Gauhati High Court
Dr Bimal Kumar Dutta vs The Union Of India And 4 Ors on 26 November, 2024
Author: Soumitra Saikia
Bench: Soumitra Saikia
Page No.# 1/18
GAHC010027392021
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/1023/2021
DR BIMAL KUMAR DUTTA
RETIRED MEDICAL OFFICER (CONTRACTUAL)
R/O PUBERUN PATH, NA ALI
BONGAL PUKHURI, JORHAT, 785001
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 4 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRIES, GOVT. OF INDIA, NEW DELHI 781037, ASSAM
2:THE CHAIRMAN
TEA BOARD OF INDIA
KOLKATTA
3:THE CHAIRMAN
TEA RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
113
PARK STREET
KOLKATTA
700016
WEST BENGAL
4:THE DIRECTOR
TOCKLAI TEA RESEARCH INSTITUTE TEA RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
CINNAMARA
JORHAT
785008
ASSAM
Page No.# 2/18
5:THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLLER
TOCKLAI TEA RESEARCH INSTITUTE
TEA RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
CINNAMORA
JORHAT
785008
ASSA
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR M Z AHMED, MR. S K SHARMA
Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., MR. S BORTHAKUR (R2),MR. S S ROY (R2),MR. S
S ROY,MR G N SAHEWALLA (R-4),MR D SENAPATI (R-4),MR. A CHETIA (R-4),MS. S. TODI
(R-4),MR H K SARMA (R-4)
Date of Hearing : 11.09.2024
Date of Judgment : 26.11.2024
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA
Judgment and Order (CAV)
Heard Mr. M.Z. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner assisted by
Mr. A.M. Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Borthakur,
learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2 and Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. A.M. Dutta, learned counsel for the respondent
nos. 3 to 5.
2] The petitioner is a doctor by profession and was appointed as a Medical
Officer initially for a period of five years on contractual basis under the Tocklai
Tea Research Institute, Tea Research Association, Cinnamara, Jorhat on
27.06.200. He joined the organization on 01.07.2000. His appointment was
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subsequently extended for different periods till 30.09.2014. According to the
petitioner, his extension was without any break in service and his salary was
enhanced up to Rs.25,000/- per month. He continued his service as a doctor on
contractual basis and his service was completed on 30.09.2014. It is submitted
that the Tocklai Tea Research Institute, formerly known as Tocklai Experimental
Station, was established way back in the year 1911 in Cinnamara, Jorhat
District. The Tea Research Association was formed in the year 1964 under the
Tea Board of India with its Headquarter at Kolkata for the purpose of research
on all aspects of tea cultivation and the Tocklai Tea Research Institute was
subsequently brought under the management of the Tea Research Association.
It is submitted that the Tocklai Tea Research Institute is the oldest and the
largest tea research association of its kind in the world and the administrative
ministry of the organization is the Ministry of Commerce and Industries,
Government of India, New Delhi.
3] It is submitted that the respondent authorities had earlier permitted the
petitioner to avail the privileged (earned) leave like other employees of the
organization and at the time of completion of his service in the organization, the
petitioner had total number of 54 days of earned leave to his credit and
accordingly, the petitioner requested for consideration and approval of
encashment of the privileged leave for the said period. However, his request
was denied by letter no. 4792 dated 01/12/2014 issued by the respondent no. 5
herein. This according to the petitioner is illegal and arbitrary as the petitioner
had earlier been granted encashment of earned leave without any question and
the instant refusal of the respondent authorities to consider his request without
indicating any reasons, therefore, is arbitrary and malafide in nature and as
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such, the impugned letter no. 4792 dated 01/12/2014 issued by the respondent
no. 5 is required to be quashed by the present proceedings. The further
contention on behalf of the petitioner is that he has not been paid the gratuity
amount due to the petitioner even after lapse of more than six years from the
date of completion of his service. He had represented before the respondent
authorities on a number of occasions for release of his gratuity but the
respondent authorities have not paid the said amount till date. It is contended
on behalf of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is
entitled to payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, but the
same has not been considered till date. In this context, the petitioner has
referred to a letter no. 3302 dated 17.08.2020 issued by the Administrative
Controller of the Tocklai Tea Research Institute, Tea Research Association,
Cinnamara, Jorhat to submit that his claim for gratuity was also rejected on the
ground that his appointment was purely contractual and the said action of the
respondent authorities in not considering his claim for gratuity is also highly
arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of law. The same is, therefore, illegal
and it calls for interference by this Court. It is not denied that the petitioner has
completed more than 14 years of service without any break and therefore,
besides his claim for earned leave he is also entitled to payment of gratuity
under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
4] Referring to Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, it is submitted
that the gratuity is payable to an employee on his superannuation or his
retirement or resignation or on his death or disablement due to accident or
disease after he has rendered continuous service of not less than five years.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submits that there is no
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specific bar under the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 to exclude
contractual employees from the benefit of gratuity. In support of his
contentions, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has referred to and relied
upon judgment of the Madras High Court rendered in Tiruchengode Agricultural
Producers Co-operative Marketing Society vs. Joint Commissioner of Labour
reported in 2012. SCC Online MAD 417.
