Supreme Court of India
Bhupal Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand on 9 January, 2025
Author: Abhay S. Oka
Bench: Abhay S. Oka
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 82 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).1408/2013
BHUPAL SINGH & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
1. The appellants/accused have been convicted for the offences
punishable under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short, the “IPC”). For the offence punishable under
Section 304B of the IPC, the appellants/accused have been sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and for the offence
punishable under Section 498A of the IPC, the appellants have been
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with a
fine of Rs.2,000/- each.
2. The first appellant is the father-in-law of the deceased
(Kamla Devi) and the second appellant is the husband of the
deceased. The marriage between the deceased and the second
appellant was solemnized in February 1996. On the night of
13th/14th June 1999, the deceased was found in burnt condition.
There are only two material prosecution witnesses. The first
witness, Shri Khim Singh Nagarkoti (PW-1), is the father of the
deceased, and the second witness, Shri Mohan Singh (PW-2), is the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHISH KONDLE
Date: 2025.01.18
uncle of the deceased.
14:20:35 IST
Reason:
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3. With the assistance of the learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellants/accused and the learned counsel representing the
respondent/State, we have carefully perused the testimony of both
the prosecution witnesses. In the examination-in-chief, PW-1 has
stated that:
(a) One year before the incident, the deceased had
disclosed to him that the first appellant used to tell her
that considering his status as a Captain in the Army, her
family members had not given adequate dowry;
(b) Once or twice a year, the second appellant (who was
in military service) used to come home on leave. He used to
demand money from her;
(c) Pursuant to the said demands, he had paid
approximately a total amount of Rs.40,000/- to Rs.45,000/-
to the in-laws of his daughter; and
(d) When he met the deceased last time, she disclosed to
him that the appellants used to tell her to bring dowry and
used to make a demand for payment of money.
4. PW-1 has not disclosed when he last met the deceased before
her death. We have perused the cross-examination of PW-1. The
four factual statements which we have set out above are omissions
as admitted by PW-1. He also accepted that he was unable to
recollect the dates on which the amounts comprising of a sum of
Rs.40,000/- to Rs.45,000/- were paid by him. In the report
submitted by him, on the basis of which the First Information
Report was registered, he accepted that the fact of sending the
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amount of Rs.40,000/- to Rs.45,000/- was not mentioned therein. He
also accepted that in the complaint, it is not mentioned that what
was demanded was towards dowry. Therefore, the testimony of PW-1
regarding the demand for dowry by the appellants and payment of a
sum of Rs.40,000/- to Rs.45,000/- is an omission. These omissions,
being significant and relevant, become contradictions by virtue of
the explanation to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
5. Apart from the contradictions, PW-1 was confronted with
letters dated 19th December 1997, 18th January 1999 and 17th March
1999. PW-1 accepted that the letters were in his handwriting and
bore his signatures. He accepted that in the said letters, he did
not mention the demand for dowry.
6. PW-2 is the uncle of the deceased. We may note here that in
the cross-examination, PW-1 stated that PW-2 was residing
separately. In his examination-in-chief, PW-2 stated that he
received a letter from the deceased which was marked as exhibit Ka-
2. After receiving the letter, he met the deceased in May 1999,
and upon making an enquiry with her, she disclosed that due to
insufficient dowry paid by her parents, her in-laws used to taunt
her. It is an admitted position that though the Investigating
Officer collected the alleged admitted handwriting of the deceased,
the said alleged handwriting, along with the letter, were not sent
to a handwriting expert to secure his opinion. Therefore, an
adverse inference needs to be drawn against the prosecution.
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7. PW-2 accepted that when his statement was recorded by Naib
Tehsildar, he did not disclose to him the receipt of the said
letter. Thereafter, he admitted that he could not definitely state
whether the letter was in the handwriting of the deceased because
he was in doubt. Even the statement of PW-2 that the deceased
disclosed to him that her father-in-law used to pressurise her to
bring more dowry is an omission, which, again being significant and
relevant, will constitute a contradiction.
8. Section 304B of the IPC reads thus:
“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury
or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called
“dowry death”, and such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-
section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning
as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than seven years but which
may extend to imprisonment for life.”
9. For proving the offence of dowry death, the prosecution must
prove that (i) the death of the woman is caused by any burns or
bodily injury or has occurred otherwise than in normal
circumstances, (ii) the death has occurred within seven years of
her marriage, (iii) soon before her death, she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or his any relative and (iv)
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the cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with the demand
for dowry.
10. We must note that both the witnesses have not deposed about
the specific instances of cruelty or harassment apart from stating
that there was a demand for dowry. As stated earlier, the version
of both the witnesses regarding the demand for dowry is an
omission. In the circumstances, the necessary ingredients of the
offence under Section 304B of the IPC were not established.
11. Section 498A of the IPC reads thus:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the
husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,
“cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”As stated earlier, there was no legally admissible evidence of the
demand for dowry made by the present appellants. There is no
specific evidence of any cruelty.
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12. In the absence of legally admissible evidence, it is not
possible to sustain the conviction of the appellants. According to
the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, the second
appellant has undergone the sentence.
13. Hence, we pass the following order:
(i) The impugned judgment dated 21st March 2013, passed by the
High Court and the impugned judgment dated 27th October 2001,
passed by the Sessions Court, are hereby quashed and set
aside. The appellants are acquitted of the offences alleged
against them. The bail bonds furnished by the first appellant
stand cancelled.
(ii) The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
……………………..J.
(ABHAY S. OKA)
……………………..J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 09, 2025.
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