Legally Bharat

Supreme Court of India

Government Of Nct Of Delhi vs M/S Bsk Realtors Llp on 17 May, 2024

Author: Dipankar Datta

Bench: Dipankar Datta, Surya Kant

                                                              REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 455


                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                             CIVIL APPEAL NO. _____/2024

       [ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO .…. DIARY NO(s) 17623/2021]




     GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.                       …APPELLANTS



                                       VERSUS



     M/S BSK REALTORS LLP & ANR.                            …RESPONDENTS

With

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 32072/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 18130/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19132/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 10132/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 15707/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 15710/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. 19012/2022,
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
satish kumar yadav
Date: 2024.05.24

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 25834/2022,
18:44:37 IST
Reason:

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 32629/2022,

Page 1 of 57
M.A. No. 277/2023 in C.A. No. 8492/2016,

M.A. ………. D.No. 39901/2022,

M.A. No. 278/2023,

M.A. ………. D.No. 674/2023,

M.A. ………. D.No. 3577/2023,

M.A. No. 346/2023,

M.A. ………. D.No. 5711/2023,

C.A. No. 542/2016,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. 30127/2015,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. 11394/2016,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. 7215/2017,

CONMT. PET. (C) No. 189/2019 in C.A. No. 2690/2017

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 9628/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 22127/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 28216/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 29469/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 3566/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 3812/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 8414/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 8556/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 10221/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 10222/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 10474/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 10475/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 15577/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 15940/2022,

Page 2 of 57
C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 16176/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 20229/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 20555/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 21746/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 27994/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 33077/2022,

M.A. ………. D.No. 39898/2022,

M.A. ………. D.No. 40951/2022,

M.A. ………. D.No. 42177/2022,

M.A. ………. D.No. 1215/2023,

M.A. ………. D.No. 1713/2023,

M.A. No. 1888/2023 in C.A. No. 352/2023,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. 28847/2015,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. 26525/2015,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. 17207/2017,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No(s). 592-593/2020,

M.A. No. 806/2020 in C.A. No. 2690/2017,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 6981/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 22388/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 22391/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 23612/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 24447/2021

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 28971/2021,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 2404/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 4937/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 10090/2022,

Page 3 of 57
C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 15722/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 18142/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 18366/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 18873/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19142/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19685/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19687/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19689/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19691/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19693/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19694/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19697/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 19724/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 20104/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 20203/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 20255/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 20260/2022,

C.A. No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) No. ……/2024 @ SLP(C) D.No. 21620/2022,

And

M.A. ………. D.No. 32991/2023

Page 4 of 57
JUDGMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. PREFACE ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5

B. BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS …………………………………………………………………………… 7

C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY ……………………………………………………………………………. 11

D. CATEGORIZATION OF CASES …………………………………………………………………….. 13

E. SUBMISSIONS ………………………………………………………………………………………… 18

F. ANALYSIS ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 24
F.1 RES JUDICATA ……………………………………………………………………………………24
F.2 SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS BY APPELLANTS ……………………………………………….28
F.3 MERGER …………………………………………………………………………………………31
F.4 ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD COMMITTED BY LANDOWNERS ……………………………………………38

G. CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 41
ANNEXURE 1…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 53

1. In view of the reasons assigned in the judgment pronounced by

Hon’ble Surya Kant, J., speaking for the three of us minutes before in Delhi

Development Authority v. Tejpal and others1, delay in presentation of

all the Special Leave Petitions (“SLPs”, hereafter) under consideration

stands condoned except those mentioned in Group B.2, which have been

rendered infructuous as discussed later in this judgment, and Group D

which we have directed to be de-tagged for separate listing.

2. Special leave is granted in all the SLPs except those in Group B.2

and Group D.

A. PREFACE

3. We are confronted with a peculiar situation where the Latin maxim

“interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it is in the interest of the State that

1
Civil Appeal No…………of 2024 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 26697/2019

Page 5 of 57
there be an end to litigation) notwithstanding, it is the State itself that has

initiated a second round of litigation before this Court after culmination of

the first round and sown the seeds for days’ of hearing engaging our

attention to erudite arguments from learned counsel on both sides. We are

now tasked to decide on which side the Court should lean.

4. The quest for primacy between private interest and public interest

has been a matter of debate for years together; the scales, however, seem

to have tilted, ever so slightly, in favour of the latter. Yet, between the devil

and the deep sea, we endeavour to construct a bridge—a ‘setu’—to strike a

harmonious balance for the greater good; all, while adhering to the

enduring Latin dictum “salus populi suprema lex esto”, a principle that

reinforces the paramountcy of the people’s welfare as the supreme law.

5. There is one other aspect which needs emphasis. Justice, alone of

all virtues, implies a notion of duty. As Judges of this Court, we are duty-

bound to not only uphold the law but also ensure its consistent application.

In navigating through the crisis, chaos, and confusion presented by the

several sets of appeals before us, we are committed to ensure consistency,

clarity, and coherence and strike a delicate, yet, necessary balance to arrive

at a harmonious resolution. In the course of rectifying the aftermath of

rulings and overrulings, and grappling with complexities surrounding

questions of limitations, maintainability, merger doctrine, etc., our

commitment to justice remains resolute.

6. With these prefatory words, we now proceed to decide the various

sets of appeals before us.

Page 6 of 57

B. BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS

7. While there are multiple civil appeals, which we are tasked to

decide, a particular SLP2 was referred to a Bench of three Judges by a Bench

of two Judges vide order dated 21st July, 2022. In view of grant of leave by

us, this would be treated as the lead matter.

8. We place on record that it is pursuant to the said order dated 21 st

July, 2022 that all these appeals have been listed before us, in deference

to orders made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.

9. Before delving deep into the intricacies presented by these civil

appeals, it would be apposite to trace the factual trajectory of the lead

matter culminating in the present stage:

a) The facts are noticed from the Civil Appeal3 arising out of the

Writ Petition4 instituted before the High Court of Delhi (“High

Court”, hereafter) by the first respondent, M/s BSK Realtors

LLP. Land acquisition proceedings had been initiated under the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act,” hereafter) to acquire

several parcels of lands. Land belonging to M/s BSK Realtors

LLP comprised in Khasra No.623(5-10) measuring 5 bighas 10

biswas in Chattarpur village also formed part of the

proceedings. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated

11th January, 2016 allowed the writ petition. In so allowing, it

relied on the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal

2
Diary No. 17623/2021
3
GNCTD & Anr. v. M/S BSK Realtors LLP & Anr., Diary No. 17623/2021
4
W.P. (C) No. 7442/2015

Page 7 of 57
Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal

Solanki and others 5 and similar line of decisions. It was held

in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) that if any one of the

two ingredients of section 24(2) of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”,

hereafter) was attracted, i.e., either the physical possession of

the land was not taken or the compensation was not paid, as

the case may be, the acquisition proceedings under challenge

would be deemed to have lapsed. As a matter of fact, the High

Court found all the ingredients of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act

as interpreted by the Supreme Court to be satisfied despite

Award No.15/87-88 dated 5th June 1987 and hence, declared

the acquisition proceedings to have lapsed.

b) Aggrieved thereby, the beneficiary of the acquisition

proceedings – Delhi Development Authority (second respondent

herein) (“DDA”, hereafter), carried such judgment and order in

appeal praying for it to be set aside. After granting leave, a

Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court vide judgment and

order dated 31st August, 2016 dismissed the Civil Appeal6. It

was observed that the issue, in principle, had already been

adjudicated against DDA in a previous judgment and order of

5
(2014) 3 SCC 183
6
Civil Appeal No. 8670/2016

Page 8 of 57
a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a related matter7. DDA was

granted extension by a period of one year to avail the liberty

of initiating acquisition proceedings afresh under section 24(2)

of the 2013 Act. This marked the culmination of the first round

of litigation.

c) However, on 06th March, 2020, the decision in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) was overturned by a Constitution Bench

of five Hon’ble Judges in Indore Development Authority v.

Manoharlal and others [5-Judge, lapse]8 holding that land

acquisition proceedings lapse only when the twin conditions are

met, i.e., non-payment of compensation to the landowners

together with failure of the State to take physical possession of

the acquired lands. Leveraging this, Government of NCT of

Delhi (first appellant herein) (“GNCTD”, hereafter) approached

this Court through a SLP9 (the lead matter) wherein M/s BSK

Realtors LLP and DDA were impleaded as the first and second

respondents, respectively. It was contended on behalf of

GNCTD that the judgment and order dated 11th January, 2016

rendered by the High Court ought to be reconsidered in view of

Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).

d) A preliminary objection qua the maintainability of the SLP was

raised by M/s BSK Realtors LLP. The first contention in line with

7
Civil Appeal No. 8477/2016 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8467/2015
8
(2020) 8 SCC 129
9
Diary No. 17623/2021

Page 9 of 57
the doctrine of merger was that the order of the High Court

dated 11th January, 2016 had merged with the order dated 31st

August, 2016 of this Court whereby the civil appeal at the

instance of DDA was dismissed. Such dismissal, M/s BSK

Realtors LLP further contended, was after grant of leave and by

a speaking order upon hearing all the parties involved. M/s BSK

Realtors LLP also contended that the order dated 11th January,

2016, upon its merger with the order dated 31 st August, 2016,

ceased to exist and GNCTD being a party to the civil appeal

filed by DDA, the same would disentitle GNCTD from initiating

a new round of litigation to have the order dated 11th January,

2016 reversed on the specious ground that the decision in

Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) has been rendered

after dismissal of the civil appeal of DDA, overruling the

decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).

