Supreme Court of India
Daljit Singh vs The State Of Haryana on 2 January, 2025
Author: Sanjay Karol
Bench: Sanjay Karol, C.T. Ravikumar
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 21
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4359 OF 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.12606/2023)
DALJIT SINGH … APPELANT(S)
Versus
STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. The questions arising in this appeal that assails the judgment and order
dated 2nd June, 2023 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at
Chandigarh in Case No.CRM-M-5784 of 2023 (O&M), whereby under Section
482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 19731 the Court refused to quash Complaint
Case No.151 of 2010 dated 8th June, 2010; summoning order dated 17th August,
2010; and order dated 28th November, 2016 declaring the appellant a proclaimed
offender passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Bhiwani; are that whether
the proclaimed offender status, under the provisions of the Cr.P.C., of an accused
Signature Not Verified
can subsist if such accused stands acquitted during trial in connection to the very
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Date: 2025.01.02
17:50:15 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter, “Cr.P.C.”
1| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
same offence; and whether the subsistence of the proclamation under Section 82
of Cr.P.C. is necessary for the authorities to proceed against an accused against
whom such a proclamation stands issued, under Section 174A of the Indian Penal
Code, 18602.
2. The facts which gave rise to the question as above, in brief, are:
2.1 The Appellant ran a business concern which was awarded a contract
for ‘8-Laning’ of a National Highway (NH-1) within Delhi, by the National
Highways Authority of India3.
2.2 In furtherance of such a contract, Respondent No. 24 approached a
company by the name of M/s Bhola Singh Jaiprakash Construction Ltd. for
stone crushing. On mutually agreed specifications, it is also part of the
agreement that the same would be supplied to the construction site. In
connection thereto, cheques by way of security, were also issued. The work
under the agreement was also executed but allegedly did not meet the
specifications, hence resulting in a dispute.
2.3 The NHAI terminated the Appellant’s contract on 13th January, 2009
and accordingly cashed the bank guarantee furnished. It is alleged that the
cheques issued by way of security to Respondent No. 2 were misplaced and
the new cheque worth ₹10 Lacs given as the payment was duly encashed on
16th October, 2009.5 Subsequently on 30th November, 2009 cheque issued
2
Hereinafter, “IPC”
3
Hereafter, “NHAI”
4
Hereinafter referred to as the complainant
5
Cheque No. 72107, Bank of Baroda.
2| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
from the bank guarantee account as security was also encashed despite
having encashed the subsequent cheque issued as final payment.
2.4 The Complaint case, in connection with the unclaimed cheque, was
filed on 8th June, 2010, in which summons were issued on 17th August, 2010.
Thereafter, the case was allegedly transferred out of Bhiwani, and eventually
back to its jurisdictional Court. Notice upon non-appearance of the
Appellant, direction to issue written proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C.
with a further direction to the Appellant to appear before the Court on 28th
November, 2016 was issued on 15th October, 2016. On 28th November,
2016, the order declaring the Appellant and another director of the company
as proclaimed offenders, was issued6. All such proceedings and orders are
subject matter of challenge in this Appeal.
2.5 This other Director, RP Singh preferred quashing petitions before
the High Court which came to be eventually dismissed.
2.6 The Appellant was arrested under the PO Order on 19 th December,
2022 and released on bail the same day, by the competent Court. He was
raided by the police again, in connection with an FIR7 of similar nature.
2.7 The Quashing Petition in which the impugned order came to be
passed was filed on 31st January, 2023. The same was dismissed on 2nd June,
2023 by the impugned order and judgment.
6
Hereafter referred to as the ‘PO Order’
7
FIR No. 200 dated 17th December 2023 u/s 174A, IPC.
3| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
3. The impugned order dismissed the Appellant’s petition under Section 482,
Cr.P.C., with reference to an earlier judgment of the Court wherein it had been
held that if a person had been declared a proclaimed offender, such a petition by
him would not be maintainable. It was observed that the validity of such a
proclamation is also to be raised before the Court which issued the proclamation.
4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is the
admitted position at the Bar that in subsequent developments after the filing of
the special leave petition, the Appellant stands exonerated in the germane
proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It is
against this backdrop that the questions identified in paragraph 1 of this judgment,
arise for consideration.
5. Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. runs thus:
“82. Proclamation for person absconding.—(1) If any Court has
reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or not) that any
person against whom a warrant has been issued by it has absconded
or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed,
such Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to
appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty
days from the date of publishing such proclamation.
(2) The proclamation shall be published as follows:—
(i) (a) it shall be publicly read in some conspicuous place of the
town or village in which such person ordinarily resides;
(b) it shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the house or
homestead in which such person ordinarily resides or to some
conspicuous place of such town or village;
(c) a copy thereof shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the
Court-house;
(ii) the Court may also, if it thinks fit, direct a copy of the
proclamation to be published in a daily newspaper circulating in
the place in which such person ordinarily resides.
(3) A statement in writing by the Court issuing the proclamation
to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a
specified day, in the manner specified in clause (i) of sub-section
(2), shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this
4| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
section have been complied with, and that the proclamation was
published on such day.
[(4) Where a proclamation published under sub-section (1) is in
respect of a person accused of an offence punishable under
section 302, 304, 364, 367, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397,
398, 399, 400, 402, 436, 449, 459 or 460 of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860), and such person fails to appear at the specified place
and time required by the proclamation, the Court may, after
making such inquiry as it thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed
offender and make a declaration to that effect.”
6. Let us now consider some of the pronouncements of this Court to appreciate
its import.
6.1 In Kartarey v. State of U.P.8 the meaning of the word ‘absconder’
was recorded as follows:-
“43. …To be an “absconder” in the eye of law, it is not necessary
that a person should have run away from his home, it is sufficient
if he hides himself to evade the process of law, even if the hiding
place be his own home…”Further, in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra9, it was
observed:-
“40. The term “absconding” has been defined in several dictionaries.
We may refer to some of them:
Black’s Law Dictionary — To depart secretly or suddenly, especially
to avoid arrest, prosecution or service of process.P. Ramanatha Aiyar — primary meaning of word is “to hide”.
Oxford English Dictionary — “To bide or sow away”.
Words and Phrases — “clandestine manner/intent to avoid legal
process”.
8
(1976) 1 SCC 172
9
(2009) 7 SCC 104
5| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
6.2 The object and purpose of Section 82, Cr.P.C. was taken note ofin Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel10. S.B Sinha J.,
writing for the Court held as under:-
“32. The provisions contained in Section 82 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure were put on the statute book for certain purpose. It was
enacted to secure the presence of the accused. Once the said purpose
is achieved, the attachment shall be withdrawn. Even the property
which was attached, should be restored. The provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure do not warrant sale of the property despite the
fact that the absconding accused had surrendered and obtained bail.
Once he surrenders before the court and the standing warrants are
cancelled, he is no longer an absconder. The purpose of attaching the
property comes to an end. It is to be released subject to the provisions
of the Code. Securing the attendance of an absconding accused, is a
matter between the State and the accused. The complainant should
not ordinarily derive any benefit therefrom. If the property is to be
sold, it vests with the State subject to any order passed under Section
85 of the Code. It cannot be a subject-matter of execution of a decree,
far less for executing the decree of a third party, who had no right,
title or interest thereon.”
(Emphasis Supplied)6.3 The evidentiary value of a person absconding has been discussed in
Raghubir Singh v. State of U.P.,11 in the following terms:
“11. …the act of absconding, even if proved, is normally considered
a somewhat weak link in the chain of circumstances utilised for
establishing the guilt of an accused person. If the evidence of eye-
witnesses is held trustworthy then the act of absconding even if
established would serve only to further fortify the satisfaction of the
court with respect to the guilt of the accused concerned, for, even an
innocent person may well try to keep out of the way if he learns of
his false implication in a serious crime reported to the police. …”
(Emphasis Supplied)6.4 In Rahman v. State of U.P.,12 it was held that absconding by itself is
not conclusive either of guilt or of a guilty conscience. For, a person may
10
(2008) 4 SCC 649
11
(1972) 3 SCC 79
12
AIR 1972 SC 110
6| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
abscond on account of fear of being involved in the offence or for any otherallied reason. The observations in Matru v. State of U.P.,13 are instructive.
