Supreme Court of India
Biswajit Das vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 16 January, 2025
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
1
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 85
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2052/2014
BISWAJIT DAS Appellant
VERSUS
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Respondent
JUDGMENT
1 The appellant was convicted for commission of offences punishable under
Section 468 r/w Section 120(B), Section 271 and 465 r/w Section 120(B) and
Section 420 r/w Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 1 as well as
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
19882.
2. For all but one of the offences punishable under the IPC, sentence of two
years’ rigorous imprisonment3 was imposed on the appellant. For the offence
under Section 271 and 465 r/w Section 120(B), sentence of R.I. for a year was
imposed. Insofar as the offence punishable under sub-section (1)(d) read with
Signature Not Verified
sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the PC Act is concerned, the appellant was
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2025.01.21
16:12:03 IST
sentenced to three years’ R.I.
Reason:
1 IPC
2 PC Act
3 RI
2
3. The conviction and sentence dated 31st July, 2009 having been carried by
the appellant to the High Court of Gauhati in an appeal under Section 374 (2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the impugned judgment and order dated 27 th
September, 2013 of a learned single Judge affirmed the same.
4. The appellant thereafter approached this Court with a special leave
petition out of which this criminal appeal, by special leave, arises.
5. On 3rd January, 2014, a coordinate Bench of this Court passed the
following order:
“Issue notice confined to the question as to whether the
petitioner could have been convicted under Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 and on the quantum of sentence for the other
offences.”
6. Service effected, this Court heard the parties and granted leave on 12 th
September, 2014 whereafter the appellant was enlarged on bail on 12th October,
2015.
7. Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
having commenced his argument assailing the findings returned by the trial
court in respect of the offences under the IPC, which were found to be proved,
Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the
respondent, invited our attention to the order issuing limited notice.
8. We then called upon Mr. Baruah to overcome the objection raised that
having regard to the limited scope of the notice to show cause, it is not open to
us to expand the scope of the appeal, hear him on all the points and record an
order acquitting the appellant, if satisfied. He referred to the decisions of this
Court in Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. vs. Salambin Mohammad 4 to support
his contention that this Court having granted leave without any restriction, it is
4 (1999) 2 SCC 635
3
a fit and proper case where we ought to hear him on the merits of all the points
that are available to be taken on behalf of the appellant for obtaining a clear
acquittal.
9. In Taherakhatoon (supra), this Court held that:
“15. It is now well settled that though special leave is granted, the discretionary power
which vested in the Court at the stage of the special leave petition continues to remain
with the Court even at the stage when the appeal comes up for hearing and when both
sides are heard on merits in the appeal. This principle is applicable to all kinds of appeals
admitted by special leave under Article 136, irrespective of the nature of the subject-
matter. …”
xxx“20. In view of the above decisions, even though we are now dealing with the appeal
after grant of special leave, we are not bound to go into merits and even if we do so and
declare the law or point out the error — still we may not interfere if the justice of the
case on facts does not require interference or if we feel that the relief could be moulded
in a different fashion. … “
10. Next, Mr. Baruah placed the decision of this Court in Yomeshbhai
Pranshankar Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat5 in support of his contention that
notwithstanding limited notice having been issued, the scope of the appeal
could be expanded by this Court. The opinion of the coordinate Bench
expressed in the said decision reads thus:
“4. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that though at the time of issuing notice,
this Court limited its rights to raise points only within the confines of Section 304 of the
Penal Code, the Court is not bound at the time of final hearing with that direction given
while issuing notice and the appellant is entitled to urge all the questions including his
right to urge that he should have been acquitted in the facts and circumstances of the
case.”
xxx
8. The provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution have been construed by this Court in
several judgments. However, one thing is clear that under Article 142 of the Constitution,
this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decrees and may make such
orders as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matters pending before
it. It is, therefore, clear that the Court while hearing the matter finally and considering
the justice of the case may pass such orders which the justice of the case demands and
in doing so, no fetter is imposed on the Court’s jurisdiction except of course any express
provision of the law to the contrary, and normally this Court cannot ignore the same
while exercising its power under Article 142. An order which was passed by the Court at
the time of admitting a petition does not have the status of an express provision of law.
Any observation which is made by the Court at the time of entertaining a petition by way
of issuing notice are tentative observations. Those observations or orders cannot limit
this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 142.
xxx
11. In view of this position under the Rules and having regard to the constitutional
provision under Article 142, we do not think that this Court at the time of final hearing is
5 (2011) 6 SCC 312
4
precluded from considering the controversy in its entire perspective and in doing so, this
Court is not inhibited by any observation in an order made at the time of issuing the
notice.
xxx
15. We are, therefore, entitled to consider the plea of the appellant for acquittal despite
the fact that at the time of issuing notice, it was limited in terms of the order dated 27-7-
2009. We, however, make it clear that this cannot be a universal practice in all cases.
The question whether the Court will enlarge the scope of its inquiry at the time of final
hearing depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. Since in the facts of this
case, we find that the appellant should be heard on all points, we have come to the
aforesaid conclusion.”