Accordingly, it was submitted that the SLP not being

maintainable deserved outright dismissal.

e) Observing that the issue requires deeper examination, a Bench

of two Hon’ble Judges, vide the said order dated 21st July,

2022, directed that the matter be placed before a three-Judge

Bench. The relevant portion of the said order is extracted

hereunder:

“According to the land-losers, rejection of challenge to the
declaration of lapsing at the instance of Authority or State,
would dis-entitle the other (i.e., Authority or State) to
maintain successive petition against the same judgment; and

Page 10 of 57
especially where in the earlier round leave to appeal was
granted by this Court and the appeal had been disposed of
after hearing all concerned. In other words, the doctrine of
merger is being invoked to buttress this preliminary
objection.

On the other hand, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional
Solicitor General is relying on the observations/dictum of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Indore Development
Authority vs. Manoharlal & Ors. reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129
to contend that the effect of the declaration or conclusion
recorded therein is to efface all the orders passed in the
concerned special leave petition or civil appeal following the
decision in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. Harakchand
Misirmal Solanki & Ors. reported in 2014 (3) SCC 183 —
which has been expressly overruled and as noted in
paragraph 365 of the reported decision. (Indore Development
Authority).

It is urged that the effect of such overruling is to efface all
the orders, including passed by this Court relying on Pune
Municipal Corporation (Supra).

[…]

Suffice it to observe that these matters require deeper
examination, for which the same need to be placed before the
three Judge Bench for hearing on 17.08.2022.”

(underlining ours, for emphasis)

10. As observed above, it is by virtue of this order that we now have

the occasion to decide the issue raised by parties on both the sides.

C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY

11. Having noticed the facts in the lead matter, we must at this stage

acknowledge the predicament of being faced with a peculiar dusty situation

where we are tasked not only to clear our path to adjudicate a similar issue

on separate fronts but also to ensure that the law on this matter settles the

dust so raised. This exercise would necessitate harmonising the different

routes that we are bound to traverse to reach the same destination. Hence,

Page 11 of 57
notwithstanding the expense of reiterating the foregoing, it is imperative to

navigate the broader judicial trajectory that has brought us to the current

stage.

a) Relying upon the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) and similar line of decisions, the High

Court vide various judgments and orders, allowed writ petitions

filed by the several affected landowners (“landowners”,

hereafter).

b) Discontented, the aggrieved authorities [being the respondents

in the writ petitions including DDA, GNCTD, Land Acquisition

Collector (“LAC”, hereafter), and Land & Building Department

(“L&B”, hereafter)] carried such judgments and orders

independently by way of their respective SLPs impleading the

other, however, as a co-respondent. This triggered the first

round of litigation (“first round”, hereafter) yielding diverse

outcomes which are categorized as follows: first, in some

cases, leave was granted but the civil appeals were

subsequently dismissed (or allowed, in handful of cases);

second, in some cases, leave was not granted and the SLPs

were dismissed in limine; and third, where SLPs/civil appeals

are still pending adjudication.

c) Dismissal of the civil appeals/SLPs brought about a quietus.

However, in the light of change in law consequent to the

decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), such of the

Page 12 of 57
authorities (DDA, GNCTD, LAC, and L&B) who had not earlier

challenged the judgments and orders of the High Court

declaring land acquisition proceedings as lapsed, approached

this Court by way of SLPs/Miscellaneous Applications (“M.A.s”,

hereafter)/Review Petitions. This triggered the second round of

litigation (“second round”, hereafter), however, with the status

of the aggrieved authorities being transposed. For instance,

filing of SLP by GNCTD impleading DDA as the second

respondent in the lead matter, as noticed above, whereas

GNCTD was the second respondent in the first round initiated

by DDA.

d) Upon the appeals being placed before us, we are entrusted with

resolving the issue, or for that matter issues, outlined later in

the judgment.

12. Since the authorities (DDA, GNCTD, LAC, and L&B) jointly harbour

a shared grievance and individually act as appellants in the ongoing

proceedings, they will be collectively denoted as “appellants” hereafter,

notwithstanding the transposition of the authorities as parties or their status

as respondents in the second round. Insofar as the affected landowners are

concerned, they shall be referred to as “landowners” or “aggrieved parties”,

as the context would require.

D. CATEGORIZATION OF CASES

13. Each of the Civil Appeals/M.A.s before us may necessitate

separate directions. We have, therefore, categorised them in six groups

Page 13 of 57
based on varied outcomes in the first round of litigation and their respective

status in the second round of litigation for ease of reference.

14. A brief overview of the groups we have carved out for the facility

of reference is as under:

a) Group A deals with M.A.s filed by the appellants-authorities

primarily pleading change in law and seeking recall of the

judgments and orders of this Court dismissing the Civil Appeals

and/or Review Petitions in the first round.

b) Group B.1 includes cases where Civil Appeals were dismissed

in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, leave

having been granted by us) is pending before us in the second

round.

c) Cases categorized under Group B.2 encompass the following

scenarios:

i. Four cases where the Civil Appeals of the appellants-

authorities were allowed in the first round and the SLPs,

filed during the pendency of the appeals in the first round,

are pending before us in the second round (present batch).

ii. One case where the appeal, filed by the appellant-authority

subsequent to the SLP pending before us in the present

round, was allowed after granting leave.

d) Group C.1 covers a case where an SLP was dismissed in limine

in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, leave

having been granted by us) is pending before us in the second

Page 14 of 57
round. In this particular case, the land acquisition proceedings

would lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-

Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions under section

24(2) of the 2013 Act are met [non-payment of compensation

to the landowners together with failure of the State to take

physical possession of the acquired lands].

e) Group C.2 covers a case where an SLP was dismissed in limine

in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, leave

having been granted by us) is pending before us in the second

round. In this particular case, land acquisition proceedings

would not lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-

Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions under section

24(2) of the 2013 Act are not met.

f) Group C.3 involves cases where during pendency of the SLP in

the first round, the appellants approached this Court with a

fresh SLP owing to a change in law. While in some cases both

the SLPs (now Civil Appeals) are pending before us in the

present batch, in some cases, the other SLP is pending

separately and is not part of the present batch. There are also

a few cases where there is only one SLP filed and the same is

now pending as a Civil Appeal in the present batch after grant

of leave.

g) Group D are miscellaneous matters which have been tagged

incorrectly with the present batch and they follow separate

Page 15 of 57
directions. Group D also involves cases where no notice has

been issued by this Court till date.

h) Cases falling under Group E generally involve allegations

related to subsequent sale transactions by landowners. There

are certain cases where this position is admitted. Some cases

also include allegations regarding the ownership title of the

land in question. Additionally, in a few instances, the appellants

claim that the land in question is vested in Gaon Sabha, a fact

which the landowners and affected parties have suppressed.

These cases require thorough fact-finding, as determined later,

and are therefore addressed separately. Cases categorized

under Group E may overlap with Groups A to C (excluding

Group B.2, which we propose to dismiss as infructuous infra).

As a result, any directions issued under Group E are intended

exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall be

automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For

added clarity, it is stated that all cases falling under Group E

are proposed to be remitted to the High Court, regardless of

their classification within the aforementioned categories.

i) We set out hereinbelow in tabular form the cases covered by

the aforesaid groups:

Page 16 of 57

TOTAL
GROUP SUB-GROUPS DESCRIPTION NUMBER
OF CASES
GROUP A Not Applicable M.A.s filed by the appellants-authorities primarily pleading 2
(M.A.s) change in law and seeking recall of the judgments and
orders of this Court dismissing the Civil Appeals and/or
Review Petitions in the first round.

GROUP B Group B.1 Civil Appeal dismissed in the first round; SLP pending in the 40
(Civil Appeal in first second round (present batch)
round) Group B.2 Civil Appeal allowed in the first round; SLP pending in the 5
second round (present batch)
GROUP C Group C.1 SLP dismissed in limine in the first round; SLP pending in 1
(SLP in first round) the second round (present batch)

• Land acquisition proceedings would lapse following the
test laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) as the twin conditions under section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act are met [non-payment of compensation
to the landowners together with failure of the State to
take physical possession of the acquired lands].

Group C.2 SLP dismissed in limine in the first round; SLP pending in 1
the second round (present batch)

• Land acquisition proceedings would not lapse following
the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) as the twin conditions under section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act are not met.

Group C.3 SLP from either the first round or both rounds is pending in 16
the present batch

• Land acquisition proceedings would not lapse following
the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) as the twin conditions under section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act are not met.

GROUP D Group D.1 • Cases filed by landowners; 5

(Miscellaneous • Cases seeking a different relief;
matters) • Cases where no notice has been issued either on delay
or on merits
Group D.2 Cases where no notice has been issued either on delay or 11
on merits
TOTAL 81
GROUP E Not Applicable Cases where the landowners are alleged to have committed 32
(Suppression of fraud by suppressing facts regarding them being
facts qua subsequent purchasers and/or the land being vested in
subsequent Gaon Sabha
purchaser/title etc.)

Note: Cases categorized under Group E, owing to their distinct facts and circumstances, may overlap with Groups
A to C (excluding Group B.2, which we propose to dismiss as infructuous). As a result, any directions issued under
Group E are intended exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall be automatically excluded from the
purview of Groups A to C. For added clarity, it is stated that all cases falling under Group E shall be remanded
back to the High Court, regardless of their classification within the aforementioned categories.

A detailed table listing each case along with its respective group has been

appended to this order for easy reference.

Page 17 of 57

E. SUBMISSIONS

15. Given the significance of the present exercise, an array of

distinguished counsel from both sides — including the learned Attorney

General, learned Additional Solicitor General, and other senior counsel —

appeared before us. While it may not be necessary for the purpose of

disposal of these appeals to record in detail the extensive submissions made

at the Bar by them, for the sake of completeness, we propose to provide a

concise overview of the arguments presented.

16. Counsel for the appellants prayed for allowing the civil appeals,

while advancing the following arguments:

On merger, res judicata, and prospective overruling:

a) The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional

law nor a doctrine having statutory recognition. It is merely a

common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety and

does not have universal applicability. Even a speaking order

dismissing the SLP would not attract the doctrine.

b) Law declared by the Constitution Bench in Manoharlal [5-

Judge, lapse] (supra) applies retrospectively from 01st

January, 2014. Earlier decision of the previous court shall not

operate as res judicata, if the law has been altered.

c) In the first round, the appellants/authorities were arrayed as

respondents merely as a formality, without being adequately

heard. As a result, the doctrines of merger or res judicata do

not apply and the judgment and order issued by this Court in

Page 18 of 57
the first round is not binding on these authorities. Such a

situation could allow anyone to come forward, get the appeal

dismissed, and conclude the lis forever, which is an undesirable

outcome.

d) By virtue of principles flowing from Rule 4 read with Rule 33 of

Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC” hereafter), this Court

possesses ample authority to do complete justice, aligned with

principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The mere

fact that a petitioner who filed the SLP in the second round was

a party to the first round as a respondent would not warrant

the application of the doctrine of res judicata.

e) Decisions rendered in the preceding round of litigation, solely

relying on judgments that have since been invalidated and

effaced, within a brief timeframe, should not be permitted to

result in a miscarriage of justice under the pretext of the

doctrine of merger. Each case possesses unique and distinct

facts, even if they pertain to a common subject.

f) Any factual claim involved in the present appeals may be

remanded to the High Court to ensure proper adjudication and

prevent miscarriage of justice.

On subsequent purchasers contesting acquisition proceedings:

g) A judgment or decree obtained through fraudulent means is

void and non-existent in the eyes of the law and can be

contested even in a collateral proceeding.

Page 19 of 57

h) Purchasers subsequent to the issuance of a Notification under

section 4(1) of the 1894 Act lack the entitlement to assert the

lapse of acquisition proceedings on any grounds. In cases

where landowners engaged in fraudulent activities by entering

into subsequent sale transactions with prior knowledge of the

Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, such

subsequent purchasers lack entitlement to initiate a case for

declaration. They do not acquire any legal rights in the land, as

the sale is fundamentally void ab initio, thereby disqualifying

them from asserting the lapse of acquisition proceedings or

claiming the land under the policy.

i) Although the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges in Govt (NCT) of

Delhi v. Manav Dharam Trust and another 10 had

recognised the right of the subsequent purchasers, such

decision is no longer good law in view of the same being

overruled by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges in Shiv Kumar

and another v. Union of India and others11 and such

decision having found approval in Manoharlal [5-Judge,

lapse] (supra).

On principles of consistency and public interest

10
(2017) 6 SCC 751
11
(2019) 10 SCC 229

Page 20 of 57

j) The constitutional tenets of consistency, the rule of law, and

the principle of “actus curiae neminem gravabit” embody the

fundamental and foundational principles of justice.

k) The Government and Public Sector Undertakings, acting in the

public interest and with good faith, aim to avoid burdening the

court dockets unnecessarily.

l) However, the appeals at hand present a unique situation not

hitherto dealt with by any judicial pronouncement of this Court

and bearing in mind the gravamen of the appellants’ complaint

and the extent of public interest at stake, the Court may not

take a view which would throw asunder the developmental

works undertaken by the appellants on the acquired lands.

17. Counsel for the landowners and the affected parties urged this

Court to dismiss the appeals at the outset, being devoid of merits. The

following submissions were advanced by them:

On merger:

a) In cases where this Court had previously granted leave and

dismissed the appeal, the doctrine of merger would apply and

the judgment and order of the High Court would stand merged

into the judgment and order of this Court. The judgment and

order of the High Court cannot thereafter be challenged by any

party, as it has ceased to exist. The doctrine applies regardless

of whether the appeal has been dismissed through a speaking

or a non-speaking order.

Page 21 of 57

b) Additionally, whether there has been a discussion of facts in

the judgment(s) of this Court will be immaterial as it has

resulted in a merger with the judgment and order of the High

Court where the facts were discussed.

On res judicata

c) The principles of res judicata and analogous principles

embodied in section 11, CPC and its Explanations clearly apply

to the present appeals. Even an erroneous decision, whether

on facts or law, would bind the parties. The acquiring

authorities (GNCTD, LAP, L&B Department), and the

beneficiary (DDA) share a common interest in the acquisition

of land for public purpose. When either of the parties litigates,

one is deemed to litigate on behalf of all interested parties.

Thus, the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one of the

authorities, would act as res judicata against the other

authority.

d) The appellants were granted one-year period to commence

fresh acquisition proceedings. With the expiry of this

timeframe, the State’s right has been closed for all intents and

purposes. It cannot now contest this Court’s order and assert

a reversal of the lapse of acquisition proceedings.

On subsequent purchasers contesting acquisition proceedings:

e) None of the appeals has alleged any form of fraud practised by

the affected parties. Legal principles dictate that when fraud is

Page 22 of 57
asserted, it must be expressly pleaded in accordance with the

provisions of Order VI Rules 2 & 4, CPC. The law does not

permit unsubstantiated assertions to be made solely through

oral arguments. The appellants have not succeeded in

establishing that a subsequent sale transaction occurred with

prior knowledge after the Notification under section 4(1) of the

1894 Act. Without evidence of such foresight and dishonest

intention, the claim of fraud cannot be substantiated.

f) The decisions of the High Court in Ranjana Bhatia v. Govt.

of NCT of Delhi and another12 and Sparsh Properties Pvt.

Ltd. v. Union of India and others 13 sanctioned subsequent

purchasers to pursue a declaration of a right that had already

vested in the landowners under the deeming provision of

section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. These decisions were given a

further seal of approval by the decision of a Bench of two

Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Manav Dharam Trust (supra).

Therefore, the change in law occasioned by its overruling in

Shiv Kumar (supra) cannot be utilised as a crutch to claim

that subsequent purchasers cannot seek a declaration of

lapsing.

12
(2014) SCC OnLine Del 2151
13
(2014) SCC OnLine Del 6659

Page 23 of 57

g) In any event, the decision in Shiv Kumar (supra) is not good

law and requires reconsideration by a larger Bench of this

Court.

F. ANALYSIS

18. Having heard the arguments presented by both sides at length on

different issues, we propose segmenting our analysis accordingly. The

following issues emerge for our consideration:

a) Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one

appellant in the first round operates as res judicata against the

other appellant in the second round before us?

b) Whether suppression of the first round of litigation by the

appellants constitutes a material fact, thereby inviting an

outright dismissal of the appeals at the threshold?

c) Does the doctrine of merger operate as a bar to entertain the

civil appeals in the present case?

d) Whether the previous determination of the rights of subsequent

purchasers in an inter se dispute precludes the same issue from

being reconsidered between the same parties?

F.1 Res judicata

19. The first issue we noticed at the start of our analysis stems from

the submission pertaining to res judicata. Counsel for the landowners,

pressing the applicability of the principle of res judicata to the present

appeals, submitted that the dismissal of a Civil Appeal preferred by one of

Page 24 of 57
the appellants in the first round, would act as res judicata against the other

in subsequent round/s of litigation. The appellants contested the same and

submitted that res judicata would not apply to the current proceedings.

20. Would the rule of res judicata operate against the co-respondents

before the High Court, namely GNCTD and DDA, and preclude us from

looking into the merits of the present set of appeals, is the question that

we propose to examine and answer now.

21. Nearly a century ago, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Privy

Council in Munni Bibi (since deceased) and another v. Tirloki Nath

and others14 laid down the following three conditions for the application of

res judicata between co-defendants:

“(1.) There, must be a conflict of interest between the defendants
concerned; (2.) it must be necessary to decide this conflict in
order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; and (3.) the question
between the defendants must have been finally decided.”

22. In State of Gujarat and others v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust

and others15, a Bench comprising two Hon’ble Judges ruled that the

principle of res judicata applies only when there has been a directly and

substantially disputed issue between the parties, which the court has heard

and conclusively resolved. The relevant extract of the decision is extracted

hereunder:

“17. […] For attracting the rule of res judicata between co-
defendants — according to the terms in Section 11 of the Civil
Procedure Code which provision of course is not, in terms,
applicable to proceedings in a writ petition — it is necessary that
there should have been some issue directly and substantially in
controversy between them which has been heard and finally

14
AIR 1931 PC 114
15
(1994) 3 SCC 552

Page 25 of 57
decided by the court. Same would be the position, where a plea
of res judicata is sought to be raised between co-respondents in a
writ petition, on the general principles of res judicata. Since the
said basic requirement is not satisfied, the said judgment cannot
be treated as res judicata between the trust and the Government.

(underlining ours, for emphasis)

23. In the lead matter before us or for that matter the other appeals,

the co-respondents before the High Court, namely, GNCTD and DDA did not

have conflicting interests. Inter se them, neither was there any disputed

issue, nor could have the High Court possibly adjudicated on any such issue.

Before this Court too, in the first round, there was no issue on which GNCTD

and DDA were at loggerheads. In the light of this, in accordance with the

aforementioned legal principle, the applicability of res judicata is negated.

24. A brief review of the ruling in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal

and others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy 16 will also guide us to the

resolution of the second issue on the applicability of res judicata. In the said

decision, the first-instance court and the High Court rejected an application

seeking fixation of standard rent, holding that the provisions of the Rent

Act did not extend to open land, relying upon an earlier decision. However,

this Court later overturned the said decision, affirming the applicability of

the Rent Act to open land as well. When A filed a fresh application, B

opposed it, claiming it was barred by res judicata. Dismissing this argument

and affirming the application’s viability, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of

this Court observed thus:

“5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of
procedure: it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative

16
(1970) 1 SCC 613

Page 26 of 57
direction between the parties so as to determine the question
relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the
jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no
question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to
the right in dispute between the parties has been determined
thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may
be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties:

the ‘matter in issue’ may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or
one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed
law and fact decided by a competent Court is finally determined
between the parties and cannot be re-opened between them in
another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue
alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res
judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed
by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from
its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the
relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts
which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in
issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is
meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and
cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A
previous decision of a competent Court on facts which are the
foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the
determination of the transaction which is the source of the right is
res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in issue is a
composite decision: the decision on law cannot be dissociated
from the decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decision
on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent
proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the
subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding,
but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law
has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent
authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the
Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision
declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law.
[…]

10. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be
deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision
of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the
Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in
our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly, by an erroneous
decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess
under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata
between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the
subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise.

11. It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res
judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or
otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one

Page 27 of 57
purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent
Court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties
be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed
question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding
between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be
questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties.

But, where the decision is on a question of law i.e. the
interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent
proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is
the same, for the expression ‘the matter in issue’ in Section 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the
parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and
the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where,
however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the
jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning
something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a
party affected by the decision will not be precluded from
challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata,
for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)

25. The law, as we noticed aforesaid, aptly resolves the first issue.

Res judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same

parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been

conclusively determined by a court. However, it is crucial to note that the

previous decision of this Court in the first round would not operate as res

judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the other appeals; more

so, because this rule may not apply hard and fast in situations where larger

public interest is at stake. In such cases, a more flexible approach ought to

be adopted by courts, recognizing that certain matters transcend individual

disputes and have far-reaching public interest implications.

F.2 Suppression of material facts by appellants

26. Counsel on behalf of the landowners have contended that the

conduct of the appellants disqualifies them from seeking any relief. They

Page 28 of 57
assert that the appellants filed the present appeals, specifically under Group

B.1, without disclosing that civil appeals filed by another appellant/authority

against the same impugned order has already been dismissed.

Furthermore, this action is deemed as providing an inaccurate declaration

under Order XXI Rule 3(2) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

27. Before addressing the aforesaid contention, we may refer to the

law laid down in this regard.

28. A Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in S.J.S. Business

Enterprises (P) Ltd v. State of Bihar and others17 held that a fact

suppressed must be material; that is, if it had not been suppressed, it would

have influenced the merits of the case. It was held thus:

“13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant
disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has
been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from
abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed
fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been
suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case.
It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of
the court, whatever view the court may have taken […]

14. Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant that the
suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the Company without
the knowledge of the Director who almost simultaneously
approached the High Court under Article 226 is unbelievable (sic),
the question still remains whether the filing of the suit can be said
to be a fact material to the disposal of the writ petition on merits.

We think not. […] the fact that a suit had already been filed by the
appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which could have
affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits.”

17
(2004) 7 SCC 166

Page 29 of 57

29. Further, a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Arunima

Baruah v. Union of India and others18 following the aforesaid dictum,

held thus:

“12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of
material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof
would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief,
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Material fact would mean material for the purpose of
determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be
that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the
relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of
the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise
its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking
the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to
approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is
removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would
still be denied is the question.”

30. Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be material in

the sense that it would have an effect on the merits of the case. The concept

of suppression or non-disclosure of facts transcends mere concealment; it

necessitates the deliberate withholding of material facts—those of such

critical import that their absence would render any decision unjust. Material

facts, in this context, refer to those facts that possess the potential to

significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory.

This principle is not intended to arm one party with a weapon of technicality

over its adversary but rather serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse

of the judicial process.

31. Nevertheless, we have carefully considered the orders issued

during the first round of litigation, which are alleged to have been

18
(2007) 6 SCC 120

Page 30 of 57
suppressed. Despite reviewing these orders, we find no compelling reason

to dismiss the appeals based solely on the prior dismissal of appeals filed

by some other appellant/authority.

F.3 Merger

32. Extensive arguments have been advanced by the parties on the

aspect of applicability/non-applicability of the doctrine of merger, either by

relying upon or distinguishing the decision in Kunhayammed and others.

V. State of Kerala and another 19, rendered by a Bench of three Hon’ble

Judges of this Court. For the purpose of a decision on these appeals qua

cases under Groups A and B.1, we do not consider it necessary to opine

either way.

33. However, in the light of the settled propositions on the doctrine of

merger and the rule of stare decisis, we respectfully concur with

Kunhayammed (supra) and the decisions that have followed the same.

We also take notice of the exception carved out by this Court in

Kunhayammed (supra), to the effect that the doctrine of merger is not of

universal or unlimited application and that the nature of jurisdiction

exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of

challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.

The exception, in our considered opinion, that has been carved out in

Kunhayammed (supra), will only be permissible in the rarest of rare cases

and such a deviation can be invoked sparingly only. We, however, hasten

to add that among such exceptions, the extraordinary constitutional powers

19
(2000) 6 SCC 359

Page 31 of 57
vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which is

to be exercised with a view to do complete justice between the parties,

remains unaffected and being an unfettered power, shall always be deemed

to be preserved as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of

stare decisis.

34. We may now at this stage look back to the Preface of this order

where we have encapsulated our predicament to not only uphold the law

but also to ensure its consistent application. It is our duty to enable

consistency, clarity and coherence and strike a delicate balance through

harmonious resolutions regardless of the crisis, chaos and confusion created

by inconsistent judicial opinions on section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, making

the present batch of lis a sui generis dispute.

35. In this regard, it would be worthwhile to notice the conclusions

recorded in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and what followed in

the aftermath thereof. The conclusions read as follows:

“Conclusions of the Court

365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn.

Is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal
Corpn.1 has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree
Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. cannot be said to be laying down
good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are
also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra5,
the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and
whether ‘or’ has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ was not placed for
consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the
light of the discussion in the present judgment.

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions
as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award
is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the

Page 32 of 57
2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to
be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window
period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim
order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided
under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it
has not been repealed.

366.3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession
and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed
lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five
years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been
paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken,
compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly,
if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken
then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court.

The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to
Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to
majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on
the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the
1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section
31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest
under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of
compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land
acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the
majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under
the 2013 Act has to be paid to the ‘landowners’ as on the date of
notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as
provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to
him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due
to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under
Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept
compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation,
cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be
treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

Page 33 of 57
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as
contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest
report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking
possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in
State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse
under Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed
lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed
due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for
five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a
proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority
concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim
orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of
five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new
cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings
of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on
the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not
revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen
concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the
legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or
mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court
to invalidate acquisition.”

36. Soon after the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)

was pronounced, applications for recall of the judgment in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) came to be filed. By an order dated 16 th July, 2020 in

Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [Recall

Order]20, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges allowed such applications,

thereby recalling the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).

37. The net result of the aforesaid judicial decisions is that the

judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) loses its precedential

value, having been recalled, although the said decision would be binding

20
2020 SCC OnLine SC 1471

Page 34 of 57
inter partes. We are informed that applications to recall the order dated 16 th

July, 2020 have since been filed but are yet to be considered. Be that as it

may.

38. At this stage, we may advert to the factual scenario of the cases

in hand. These cases can be, in a way, further categorized as pre-

Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). On the other hand, the cases which

fall in Groups C, are where SLPs were dismissed in limine in the first round

and/or such SLPs are pending in the second round. These cases, given the

binding nature of the law laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]

(supra), are covered by that decision against the landowners. It is a totally

fortuitous and an incidental circumstance that one SLP arising out of the

same acquisition may have been converted into a civil appeal and dismissed

by this Court but another SLP, again arising out of the same acquisition,

either might have been dismissed without granting leave or is still pending.

The necessary consequence is that one parcel of land stands acquired and

vested in the State free from all encumbrances under the 1894 Act whereas

another parcel of adjoining land stands released on account of the

acquisition having lapsed under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is also

quite possible that the parcel of land qua which the acquisition is deemed

to have lapsed already stands utilized fully or partially for the development

of public infrastructure, and on the other hand the parcel of the land which

has vested in the State is still lying unutilized as the public project is yet to

be completed.

39. This piquant situation created not by an act of State and rather

being a consequence of inconsistent judicial pronouncements of this Court,

Page 35 of 57
has led to hostile discriminatory treatment to identically placed landowners.

If not cured, it will lead to unexplained disparities. Not only this, it would

cause a serious crisis and chaos as several projects of paramount public

importance like the construction of metro, flyovers, schools, hospitals or

other public utilities will have to be halted until the State re-acquires such

parcels of land which are compelled to be released on account of acquisition

qua them having lapsed in the pre-Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)

era. The consequences are extremely grave and would be totally

detrimental to public interest.

40. The concept of ‘public interest’ need not be elaborately explained

by us here for the reason that we have succinctly explained the same in our

judgment pronounced separately in Tejpal (supra). There, we have

summed up the following elements of ‘public interest’, which we employ

mutatis mutandis in this batch of cases also:

a) While balancing the interest of the public exchequer against

that of individuals, there are many other interests at stake, and

it might not be possible to undo the acquisitions without

causing significant cascading harms and losses to such other

interests;

b) Since development projects have either begun or most of the

acquired lands have already been deployed for essential public

projects such as hospitals, schools, expansion of metro, etc.,

the effect of non-condonation of delay would go beyond mere

Page 36 of 57
financial loss to the exchequer and would extend to the public

at large;

c) It would be like unscrambling the egg if compensation paid

would have to be clawed back or possession taken would have

to be reversed;

d) In many cases, the development projects might also have to

be undone. The reversal of possession of even a small plot lying

on projects such as an under-construction metro corridor would

be practically impossible;

e) These are the cases where rights are vested to the public at

large given the public infrastructure that has come up on a

large number of acquired lands;

f) The fresh acquisition, if so is required to be done by the State,

would be at the expense of delaying the construction of critical

public infrastructure in our national capital. When balancing

public with private interest, the comparative interest on the

landowners would be nominal as compared to the public at

large; and

g) The multiplicity of contradictory judicial opinions on section 24

(2) of the 2013 Act has made the present set of circumstances

sui generis. The constant flux in the legal position of law has

posed significant challenges for the State and its authorities.

Page 37 of 57

41. Having held that the concept of public interest need not be viewed

narrowly only on the yardstick of loss to public exchequer and that these

are the cases where public at large has acquired interest in the public

infrastructures already complete or in process of completion, we are

satisfied that if the doctrine of merger is applied mechanically in respect of

Groups A and B.1 cases, it will lead to irreversible consequences. We are

satisfied that the element of disparity between Groups A and B.1 cases vis-

à-vis cases falling in Group C is liable to be eliminated and this can only be

done by invoking our extraordinary power under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India so that we are able to do complete justice between the

expropriated landowners, the State and its developing agencies and most

importantly the public in general who has acquired a vested right in the

public infrastructure projects. We will do so through the operative part of

this order.

F.4 Allegations of fraud committed by landowners

42. As stated aforesaid, Group E cases deal with allegations regarding

fraud by landowners by suppressing subsequent sale transactions,

ownership title disputes, etc.

43. The appellants contended that the landowners and affected parties

deliberately concealed crucial facts from the High Court, including details

about previous legal disputes and subsequent sale transactions. Such

concealment constitutes fraud, and as a result, the landowners and affected

parties should not be permitted to benefit from their own deceptive actions.

Page 38 of 57

44. It is settled law that after the Notification under section 4(1) of

the 1894 Act is published, any encumbrance created by the owner does not

bind the State. In such a scenario, a bona fide purchaser of land for value

does not acquire any right, title or interest in the land, and he is only entitled

to receive compensation if not objected to by the landowner/transferor.

Therefore, transfer of land in respect of which acquisition proceedings had

been initiated, after issuance of Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894

Act, is void and a subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the

notification or the irregularity in taking possession of the land.

45. We may also refer to the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers)

Act, 1972 (“1972 Act”, hereafter) which imposes certain restrictions on

transfer of lands which have been acquired. Section 3 prohibits the transfer

of any land acquired by the Central Government under the 1894 Act.

Section 4 mandates obtaining prior permission from the competent

authority for transferring any land intended for acquisition, following a

declaration by the Central Government under section 6 of the 1894 Act.

Section 5 requires the transferor of a land mentioned in a Notification under

section 4(1) to submit a written application to the competent authority. The

structure of the 1972 Act clearly indicates that any subsequent sale of the

specified land without prior permission from the competent authority is not

allowed, and if such sale is done through concealment, it amounts to fraud.

46. The law with respect to “who” can invoke section 24(2) of the

2013 Act has been well settled after the decision of this Court in Shiv

Kumar (supra) wherein it was held that subsequent purchasers do not have

the locus to contest the acquisition and/or claim lapse of the acquisition

Page 39 of 57
proceedings. This decision has expressly overruled the previous decision of

this Court in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) by recognizing the statutory

intention behind the 2013 Act, which sought to benefit owners of lands who

purchased the lands before the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894

Act but not for the benefit of those who have purchased the lands after

vesting of lands with the State. The relevant paragraphs of the decision are

extracted hereunder:

“21. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act,
challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over of
possession under the 1894 Act cannot be made, based on a void
transaction nor declaration can be sought under Section 24(2) by
such incumbents to obtain the land. The declaration that
acquisition has lapsed under the 2013 Act is to get the property
back whereas, the transaction once void, is always a void
transaction, as no title can be acquired in the land as such no such
declaration can be sought. It would not be legal, just and equitable
to give the land back to purchaser as land was not capable of being
sold which was in process of acquisition under the 1894 Act. The
2013 Act does not confer any right on purchaser whose sale is ab
initio void. Such void transactions are not validated under the
2013 Act. No rights are conferred by the provisions contained in
the 2013 Act on such a purchaser as against the State.

26. […] No declaration can be sought by a purchaser under Section
24 that acquisition has lapsed, effect of which would be to get
back the land. They cannot seek declaration that acquisition made
under the 1894 Act has lapsed by the challenge to the proceedings
of taking possession under the 1894 Act. Such right was not
available after the purchase in 2000 and no such right has been
provided to the purchasers under the 2013 Act also. Granting a
right to question acquisition would be against the public policy and
the law which prohibits such transactions; it cannot be given effect
to under the guise of subsequent legislation containing similar
provisions. Subsequent legislation does not confer any new right
to a person based on such void transaction; instead, it includes a
provision prohibiting such transactions without permission of the
Collector as provided in Section 11(4).

28. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust does not
lay down the law correctly. Given the several binding precedents

Page 40 of 57
which are available and the provisions of the 2013 Act, we cannot
follow the decision in Manav Dharam Trust […].”

47. Counsel representing the landowners have contested the

correctness of the decision in Shiv Kumar (supra) and urged this Court to

refer it to a larger Bench for reconsideration. This was a contention raised

in desperation overlooking that Shiv Kumar (supra) has been approved by

the Constitution Bench in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). We are,

thus, not impressed by the aforesaid contention and reiterate that Shiv

Kumar (supra) represents the correct exposition of law.

48. Coming to the specifics of each case qua subsequent purchasers

or disputes regarding the title of the subject lands, we have already clarified

the scope of our inquiry in Tejpal (supra). At the expense of reiterating, as

far as the concealment of material facts regarding subsequent sale

transactions, earlier round of litigations etc. are concerned, it is noted that

the landowners and affected parties are under no obligation to either

confirm or deny the allegations levelled against them. Nor have we directed

the appellants to furnish original records or documents to substantiate their

claim of concealment and suppression of material facts. Engaging in a

factual inquiry at such an advanced stage of the legal process, especially

without providing adequate opportunities to all parties, may not be fair. The

cases listed in Group E involve complex questions of fact and we being the

Court of the last resort, ought not to be involved in such elaborate fact-

finding exercise. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to remit these cases to

the High Court for proper adjudication on points of law as well as facts.

G. CONCLUSION

Page 41 of 57

49. The following conclusion has been reached regarding each

category of cases outlined at the beginning:

a) So far as the cases falling under GROUP A and B.1 are

concerned (for which we have already condoned delay and

have granted leave through para 1 and 2 of this judgment), we

hold that, owing to the exceptional and unprecedented

situation having arisen for the reasons already discussed

elaborately, we do not deem it necessary to draw any

distinction among the cases classified under Group A and B.1

vis-à-vis cases falling in Group C. Consequently, taking an

overall view of the matter and upon due consideration of the

principles of uniformity, consistency, and public interest

involved, we exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court

by Article 142 of the Constitution and issue the following

directions in each of the cases that have been dealt with by this

judgment and classified under Groups A and B.1:

i. The time limit for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings

in terms of the provisions contained in section 24(2) of the

2013 Act is extended by a year starting from 01st August,

2024 whereupon compensation to the affected landowners

may be paid in accordance with law, failing which

consequences, also as per law, shall follow;

ii. The parties shall maintain status quo regarding possession,

change of land use and creation of third-party rights till

Page 42 of 57
fresh acquisition proceedings, as directed above, are

completed;

iii. Since the landowners are not primarily dependent upon the

subject lands as their source of sustenance and most of

these lands were/are under use for other than agricultural

purposes, we deem it appropriate to invoke our powers

under Article 142 of the Constitution and dispense with the

compliance of Chapters II and III of the 2013 Act

whereunder it is essential to prepare a Social Impact

Assessment Study Report and/or to develop alternative

multi-crop irrigated agricultural land. We do so to ensure

that the timeline of one year extended at (a) above to

complete the acquisition process can be adhered to by the

appellants and the GNCTD, which would also likely be

beneficial to the expropriated landowners;

iv. Similarly, compliance with sections 13, 14, 16 to 20 of the

2013 Act can be dispensed with as the subject-lands are

predominantly urban/semi-urban in nature and had earlier

been acquired for public purposes of paramount importance.

In order to simplify the compliance of direction at (a) above,

it is further directed that every Notification issued under

section 4(1) of the 1894 Act in this batch of cases, shall be

treated as a Preliminary Notification within the meaning of

section 11 of the 2013 Act, and shall be deemed to have

been published as on 01st January, 2014;

Page 43 of 57
v. The Collector shall provide hearing of objections as per

section 15 of the 2013 Act without insisting for any Social

Impact Assessment Report and shall, thereafter, proceed to

take necessary steps as per the procedure contemplated

under section 21 onwards of Chapter-IV of 2013 Act, save

and except where compliance of any provision has been

expressly or impliedly dispensed with;

vi. The landowners may submit their objections within a period

of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this order.

Such objections shall not question the legality of the

acquisition process and shall be limited only to clauses (a)

and (b) of section 15(1) of the 2013 Act;

vii. The Collector shall publish a public notice on his website and

in one English and one vernacular newspapers, within two

weeks of expiry of the period of four weeks granted under

direction (f) above;

viii. The Collector shall, thereafter, pass an award as early as

possible but not exceeding six months, regardless of the

maximum period of twelve months contemplated under

section 25 of the 2013 Act. The market value of the land

shall be assessed as on 01st January, 2014 and the

compensation shall be awarded along with all other

monetary benefits in accordance with the provisions of the

2013 Act except the claim like rehabilitation etc.;

Page 44 of 57
ix. The Collector shall consider all the parameters prescribed

under section 28 of the 2013 Act for determining the

compensation for the acquired land. Similarly, the Collector

shall determine the market value of the building or assets

attached with the land in accordance with section 29 and

shall further award solatium in accordance with section 30

of the 2013 Act;

x. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, since it

is difficult to reverse the clock back, the compliance of

Chapter (V) pertaining to “Rehabilitation and Resettlement

Award” is hereby dispensed with; and

xi. The expropriated landowners shall be entitled to seek

reference for enhancement of compensation in accordance

with Chapter-VIII of the 2013 Act.

b) The SLPs under GROUP B.2 have been rendered infructuous

as the appeals carried by the appellant-authorities have

already been allowed by this Court and the impugned judgment

and order of the High Court have been set aside after applying

the law laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).

No question of filing a subsequent SLP against the same

judgment and order by the appellants, therefore, arises. These

SLPs are accordingly dismissed at their threshold.

c) In one case under GROUP C.1 (GNCTD VS. RAMPHAL

SINGH [Diary No.- 19697/2022]), it is an admitted position of

Page 45 of 57
the appellant/GNCTD that neither possession has been taken

nor compensation granted. With the twin conditions under

section 24(2) of the 2013 Act having been met, applying the

principles laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)

is, therefore, unwarranted in this context. Thus, keeping in

mind the principles of public interest that we have carved out

earlier, it is imperative to invoke our jurisdiction under Article

142 of the Constitution and subject this case to the eleven

directions previously issued for Groups A and B.1.

d) With respect to the SLPs (now civil appeals, leave having been

granted by us) which fall in GROUP C.2 and C.3, the same are

directed against one or the other judgment of the High Court

where acquisition has been declared to have lapsed under

section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. While doing so, the High Court

has followed the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) case or such other decisions, all of which

have since been overruled by the Constitution Bench in

Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). Since the twin

conditions under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act have not been

met in these Civil Appeals, the land acquisition proceedings

would not lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-

Judge, lapse] (supra). These Civil Appeals are accordingly

allowed, the impugned judgments of the High Court in each

case are set aside and the acquisition of the landowners’ lands

under the 1894 Act is accordingly upheld. This will, however,

Page 46 of 57
not preclude the landowners from recovery of the

compensation amount, if already not paid or to the extent it is

not paid, along with interest and other statutory benefits under

the 1894 Act. Similarly, they shall be at liberty to seek

reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act in accordance with

law. The GNCTD and its authorities are directed to take physical

possession of the lands falling under Group C.2 and C.3

forthwith, if not already taken and continue uninterruptedly to

complete the public infrastructure projects. We may clarify that

this will not prevent cases within this Group, if any, from being

remanded to the High Court for the specific purpose of

conducting a factual inquiry regarding fraud, as we intend to

do in the subsequent sub-paragraph.

e) For the reasons given in Section F.4 (Allegations of fraud

committed by landowners), the cases listed in GROUP E are

hereby remitted to the High Court for adjudication of the facts

as well as the law as a fact-finding inquiry is necessary to

ascertain the rightful claimant for receiving the compensation.

We hereby set aside the orders of the High Court that were

under challenge in the Civil Appeals/M.A.s and revive the

relevant writ petitions which shall stand restored on the file of

the High Court for this limited purpose on remand being

ordered. We issue the following directions:

i. The Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to constitute

a dedicated bench to decide these writ petitions in the

Page 47 of 57
manner indicated hereafter. The nominated bench will

accord an opportunity to the landowners/subsequent

purchasers, the GNCTD, and the DDA to submit additional

documents on affidavits whereupon such bench shall

embark on an exercise to decide who between the

landowner(s) and the subsequent purchaser(s) is the

rightful claimant to receive compensation. The nominated

bench will have the authority to obtain independent fact-

finding enquiry reports, if deemed necessary. The inquiry

could include determination as to whether after the

Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, any transfer

could have been effected and even if effected, whether such

transfer is permitted by any law. Once compensation is

determined, the relevant authority in the land acquisition

department shall deposit the same with the reference court.

The reference court shall then invest the deposited amount

in a short-term interest-bearing fixed deposit account with

a nationalized bank, ensuring its periodical renewal until the

relevant writ petition is disposed of by the nominated bench.

Release of the invested amount together with accrued

interest to the rightful claimant will be contingent upon the

decision of the High Court.

ii. The question as to whether the cases in that group will be

eventually covered by the directions issued by us in exercise

of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India or

Page 48 of 57
whether such case will be covered in terms of the direction

contained in sub-paras above, will depend upon and will be

decided by the High Court in accordance with law based

upon facts and circumstances of each case.

50. The above directions however shall not apply to the following

miscellaneous matters (GROUP D) which have been incorrectly tagged in

the present batch. While four of the cases in Group D.1 have been filed by

the landowners seeking relief different from the relief claimed in the appeals

filed by the appellants, in one case the DDA is before us by way of an M.A.

These cases shall be listed separately in the week commencing 22nd July,

2024. The details of the cases are as follows:

a) DELHI ADMINISTRATION AND ORS. VS. M/S AUTO GRIT

(PETROL PUMP) AND ORS. [C.A. No. 542/2016]: The relief

sought in this Civil Appeal is particularly regarding the release

of the land under section 48 of the 1894 Act.

b) RAJENDER SINGH CHAUHAN VS. TARUN KAPOOR AND

ORS. [CONMT.PET. (C) NO. 189/2019 IN C.A. NO.

2690/2017]: In this Contempt Petition, the contempt

petitioner-landowner, dissatisfied with the DDA’s lack of action

in initiating new acquisition proceedings pursuant to the

dismissal of the Civil Appeal vide judgment and order dated

13th February, 2017, has filed a contempt petition.

c) DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH CHAUHAN AND ORS. [M.A. No.

806/2020]: This M.A. is connected to the case that led to the

Page 49 of 57
contempt petition mentioned earlier in point (ii). In this M.A.,

the DDA is seeking a modification of the judgment and orders

dated 13th February, 2017 and 31st July, 2019, whereby the

Civil Appeal and the Review Petition preferred by the DDA were

dismissed, respectively. Although this M.A. could have been

decided based on the directions we have issued for Group D,

since it is connected to the aforementioned contempt petition

and no notice either on delay or on merits has been issued in

this M.A. so far, we deem it appropriate to separate it and have

it heard independently along with the aforesaid contempt

petition.

d) GNCTD VS. SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA [M.A. No.

1888/2023]: This M.A. has been filed by the landowner

seeking recall of the judgment and order dated 10th February,

2023 passed by this Court whereby the Civil Appeal preferred

by the GNCTD against the judgment and order of the High

Court was allowed in view of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]

(supra).

e) LAC VS. VIVEK & ORS. [M.A. …DIARY NO. 32991/2023]:

This M.A. has been filed by the landowner seeking recall of the

judgment and order dated 9th February, 2023 passed by a

Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court whereby the Civil

Appeal preferred by the LAC was partly allowed and the

judgment and order of the High Court was set aside and the

same was remanded back to the High Court for a fresh

Page 50 of 57
determination. It is imperative to note that no notice has been

issued, either on delay or on merits.

51. Group D.2 involves the following cases where no notice has been

issued so far by this Court either on delay or on merits. It is, therefore,

necessary in the interest of justice to de-tag these cases for separate listing

in the week commencing 22nd July, 2024:

a) DDA VS. GITA SABHARWAL [DIARY NO. 21746/2022];

b) DDA VS. NARENDAR KUMAR [DIARY NO. 674/2023, MA];

c) DDA VS. BAL KISHAN [DIARY NO. 5711/2023, MA];

d) DDA VS. ISHAAQ [DIARY NO. 1713/2023, MA];

e) DDA VS. ABHISHEK JAIN [DIARY NO. 40951/2022, MA];

f) DDA VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES PVT LTD [DIARY NO.

42177/2022, MA];

g) DDA VS. SHAKEEL AHMED [DIARY NO. 3577/2023, MA];

h) DDA VS. SURESH KUMAR NANGIA [DIARY NO. 39901/2022,

MA];

i) DDA VS. PHIRE RAM AND ORS. [MA 278/2023];

j) DDA VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH [DIARY NO. 39898/2022,

MA]; and

k) DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH DHANKAR [DIARY NO.

1215/2023, MA].

Page 51 of 57

52. The aforementioned civil appeals and miscellaneous applications

are disposed of on the above terms. Pending applications, if any, shall stand

disposed of. No order as to costs.

53. Before parting, we deem it appropriate to provide a cautionary

note that the limited fact-finding conducted by this Court may not be

entirely accurate due to the complex nature of cases involving subsequent

sale transactions, earlier rounds of litigation, land titles, and status of

compensation and/or possession. We accordingly grant liberty to the parties

to approach the High Court if any disputes arise in future or if further

clarification is required, which will decide these cases based on the

principles outlined above, taking into account the facts and, if necessary,

the merits of the case.

54. It is also needless to clarify that the High Court shall proceed to

decide the cases remitted to it as expeditiously as possible, but subject to

its convenience, in accordance with law.

…………………………………J
(SURYA KANT)

…………………………………J
(DIPANKAR DATTA)

…………………………………J
(UJJAL BHUYAN)

New Delhi;

17th May, 2024.





                                                                      Page 52 of 57
                                                   ANNEXURE 1

                            CATEGORY OF CASES IN THE PRESENT BATCH

                                                                                                                    TOTAL
                SUB-                                                                                               NUMBER
 GROUP                          DESCRIPTION                             CASE TITLE AND NUMBER
               GROUPS                                                                                                OF
                                                                                                                    CASES
GROUP A           Not       M.A.s     filed   by   the   1.   DDA VS. PHIRE RAM                                       2
 (M.A.s)       Applicable   appellants-authorities            [MA 277/2023]

primarily pleading 2. DDA VS. JAI PRAKASH GUPTA
change in law and [MA 346/2023]
seeking recall of the
judgments and orders of
this Court dismissing the
Civil Appeals and/or
Review Petitions in the
first round.

GROUP B Group B.1 Civil Appeal dismissed in 1. GNCTD & ANR VS. M/S BSK REALTORS LLP & ANR. 40
(Civil the first round; SLP [DIARY NO. 17623/2021]
Appeal in pending in the second 2.
LAC VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH & ORS.
first round) round (present batch) [DIARY NO. 32072/2022]

3. LBD VS. DEEKSHA SURI & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 18130/2021]

4. GNCTD & ANR VS. LATINDER SINGH & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 19132/2021]

5. GNCTD & ANR VS. ANJU SHARMA & ORS.

[DIARY NO.10132/2022]

6. GNCTD VS. ANIL MONGA & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 15707/2022]

7. LBD VS. JYOTSNA SURI & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 15710/2022]

8. GNCTD VS. KUSHAM JAIN & ANR.

[SLP(C) NO. 19012/2022]

9. GNCTD VS. RS RETAIL STORES Pvt Ltd & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 25834/2022]

10. DDA VS. CHANDRALEKHA SOLOMON & ORS.

[SLP(C) 30127/2015]

11. GNCTD VS. MATRIX INVESTMENT PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[SLP(C) NO.11394/2016]

12. LBD VS. VIKRAM MADHOK & ORS
[DIARY NO. 22127/2021]

13. GNCTD VS. BODE RAM & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 28216/2021]

14. GNCTD VS. BAKSHI RAM AND SONS (HUF) & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 3566/2022]

15. GNCTD VS. M/S SANTOSH INFRATECH
PRIVATE LTD. & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 8414/2022]

16. GNCTD VS. EMMSONS INTERNATIONAL LTD. & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 8556/2022]

17. GNCTD VS. SUDARSHAN KAPOOR & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 10221/2022]

18. GNCTD VS. M/S BGNS INFRATECH PVT LTD.

COMPANY & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 10222/2022]

19. GNCTD VS. BHIM SINGH & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 10474/2022]

20. GNCTD VS. ISHWAR SINGH & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 10475/2022]

Page 53 of 57

21. GNCTD VS. ISHAAQ & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 15577/2022]

22. LBD VS. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 15940/2022]

23. GNCTD VS. HIMMAT SINGH & ORS
[DIARY NO. 16176/2022]

24. GNCTD VS. ALKA LUTHRA & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 27994/2022]

25. LBD VS. M/S PRASHID ESTATE PVT LTD & ORS.

[SLP (C) NO. 28847/2015]

26. GNCTD VS. SH. ALIMUDDIN & ANR.

[SLP (C) 26525/2015]

27. GNCTD VS. LALIT JAIN & ORS.

[SLP (C) 17207/2017]

28. DDA VS. SURENDER SINGH & ANR.

[SLP (C) 592-593/2020]

29. GNCTD VS. GEETA GULATI AND ORS.

[DIARY NO. 22388/2021]

30. LBD & ANR. VS. ISHWAR SINGH AND ORS.

[DIARY NO. 22391/2021]

31. LBD & ANR. VS. PRAVEEN KUMAR JAIN & ANR.

[DIARY NO. 23612/2021]

32. LBD & ANR. VS. BRAHAM SINGH
[DIARY NO. 24447/2021]

33. GNCTD VS. AMAN SINGH & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 28971/2021]

34. LAC VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES PVT LTD
[DIARY NO. 2404/2022]

35. GNCTD VS. GULBIR SINGH VERMA & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 4937/2022]

36. DDA VS. HARBANS KAUR & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 10090/2022]

37. LBD VS. SUKHBIR SINGH
[DIARY NO. 15722/2022]

38. GNCTD VS. KRISHNA RAJAURIA
[DIARY NO. 18873/2022]

39. DDA VS. TEJPAL & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 20255/2022]

40. DDA VS. TANVIR BEGUM & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 21620/2022]

Group B.2 Civil Appeal allowed in 1. GNCTD VS. BHIM SAIN GOEL & ORS. 5
the first round; SLP [DIARY NO. 18142/2022]
pending in the second 2. LBD AND ORS VS. SATISH KUMAR
round (present batch) [DIARY NO. 19142/2022]