“19. … Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade
arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct
of self-preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant piece
of evidence to be considered along with other evidence but its value
would always depend on the circumstances of each case. Normally
the courts are disinclined to attach much importance to the act of
absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence for
sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a determining link
in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence which must admit
of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the
accused. …”
(Emphasis Supplied)
6.5 The notice under Section 41 Cr.P.C., must have necessarily been
issued prior to the notice and declaration under Section 82, and attachment
under its subsequent sections. In State v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar14, it was
held: –
“22. … Now, the power of issuing a proclamation under Section 82
(quoted earlier) can be exercised by a Court only in respect of a
person “against whom a warrant has been issued by it”. In other
words, unless the Court issues a warrant the provisions of Section
82, and the other sections that follow in that part, cannot be invoked
in a situation where in spite of its best efforts the police cannot arrest
a person under Section 41.”6.6 Numerous judgments of this Court which concern this Section, have
been about bail. Illustratively, Sureshchandra Ramanlal v. State of
Gujarat15, State of M.P. v. Pradeep Sharma16, Prem Shankar Prasad v.
State of Bihar17 and Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar18. However, we
13
(1971) 2 SCC 75
14
(2000) 10 SCC 438
15
(2008) 7 SCC 591
16
(2014) 2 SCC 171
17
(2022) 14 SCC 516
18
2024 SCC OnLine SC 282
7| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
are not concerned with bail in the present matter, so it is not necessary to go
into them.
7. Having considered the law as laid down in the judgments above in respect
of Section 82, at this stage we must also consider Section 174A IPC which lays
down penal consequences for intentionally evading the process under Section 82
Cr.P.C. It reads as under :-
“174A. Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under
section 82 of Act 2 of 1974.—
Whoever fails to appear at the specified place and the specified
time as required by a proclamation published under sub-section
(1) of section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall
be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years or with fine or with both, and where a declaration has
been made under sub section (4) of that section pronouncing him
as a proclaimed offender, he shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable
to fine.”Now, let us consider the second question arising in this appeal, in reference to this
provision is, whether the subsistence of the proclamation u/s 82 Cr.PC is
necessary for the authorities to proceed against the accused person u/s 174A IPC.
In other words, whether Section 174A IPC can stand independent of the
proclamation u/s 82 Cr.P.C. or not?
7.1 The purpose of Section 82 Cr.P.C., as can be understood from a bare
reading of the statutory text is to ensure that a person who is called to appear
before a Court, does so. This Section appears as part of Chapter VI which is
titled ‘Process to Compel Appearance’. Section 83 to 90 provide for the
additional method of attachment of property to the end of securing
appearance. Necessarily then some or the other proceeding has to be
8| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
ongoing for which the presence of such person is necessary. The words of
the Section dictate that it can be only issued in respect of a person against
whom a warrant has been issued. Neither a warrant nor proclamation
subsequent can be conjured up out of thin air.
7.2 Section 174A IPC, inserted by the 2005 Amendment to the Indian
Penal Code inserts a substantive offence, prescribing punishment of three
years or fine or both when such proclamation is issued under Section 82(1)
Cr.P.C. and, seven years and fine if the said proclamation is under Sub-
section (4) thereof. The object and purpose of this Section is to ensure penal
consequences for defiance of a Court order requiring a person’s presence.
7.3 Now, what happens if the status under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is
nullified i.e., the person subjected to such proclamation, by virtue of
subsequent developments is no longer required to be presented before a
Court of law. Then, can the prosecution still proceed against such a person
for having not appeared before a Court during the time that the process was
in effect. The answer is in the affirmative. We say so for the following
reasons:-
(i) The language of Section 174A, IPC says “whoever fails to
appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by
proclamation…”. This implies that the very instance at which a
person is directed to appear, and he does not do so, this Section comes
into play;
9| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
(ii) What further flows from the language employed is that the
instance of non-appearance becomes an infraction of the Section, and
therefore, prosecution therefor would be independent of Section 82,
Cr.P.C. being in effect;
(iii) So, while proceedings under Section 174A IPC cannot be
initiated independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C., i.e., can only be started
post the issuance of proclamation, they can continue if the said
proclamation is no longer in effect.
