Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Devagiri Pamula Reddy vs The Executive Officer, Sri … on 13 September, 2024
1
*HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI
+WRIT PETITION Nos: 20490, 20491, 20531, 20548/2011 and 32850/2010
W.P. No.20490 of 2011
Between:
#Challa Vengal Reddy ...PETITIONER
AND
$The Executive Officer and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON 13.09.2024
THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may
be allowed to see the Judgments?
- Yes -
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
- Yes -
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the Judgment?
- Yes -
___________________________________
DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
2
* THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
+WRIT PETITION Nos: 20490, 20491, 20531, 20548/2011 and 32850/2010
W.P.No.20490 of 2011
% 13.09.2024
#Challa Vengal Reddy ...PETITIONER
AND
$The Executive Officer and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
! Counsel for the Appellant : Sri P. Vijaya Kiran
Sri Md. Saleem
Counsel for Respondents: AGP for Endowments.
Smt. Padmavai Padnavis
Sri M. Srinivasa Rao, SC for Endowments
Sri E. Sambasiva Pratap
Head note :
?Cases referred :
1. http://ubduabjabiib.org/doc/45285691/
2. (2002) 3 SCC 195
3. (1985) 3 SCC 590
4. AIR 1978 AP 166
5. AIR 2010 SC 3791
6. (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 431 = AIR 2003 SC 459
7. Air 1995 SC 2272
8. (2008) 3 SCC 70
9. (2009) 2 SCC 689
10. (1010) 8 SCC 685
11. AIR 2011 SC 1199
12. (2012) 5 SCC 157
3
APHC010746472011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3310]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY ,THE THIRTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE K MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION Nos:: 20490
20490, 20491, 20531, 20548/2011 and 32850/2010
W.P. No.20490 of 2011
Between:
Challa Vengal Reddy ...PETITIONER
AND
The Executive Officer and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. P VIJAYA KIRAN
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. ...
2. GP FOR ENDOWMENTS
The Court made the following:
COMMON ORDER:
WP No.20490 of 2011 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India
for the following relief:
“….to issue a writ order or direction more specifically one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for records
nd
to set aside the impugned order dated 16.5.2011 in I.A.No.44 of 2010 passed by 2 respondent and
consequently quash Appeal No.29 29 of 2011 on the file of the 2nd respondent filed against the orders dt
16.10.2003
2003 passed by the Assistant Commissioner vide Rc No A5/8113/2003 dated 25/12/2003
declaring the impugned order and exercising jurisdiction over the appeal as void unlawful and contrary to
provisions 162 of A P Charitable and Hindu Regligious Institutions and Endowments Act 1987 and also
against Rule 3, 4 of A P Charitable and Hindu Religious institutions and Endowments Lease of
Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 Section 5 of Limitation Act 1963 Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution of India
and pass…”
4
WP No.20491 of 2011 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India
for the following relief:
“….to issue a writ order or direction more specifically one in the nature of writ of Certiorari
calling for records to set aside the impugned order dated 16.5.2011 in I.A.No.49/2010 passed by 2nd
respondent and consequently quash Appeal No.25 of 2011 on the file of 2nd respondent filed against the
orders dated 16.10.2003 passed by the Assistant Commissioner vide Rc No A5/8113/2003 dated
25.12.2003 declaring the impugned order and exercising jurisdiction over the appeal as void unlawful
and contrary to provisions 162 of AP Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act
1987 and also against Rule 3 and 4 of AP Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments
Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 section 5 of limitation Act 1963 aritcles 14 and 21 of Constitution
of India and to pass…”
WP No.20531 of 2011 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India
for the following relief:
“….to issue Writ order or direction more specifically one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for
records to set aside the impugned order dated 16.05.2011 in I.A.No. 46/2010 passed by 2nd respondent
nd
and consequently quash Appeal No.27 of 2011 on the file of 2 respondent filed against the orders
dated 16.10.2003 passed by the Assistant Commissioner vide Rc No A5/8113/2003 dated 25.12.2003
declaring the impugned order and exercising jurisdiction over the appeal as void unlawful and contrary to
provisions 162 of A P Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act 1987 and also
against Rule 3 and 4 of A P Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Lease of
Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 Section 5 of limitation Act 1963 articles 14 and 21 of constitution of India
and to pass….”
WP No.20548 of 2011 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India
for the following relief:
“….to issue a Writ order or direction more specifically one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling
for records to set aside the impugned order dated 16.05.2011 in I.A.No. 47/2010 passed by 2nd
nd
respondent and consequently quash Appeal No.26 of 2011 on the file of 2 respondent filed against the
orders dated 16.10.2003 passed by the Assistant Commissioner vide Rc No A5/8113/2003 dated
25.12.2003 declaring the impugned order and exercising jurisdiction over the appeal as void unlawful
and contrary to provisions 162 of A P Charitable and Hindu Regious Institutions and Endowments Act
1987 and also against Rule 3 and 4 of A P Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments
Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 Section 5 of limitation Act 1963 articles 14 and 21 of constitution
of India and to pass….”
WP No.32850 of 2010 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India for
the following relief:
” ….. to a writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of certiorari call for the
records relating to and in connection with the orders passed by the 1st Respondent in RP No 9 of 2009
nd
dt 31.8.2010 in setting aside the proceedings of the 2 Respondent in Rc.No.A1/ 1608 /2008 dated
27.6.2008 and to quash or set aside the same by holding it as illegal, improper, incorrect, unjust,
contrary to law in exercising the jurisdiction and un constitutional and to pass….”
5
2. As the issue involved in all these writ petitions is one and the same,
they are being taken up for hearing as well as disposed of by way of this
Common Order.
3. the petitioners in all the writ petitions were declared as landless poor
cultivating tenants in respect of the respective lands under their cultivation
belong to the respective temples by different orders of the concerned
Assistant Commissioner, Endowment and cultivating the lands. Thereafter the
Executive Officers of the respective temples filed appeals against the said
orders along with condonation of delay. The petitioners contended that there
are no cogent and valid grounds to allow the delay condonation petition
except with a malafide intension to evict them form the cultivating lands. It is
further stated that the 2nd respondent erred in appreciating the amended law
under the Andhra Charitable & Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments
Act 1987 w.e.f 03.01.2008, especially making the Act as special enactment
with a mandatory provision of creating a separate adjudicative mechanism
under Section 87 read with Section 162 of the Act. It is further stated that the
exemption granted to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 87(5) of Act 33
of 2007 for short period during the intercession period till constitution of
Endowments Tribunal and once the Tribunal is constituted the adjudicative
powers of Deputy Commissioner or appellate authority or Regional Joint
Commissioner under Rule 4 of Endowments lease of Agricultural Lands Rules
2003 are deemed to have been ousted. Hence the impugned orders are void
and without any jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed.
6
3. This Court vide order dated 21.07.2011, while issuing Rule Nisi, has
granted interim stay as prayed for in all the writ petitions i.e., in WP
Nos.20490, 20491, 20531 and 20548 of 2011 and granted interim suspension
in WP No.32850 of 2010 on 29.12.2010.
4. Counter affidavits have been filed in all the writ petitions by the 1st
respondent. While denying all the allegations made in the petitions,
contended that, the persons who were once declared as Landless poor
persons for cultivating the agricultural lands cannot take the advantage of the
orders passed by the competent authority because, the very character of the
agricultural land for which they were declared as land less poor has changed
due to vast developments that have taken place as per the above reasons and
as such the appeal preferred by 3rd respondent is maintainable and legal. It
will be a contradiction in terms under section 82 if a land less poor person not
having income more that Rs.12,000/- per year is ready to buy in case the
temple is willing to sell the very land which is now worth Crores of Rupees. It
is further stated that the delay in filing the Appeals filed before the Regional
Joint Commissioner, Multi Zone-II has occurred due to the above said
reasons. Further the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments, Guntur has
directed the Executive Officers/ Managers of the temples/Institutions having
lands situated at Urban area or under VGTM-UDA to file the Appeals before
the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments Department, Multi Zone-II,
Tirupati against the orders passed declaring the concerned people as Land
Less Poor Persons vide his proceedings Circular in Rc. No.A7/2011/10 dated
7
11-5-2010. Immediately after receiving the above orders this respondent
preferred the appeals before the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments
Department, Multi Zone-II, Tirupati along with the condone delay applications
under Section 5 of limitation Act. But as submitted in the very beginning of this
counter affidavit only a delay of 35 days has occurred on the part of the 3 rd
respondent temple. As such there is no illegality or infirmity in the orders
passed by the 1st respondent. Hence prayed to dismiss the writ petitions.
