supra, in so far as
the opinion of the learned Advocate General is
concerned, the same with regard to shifting of the
date to reckon the market value of the land from
the date of the preliminary notification to a later
date is concerned, the said opinion was beyond
the scope and ambit of the query put forth to him
and consequently, the said opinion could not
have been made the basis by the SLAOs to pass
the impugned awards.
X—X —X —X —X —X —X
17.10 The second factor/circumstance that has been
taken into account by the SLAOs to shift the date to
reckon the market value of the lands from the date of
the preliminary notification to a later/subsequent
dates is by placing reliance upon the following
decisions of the Apex Court viz.,
a. Competent Authority Vs. Barangor Jute
Factory C/w State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Onkar Prasad Patel – (2005) 13 SCC 47
b. Gaurishankar Gaur Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh – (1994) 1 SCC 92; and
c. Haji Saeed Khan Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh – (2001) 9 SCC 513.
17.11 In this context, it is relevant to state that as
can be seen from the aforesaid decisions as well as
various decisions of the Apex Court as well as this
Court referred to supra by both sides, that the
market value of the acquired lands has to be
taken as on the date of the preliminary
notification as contemplated under Section 11 of
the L.A. Act, 1894; it has been held that under
exceptional circumstances, where either the Apex
Court or High Courts came to the conclusion that19
the acquisition proceedings themselves were
liable to be quashed on account of certain
illegalities or infirmities in the acquisition
process/procedure, it was permissible only for
the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under
Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article
226 of the Constitution of India to shift the date
to a later/subsequent date; however, this power
to shift the date is available only to either the
Apex Court or the High Courts and not
definitely/certainly to the SLAOs or the State
Government; in other words, a perusal of the
decisions referred to supra, will indicate that in
cases, where the Apex Court as well as this Court
deemed it necessary to shift the date in order to
do complete and substantial justice, inherent
powers of the Courts were invoked and the dates
were shifted in order to ensure no hardship, loss
or prejudice would be caused to the land losers.
17.12 A perusal of the decisions relied upon by the
SLAOs in the impugned awards referred to supra, will
clearly indicate that in the said cases, the Apex Court
has invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction and powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and in
the peculiar/special facts and circumstances
obtaining in the said cases, the Apex Court had
shifted the date to reckon the market value. The
SLAOs clearly fell in error in placing reliance upon
the said decisions of the Apex Court for the
purpose of shifting the date from the date of the
preliminary notification without appreciating
that the said shifting of the date by the SLAOs or
the State Government is not legally permissible
in law either under the provisions of the L.A. Act,
1894 or the KIAD Act or the Rules or by any
judicial precedent. It is also relevant to state that
even as per the aforesaid judgments, shifting of the
date from the date of the preliminary notification to
any later/subsequent date has been done only up to
the date of taking possession from the land losers. In20
the instant case, the impugned awards disclose that
the SLAOs have shifted the date to a date
subsequent/later to the date of taking possession.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the
impugned awards purporting to shift the date suffers
from several legal and factual infirmities and
illegalities which vitiate the impugned awards, which
deserve to be quashed on this ground also.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. It can thus be seen that the learned Single Judge of the
High Court, upon appreciation of the material placed on
record, was of the view that insofar as the opinion of the
learned Advocate General with regard to shifting of the date of
the preliminary notification to a later date is concerned, the
said opinion was beyond the scope and ambit of the query put
forth to him and consequently, the said opinion could not have
been made the basis by the SLAO to pass the Award. It is
further to be seen that the learned Single Judge of the High
Court after considering the provisions of 1894 LA Act, KIAD
Act and various decisions of this Court, observed that the
market value of the acquired land has to be taken as on the
date of the preliminary notification as contemplated under
Section 11 of the 1894 LA Act. Further, the learned Single
Judge of the High Court observed that only in exceptional
circumstances, where either this Court or the High Court
21
comes to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings
themselves were liable to be quashed on account of certain
illegalities or infirmities in the acquisition process/procedure,
it was permissible only for this Court in exercise of its powers
under Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India to shift the date to a
later/subsequent date. It was further observed that this power
to shift the date is available only to either this Court or the
High Courts and not definitely/certainly to the SLAOs or the
State Government.
17. We are in agreement with the findings of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court, inasmuch as the SLAO cannot
shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification. In case,
upon appreciation of the material placed on record if this
Court or the High Court, in exceptional circumstances, came
to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings themselves
were liable to be quashed only then by exercising inherent
powers this Court under Article 32/142 or the High Courts
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India respectively can
shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification to a later
date. In our considered opinion, therefore, the learned Single
22
Judge of the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that
the Award dated 22nd April 2019 be quashed and set aside and
ordered accordingly.