5] In Tiruchengode Agricultural (supra), the issue was raised before the
Hon’ble Court whether a contractual worker or a khalasi is entitled to the
benefits of Payment of Gratuity Act. He submits that the Hon’ble Madras High
Court upon examination of the matter by relying on another order dated
23.06.2000 passed in WP(C) No.15976 of 1993 had held that the same issue
was decided by a Coordinate Bench of the said Apex Court and consequently,
the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court concluded that in the
absence of any specific exclusion it is presumed that even contract workers or
khalasis are entitled to the benefit under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The
Court, therefore, was not inclined to take a different view than the view of the
other Coordinate Bench of the Hon’ble Madras High Court rendered in WP(C)
No.15976 of 1993.
6] Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a judgment
of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP(C) No.20971 of 2003(V)
where the question of whether a doctor is entitled to gratuity who has claimed
the benefit of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 after having
worked in the hospital for about 11 years and subsequently resigned. The
respondent no.3 in WP(C) No.20971 of 2003(V) filed an application before the
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controlling authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act seeking directions to the
petitioner to pay the gratuity. The said proceeding was allowed and the
respondent no.3, namely, Dr. Josey Neroth, was directed to pay an amount of
Rs.44,423/- with 10% interest as gratuity by the petitioner. This order directing
payment of Gratuity to the 3rd respondent came to be challenged before the
Hon’ble High Court. The Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held that the doctor
working in the hospital would be an employee within the meaning of Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972 and therefore, the distinction sought to be raised by the
employer before the Hon’ble High Court that since the respondent no.3 was
permitted to have private practice, he cannot be termed as an employee defined
under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, such, submission did not find merit
before the Court and accordingly, the petition was dismissed and the order of
the Controlling Authority directing the employer Hospital to pay gratuity to the
respondent no.3 was upheld.
7] The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also place reliance on a
judgment from the Gujarat High Court rendered in the Gujarat State Road
Transport Corporation vs. Dr. R. D. Rathod in Special Civil Application No. 12192
of 2009. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that in this case the
Corporation had challenged the order passed by the Controlling Authority dated
24.05.2007 under the Payment of Gratuity Act towards payment of gratuity of
Rs.11,538/- with 10% simple interest. This order was challenged by filing an
appeal before the Appellate Authority which also came to be rejected on the
ground of limitation. Being aggrieved, the employer approached the Hon’ble
Gujarat High Court by filing the writ petition. The orders of the controlling
authority as well as the order passed by the Appellate Authority were assailed
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before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat. It was urged before the Hon’ble Court
that the respondent was not covered by the definition of employee given under
Section 2 within (e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. It was urged that the
definition Section 2 (e) of the Act of 1972 excludes persons who holds a post
under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any
other Act or Rules providing for payment of gratuity. The Hon’ble Gujarat High
Court while considering the matter also considered an earlier judgment of the
Hon’ble High Court rendered in the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation
(GSRTC) vs Dr. Praveen Chandra C. Nayak reported in 2004 (3) GLH page 291.