11. Reference was also made to a decision of this Court of recent origin in
Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v.
Collector, Haridwar6 where, upon noticing the decision in Indian Bank v.
Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd.7, it has been held by another
coordinate Bench as follows:
“18. In Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd., a Bench of two
Judges of this Court held that (SCC p. 548, para 9) though a limited notice was
issued initially, leave having been granted thereafter, ‘all the contentions of the
parties are now open’.
19. We respectfully reiterate and adopt this view which is based on a sagacious
approach to the constitutional powers that are conferred upon the Court. Article
142 embodies the fundamental principle that the jurisdiction of the Court is to
render complete justice and as an incident of it, the Court may pass such
decrees or orders as it considers fit. When the Court initially issues a limited
notice but subsequently grants leave, the scope of the appeal does not raise a
matter of jurisdiction but of judicial discretion. Since it constitutes a matter of
discretion and not of jurisdiction, the guiding principle has to be the
advancement of substantial justice.”
12. We are also not oblivious of the decision in Spring Meadows Hospital v.
Harjol Ahluwalia8, relied on by Mr. Banerjee, where this Court refused to
examine a contention in view of limited notice by recording as follows:
“6. … But we are not in a position to examine this contention advanced on behalf
of the learned counsel appearing for the insurer in view of the limited notice
issued by this Court. It would not be open for us to entertain this question for
consideration as the notice issued by this Court indicates that only the award of
compensation to the parents of the minor child and the legality of the same can
only be considered. We are, therefore, unable to examine the contention raised
by the learned counsel appearing for the insurer.”6 (2017) 16 SCC 418
7 (2008) 12 SCC 541
8 (1998) 4 SCC 39
5
13. Shifting views of this Court, to an extent striking discordant notes, are
discernible on bare reading of the aforesaid decisions. A water-tight approach in
Spring Meadows Hospital (supra) is followed by a guarded approach in
Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt (supra), bearing in mind Article 142 of the
Constitution; and, ultimately, we find the liberal approach adopted in Kutchi
Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust (supra), where
this Court had the guiding principle of rendering substantial justice foremost in
its mind.
14. Taherakhatoon (supra) is not on limited notice; hence, it is
distinguishable. Having perused the decision in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar
Bhatt (supra), we find the same to bear close resemblance with the point under
consideration. Much water has flown since Spring Meadows Hospital (supra)
was rendered. It may not be good law having regard to the line of decisions
delivered by this Court later. We are conscious that the said decision has neither
been overruled nor distinguished by any later decision; hence, being a
coordinate Bench decision, we are not competent to rule that the said decision
did not lay down good law. However, one distinguishing feature is noticeable.
Spring Meadows Hospital (supra) arose out of a statutory appeal under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and was not a case where jurisdiction under
Article 136 was invoked. In a matter such as the present, this distinction
enables us not to be guided by Spring Meadows Hospital (supra). In any
event, whatever be the precedential value of the said decision, we are inclined
to the opinion that the views expressed in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt
(supra) and Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra
Trust (supra) are in consonance with the rapidly changing times of liberty being
given the primordial consideration and, therefore, commend acceptance.
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15. Also, tracing the development of jurisprudence in criminal matters by this
Court through recent decisions would reveal a novel approach of sorts. Even
after a convict’s challenge to his conviction and sentence failing, such a
convict’s case may still be reopened upon a co-convict’s appeal, directed
against the self-same judgment, succeeding and similar relief granted to the co-
convict being extended to the convict by even recording an order of acquittal.
One may in this connection profitably refer to the decision in Javed Shaukat
Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat9. There, a special leave petition filed by the
petitioner, Accused 2, challenging his conviction was dismissed by this Court.
While considering a criminal appeal carried by the co-accused – Accused 1, 5
and 13 – from the common judgment of conviction and order on sentence, this
Court while acquitting Accused 1, 5 and 13 found Accused 2 to stand on similar
footing and, hence, recalled the order of dismissal of Accused 2’s SLP, granted
leave and acquitted him. The pro-liberal and justice-oriented approach of this
Court to secure the liberty of citizens cannot, therefore, go unnoticed.
16. We may now summarize the principles in view of the precedents noticed
above. When a limited notice is issued by a bench on an appeal/petition, more
often than not, the view taken is tentative. There could be occasions when the
claim of the party succeeding before the court below is demonstrated to be
untenable because of a patent infirmity in the findings recorded in the
impugned judgment, or a glaring error in the procedure followed having the
effect of vitiating the proceedings is shown to exist, at any subsequent stage of
the proceedings, which might have been overlooked by the Bench when it
issued limited notice. Justice could be a real casualty if the same or the
subsequent Bench, in all situations of limited notice having been issued initially,
9 (2023) 9 SCC 164
7
is held to be denuded of its jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the contentions
relatable to points not referred to in the notice issuing order. As it is, since
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 is discretionary, notices on
appeals/petitions are not frequently issued by this Court. Nonetheless, if in a
given case, notice is issued which is limited on terms but the party approaching
the Court is otherwise persuasive in pointing out that the case does involve a
substantial question of law deserving consideration and the Bench is so
satisfied, we see no reason why the case may not be heard on such or other
points. In such a case, the jurisdiction to decide all legal and valid points, as
raised, does always exist and would not get diminished or curtailed by a limited
notice issuing order. However, whether or not to exercise the power of enlarging
the scope of the petition/appeal is essentially a matter in the realm of discretion
of the Bench and the discretion is available to be exercised when a satisfaction
is reached that the justice of the case so demands. If this position is not
accepted, Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 read with Article
142 of the Constitution will lose much of its significance.