5. Heard Sri P. Vijaya Kiran, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners in WP Nos.20490, 20491, 20531 and 20548 of 2011 and Sri Md.
Saleem, leaned counsel appearing for the petitioner in WP No.32850 of 2010;
learned Assistant Government Pleader for Endowments; Smt P. Padmavathi,
learned Standing Counsel for Endowments in WP Nos.20490, 20491, 20531
and 20548 of 2011 and Sri M. Srinivasa Rao, learned Standing Counsel for
Endowments in WP No.32850 of 2010 appearing for the respondents.
6. On hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated while
reiterating the averments made in the petition, submits that, the 2 nd
respondent ought to have rejected the petition to condone the delay
applications in filing appeals as the 1st respondent has no locus standi to file
appeals against the order of Assistant Commissioner. He further submits that,
the Regional Joint Commissioner failed to see that the rules framed under the
Endowments Act 2003 does not provide for condonation of delay applications
and Regional Joint Commissioner has erroneously exercised jurisdiction not
vested in it. Further, the 2nd respondent ought to have dismissed the delay
8
condonation petitions by observing that the 1st respondent has committed
willful laches even though he received the orders and that no reasons are
stated by the respondent for condonation of inordinate delays and the orders
of Regional Joint commissioner deserve to be set aside. Therefore, learned
counsel for the petitioners prayed to allow these writ petitions by setting aside
the impugned orders.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a decision
of High Court of Madras reported in Kapil and others vs. Union of India and
others1, wherein it was held that :
To summarize, it is stated that in the absence of any specific exclusion of the provisions of Sections
4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, either in the form of a specific provision or by necessary intendment or
inference in the Claims Tribunal Act which is not a complete code in itself, specifically in view of the fact
that the provisions of sections 4 to 24 are not directly or indirectly in conflict with any provisions relating
to filing of an appeal before the High Court contained in the Claims Tribunal Act nor do the provisions
of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act render any provision relating to the filing of an appeal contained
in the Claims Tribunal Act otiose or redundant, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act would
apply to the filing of an appeal under section 23 of the Claims Tribunal Act by virtue of the provisions
of section 29(2) of the Act.
67. We are also of the considered opinion that reading the provisions of section 4 to 24 of the Limitation
Act in terms of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act into the provisions of the Claims Tribunal Act, which
we have held is not a complete code in itself, would in fact further the object and purpose for enacting
the Claims Tribunal Act which is a benevolent beneficial and welfare legislation & Bunch matters and is
enacted with the avowed purpose of providing adequate and speedy remedy for decision in respect of
claims arising out of untoward incidents and railway accidents and other disputes.
68. In the light of the above discussion we hold that the decision of the learned single Bench in the case
of Kunjmati (supra) does not lay down the correct proposition of law and is accordingly overruled and in
answer to the question referred to us we state that in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the
provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act is included in and has to be read into the provisions of the
Claims Tribunals Act as it has not been expressly excluded therefrom either by a specific statutory
provision or by necessary intendment or inference and, therefore, the High Court has the power to
condone the delay in filing an appeal filed under Section 23 of the Claims Tribunal Act in exercise of
powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on sufficient cause being shown by an appellant.
8. Whereas, the learned Assistant Government Pleader and learned
Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed for
grant of any relief in the present writ petitions.
1
http://ubduabjabiib.org/doc/45285691/
9
9. To support their contentions, learned counsel for the respondents
has placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in
Ram Nath Sao Alias Ram Nath Sahu and others versus Govardhan Sao
and others2, wherein the Apex Court held that :
“…….The Court further observed in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which run thus:-
“11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is
to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal
remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never
revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek
legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period
for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but
seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively
fixed period of time.
12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his
cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has
held that the words “sufficient cause”
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (1969) 1 SCR 1006 and State of W.B. v.
Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366.
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the
litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court
must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the
delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against
acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party
altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large
litigation expenses. ”
[ Emphasis added] Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning
of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona
fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient
cause” or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for
accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear
that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the
petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished
should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide
can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should
not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued
to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should
not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case,2
(2002) 3 Supreem court Cases 195
10causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either by
default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While
considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to
pass upon the parties either way.
In view of the foregoing discussions, we are clearly of the opinion that on the facts of present case,
Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in upholding order passed by the learned Single Judge
whereby prayers for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement were refused and accordingly the
delay in filing the petition for setting aside abatement is condoned, abatement is set aside and prayer for
substitution is granted….”
10. The facts of the above case are not applicable to the present set of
facts of these cases.
11. The point for consideration arise for consideration in these writ
petitions are whether the condonation of delay in filing the appeals is factually
or legally justified or not and if not, whether the impugned orders are
sustainable?
12. The Apex Court was considering the question of condonation of
delay in filing an appeal before the Collector under the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 in Sakuru v.
Tanaji3; K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao 4 by a Division Bench was
referred to, wherein this Court held that the Limitation Act applies only to
proceedings before a civil or criminal Court and since the Collector before
whom an appeal is filed under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act is not a civil or
criminal Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application
to the proceedings before him unless there is express provision in the special
enactment, whereunder the Collector is exercising appellate jurisdiction,
making any particular section of the Limitation Act specifically applicable to
3
(1985) 3 SCC 590
4
AIR 1978 AP 166
11
such proceedings. The Division Bench, in fact, did not even consider Section
93 of the said Act, which made the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act,
1908 apply for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation for filing
appeal or application for revision under that Act, to be making the provisions
of Section 5 applicable, as only Sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act fall
within the group of the sections relating to the computation of the period of
limitation. The Apex Court unhesitatingly came to the conclusion that the view
taken by the Division Bench in K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao (3
supra) is perfectly correct and sound and referred to the precedents from the
Apex Court holding that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to the
proceedings in Courts and not to appeals and applications before Bodies
other than Courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities,
notwithstanding the fact that such Bodies or authorities may be vested with
certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or
Criminal Procedure. In fact, the Apex Court also repelled the contention that
subsequent amendment of the Tenancy Act by the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy
Laws (Amendment) Act 1979, A.P. Act 2 of 1979 expressly made the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to appeals and
revisions under the said Act and that the amendment is clarificatory in nature
and held that the provisions of Section 93 as they stood prior to the
amendment were free from any ambiguity and called for no clarification and
the Legislature did not give any indication of any intention to clarify, but has
only amended the section with prospective effect.
12
13. In Om Prakash v. Ahswani Kumar Bassi5 the Apex Court held
that the Rent Controller under the East Pubjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is a
creature of statute and can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by
the statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him
with such power. Referring to Prakash H. Jain v. Marie Fer nandes6 and
Mukri Goipal v. Cheppilat Puthanpuraji and other precedents 7, the Apex
Court distinguished between a Court discharging the functions of an appellate
authority and a statutory authority discharging such functions as a persona
designata.
14. The long title of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu
Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987, A.P. Act 30 of 1987, specified
the Act to be to consolidate and amend the law relating to the administration
and governance of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and
Endowments in the State of Andhra Pradesh, thus, clearly signifying that the
enactment was intended and designed to be a complete code in itself so far
the administration and governance of such institutions and endowments are
concerned. Even the statement of objects and reasons for the said Act
referred to the report of Sri Challa Kondaiah Commission, the examination of
the recommendations of the Commission by the Government and their
acceptance with certain modifications. It was specifically stated that the
Government proposed to repeal the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu
5
AIR 2010 SC 3791
6
(2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 431 = AIR 2003 SC 459
7
AIR 1995 SC 2272
13
Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 and the Tirumala Tirupathi
Devasthanams Act, 1979 and in their place proposed to enact a
comprehensive law providing better management of the properties and
utilization of funds of the institutions and endowments, etc. It was specifically
stated that a provision is also made to terminate the leases held by the
persons other than landless poor persons and to enable landless poor
persons to purchase the lands held by them on lease. The statement of
objects and reasons for A.P. Act 33 of 2007, by which Section 82 was
amended, stated that the land in urban areas being more precious, the
amendment to Section 82 is intended to protect the interests of endowment
institutions located in urban areas by not allowing sale of endowment lands in
these areas. One of the salient features of the amending legislation was,
therefore, safeguarding valuable endowment lands in urban areas and major
Gram Panchayats by excluding them from the possibility of sale to lease
holders. The Act being a comprehensive and consolidated legislation, did not
undergo any change in its character by any subsequent amendments also.