In the said matter before the Gujrat High Court the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner therein, namely, the GSRTC had submitted that a medical
doctor would also be a person doing a technical work for the said industry and
he would fall within the definition of workmen as defined under Section 2 (s) of
the Industrial Disputes Act and would therefore be entitled to bonus as may be
declared by the Company. The said submission was taken note of before the
Hon’ble Gujarat High Court and it accordingly upheld the findings of the
Controlling Authority that the respondent was an employee of the petitioner
establishment within the meaning of section 2 (e) of the Payment of Gratuity
Act, 1972 and that the wages received by the respondent are covered within the
definition given under section 2(s) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
8] The petitioner has also referred to a judgment of the Apex Court rendered
in Gestetner Duplicators Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West
Bengal, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 354 to submit that salary under the
recognized Provident Fund Scheme Rules would not only include the fixed
monthly salary but also commission and dearness allowance paid by the
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employer to its employees. He submits that the Apex Court by referring to
various dictionary meanings that conceptually “salary” and “wages” connotes
one and the same thing, namely, remuneration or payment for work done or
services rendered, but the former expression is generally used in connection
with the services of a higher or non manual type, while the latter is used in
connection with manual services. The Apex Court held that there is no
difference between “salary” and “wages” and the words both being a
recompense for work done or services rendered, though ordinarily the former
expression is used in connection with the services of the non manual type, while
the letter is used in connection with manual services. He, therefore, submits
that the claim of the petitioner is justified and ought to have been accepted by
the respondents that he entitled to gratuity under the provisions of the Payment
of Gratuity Act, 1972 and therefore, the same ought not to have been rejected.
The claim of the petitioner is, therefore, required to be accepted by the
respondents and a suitable direction to that effect be issued by this Hon’ble
Court.
9] The respondents have contested the case of the petitioner by filing an
affidavit-in-opposition. The respondent nos. 3 to 5 have referred to the original
order of appointment dated 27.06.2000 which is enclosed as Annxure-1 to the
said affidavit-in-opposition. By the said communication dated 27.06.2000 the
petitioner was appointed to the post of Medical Officer in the Association at a
consolidated salary of Rs.12,000/- (Rupees Twelve thousand only) per month
and he was to contribute 12% of his salary to the Provident Fund account and
the Association would make equivalent contribution. Learned Senior Counsel for
the respondent nos. 3 to 5 strenuously submits by referring to the said order of
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appointment that there was a clear stipulation that ” apart from consolidated
salary, no other charges or allowances will be admissible”. It is further
contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner’s claim that there
was continuous service rendered by the petitioner is also not correct, as there
were intermittent gaps between his re-engagement on contractual service
pursuant to completion of the earlier contract period. The learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the respondents further submits that the writ petition
ought not to be entertained in view of alternative remedy available. It is
submitted that the petitioner ought to have approached the Controlling
Authority in the first instance towards his claim for payment of gratuity.
Referring to Section 7(4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, submits that if
there is a dispute as to the admissibility of any claim or in relation to an
employee for payment of gratuity, the application lies before the Controlling
Authority. Further, under Section 7 (7), any person aggrieved by the order of the
Controlling Authority may file an appeal before the appropriate authority.
Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent nos. 3 to 5 therefore submits that
there is a complete procedure prescribed under the provisions of the Act for
determination of the question of admissibility and/or payment of gratuity in
respect of such cases which the petitioner has not availed of nor is there any
explanation as to why the statutory remedy prescribed has not been availed of.
Under such circumstances, this writ petition ought not to be entertained and the
petition is required to be dismissed.
10] Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent nos. 3 to 5 further submits that
there are factual disputes with regard to the claim of the petitioner that he had
rendered continuous service for more than 14 years vis-a-vis the contentions of
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the respondents that there were breaks in his service before being renewed by
the respondent authority as contractual services and therefore, the petitioner
should have approached the Controlling authority prescribed under the Act for
any claims towards payment of gratuity. It is, therefore, submitted that the Apex
Court has time and again held that where there are effective alternative
remedies prescribed, the petitioner should be relegated to avail of such
statutory remedies prescribed.
11] Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent nos. 3 to 5 has referred to a
judgment of the Apex Court rendered in M/S Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs. the Excise
and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors. in Civil Appeal
No.5393/2010 on 01.02.2023. Referring to the said judgment, the Senior
Counsel for the respondent submits that unless there is procedural impropriety
or illegality, the claimant is required to approach the statutory authority for the
remedy. The writ petitioner filed his rejoinder affidavit disputing the contentions
of the respondents and reiterating the case projected in the writ petition.
12] Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and pleadings on the
record have been carefully perused.
13] The facts which are evident from the pleadings are that the petitioner was
appointed on contractual basis by order dated 27.06.2000 by the Tocklai Tea
Research Association and he joined his service on 01.07.2000 and the same was
communicated by his joining report dated 03.07.2000. There is no dispute that
the petitioner has rendered more than 14 years of service as a contractual
employee as a medical doctor under the Tocklai Tea Research Association.