3. LBD AND ANR VS. BHAGWAT SINGH & ORS
[DIARY NO. 19687/2022]

4. DDA VS. OMBIR SINGH & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 20104/2022]

5. DDA VS. MEHAR CHAND SHARMA & ORS.

                                                             [DIARY NO. 20203/2022]

 GROUP C       Group C.1   SLP dismissed in limine in   1.   GNCTD VS. RAMPHAL SINGH & ORS.                            1
   (SLP in                 the first round; SLP              [DIARY NO. 19697/2022
first round)               pending in the second
                           round (present batch)

                           •   Land       acquisition
                               proceedings    would
                               lapse following the
                               test laid down in
                               Manoharlal        [5-
                               Judge,        lapse]
                               (supra) as the twin
                               conditions     under


                                                                                                       Page 54 of 57
                section 24(2) of the
                2013 Act are met
                [non-payment        of
                compensation to the
                landowners together
                with failure of the
                State     to     take
                physical possession
                of    the    acquired
                lands].
Group C.2   SLP dismissed in limine in   1.   GNCTD & ANR. VS. ANJU LATA & ANR.                       1
            the first round; SLP              [DIARY NO. 19691/2022]
            pending in the second
            round (present batch)

            •   Land       acquisition
                proceedings     would
                not lapse following
                the test laid down in
                Manoharlal        [5-
                Judge,         lapse]
                (supra) as the twin
                conditions      under
                section 24(2) of the
                2013 Act are not
                met.
Group C.3   SLP from either the first    1.   DDA VS. GYAN CHAND & ORS.                           16
            round or both rounds is           [DIARY NO. 32629/2022]

pending in the present 2. DDA VICE CHAIRMAN VS. SHANTI INDIA PVT LTD & ORS.

            batch                             [SLP(C) NO. 7215/2017]
                                         3.   LAC VS. SEWARAM & ORS.
            •   Land       acquisition        [DIARY NO. 9628/2021]

proceedings would 4. GNCTD VS. GITA SABHARWAL & ANR.
not lapse following [DIARY NO. 29469/2021]
the test laid down in 5.
GNCTD VS. GYAN CHAND & ORS.

                Manoharlal        [5-         [DIARY NO. 3812/2022]
                Judge,         lapse]    6.   DDA VS. SIMLA DEVI & ORS.
                (supra) as the twin           [DIARY NO. 20229/2022]
                conditions      under    7.   DDA VS. YOG RAJ & ORS.
                section 24(2) of the          [DIARY NO. 20555/2022]
                2013 Act are not         8.   DDA VS. SEWA RAM & ORS.
                met.                          [DIARY NO. 33077/2022]
                                         9.   GNCTD & ANR. VS. ISHAQ (DEAD) & ORS.
                                              [DIARY NO. 6981/2021]
                                         10. DDA VS. GOPAL SINGH & ORS.
                                             [DIARY NO. 18366/2022]
                                         11. GNCTD & ANR. VS. MADHU & ANR.
                                             [DIARY NO. 19685/2022]
                                         12. LBD & ANR. VS. NARENDER SINGH & ORS.
                                             [DIARY NO. 19689/2022]
                                         13. GNCTD VS. SURESH KUMAR & ORS.
                                             [DIARY NO. 19693/2022]
                                         14. GNCTD VS. GHANSHYAM DASS & ORS.
                                             [DIARY NO. 19694/2022]
                                         15. GNCTD VS. JYOTI DEVI & ORS.
                                             [DIARY NO. 19724/2022]
                                         16. DDA VS. PARSHOTAM JOSHI & ORS.
                                             [DIARY NO. 20260/2022]




                                                                                      Page 55 of 57
GROUP D        Group D.1    •   Cases      filed  by     1.   DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ORS. VS. M/S AUTO GRIT               5
(Miscellane                     landowners;                   (PETROL PUMP) & ORS. [CA 542/2016]

ous • Cases seeking a 2. RAJENDER SINGH CHAUHAN VS. TARUN KAPOOR & ORS.
matters) different relief [CONMT.PET. (C) NO.189/2019 IN C.A. NO. 2690/2017]

3. DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH CHAUHAN & ORS.

[MA 806/2020]

4. GNCTD VS. SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA
[MA 1888/2023]

5. LAC VS. VIVEK & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 32991/2023, MA]
Group D.2 Cases where no notice 1. DDA VS. GITA SABHARWAL 11
has been issued either on [DIARY NO. 21746/2022]
delay or on merits 2. DDA VS. NARENDAR KUMAR
[DIARY NO. 674/2023, MA]

3. DDA VS. BAL KISHAN
[DIARY NO. 5711/2023, MA]

4. DDA VS. ISHAAQ
[DIARY NO. 1713/2023, MA]

5. DDA VS. ABHISHEK JAIN
[DIARY NO. 40951/2022, MA]

6. DDA VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES PVT LTD
[DIARY NO. 42177/2022, MA]

7. DDA VS. SHAKEEL AHMED
[DIARY NO. 3577/2023, MA]

8. DDA VS. SURESH KUMAR NANGIA
[DIARY NO. 39901/2022, MA]

9. DDA VS. PHIRE RAM & ORS.

[MA 278/2023]

10. DDA VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH
[DIARY NO. 39898/2022, MA]

11. DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH DHANKAR
[DIARY NO. 1215/2023, MA]

TOTAL 81

GROUP E Not Cases where the 1. GNCTD & ANR VS. M/S BSK REALTORS LLP & ANR. 32
(Suppressi Applicable landowners are alleged to [DIARY NO. 17623/2021]
on of facts have committed fraud by 2.
LAC VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH & ORS.

qua suppressing facts [DIARY NO. 32072/2022]
subsequen regarding them being 3. LBD VS. DEEKSHA SURI & ORS.

t subsequent purchasers [DIARY NO. 18130/2021]
purchaser/ and/or the land being 4. GNCTD & ANR. VS. ANJU SHARMA & ORS.
title etc.) vested in Gaon Sabha [DIARY NO.10132/2022]

5. GNCTD VS. ANIL MONGA & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 15707/2022]

6. LBD VS. JYOTSNA SURI & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 15710/2022]

7. GNCTD VS. RS RETAIL STORES Pvt Ltd & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 25834/2022]

8. DDA VS. JAI PRAKASH GUPTA
[MA 346/2023]

9. GNCTD VS. MATRIX INVESTMENT PVT. LTD. & ANR.

[SLP(C) NO.11394/2016]

10. LBD VS. VIKRAM MADHOK & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 22127/2021]

11. GNCTD VS. BODE RAM & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 28216/2021]

12. GNCTD VS. BAKSHI RAM AND SONS (HUF) & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 3566/2022]

13. GNCTD VS. M/S SANTOSH INFRATECH PVT LTD. & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 8414/2022]

14. GNCTD VS. EMMSONS INTERNATIONAL LTD. & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 8556/2022]

Page 56 of 57

15. GNCTD VS. SUDARSHAN KAPOOR & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 10221/2022]

16. GNCTD VS. M/S BGNS INFRATECH
PVT LTD. COMPANY & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 10222/2022]

17. GNCTD VS. ISHAAQ & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 15577/2022]

18. LBD VS. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 15940/2022]

19. GNCTD VS. ALKA LUTHRA & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 27994/2022]

20. GNCTD VS SH. ALIMUDDIN & ANR.

[SLP (C) 26525/2015]

21. GNCTD VS. LALIT JAIN & ORS.

[SLP (C) 17207/2017]

22. LAC VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES PVT LTD
[DIARY NO. 2404/2022]

23. LBD VS. SUKHBIR SINGH
[DIARY NO. 15722/2022]

24. DDA VS. GOPAL SINGH & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 18366/2022]

25. GNCTD AND ANR VS. MADHU & ANR.

[DIARY NO. 19685/2022]

26. LBD AND ANR VS. NARENDER SINGH & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 19689/2022]

27. GNCTD AND ANR VS. ANJU LATA & ANR.

[DIARY NO. 19691/2022]

28. GNCTD VS. SURESH KUMAR & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 19693/2022]

29. GNCTD VS. GHANSHYAM DASS & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 19694/2022]

30. GNCTD VS. JYOTI DEVI & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 19724/2022]

31. DDA VS. TEJPAL & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 20255/2022]

32. DDA VS. PARSHOTAM JOSHI & ORS.

[DIARY NO. 20260/2022]

Note: Cases categorized under Group E, owing to their distinct facts and circumstances, may overlap with Groups A to C (excluding
Group B.2, which we have dismissed as rendered infructuous). As a result, any directions issued under Group E are intended
exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall be automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For added
clarity, it is stated that all cases falling under Group E shall be remanded back to the High Court, regardless of their classification
within the aforementioned categories.

Page 57 of 57

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