18. Having decided thus, in the Writ Petitions filed by the
Project Proponents, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
came to the conclusion that the Writ Petition filed by the
appellants herein before the High Court does not survive for
consideration and the same was, accordingly, disposed of.
19. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein filed an intra-
court appeal being Writ Appeal No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB)
before the Division Bench of the High Court.
20. The Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned
judgment and order dated 22nd November 2022 upon
consideration of the material placed before it, in paragraph 9,
observed thus:
“9. Further, the learned Single Judge held that the
SLAO has to determine the compensation as on the
date of issuing the preliminary notification as
contemplated under Section 11 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, and not to shift the date to a
later/subsequent date. The learned Single Judge has
set aside the award passed by the SLAO and directed
the SLAO to reconsider and pass award. The
grievance of the petitioner regarding shifting the
date at any later or subsequent date could be
considered only if award is passed by the SLAO.
23
The SLAO is yet to pass an award. The grievance
raised by the petitioner in this writ appeal is
premature. If the petitioner is dissatisfied with
the award to be passed by the SLAO, liberty is
reserved to the petitioner to raise the grounds
urged in this appeal in the appropriate
proceedings before the appropriate forum. The
question of considering the shifting of date from the
date of preliminary notification to any other date
would arise only when the award is passed. The
cause of action arose for the petitioner to raise the
said issue only after the award is passed. The shifting
of the date to a later/subsequent date is available
only to the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, but
not to the SLAO or State Government…”
(emphasis supplied)
21. It can thus be seen that the Division Bench of the High
Court dismissed the Writ Appeal on the ground that the
learned Single Judge has set aside the award passed by the
SLAO and directed the SLAO to reconsider and pass award
and so the grievance regarding shifting the date at any later or
subsequent date could be considered only if an award is
passed by the SLAO. The Division Bench of the High Court
was, therefore, of the opinion that the grievance sought to be
raised in the writ appeal is premature and that the question of
considering the shifting of date of preliminary notification to
any other date would arise only when the award is passed.
24
22. In the present appeal, it was sought to be contended by
the learned counsel for the appellants that the Writ Appeal was
not pre-mature inasmuch as the prayer to shift the date for
considering the market value of the land as on the date of the
award and not as on the date of the preliminary notification
was rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and
thus the issue stood decided against the appellants, as a
consequence of which the cause of action remained.
23. We are of the opinion that the contention of the learned
counsel for the appellants is liable to be accepted. We say so
because upon adjudication of the Writ Petitions filed by the
Project Proponents, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
came to the conclusion that the Award dated 22nd April 2019,
is liable to be quashed and set aside and ordered accordingly.
However, upon consideration of the extant position of law, the
learned Single Judge further directed that the SLAO has to
determine the compensation as on the date of issuance of the
preliminary notification and not to shift the date to a
later/subsequent date. Therefore, the learned Single Judge of
the High Court while exercising inherent powers under Article
226 of the Constitution quashed and set aside the Award
25
dated 22nd April 2019, but decided against granting relief to
the appellants by shifting/postponing the date of the
preliminary notification to a later/subsequent date. In our
opinion, therefore, the cause of action with regard to prayer
clause (b) of the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein still
survives for consideration. The Division Bench of the High
Court should have, especially taking into consideration the
facts and circumstances of the present case, at least
considered the case of the appellants herein with regard to
said prayer. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
impugned judgment and order dated 22nd November 2022,
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is liable to be
quashed and set aside on this short ground alone. We order
accordingly.
24. Having set aside the impugned judgment and order
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on the
aforesaid ground, we shall now proceed to examine if the relief
sought by the appellants herein in prayer clause (b) of the Writ
Petition referred to hereinbefore is liable to be granted or not.
25. For the purpose of consideration of the relief sought by
the appellants herein, it will be appropriate to refer to a few
26
judgements of this Court on which reliance has been placed
by the learned counsel for the parties.
26. In the case of Ram Chand (supra), proceedings were
instituted for quashing the land acquisition proceedings,
which had been initiated between the years 1959 and 1965 by
issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act
but in which no awards were made upto the years 1979-80,
although the declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 LA Act
had been made in the years 1966 and 1969. The question
sought to be answered by this Court in the aforesaid case was
as to if a person is paid compensation in the year 1980/81 at
the market rate prevailing twenty years back, will that be in
compliance of the constitutional and statutory mandate. In
this regard, this Court observed thus:
“14. … Ignoring the escalation of the market
value of the lands, especially near the urban
agglomeration or metropolitan cities, will amount
to ignoring an earthquake and courts can
certainly take judicial notice of the said fact. The
interest and the solatium, which have to be paid
under the provisions of the Act, are linked with the
market value of the land with reference to the date of
the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of
the Act. If a decision had been taken as early as in
the year 1966, by issuance of declarations under
Section 6, that the lands belonging to the
different cultivators, who held those lands within27
the ceiling limit for cultivation, were needed for
public purpose, respondents should have taken
steps for completion of the acquisition
proceedings and payment of compensation at an
early date. In the present cases, unless a
justification is furnished on behalf of the
respondents, can it be said that the statutory power
of making an award under Section 11 has been
exercised within a reasonable time from the date of
the declaration under Section 6? Due to escalation
in prices of land, more so in this area, during the
preceding two decades, in reality, the market
rate, on the date of the notification under Section
4(1) is a mere fraction, of the rate prevailing at
the time of its determination in the Award.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case
has observed that the respondents therein should have taken
steps for completion of the acquisition proceedings and
payment of compensation at an early date. It was further
observed that due to escalation in prices of land, more so in
the area in question, during the preceding two decades, in
reality, the market rate, on the date of the notification under
Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act is a mere fraction of the rate
prevailing at the time of its determination in the Award. This
Court, however, in the aforesaid case was also dealing with a
challenge to the acquisition proceedings itself. In this regard,
this Court observed thus:
28
“16. On behalf of the respondents, it was pointed out
that the petitioners have approached this Court only
after making of the awards, or when awards were to
be made, having waited for more than fourteen years,
without invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 or of this Court under Article 32.
It is true that this Court has taken note of delay
on the part of the petitioners concerned in
invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court or of
this Court for quashing the land acquisition
proceedings on the ground that the proceedings
for acquisition of the lands in question have
remained pending for more than a decade, in the
cases of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975)
4 SCC 285] and Ramjas Foundation v. Union of
India [1993 Supp (2) SCC 20 : AIR 1993 SC 852].
According to us, the question of delay in invoking the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
or of this Court under Article 32, has to be considered
along with the inaction on the part of the authorities,
who had to perform their statutory duties. Can the
statutory authority take a plea that although it has
not performed its duty within a reasonable time, but
it is of no consequence because the person, who has
been wronged or deprived of his right, has also not
invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this
Court for a suitable writ or direction to grant the relief
considered appropriate in the circumstances? The
authorities are enjoined by the statute concerned to
perform their duties within a reasonable time, and as
such they are answerable to the Court why such
duties have not been performed by them, which has
caused injury to claimants. By not questioning, the
validity of the acquisition proceedings for a long
time since the declarations were made under
Section 6, the relief of quashing the acquisition
proceedings has become inappropriate, because
in the meantime, the lands notified have been
developed and put to public use. The lands are
being utilised to provide shelter to thousands and
to implement the scheme of a planned city, which
is a must in the present set-up. The outweighing
29
public interest has to be given due weight. That
is why this Court has been resisting attempts on
the part of the landholders, seeking quashing of
the acquisition proceedings on ground of delay in
completion of such proceedings. But, can the
respondents be not directed to compensate the
petitioners, who were small cultivators holding lands
within the ceiling limit in and around Delhi, for the
injury caused to them, not by the provisions of the
Act, but because of the non-exercise of the power by
the authorities under the Act within a reasonable
time?”
(emphasis supplied)
28. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case
observed that by not questioning the validity of the acquisition
proceedings for a long time since the declarations were made
under Section 6 of the 1894 LA Act, the relief of quashing the
acquisition proceedings has become inappropriate, because in
the meantime, the lands notified have been developed and put
to public use. It was further observed that the lands are being
utilized to provide shelter to thousands and to implement the
scheme of a planned city, which is a must in the present set-
up and that the outweighing public interest has to be given
due weight.
29. Ultimately, this Court in paragraph 27 of the aforesaid
case, taking into consideration the interest of the public,
instead of quashing the proceedings for acquisition, directed
30
that the petitioners therein shall be paid an additional amount
of compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12% per
annum, after expiry of two years from August 23, 1974, till the
date of the making of the awards by the Collector, to be
calculated with reference to the market value of the lands in
question on the date of the notifications under sub-section (1)
of Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act.
30. In the case of Haji Saeed Khan and Others v. State of
U.P. and Others5, land was acquired for the purposes of
construction of a housing colony under the “Planned
Development Scheme” in Village Dhimri Pargana, District
Moradabad by the Moradabad Development Authority. The
challenge to the land acquisition proceedings before the High
Court in the aforesaid case was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby,
this Court was called upon to adjudicate the lis. This Court,
having regard to the peculiar facts of the aforesaid case,
instead of deciding the matter on merits, suggested to the
counsel on both sides that it would be reasonable in the
interests of justice if they agreed that the market value of the
property could be fixed by treating 15th June, 1998, i.e., the
5
(2001) 9 SCC 513
31
date of taking possession as the date of notification under
Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act instead of the actual date of
notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act i.e., 30th
March, 1995. When the suggestion came from the Bench, the
counsel appearing on both sides accepted the suggestion from
the Court. Accordingly, this Court upheld the judgment and
order of the High Court, thereby the land acquisition
proceedings were upheld with modification to the limited
extent qua the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the
1894 LA Act shifted to the date of taking possession.
31. In the case of Barangore Jute Factory (supra), the
subject matter of the appeals before this Court was the
compulsory acquisition of certain lands by the Central
Government by a notification dated 11th June 1998 under
Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter,
“NH Act”). The landowners challenged the acquisition of their
land on various grounds before the Calcutta High Court. The
Division Bench of the High Court by a judgment and order
dated 7th April 2004, disposed of the writ-petition holding the
impugned notification regarding compulsory acquisition of
land to be bad in law, however, keeping in view the fact that
32
possession of the acquired land had already been taken by the
authorities, the High Court felt that no useful purpose would
be served by quashing the notification. The High Court also
took note of the power of the acquiring authority to issue a
fresh notification for acquisition of the land which could only
lead to possible increase in the amount of compensation
payable to the owners. Keeping these aspects in view, it
ordered that an additional amount of compensation
(calculated at 30% over and above the above the compensation
already determined) be awarded to the landowners. Aggrieved
by the judgment and order of the Calcutta High Court, three
appeals by way of special leave were filed before this Court.
The first by the competent authority qua validity of acquisition
notification, second by the National Highways Authority of
India (hereinafter, “NHAI”) qua award of additional
compensation to the landowners and third by the landowners
qua the acquisition notification not being quashed in spite of
having been declared as illegal.
32. The acquisition of land in the aforesaid case was under
the NH Act. The power to acquire land is contained in Section
3-A of the NH Act. According to sub-section (1) of Section 3-A
33
of the NH Act, where the Central Government is satisfied thatfor a public purpose any land is required for building,
maintenance, management or operation of a national highway
or part thereof, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
declare its intention to acquire such land. Sub-section (2) of
Section 3-A of the NH Act provides that every notification
under sub-section (1) thereof shall give a brief description of
land. Under sub-section (3) of Section 3-A of the NH Act, the
competent authority is required to cause the substance of the
notification to be published in two local newspapers, one of
which will be in a vernacular language. The acquisition
notification in the aforesaid case was challenged on the ground
that it does not give a brief description of the land sought to
be compulsorily acquired. This Court, upon consideration of
the acquisition notification, observed thus:
“5. …So far as the question whether the impugned
notification meets the requirement of Section 3-A(1)
of the Act regarding giving brief description of land is
concerned, we have already shown that even though
plot numbers of lands in respect of each mouza are
given, different pieces of land are acquired either as
whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a
portion of a bigger piece of land, there is no
description as to which portion was being acquired.
Unless it is known as to which portion was to be
acquired, the petitioners would be unable to
understand the impact of acquisition or to raise any34
objection about user of the acquired land for the
purposes specified under the Act or to make a claim
for compensation. It is settled law that where a
statute requires a particular act to be done in a
particular manner, the act has to be done in that
manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be
given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned
notification fails to meet the statutory mandate. It is
vague. The least that is required in such cases is that
the acquisition notification should let the person
whose land is sought to be acquired know what he is
going to lose. The impugned notification in this case
is, therefore, not in accordance with the law.”
33. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case
observed that it is settled law that where a statute requires a
particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to
be done in that manner alone. It can further be seen that this
Court held that the acquisition notification therein failed to
meet the statutory mandate and that it was vague. It was
further held that the least that was required was that the
acquisition notification therein should have let the person
whose land was sought to be acquired know what he was going
to lose. It was, therefore, held that the acquisition notification
was not in accordance with law.
34. Having held that the notification regarding acquisition of
land was invalid because it failed to meet the statutory
requirements and also having found that taking possession of
35
the land of the landowners in the aforesaid case in pursuance
to the acquisition notification was not in accordance with law,
the question that arose for the consideration of this Court was
as to what relief can be granted to the landowners. In that
regard, this Court observed thus:
“14. … The High Court rightly observed that the
acquisition of land in the present case was for a
project of great national importance i.e. the
construction of a national highway. The construction
of a national highway on the acquired land has
already been completed as informed to us during the
course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served
by quashing the impugned notification at this stage.
We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the
acquiring authority can always issue a fresh
notification for acquisition of the land in the event of
the impugned notification being quashed. The
consequence of this will only be that keeping in view
the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of
compensation payable to the landowners may be
more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about
the quantum of compensation payable to the
landowners. Quashing of the notification at this stage
will give rise to several difficulties and practical
problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as
against the problems involved in quashing the
impugned notification, we are of the view that a
better course will be to compensate the landowners,
that is, the writ petitioners appropriately for what
they have been deprived of. Interests of justice
persuade us to adopt this course of action.”36
35. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case
observed that the Calcutta High Court rightly observed that
the acquisition of land was for a project of great national
importance i.e., the construction of a national highway. This
Court further observed that the construction of a national
highway on the acquired land had already been completed. It
was further observed that no useful purpose would be served
by quashing the acquisition notification at this stage.