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However, while the petitioner claims that there is continuous service rendered
by him without any break, the said claim is disputed by the respondents who
claim that there were gaps in his services prior to the same being renewed from
time to time pursuant to expiry of the earlier contract periods. A bare perusal of
the appointment letter dated 27.06.2000 reveals that there is a condition which
provides that apart from consolidated salary, no other charges or allowances will
be admissible.
14] A perusal of the Payment of Gratuity Act reveals the Definition of
“Employees” provided under Section 2(e). As per section 2(e) of the Act,
employees defined as under:
“2(e) “employee” means any person (other than an apprentice) employed on wages, [3] [***] in any
establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company or shop, to do any skilled,
semi-skilled, or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, whether the terms of such
employment are express or implied, [4] [and whether or not such person is employed in a managerial or
administrative capacity, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central
Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for
payment of gratuity].”
15] Wages is defined under Section 2 (s) of the Act, which produced herein
below:
(s) “wages” means all emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave in
accordance with the terms and conditions of his employment and which arc paid or arc payable to him
in cash and includes dearness allowance but does not include any bonus, commission, house rent
allowance, overtime wages and any other allowance.
16] Section 2 A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, defines continuous
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service and the same is quoted below:
“For the purposes of this Act, – (1) an employee shall be said to be in continuous service for a
period if he has, for that period, been in uninterrupted service, including service which may be
interrupted on account of sickness, accident, leave, absence from duty without leave (not being
absence in respect of which an order [***] treating the absence as break in service has been
passed in accordance with the standing order, rules or regulations governing the employees of the
establishment), lay off, strike or a lock-out or cessation of work not due to any fault of the
employee, whether such uninterrupted or interrupted service was rendered before or after the
commencement of this Act.
(2) where an employee (not being an employee employed in a seasonal establishment) is not in
continuous service within the meaning of clause (1), for any period of one year or six months, he
shall be deemed to be in continuous service under the employer –
(a) for the said period of one year, if the employee during the period of twelve calendar months
preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under
the employer for not less than –
(i) one hundred and ninety days, in the case of an employee employed below the ground in a mine
or in an establishment which works for less than six days in a week; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for the said period of six months, if the employee during the period of six calendar months
preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, has actually worked
under the employer for not less than –
i) ninety-five days, in the case of an employee employed below the ground in a mine or in an
establishment which works for less than six days in a week; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case;
Explanation: For the purpose of clause (2), the number of days on which an employee has
actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which –
(i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made
under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any other law applicab1c to the
establishment;
(ii) (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous year;
(iii) (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment and
(iv) (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the
total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.
(v) (3) where an employee employed in a seasonal establishment, is not in continuous
service within the meaning of clause (1), for any period of one year or six months, he shall be
deemed to be in continuous service under the employer for such period if he has actually worked
for not less than seventy five per cent of the number of days on which the establishment was in
operation during such period.”
17] Payment of gratuity is prescribed under the Section 4 of the Act. Under
section 7 of the Act there is a procedure for determination of the amount of
gratuity. Section 7(4) of the Act provides that if there is any dispute to the
amount of gratuity payable under the Act or as to the admissibility of any claim
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or in relation to an employee for payment of gratuity or whether such person is
entitled to receive gratuity, the Controlling Authority (as appointed under
Section 3 of the Act) will cause an enquiry and thereafter, pass necessary orders
on the entitlement or admissibility of such claim of gratuity. Section 7 (7) of the
Act provides for an appeal against any order passed by the Controlling Authority
under Section 7 (4).
18] Various judgments have been referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioner in support of his contentions to justify the claim of the petitioner
towards gratuity. Seeking to include a Medical Officer within the definition
prescribed under the Act of 1972 reveals that there is some cloud as to whether
the petitioner’s employment as a Medical Officer read with his appointment
letter dated 27.06.2000, and his consequential acceptance thereto can be
interpreted to extend the benefit of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972.
19] A plain reading of the provisions of the Act reveals that the Act itself
provides for a specific forum to determine such issues including the question of
admissibility of any claims of gratuity.
20] There is no averment in the writ petition or in the affidavit-in-reply
explaining as to why the claim of the petitioner could not be or cannot be
addressed by the Statutory Authority, namely, the Controlling Authority
prescribed under the provisions of the Act. There is no limitation prescribed
under Section 7(4) within which the parties are required to approach the
Controlling Authority.
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21] The claim of the petitioner consistently has been that he is included within
the definition of the “Employee” rendered in Section 2 (e) of the Act and the
respondents have rejected the claim.