15. A ‘Court’ for the purpose of the Act has been defined in Section
2(8) which did not include any statutory authority beyond the Courts specified
in its meaning. The powers and functions of Regional Joint Commissioner
defined by Section 9 do not clothe any exercise of powers or performance of
functions by the Regional Joint Commissioner with any colour of such
exercise of powers or performance of functions by a Court. None of the
provisions of the enactment providing for any appeals or reviews or revisions
14
specified the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 or Section 5 of the
Limitation Act in particular to be applicable and Section 149, which governs
the procedure and powers at enquiries under the Act including hearing of
appeals, prescribes about the applicability of the procedure under the Code of
Civil Procedure to the trial of suits and the further applicability of the Evidence
Act and Oaths Act, but not the Limitation Act, 1963. Deeming the officers
under Section 149(3) to be persons acting judicially within the meaning of the
Judicial Officers’ Protection Act, 1850 can be considered no indication of
treating such officers as Courts for any other purpose and the beneficiary
provision should be considered available only to the specific extent provided
therein to the officer, but cannot be stretched to make the officer a judicial
officer/Court for all purposes.
16. Section 82(1) of the Act provided exemption to leases held by
landless poor persons from the general cancellation of all leases of
agricultural lands subsisting on the date of commencement of the Act and the
Rules under G.O.Ms. No.379 Revenue (Endowments.I) Department, dated
11-03-2003 were made in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 82
read with the general rule making power under Section 153(1). While Rule 3
thereof provides for determination of landless poor person, Rule 4 provides for
an appeal to the Regional Joint Commissioner having jurisdiction within 30
days from the date of receipt of the decision or order made or passed under
Rule 3 by any person aggrieved by such decision or order and the decision or
order of the Regional Joint Commissioner is made final. The period of 30 days
15
from the date of the receipt of the decision or order by the aggrieved person,
within which the appeal has to be, thus, filed under the statutory rules, is not
expressly or impliedly impressed with any elasticity either by the statutory
rules or by the statute under which the rules were made. The above
background may clearly exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act to such appeals.
17. Section 5 of the Limitation Act providing for extension of prescribed
period in certain cases like any appeal or any application, enabled admission
of such an appeal or application only if the appellant or the applicant satisfies
the “Court” that he had a sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period. The word “Court” itself, not defined
by the Limitation Act, 1963, but defined by A.P. Act 30 of 1987 for its
purposes, does not include the Regional Joint Commissioner of Endowments
in any view. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provided that the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as
and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or
local law, where any such special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal
or application a different period of limitation than prescribed by the Limitation
Act, 1963. A.P. Act 30 of 1987 being a complete code in itself may, thus,
make any applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the appeals
provided by the statutory rules above referred to, not arise with reference to
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, apart from Section 5 specifically
referring to satisfaction of the Court in this regard. The principles laid down by
16
a Division Bench of this Court in K. Venkaiah’s case (3 supra) upheld by the
Apex Court in Sakuru’s case (6 supra) and the ratio decidendi of the other
precedents above referred to, make Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
inapplicable to appeals under Rule 4 of the Rules in the absence of any
express or even an implied provision under A.P. Act 30 of 1987 to consider
such application even remotely possible. The limitation on exercise of such
power by a statutory authority, who is a persona designata, is circumscribed
by the very statutory provisions, which conferred quasi-judicial powers and
any other equitable considerations cannot provide shelter to exercise of any
such power against the unambiguous letter of the statute and if so, Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not have been taken aid by the Regional
Joint Commissioner to entertain applications for condonation of delay in filing
the appeals under Rule 4 of the Rules and condone the delay by allowing any
such applications on any ground.
18. Even otherwise, whether there was any basis for the statutory
authority to arrive at any satisfaction on the appellants having sufficient cause
for not preferring the appeals within the prescribed period, also appears to be
a question to be answered against the appellants. In all the appeals, the
petitions for condonation of delay and the appeals were filed on the
instructions of the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments directing the
Executive Officers/Managers/Executive Authorities of the temples/Institutions
having lands situated at urban area or under Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali,
Mangalagiri Urban Development Authority and who got the landless poor
17
declaration orders previously from the very office of the Assistant
Commissioner, who gave instructions to file revision petitions before the
Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments, Multizone-II, Tirupati for
cancellation of the landless poor declarations immediately, since the tenants
for the urban lands cannot be declared as landless poor tenants. While it is
strange that the very person who declared the tenants as landless poor for the
purposes of Section 82(1) himself instructed the temples/institutions to file
revision petitions (?) before the Regional Joint Commissioner questioning his
own orders (even if it were an individual who is successor in office to the
individual who gave such declarations), the affidavits of the executive officers
of the temples in support of their applications under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act for condonation of the delay only referred to the factual background of the
lands being of commercial value and in urban area, the tenants having no
registered lease deeds in their favour, the change in the master plan and the
absence of any other remedy against the impugned orders except an appeal
under Rule 4, but did not allege any cause, leave alone sufficient cause for the
delay in filing the appeals beyond the prescribed period. The inclusion of the
land in question in the urban development zone alone was claimed to be
justifying preferring the appeals at that distance of time, which was attempted
to be construed as indicating practically the absence of any delay. The
petitions were filed in 2010. The orders of the Assistant Commissioner
declaring the tenants as landless poor for purposes of Section 82 were in
2003/2004. G.O.Ms. No.695 and G.O.Ms. No.679 referred to about the lands
18
coming under the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas Development Act, 1975 were
in 1977 and 2006. The amendment of Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987
excluding lands situated in municipalities and municipal corporations in sub-
section (2), etc., by A.P. Act 33 of 2007 came into effect from 03-01-2008. The
instructions of the Assistant Commissioner to file the appeals were in May,
2010 and the appeals along with petitions for condonation of delay were much
later. Even assuming that the amendment by A.P. Act 33 of 2007, which came
into force with effect from 03-01-2008, either activated or provided justification
for the appellants to file the appeals along with petitions for condonation of
delay, why the Assistant Commissioner or the appellants did not act from 03-
01-2008 till May, 2010/July, 2010 was never stated. Apart from the question
whether the subject lands herein, which are not claimed to be situated within
the territorial limits of any municipality or municipal corporation, can be
considered exempt by Section 82(2) as amended with effect from 03-01-2008,
even the counter-affidavits filed along with vacate stay petitions did not
attempt even to remotely state the causes for not preferring the appeals
against the orders of the Assistant Commissioner declaring the writ petitioners
herein as landless poor, within the prescribed period or thereafter till July,
2010, though even the last of the events, which is claimed as providing the
justification for filing the appeals due to the amendment of Section 82(2) with
effect from 03-01-2008, was more than two and half years earlier to filing of
the appeals and the delay condonation petitions. Even if the statute provided
19
no other remedy as claimed, that cannot justify any condonation of delay in
the absence of satisfaction of the Court about the requirements of Section 5.
19. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and the Apex Court not only
noted the law of limitation to be the same for a private citizen as for
governmental authorities, but also took note of the very nature of
governmental functioning which makes procedural delay implicit and incidental
to the decision making process. While certain amount of latitude is not
impermissible, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ was directed to be considered
with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical
detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. However, it is to
be noted that it is evident that even in such a case some cause should exist
and in no event non- existence of any cause will help the defaulter.
20. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Jamshedpur and others 8 is a case where any strait-jacket formula for
accepting or rejecting an explanation furnished for delay is not adopted, but
the causes shown for condonation have to be of acceptable value.