(iv) We find that the Delhi High Court has taken this view, i.e.,
that Section 174A, IPC is a stand-alone offence in Mukesh Bhatia v.
State (NCT of Delhi)19; Divya Verma v. State20; Sameena & Anr. v.
State GNCT of Delhi & Anr.21 For the reasons afore-stated, we agree
with the findings made in these judgments/orders. At the same time,
it stands clarified that we have not commented on the merits of the
cases.
(v) Granted that the offence prescribed in Section 174A IPC is
indeed stand-alone, given that it arises out of an original offence in
connection with which proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is
initiated and in the said offence the accused stands, subsequently,
acquitted, it would be permissible in law for the Court seized of the
trial under such offence, to take note of such a development and treat
the same as a ground to draw the proceedings to a close, should such
a prayer be made and the circumstances of the case so warrant.
8. In conclusion, we hold that Section 174A IPC is an independent,
substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82,
Cr.P.C. is extinguished. It is a stand-alone offence. That being the position of
19
2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023
20
2023 SCC OnLine Del 2619
21
Crl. M.C No, 1470 of 2021, Dated 17th May, 2022
10| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
law, let us now turn to the present facts. As we have already noted supra, the
Appellant stands acquitted of the main offence.
9. The record speaks to the fact that an FIR under Section 174A IPC was
registered against the Appellant, in connection with which, he was released on
bail by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhiwani, vide order dated 19th
December, 2022. It reads: –
“Dinesh Kumar Vs. R.P. Singh etc.
BA-3034-2022
COMA-1664-2013
Present: Complainant in person with Sh. Raj kumar Gugnani,
Advocate.
Sh. Devender Singh Tanwar, counsel for the accused Daljeet Singh.
Reply to the bail application not filed. Brief arguments on the bail
application heard. At this juncture a compromise has been effected
wherein the matter has been settled for 9.5 lakh out of which Rs. 1
lakh have been paid to the complainant and another Rs. 1 lakh shall
Be transferred in his bank account today. The nephew and son of the
accused have further suffered a statement that the remaining 7.5 lakh
shall be paid to the complainant on or before the adjourned date of
hearing. The complainant have suffered a statement and agrees with
the said arrangement. In the given circumstances when the matter
has been settled and even otherwise also the proceedings had been
stayed by Hon’ble High court way back on 07.02.2017 and which
have only been dismissed on 15.11.2022 after which, the accused
was arrested on 17.12.2022. he is admitted to bail subject to the
following conditions.
1. He shall furnish personal and surety bonds in the sum of
Rs.50,000/-along with an FDR In the sum of Rs. 50,000/-
2. The present place of residence as well as office of the accused be
furnished by way of affidavit through next of kin.
3. That he shall come present in Court in person on all dates of
hearing, failing which his bail shall be cancelled, subject to just
exceptions.
Requisite bonds, affidavit and FDR furnished. Accepted and
atlested. Additional affidavit also filed by surety that he shall not en
cash the FDR without the permission of the Court and that the R.C.
submitted is original which he shall not sell without the permission
of The Court Release Warrant be issued forth with.
11| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023
Adjourned to 21.01.2023 for payment else for further proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. None has disputed the above or brought to the attention of this Court such
a fact that the said arrangement has not been complied with.
11. The Appellant has been acquitted which means that there is no case for
which his presence is required to be secured. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed.
In the attending facts and circumstances of the case, i.e. that the original offence
pertains to the year 2010; the money subject matter of dispute stands paid, the
judgment of the High Court with the particulars as mentioned in paragraph 1 of
this judgment, stands quashed and set aside. All criminal proceedings, inclusive
of the FIR under Section 174A IPC, shall stand closed. The Appellant’s status,
as a ‘proclaimed person’ stands quashed.
Pending Application(s) if any, stand disposed of.
…….………………..J.
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
….…………………..J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
New Delhi;
2nd January, 2025.
12| SLP (Crl.) No. 12606/2023