Pertinently, this Court observed that the acquiring authority
could always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the
land in the event the acquisition notification therein was
quashed and that the consequence of that would only be that
the amount of compensation payable to the landowners may
be more. Therefore, this Court observed that the ultimate
question would be about the quantum of compensation
payable to the landowners. Having observed so, this Court
held that the better course would be to compensate the
landowners appropriately for what they have been deprived of
and that the interests of justice persuade this Court to adopt
that course of action. The relief, therefore, granted by this
37
Court in the aforesaid case was molded in the form of
paragraph 15, which reads as under:
“15. Normally, compensation is determined as
per the market price of land on the date of
issuance of the notification regarding acquisition
of land. There are precedents by way of judgments
of this Court where in similar situations instead
of quashing the impugned notification, this Court
shifted the date of the notification so that the
landowners are adequately compensated.
Reference may be made to:
(a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar
Johri [(1992) 1 SCC 328]
(b) Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of
U.P. [(1994) 1 SCC 92]
(c) Haji Saeed Khan v. State of U.P. [(2001)
9 SCC 513]
In that direction the next step is what should be
the crucial date in the facts of the present case
for determining the quantum of compensation.
We feel that the relevant date in the present case
ought to be the date when possession of the land
was taken by the respondents from the writ
petitioners. This date admittedly is 19-2-2003.
We, therefore, direct that compensation payable
to the writ petitioners be determined as on 19-2-
2003, the date on which they were deprived of
possession of their lands. We do not quash the
impugned notification in order not to disturb
what has already taken place by way of use of the
acquired land for construction of the national
highway. We direct that the compensation for the
acquired land be determined as on 19-2-2003
expeditiously and within ten weeks from today and
the amount of compensation so determined, be paid
to the writ petitioners after adjusting the amount
already paid by way of compensation within eight
weeks thereafter. The claim of interest on the
38
amount of compensation so determined is to be
decided in accordance with law by the appropriate
authority. We express no opinion about other
statutory rights, if any, available to the parties in
this behalf and the parties will be free to exercise
the same, if available. The compensation as
determined by us under this order along with
other benefits, which the respondents give to
parties whose lands are acquired under the Act,
should be given to the writ petitioners along with
what has been directed by us in this judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)
36. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case
observed that normally, compensation is determined as per
the market price of land on the date of issuance of the
notification regarding acquisition of land but there are
judgments of this Court where in similar situations instead of
quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted the date
of the notification so that the landowners are adequately
compensated. This Court directed that compensation payable
to the landowners be determined as on the date when
possession of land was taken by the respondents therein i.e.,
19th February 2003.
37. In the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), the land
situated in Village Shirwame, Taluka and District Thane,
stood notified under Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act on 6th June
1964 for establishment of Ulhas Khore Project i.e., a project
39
for industrial development. However, no subsequent
proceedings were taken up thereafter, and the acquisition
proceedings lapsed. The respondent-authorities therein
realised, in 1981, that grave injustice had been done to the
appellants therein and so a fresh notification under Section 4
of the 1894 LA Act was issued on 14th May 1981. However, no
further proceedings were initiated and therefore, such
proceedings also died a natural death. In the aforesaid case,
when the appellants therein reached this Court, this Court in
unequivocal terms observed that even after the right to
property ceased to be a fundamental right, taking possession
of or acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly
tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take
place only in accordance with “law”, as the said word has
specifically been used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. In
paragraph 22 of the aforesaid case, this Court observed that
the concerned-State therein came forward with a welcome
suggestion stating that in order to redress the grievances of
the appellants therein, the respondent authorities would
notify the land in dispute under Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act
and that the market value of the land in dispute would be
40
assessed as it prevails on the date on which Section 4
notification is again published in the Official Gazette.
38. In the aforesaid case of Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra),
this Court observed that the right to property is now considered
to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a
“human right”. It was further observed that human rights are
considered in the realm of individual rights, such as right to
health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment,
etc. This Court further observed that now, however, human
rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted dimension and
that the right to property is considered very much to be a part
of such new dimension.
39. It would be appropriate to refer to two recent
pronouncements of this Court on the right to property.
40. This Court, in the case of Vidya Devi v. State of
Himachal Pradesh and Others6, while surveying the earlier
judgments on the issue, has observed thus:
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III
of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,6
(2020) 2 SCC 569 : 2020 INSC 2341
(1953) 2 SCC 688 : AIR 1954 SC 92] , which could
not be deprived without due process of law and upon
just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be
a human right [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013)
1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] in a welfare
State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A
of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a
citizen of his property except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The obligation to pay
compensation, though not expressly included in
Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T.
Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC
1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414]
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private
property, without following due process of law, would
be violative of a human right, as also the
constitutional right under Article 300-A of the
Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment
in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627] , wherein this
Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6)
“6. … Having regard to the provisions
contained in Article 300-A of the
Constitution, the State in exercise of its
power of “eminent domain” may interfere
with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be
for a public purpose and reasonable
compensation therefor must be paid.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy [N.
Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15
SCC 517] , this Court held that: (SCC p. 526, para
21)
42
“21. If the right of property is a human right
as also a constitutional right, the same
cannot be taken away except in accordance
with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution
protects such right. The provisions of the
Act seeking to divest such right, keeping
in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India, must be strictly
construed.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of
U.P. [Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.,
(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673] , this
Court recognised the right to property as a basic
human right in the following words: (SCC p. 379,
para 30)
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence
and by different political thinkers that some
amount of property right is an
indispensable safeguard against tyranny
and economic oppression of the
Government. Jefferson was of the view that
liberty cannot long subsist without the
support of property. “Property must be
secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was
the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the
view that property itself is the seed-bed
which must be conserved if other
constitutional values are to flourish, is the
consensus among political thinkers and
jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat [Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] , this Court held as
follows: (SCC p. 627, para 48)
“48. … In other words, Article 300-A only
limits the powers of the State that no
person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. There has to be
43
no deprivation without any sanction of law.
Deprivation by any other mode is not
acquisition or taking possession under
Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no
law, there is no deprivation.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any
legal sanction, and without following due process of
law, and depriving her payment of just
compensation, being a fundamental right on the date
of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant
or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the
acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete
lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily
divesting the appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of
law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of
their property without the sanction of law. Reliance
is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram
Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC,
(2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein
it was held that the State must comply with the
procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other
permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare
State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to
itself a status beyond what is provided by the
Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011)
10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the
right to property is now considered to be not only a
constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. Human rights have been considered in the
realm of individual rights such as right to shelter,
livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights
have gained a multi-faceted dimension.
………………
44
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975)
1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”
41. In the case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram and
Others7, this Court observed thus:
“D. Role of the State under Article 300-A of the
Constitution
43. The Right to Property in our country is a net of
intersecting rights which has been explained by this
Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal
Kumar Shah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 968. A division
bench of this Court identified seven non-exhaustive
sub-rights that accrue to a landowner when the State
intends to acquire his/her property. The relevant
observations of this Court under the said judgment
are reproduced below:
“…27.
… Seven such sub-rights can be identified,
albeit non-exhaustive. These are : i) duty of
the State to inform the person that it
intends to acquire his property – the right to
notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear
objections to the acquisition – the right to be
heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the
person of its decision to acquire – the right
to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the
State to demonstrate that the acquisition is
for public purpose – the duty to acquire only
for public purpose, v) the duty of the
State to restitute and rehabilitate – the
right of restitution or fair
compensation, vi) the duty of the State
to conduct the process of acquisition7
2024 SCC OnLine 2598 : 2024 INSC 70945
efficiently and within prescribed
timelines of the proceedings – the right
to an efficient and expeditious process,
and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings
leading to vesting – the right of
conclusion…”
[Emphasis Supplied]
This Court held that a fair and reasonable
compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition
process.
44. In Roy Estate v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 12
SCC 194; Union of India v. Mahendra Girji, (2010) 15
SCC 682 and Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak, (1984) 1
SCC 125, this Court underscored the importance of
following timelines prescribed by the statutes as well
as determining and disbursing compensation
amount expeditiously within reasonable time.
45. The subject land came to be acquired by invoking
special powers in cases of urgency under Section
17(4) of the 1894 Act. The invocation of Section 17(4)
extinguishes the statutory avenue for the landowners
under Section 5A to raise objections to the
acquisition proceedings. These circumstances
impose onerous duty on the State to facilitate justice
to the landowners by providing them with fair and
reasonable compensation expeditiously. The seven
sub-rights of the landowners identified by this Court
in Kolkata Municipal Corporation (supra) are
corresponding duties of the State. We regret to note
that the amount of Rs. 3,05,31,095/- determined as
compensation under the Supplementary Award has
not been paid to the landowners for a period of more
than two years and the State of Himachal Pradesh as
a welfare State has made no effort to get the same
paid at the earliest.
46. This Court has held in Dharnidhar Mishra
(D) v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
932 and State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011)
10 SCC 404 that the right to property is now
considered to be not only a constitutional or46
statutory right, but also a human right. This Court
held in Tukaram Kana Joshi thr. Power of Attorney
Holder v. M.I.D.C., (2013) 1 SCC 353 that in a welfare
State, the statutory authorities are legally bound to
pay adequate compensation and rehabilitate the
persons whose lands are being acquired. The non-
fulfilment of such obligations under the garb of
industrial development, is not permissible for any
welfare State as that would tantamount to uprooting
a person and depriving them of their
constitutional/human right.
47. That time is of the essence in determination and
payment of compensation is also evident from this
Court’s judgment in Kukreja Construction
Company v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 2547 wherein it has been held that once the
compensation has been determined, the same is
payable immediately without any requirement of a
representation or request by the landowners and a
duty is cast on the State to pay such compensation
to the land losers, otherwise there would be a breach
of Article 300-A of the Constitution.
48. In the present case, the Government of Himachal
Pradesh as a welfare State ought to have proactively
intervened in the matter with a view to ensure that
the requisite amount towards compensation is paid
at the earliest. The State cannot abdicate its
constitutional and statutory responsibility of
payment of compensation by arguing that its role was
limited to initiating acquisition proceedings under
the MOU signed between the Appellant, JAL and
itself. We find that the delay in the payment of
compensation to the landowners after taking away
ownership of the subject land from them is in
contravention to the spirit of the constitutional
scheme of Article 300A and the idea of a welfare
State.
49. Acquisition of land for public purpose is
undertaken under the power of eminent domain of
the government much against the wishes of the
owners of the land which gets acquired. When such
47
a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden
duty and obligation on the part of the government
body to ensure that the owners whose lands get
acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount as
declared by the statutory award at the earliest.
50. The State Government, in peculiar
circumstances, was expected to make the requisite
payment towards compensation to the landowners
from its own treasury and should have thereafter
proceeded to recover the same from JAL. Instead of
making the poor landowners to run after the powerful
corporate houses, it should have compelled JAL to
make the necessary payment.”
42. Right to Property ceased to be a Fundamental Right by
the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978,
however, it continues to be a human right in a welfare State,
and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the
Constitution.
43. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The
State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in
accordance with the procedure established by law.
44. This Court in the aforesaid case of Vidya Devi (supra)
observed that in a democratic polity governed by the rule of
law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their
property without the sanction of law. It was further observed
48
that the State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law
cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by
the Constitution.
45. Recently, this Court in the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech
Cement Ltd. (supra) observed that the Government as a
welfare State ought to have proactively intervened in the
matter with a view to ensure that the requisite amount
towards compensation is paid at the earliest. It was further
observed that the State cannot abdicate its constitutional and
statutory responsibility of payment of compensation by
arguing that its role was limited to initiating acquisition
proceedings. It was, therefore, observed that the delay in the
payment of compensation, in accordance with law, to the
landowners after taking away ownership of the subject land
from them is in contravention to the spirit of the constitutional
scheme of Article 300-A and the idea of a welfare State.
46. In the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. (supra),
this Court further observed that acquisition of land for public
purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of
the government much against the wishes of the owners of the
land which gets acquired. It was, therefore, observed that
49
when such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden
duty and obligation on the part of the government body to
ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are paid
compensation/awarded amount as declared by the statutory
award at the earliest.
47. It will also be appropriate for the purpose of the present
discussion to refer to the judgment of this Court, in the case
of K. Krishna Reddy and Others v. Special Deputy
Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar,
Andhra Pradesh8, specifically in paragraph 12, observed
thus:
“12. We can very well appreciate the anxiety and
need of claimants to get compensation here and now.
No matter what it is. The lands were acquired as far
back in 1977. One decade has already passed. Now
the remand means another round of litigation. There
would be further delay in getting the compensation.
After all money is what money buys. What the
claimants could have bought with the compensation
in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one
half of it. It is a common experience that the
purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising
inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charms
and utility of the compensation. In some cases, the
delay may be detrimental to the interests of
claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have
no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If
uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They
are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw.
8
(1988) 4 SCC 163 : 1988 INSC 265
50
They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no
other work. They may even face starvation unless
rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost
importance that the award should be made without
delay. The enhanced compensation must be
determined without loss of time. The appellate power
of remand, at any rate ought not to be exercised
lightly. It shall not be resorted to unless the award is
wholly unintelligible. It shall not be exercised unless
there is total lack of evidence. If remand is
imperative, and if the claim for enhanced
compensation is tenable, it would be proper for the
appellate court to do modest best to mitigate
hardships. The appellate court may direct some
interim payment to claimants subject to adjustment
in the eventual award.”
48. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants herein have
been deprived of their legitimate dues for almost 22 years ago.
It can also not be controverted that money is what money
buys. The value of money is based on the idea that money can
be invested to earn a return, and that the purchasing power of
money decreases over time due to inflation. What the
appellants herein could have bought with the compensation in
2003 cannot do in 2025. It is, therefore, of utmost importance
that the determination of the award and disbursal of
compensation in case of acquisition of land should be made
with promptitude.
51
49. We find that in the present case, the appellants were
required to knock at the doors of the courts on number of
occasions during the period of last twenty-two years. The
appellants have been deprived of their property without paying
any compensation for the same in the said period of last
twenty-two years. As already discussed hereinabove, the
appellants had purchased the plots in question for
construction of residential houses. Not only have they not
been able to construct, but they have also not been even paid
any compensation for the same. As discussed hereinabove,
though Right to Property is no more a fundamental right, in
view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of
India, it is a constitutional right. A person cannot be deprived
of his property without him being paid adequate compensation
in accordance with law for the same.
50. In the present case, it can clearly be seen that there is no
delay which can be attributed to the appellants in not getting
compensation, but it was on account of the lethargic attitude
of the officers of the State/KIADB that the appellants were
deprived of compensation.
52
51. Only after the notices were issued in the contempt
proceedings, the compensation was determined by the SLAO
on 22nd April 2019 taking guideline values prevailing in the
year 2011 for determining the market value of the acquired
land.
52. No doubt that as already observed by us hereinabove, we
do not find any error in the approach adopted by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court in holding that the SLAO could
not have shifted the date and it could have been done only by
this Court in exercise of powers under Article 32/142 of the
Constitution of India or by the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. However, the learned Single Judge
of the High Court instead of relegating the appellants to again
go through the rigors of determination by SLAO, ought to have
exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to do
complete justice. Even the Division Bench of the High Court
on a hyper technical ground has non-suited the appellants.
53. In that view of the matter, we find that it is a fit case
wherein this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142
of the Constitution should direct shifting of the date for
53
determination of the market value of the land in question of
the appellants.
54. If the compensation to be awarded at the market value
as of the year 2003 is permitted, it would amount to permitting
a travesty of justice and making the constitutional provisions
under Article 300-A a mockery.
55. Since the State/KIADB was in deep slumber from 2003
to 2019 and acted for the first time only after the notices were
issued in contempt proceedings, we find that though SLAO
had no power to shift the date for determination of market
value, he had rightly done so. The learned Single Judge of the
High Court also does not say that the determination of
compensation to be awarded by shifting of the date by the
SLAO to that of 2011 was unjust but only sets aside the award
on the ground that SLAO had no jurisdiction to do so.
56. There is another reason for doing so. If on account of the
inordinate delay in paying the compensation and thereby
depriving the constitutional right to the appellants under
Article 300-A, the land acquisition proceedings are quashed,
the only recourse available to the State/KIADB in order to save
the project will be to now issue a fresh acquisition notification
54
by invoking the provisions as applicable under the 2013 LA
Act which would entail huge expenditure to the public
exchequer.
57. We, therefore, in exercise of power of this Court under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, find it appropriate in
the interest of justice that the SLAO be directed to determine
the compensation to be awarded to the appellants herein on
the basis of the market value prevailing as on 22nd April 2019.
The appellants shall also be entitled to all the statutory
benefits as are available to them under the 1894 LA Act. This
shall be without prejudice to the rights/contentions of either
party, in case they make a reference before an appellate
authority, if they are so aggrieved by the fresh determination
of compensation by the SLAO. We further clarify that, any
other award which may have been passed pursuant to the
directions of the learned Single Judge of the High Court shall
stand nullified by this judgment.
58. Respondent Nos.6 and 7 contend that they cannot be
imposed with a liability for this huge additional expenditure.
It is their contention that the delay in determination of
compensation and payment of the same is not attributable to
55
them but is on account of inaction on the part of the State and
KIADB. We clarify that we are not observing anything about
the inter se dispute between the State and KIADB on the one
hand and Respondent Nos.6 and 7 on the other hand,
inasmuch as the same shall be governed by the FWA and/or
any other agreement between them. We only say that
Respondent Nos.6 and 7, will be at liberty to take recourse to
such remedies as are available to them in law for redressal of
their inter se dispute.
59. In the result, the appeal is disposed of in the following
terms:
(i) The judgment and order passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court dated 22nd November 2022 in Writ
Appeal No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB) is quashed and set
aside;
(ii) The writ petition filed by the appellants herein before
the High Court being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 is allowed;
(iii) The SLAO shall pass a fresh award taking the market
value prevailing as on 22nd April 2019 within a period
of two months from today after hearing the parties;
56
(iv) The appellants herein shall be entitled to all statutory
benefits as are available to them in law;
(v) The rights of parties to challenge the award in
reference, if they are aggrieved by it, shall remain
open; and
(vi) As we have not expressed our opinion on the claims, if
any, of Respondent Nos.6 and 7 against the
State/KIADB qua the delay in passing the award by
the SLAO, Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are at liberty to
take such steps as are permissible in law in case they
are aggrieved by the award to be passed by the SLAO.
60. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
…………………………J.
(K. V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 02, 2025.
57