17. Based on our aforesaid understanding of the legal position, we have heard
Mr. Baruah on the merits of the appeal without allowing any technicality to
stand in the way to satisfy our conscience that the limited notice issued by the
coordinate Bench does not result in any injustice being caused to the appellant.
18. The prosecution version need not be noticed in detail. Suffice it to note
that the appellant – a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of
India10 – was found guilty of being instrumental, together with a co-convict, in
obtaining settlement of two insurance claims by projecting the insured 11 as dead
although he was, in fact, alive. The evidence of the insured, inter alia, to the
10 LICI
11 (PW – 22)
8
effect that the appellant and the co-convict took the policies from him on the
assurance of the same being upgraded was not dislodged even after thorough
cross-examination. That the insured and the appellant were friendly is further
borne out from the records. Significantly, the appellant could not satisfactorily
explain why he filled up the six blank cheques (Exhibits 4-9) for different
amounts totaling to Rs. 1,67,583, i.e., the amount for satisfaction of the
insurance claim. There is other evidence on record which, read together with
the evidence of the insured and in the light of the appellant having filled up the
blank cheques, would unmistakably lead us to the conclusion that the
prosecution was successful in driving home the charges against him. Therefore,
even after hearing Mr. Baruah in extenso, we do not find any good reason or
ground to hold that conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under
the IPC was erroneously recorded by the trial court and was affirmed by the
High Court, also erroneously.
19. Moving on to consider the points limited by the notice issuing order dated
3rd January, 2014 as to whether the provisions of the PC Act would be applicable
to the appellant or not, we have considered the submissions advanced by Mr.
Baruah and perused the decision relied on by him in State of Gujarat
v. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi12.
20. Having regard to the provisions of Section 2(c)(iii) of the PC Act read with
Section 13, as it then stood, the appellant serving as a Development Officer in
the LICI, which has been established by a Central statute, namely, the Life
Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956, had committed the offences and the
contention that the PC Act does not apply to him has no substance. The decision
in Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi (supra) was rendered in the case of
12 (1972) 2 SCC 392
9
a public servant who had not committed any offence while discharging his
official duty as a lecturer but had indulged in corrupt practices while being
required to perform the duty of an examiner which, this Court held, was not his
official duty. The decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable.
21. We, thus, hold that on the basis of the materials on record, the trial court
as well as the High Court was justified in returning a finding that the appellant
was guilty of the offences for which he was charged, both under the IPC and the
PC Act.
22. Now, we turn to the sentence imposed on the appellant. We have noticed
previously that while issuing notice, this Court by the order dated January 3,
2014 had also called upon the respondents to show cause on the question of
sentence imposed upon the appellant, meaning thereby that prima facie a case
for alteration/modification of the sentence had been set up.
23. Perusal of the Record of Proceedings reveal that the appellant was
released on bail after he had served 22 (twenty-two) of the 36 (thirty-six)
months’ prison term imposed by the trial court.
24. Mr. Banerjee, in his usual fairness, has brought to our notice that at the
relevant time, the minimum sentence for the offence under Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act was one year.
25. Since the date of the incident relates back to 2004 and the appellant has
spent a little less than 2/3rd of the prison term of 36 (thirty-six) months in
custody, we are of the considered opinion that interest of justice would be
sufficiently served if the sentence is altered to the period of imprisonment
already undergone. It is ordered accordingly.
26. While maintaining the conviction, we partially allow the appeal by
directing that the appellant shall not be required to serve the remainder of the
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prison term. The bail bond shall stand discharged.
27. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
………………………….J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
………………………J.
[MANMOHAN]
New Delhi;
January 16, 2025.
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ITEM NO.101 COURT NO.15 SECTION II
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 2052/2014
BISWAJIT DAS Appellant(s)
VERSUS
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Respondent(s)
Date : 16-01-2025 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, AOR
Mr. Anurag Mishra, Adv.
Mr. Utkarsh Dwivedi, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G.
Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR
Mr. Adit Khorana, Adv.
Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, Adv.
Mr. Shantnu Sharma, Adv.
Mr. P V Yogeswaran, Adv.
Mrs. Ranjana Narayan, Adv.
Mr. Kartik Dey, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. The appeal is partially allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.
2. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(JATINDER KAUR) (SUDHIR KUMAR SHARMA) P.S. to REGISTRAR COURT MASTER (NSH)
[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]
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