21. The test of ‘sufficient cause’ was stated in R.B. Ramlingam v.
R.B.Bhvaneswari9 to be purely individualistic test and not an objective test.
Hence, no two cases can be treated alike. It was pointed out that the concept
of ‘sufficient cause’ was left delightfully undefined and each case spells out a
unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such.
8
(2008) 3 SCC 70
9
(2009) 2 SCC 689
20
22. The Apex Court further held in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish
Singh and others10 after an exhaustive review of the precedents, that even if
the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely
fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party
concerned. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible so as to
persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true,
but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. The
normal behaviour of a common prudent person was referred to and it was
cautioned that liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to
the other party. The word ‘sufficient cause’ was stated to mean adequate
enough and the party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken
all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court
without any unnecessary delay.nThe decisive factor is the sufficiency of a
satisfactory explanation.
23. The later view of the Supreme Court was clarified in Lanka
Venkateswarlu (D) by L.Rs. v. State of A.P. & Ors. 11 , wherein it was
asserted that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented
approach’, ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial
law of limitation. It was also stated that all discretionary powers, especially
judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the
law and the discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by
10
(2010) 8 SCC 685
11
AIR 2011 SC 1199
21
reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not
form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.
24. The latest declaration of law on the subject is by Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai12 , wherein the Supreme
Court stated that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is
required to be adopted in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the
fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the
judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of
litigation apart from the cost. It was laid down that no premium can be given
for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State
and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for
condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting
the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will
cause injury to the public interest. In fact, in the case before Their Lordships,
the cause shown for the delay of more than 7 years was treated as wholly
unsatisfactory and as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
25. Thus, the principles are well settled and the application of the
principles to the facts of the case does not disclose any reason being
assigned for the delay that occurred in filing the appeals at least since the
amendment to Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 coming into force with effect
12
(2012) 5 SCC 157
22
from 03-01-2008 and the filing of the appeals in or after July, 2010, even
assuming that the subsequent statutory amendment can provide justification
for reopening of closed and stale matters. The circumstances relating to the
absence of registered lease deeds and urbanization of the lands were in
existence even since earlier, but were not acted upon and the inaction since
inception up to filing of the appeals cannot be considered to be providing any
reasonable basis for condonation of delay even assuming the question to be
answerable with the broadest of liberality to be adopted. As such, even on
facts, the judicial discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on
satisfaction about the existence of sufficient cause for the delay cannot be
considered to have been exercised in accordance with sound judicial
principles and the rights of the writ petitioners herein were obviously very
lightly interfered with, even without the existence of any cause, leave alone
sufficient cause justifying any condonation of delay.
26. Many other questions were raised by either parties about the
relevancy of the subsequent change in the contents of the statute or the
nature of the land providing any reasonable basis for reopening a closed
chapter by way of an appeal against an order which had become final by
efflux of time and about the jurisdiction or otherwise of the Regional Joint
Commissioner to entertain the appeals or petitions for condonation of delay
after the Endowments Tribunal has been made part of A.P. Act 30 of 1987.
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27. Even in the writ petitions where the final orders in the appeals are
challenged, there is no need to go into the orders in appeals further in view of
the legal basis for entertaining such appeals being found to be non-existent.
28. In view of the foregoing discussion and by following the decision of
Alladi Nageswara Rao’s case, this Court is of the view that, the impugned
orders in all the writ petitions entertaining the applications under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in filing appeals, without any
jurisdiction and accepting the requests for condonation of such delay even
without the existence or proof of any sufficient cause, are declared as illegal.
Therefore, this Court is inclined to allow the writ petitions by setting aside the
impugned orders in all the Writ Petitions.
29. Accordingly, all the Writ Petitions are allowed. The impugned
orders in all the writ petitions are hereby set aside and quashed. There shall
be no order as to costs.
30. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
______________________________
DR. K. MANMADHA RAO, J.
Date : 13-09-2024
Note : L.R copy to be marked.
(b/o)
Gvl
24
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION Nos: 20490, 20491, 20531, 20548/2011 and 32850/2010
Date : 13.09.2024
Gvl
25