Allahabad High Court
Dinesh Pal Singh vs Presiding Officer And 2 Others on 13 September, 2024
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:149947 Court No. - 36 Case :- CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION No. - 383 of 2023 Applicant :- Dinesh Pal Singh Opposite Party :- Presiding Officer And 2 Others Counsel for Applicant :- Ananya Shukla,Shikhar Kaushal Counsel for Opposite Party :- Piyush Bhargava with Case :- CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION No. - 384 of 2023 Applicant :- Digvijay Govil Opposite Party :- Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal And 2 Others Counsel for Applicant :- Ananya Shukla,Shikhar Kaushal Counsel for Opposite Party :- Piyush Bhargava Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra,J.
1. Heard Mr. Shikhar Kaushal along with Ms. Ananya Shukla, learned counsel for the applicant-writ petitioner, Mr. Piyush Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondent-employer and Mr. Vinod Kumar Sahu, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State respondent.
2. This application has been filed under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC seeking review of my final judgment and order dated 06.07.2023 whereby I had dismissed Writ-C No. 30049 of 2016 and the connected Writ-C No. 30052 of 2016.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the judgment suffers from following errors that are apparent on the face of record:
(i) In paragraph No. 23 of the judgment, this Court had quoted paragraph No. 24 of the written statement filed by the employer before the Industrial Tribunal in which Mr. S.P. Shukla was pleaded as Deputy Labour Commissioner, Aligarh but the Court mentioned him as Assistant Labour Commissioner, Aligarh and held that reference made by him was without jurisdiction.
(ii) In paragraph No. 48 of judgement, a reference of Section 2(oo) has been given whereas the same does not apply to the present case as the said provision falls under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 whereas the case arises from U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
(iii) In paragraph No. 44 of the judgement, the Court had interpreted Clause-10 of 5th Schedule in the sense that it applies for appointments of collective nature and not of individual nature as is apparent from use of the words “workmen” and “them” whereas the Act being a beneficial legislation, the interpretation should be extended to individual workman also.
(iv) Judgement of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. Hindalco Industries Ltd: (2014) 11 SCC 85, cited on his behalf during the course of writ proceedings has been misinterpreted by this Court.
4. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India and another vs. Netaji Cricket Club and Others: (2005) 4 SCC 741, especially paragraph Nos. 89 and 90, thereof, and submitted that misconception of fact and law by a Court is covered by the phrase, “error apparent on the face of the record”, as per Rule 1 of Order 47 CPC.
5. Per contra, Mr. Piyush Bhargava, learned counsel submits that though it is correct that Mr. S.P. Shukla was pleaded as Deputy Labour Commissioner and not as Assistant Labour Commissioner in the written statement and words “Assistant Labour Commissioner” have been wrongly mentioned in paragraph No. 23 of the judgment, the same would not make any difference as per the schedule described at internal page No. 11 of the judgment, entry No. 3 which confers jurisdiction to make a reference upon Deputy Labour Commissioner, Agra, Region Agra and once, admittedly, Mr. S.P. Shukla was working as Deputy Labour Commissioner, Aligarh, mere describing him as “Assistant Labour Commissioner, Aligarh” would not improve the case of the petitioner-applicant.
6. As regards applying Section 2(oo), Mr. Piyush Bhargava, fairly admits that this Court erred in mentioning the said provision, however, he refers to paragraph No. 37 of the judgment where reliance on a judgment of this Court in Baij Nath Bhattacharya Vs. The Labour Court, Allahabad and another (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.16454 of 1985, decided on 02.05.1994) has been placed in connection with completion of not less than 12 calendar months working by the workman which the petitioner failed to prove. He submits that this requirement is associated with Section 6-N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is pari materia with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and in totality of circumstances, even if Section 2(oo) would not apply in the present case, the result would be same.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find that my judgement contains two errors apparent on the face of the record, one, wrong depiction of the designation of Mr. S.P. Shukla as Assistant Labour Commissioner, though, as per the pleading contained in paragraph No. 24 of the written statement, he was described as Deputy Labour Commissioner. Secondly, under some misconception of law, this Court erred in mentioning Section 2(oo) in paragraph No. 48 of the judgment which relates to Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereas the case arises from U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
8. Nevertheless, in view of schedule described at page No. 11 of the judgment, mere error in describing the designation of Mr. S.P. Shukla would not make the reference competent as he was an officer of Aligarh, whereas the jurisdiction to make reference was with Deputy Labour Commissioner, Agra, Region Agra. Similarly, in view of the fact that working of the petitioner having been analyzed in the light of documents on record, he was found to not have completed 12 calendar months of working, mentioning Section 2(oo) would not alter the ultimate decision of the Writ Court. The Court may refer to equivalent relevant provisions of 6-N and 2(s) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. All other arguments based upon wrong application of judgment of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra) or other submissions regarding beneficial legislation, the same being an interpretation of the Court on the facts and law applicable, the same do not fall within the strict parameters of an error apparent on the face of record covered by Section 114 or Order 47 Rule 1.
9. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being the substantive provision for review, clearly uses the words ” the Court may make such order thereon”. It means that power to allow or reject a review application depends on discretion of the Court in given facts and circumstances of a particular case and the Court is not bound to allow the application in every case and situation.
10. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1372, the Supreme Court observed that a review is, by no means, an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.
11. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma 1979 (4) SCC 389, the Supreme Court observed that there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. It held that the power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of Appeal. The power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.
12. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury AIR 1995 SC 455, the Apex Court held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
13. In Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri Devi and others 1997 (8) SCC 715, it was held that an error, which is not self evident and has to be detected by process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise powers of review.
14. In Rajendra Kumar Vs. Rambai, AIR 2003 SC 2095, the Supreme Court elaborated about limited scope of judicial intervention at the time of review of the judgment and observed that the limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgement/order cannot be disturbed.
15. Thus, review is not an appeal in disguise. Rehearing of the matter is impermissible in the garb of review. It is an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. In Lily Thomas Vs. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 1650, the Supreme Court said that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a new view. Such powers can be exercised within limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power.
16. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Inderchand Jain Vs. Motilal (2009) 4 SCC 665 and in Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati and others 2013 (8) SCC 320, the Supreme Court observed that mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking review jurisdiction. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
17. In view of the above discussions, the review application stands partly allowed to the extent of wrong description of designation of the officer in paragraph No. 23 of the judgment as explained above as well as erroneous mention of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, however with the observation that the same would not reverse or affect the ultimate decision of the Court in terms of dismissal of writ petition.
Order Date :- 13.9.2024
K.K.Tiwari