22] There is also no explanation on behalf of the respondents as to why a
reference to the Controlling Authority was not made to determine on the
question of payment of gratuity as claimed for by the petitioner.
23] It is no longer res integra that for resolving any disputes, ordinarily parties
should approach a forum prescribed under the statute in case of any grievances.
In Titaghur Paper Mills Company Limited. Vs. State of Orissa reported in 1983
(2) SCC 433, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that where there is a statutory forum,
prescribed parties are ordinarily required to approach such a forum prescribed.
In Assistant Commissioner (Ct) LTU. Kakinada and Ors. Vs. M/s Glaxi Smith
Kline Consumer Health Care Limited reported in 2020 (19) SCC 681 on the
question of maintainability of a writ petition where alternative remedy is
available, the Apex Court held that where a right or a liability is created by a
statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by
that statute must only be availed of. Though an Act cannot bar or curtail remedy
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India, the Constitutional Court
would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of
the Act and would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the
enactment.
24] The Apex Court held that to put it differently, the fact remains that since
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the High Court has wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India does not mean that it can disregard the substantive provisions of a statute
and pass orders which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed by
the statute. Even in the context of the powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that it is one thing to state that
prohibitions or limitations in a statute cannot come in the way of exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice
between the parties in the cause or the matter arising out of that statute. But it
is quite a different thing to say that while exercising jurisdiction under Article
142 the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court can altogether ignore
the substantive provisions of the statute dealing with the subject and pass
orders concerning an issue which can be settled only through a mechanism
prescribed in another statute. The Apex Court held that indubitably, the powers
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are wide but
certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on the Hon’ble Supreme
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
25] What the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, it is unfathomable, as to
how the High Court can take a different approach in the matter in reference to
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The principle underlying the rejection of
such argument by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would apply on all force to the
exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and
accordingly, in the facts of that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, therefore,
allowed the appeal preferred by the Revenue against the order passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana interfering
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with the order which was passed, entertaining a challenge to the assessment
order on the sole ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order
stood foreclosed by the law of limitation.
26] The Apex Court referred to several earlier precedents on this issue and held
that where there is a statutory remedy provided, the same is required to be
availed of unless it can be shown that the remedy provided will not be an
effective remedy.
27] While it is correct that existence of an alternative remedy cannot be an
absolute bar to prevent the Constitutional Court from exercising its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but there are certain well accepted
principles which are to be considered before a Court proceeds for exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the
existence of such remedies. In the recent judgment of the Apex Court rendered
in Mangt. Of M/S D.T.C. vs. Dharam Pal Singh & Anr. reported in 2022 (16) SCC
477 it was reiterated that only in cases under the following circumstances,
namely,
(i) Breach of fundamental rights;
(ii) violation of principles of natural justice;
(iii) excess of jurisdiction; and
(iv) challenge to the vires of a statute or a delegated legislation, ordinarily,
where the statute prescribes an adjudicatory forum, parties are expected to
approach such forum.
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28] As discussed above, no such exceptional circumstances have been pleaded
in the present proceedings. Even during the arguments made before the Court,
no such instance was pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that the authority prescribed under the Payment of Gratuity Act,
namely, the Controlling Authority, will not be the appropriate authority to decide
the question of payment and/or legal admissibility of the claim of the petitioner
towards payment of gratuity.
29] Under such circumstances, this Court is of the view that this writ petition
fails and is not maintainable in view of the Statutory Authority prescribed under
the Act and the absence of any material before this Court as to why the
statutory remedy prescribed will not be an effective remedy to redress the
grievances of the writ petitioner.
30] However, in view of the claim made by a Medical Doctor, who was on
contractual basis, towards gratuity and the denial of his claim by the
respondents, the matter stands disposed of with a direction to both the
petitioner and the respondents to appear before the Controlling Authority
appointed for the State of Assam as per the rules prescribed under within a
period of 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order. The prescribed Controlling Authority will thereafter proceed to make
necessary enquiries, if required, and thereupon, pass appropriate orders as to
the claim and/or the admissibility of the claim for payment of gratuity under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Any party aggrieved may thereafter prefer an
appeal before the Appellate Forum as prescribed under Section 6 of the Act. The
question of whether a Medical Doctor, who was appointed on contractual basis
can be accepted to be an employee for the purposes of the Payment of Gratuity
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Act, 1972 is left open to be decided in an appropriate proceeding.
31] Writ petition accordingly is disposed of in terms of the above, no order as
to cost.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant