Supreme Court of India
Government Of Telangana vs Rao V.B.J.Chelikani on 25 November, 2024
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 894 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3791-3793 OF 2011
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS ..... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
DR. RAO, V.B.J. CHELIKANI AND OTHERS ..... RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3794-3796 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3797-3799 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3800-3802 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3803 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3804-3806 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NOS 3807-3809 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3810 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 19838 of 2010)
AND
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1122-1124 OF 2023
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3797-3799 OF 2011
JUDGMENT
Signature Not Verified
SANJIV KHANNA, CJI.
Digitally signed by
geeta ahuja
Date: 2024.11.25
17:11:33 IST
Reason:
Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 19838 of 2010.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 1 of 64
2. This common judgment decides the cross appeals which impugn the judgment
dated 05.01.2010, of the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
in Writ Petition Nos. 7956, 7997, and 23682 of 2008. These Writ Petitions
challenged the allotment of land parcels, vide several State Government
Memoranda1, within the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation limits. The
land was allocated to Cooperative Societies composed of members of various
groups, including Members of Parliament2, Members of both houses of the
State Legislature3, officers of All India Services4, Judges of the Supreme Court
and High Court5, State Government employees, defence personnel, journalists
and individuals from weaker sections of society.
3. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has partly allowed the Writ
Petitions, quashing the GoMs that laid down the allotment policy and facilitate
the allotments to the Cooperative Societies. It held that the parcels of land
allotted to the respondents were to be restored to the Government, and that
fresh allotments can only be made following the issuance of appropriate GoMs
consistent with the judgment. The High Court further directed that before such
GoMs are issued, the State shall call for details of members who meet the
eligibility criteria; ensure they sign affidavits declaring their eligibility; and
publish this information on its website for public access. Any false declaration
will result in cancellation of the allotment, and initiation of civil and criminal
proceedings.
1 For short, “GoM”.
2 For short, “MP”.
3 For short, “MLA”.
4 For short, “AIS”.
5 We note that while the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court have withdrawn their claims and
are not seeking allotment, we have addressed their category for the purpose of tackling the legal issue
arising out of allotment made under GoM No. 243.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 2 of 64
4. While the Cooperative Societies, their members, and the State of Telangana 6
have preferred appeals contesting these directions, Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav,
the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 23682/2008, has filed a cross-appeal. Mr.
Keshav Rao Jadhav prays that preferential allotment of land – particularly at
basic rates – to MLAs, MPs, journalists, officers of the AIS and Judges, is
illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional, as it violates the right to equality
guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
FACTS OF THE CASE
5. On 28.02.2005, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued three GoMs – Nos.
242, 243 and 244. GoM No. 242 established a comprehensive policy for
managing land resources and housing in urban and semi-urban areas. GoM
No. 243 outlined categories of individuals eligible for land allotment, while GoM
No. 244 provided guidelines for this process.
6. GoM No. 242 emphasized the urgent need for prudent management of land
resources in urban and semi-urban areas due to rising urbanization and
increasing demand for housing. Due to growing urbanisation, demand for land
for housing purposes has surged. It highlighted the challenges faced by the
working middle class, as private developers often artificially inflate land prices,
making it difficult for them to secure plots. Recognizing that providing shelter
is a top priority for the State, the Government had previously formulated a
housing scheme for the poor. However, there was no fixed policy catering to
“other deserving sections” of the society. Consequently, the Government
6 Refer to the order dated 30.03.2016 passed by this Court, giving directions for amendment in the
Cause Title.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 3 of 64
decided that a comprehensive policy was necessary, leading to the issuance
of GoM No. 242. Key stipulations of the GoM include:
• Creation of a land bank, source-pooled for allotment to various housing
Cooperative Societies and other target groups.
• The source of the land bank would consist of land located in and around
120 municipalities with clear titles.
• The land would be within a radius of 25 kilometres for Category “A”
municipalities, 15 kilometres for Category “B” municipalities and 10
kilometres for Category “C” municipalities.
• Government land available with various departments which was not
being used for specified categories such as Horticulture, Agriculture,
Roads and Buildings amongst other categories, was also to be
subsumed and put in the land bank.
• Surplus ceiling land, endowment lands and private lands that had been
acquired were to also form a part of the land pool.
• Revenue department was responsible for collecting details of large
chunks of available land which would fall in the said categories.
• The Collector and District Magistrate was nominated as the Competent
Authority for transfer of the government land to the land bank in
consultation with concerned government departments.
• The Collector and District Magistrate would also be competent to
acquire private land for public purposes, after examining the demand
and after consulting the agencies in-charge of the land bank.
• Each category of land was to be treated as a distinct entity till the same
was alienated to the applicant. The objective was to plough back the
cost of land acquisition.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 4 of 64
• The Empowered Committee chaired by the Chief Commissioner of Land
Administration and comprising five members was vested with the power
to decide allotment of the land, its apportionment and its use, based
upon the hierarchy of needs, and submit proposals to the Government.
• The designated officers who would be the members of the Empowered
Committee, while recommending allotment of land in favour of the
Cooperative Societies, would also recommend the price to be fixed for
the land proposed for allotment.
• The recommended price was to be fixed after taking into account the
acquisition cost of land, activity of the beneficiary institution and demand
for the land.
• Separate orders were to be issued on the methodology to be adopted
for selecting the housing society/institution for allotment of land from the
land bank; deciding conditions of allotment; and ownership rights.
7. On 28.02.2005, GoM No. 243 was also issued. It stated that land from the land
bank could be allotted for housing and institutional purposes. For housing, the
Government encouraged allocation of land for independent housing sites in
areas where such housing schemes were prevalent, and for the construction
of flats in regions where flats were established. The key stipulations of the GoM
are outlined below:
• The Government might alienate lands, preferably for construction of
flats in view of land scarcity, in the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad,
Warangal, Vijayawada, Guntur, Rajahmundry, Visakhapatnam, Kurnool
and Nellore.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 5 of 64
• Land was not to be allotted to individual beneficiaries, but to groups orCooperative Societies of which the beneficiaries would be members.
• A Cooperative Society or group was to have a minimum of 12 eligible
members.
• The applications for allotment of flat/housing site were to be made to the
Collector and District Magistrate, who in turn had to obtain necessary
approval for land allotment from the Empowered Committee and the
Government.
• The Collector was to be nominated as the Nodal Authority and was
tasked with the duty to make the Scheme operational.
• For allotment of the land to institutions, the Collector was to submit the
proposal to the Empowered Committee.
• The allotment for the Cooperative Societies comprising Judges, MPs,
MLAs, officers of the AIS, officers of the Andhra Pradesh cadre, officers
of other State cadres who were natives of Andhra Pradesh and who had
worked on deputation with the Andhra Pradesh Government, officers of
the Government of Andhra Pradesh, and journalists, would be in
satellite towns of Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy districts.
• The lands located in prime locations would only be allotted to
government organisations for public purposes or for institutional use.
• Government lands located in the proposed Outer Ring Road would not
be allotted for housing sites for group of individuals or Cooperative
Housing Societies.
• The Cooperative Society or group concerned which would be allotted
land by the Government, shall further allot individual housing sites/flats
to its individual members.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 6 of 64
• Land would be allotted without any development, which had to beundertaken by the Cooperative Society or group.
• Time limit fixed for the completion of development of land and
infrastructure facilities (road, water supply, electricity etc.) was one year
from the date of alienation of land, failing which the land would be
repossessed by the government.
• Cost and categorisation of sections of the society was prescribed in the
following manner:
“CATEGORISATION FOR PRICING:
i) MLAs, MPs, Judges of Supreme Court and High Court, All
India Services Officers.
ii) Accredited Journalists from recognized and registered
newspapers.
iii) State Government Employees and Panchayat Raj
Teachers working in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
iv) Recognised National and International Sports persons
and eminent persons in the field of Culture and Arts.
v) Defence Employees, Central Government employees and
employees of PSUs.
vi) Widows of Kargil and other war heroes and extremist
violence who are hailing from Andhra Pradesh.
vii) Weaker Sections.
viii) Institutions – Educational/Charitable/Religious etc.,
The land shall be allotted to the categories figuring at Sl. No. i
to iv at the basic value of the land; for category v and viii at
prevailing market value; for category vi on free of cost and for
category vii as per the policy of the Government in vogue. The
acquired land shall be alienated on cost basis, which means
that the actual cost paid to the landowners shall be fixed as
cost of land.”C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 7 of 64
• The following conditions of allotment were laid down:
o The Cooperative Society/group would ensure that its members were
seeking allotment of land for the first time.
o All the members were to file an affidavit stating that they had not
received benefit of concessional allotment from the government
earlier, nor were they a member of any Cooperative Society/group
to which concessional allotment had been made earlier.
o The members would also give an undertaking that they would not
avail of such facility in the future.
o Allotment process had to be completed within six months from the
date of alienation of land.
o The allottee/beneficiary would have to complete the development
within a period of two years from the date of allotment by the
Cooperative Society/group.
o The beneficiary/allottee would not have any right to sell the property
allotted for a period of 15 years.
o The Cooperative Societies/groups were restricted from allotting
open spaces in the layout or making changes in the layout without
approval of the Competent Authority.
o In satellite townships being developed by the urban development
agencies in Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy districts, certain
categories of persons, such as Class IV Employees, NGOs etc.,
who may not be in a position make an investment for buying a plot,
would be considered for allotment of housing sites at an appropriate
rate.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 8 of 64
o However, the conditions for allotment in respect of governmentemployees would be issued separately.
• The Supreme Court and High Court Judges, MLAs, MPs, and officers
of AIS would be allotted plots of 500 square yards.
• Government employees would be allotted plots of 100-400 square
yards.
• Journalists would be allotted plots of 300 square yards.
• The Cooperative Society/group would decide whether they would like to
build the houses themselves or would like to avail assistance of Andhra
Pradesh Housing Board.
8. On 28.02.2005, GoM No. 244 was also issued, whose key stipulations read:
• The Collector would be the Nodal Authority to make the scheme operational
and would be competent to allot the land to the Cooperative Society or the
group.
• The Collector would monitor implementation of the scheme very closely
and send a monthly progress report to the Government.
• The Government would alienate land to the Cooperative Society or the
group, which would in turn convey the title of the plot/flat to the members
through a registered sale deed.
• Following conditions of allotment were laid down:
o The employee must be a member of the Cooperative Society or the
group.
o To facilitate the Cooperative Society to arrive at an estimation of the
land required, they were advised to complete the admission of its
members before making an application to the authorities.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 9 of 64
o Where some employees did not form part of an existing society, theycould form a separate Cooperative Society/group and make a
request for allotment.
o The Cooperative Societies/groups would not allot housing sites/flats
to any other member whose name did not figure in the application
submitted to the Competent Authority.
o The employee would have to be an approved probationer in service
of the Government or local body, who has completed a minimum of
five years in service.
o Only one housing site/flat would be allotted to a particular
government servant.
o If both the husband and wife were in government service, they
would be eligible for allotment of only one housing site/flat.
o The allotment of the housing site/flat was to be completed within six
months from the date of alienation of the land.
o The allotment of house site/flat would be done by draw of lots.
o The Cooperative Societies/group would complete construction on
the allotted land within two years from the date of allotment.
o Construction would be done directly or through the Housing Board
or through any other agency as mutually agreed upon by the
members.
o The employee who was once allotted a housing site/flat would not
be permitted to sell the same for a period of 15 years.
o The society would not allot open spaces indicated in the layout or
change the layout without the approval of the Competent Authority.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 10 of 64
o The allotment of housing site/flat would be recorded in the servicebook of the employee.
o The employee would be entitled for concessional allotment of land
only once during the period of service.
o Members of the Cooperative Society would have to file an affidavit
stating that they had not received the benefit of concessional
allotment earlier, nor were they a member of a society to which
concessional allotment of land had been made earlier.
o All members would have to furnish an undertaking stating that they
would not avail of such facilities in the future.
o Indian Administrative Service,7 Indian Police Service,8 and Indian
Foreign Service9 officers belonging to Andhra Pradesh cadre would
be entitled to a plot size of 500 square yards.
o Non-cadre Head of Departments, Fourth Level Gazetted Officers
and above were entitled to a plot size of 400 square yards.
o Second and Third Level Gazetted Officers were entitled to a plot
size of 300 square yards.
o First Level Gazetted Officers were entitled to a plot size of 250
square yards.
o Superintendents, Assistant Section Officers, Senior Assistants,
Telephone Operators, LD Stenos, TCAs, Junior Assistants, etc. and
persons holding equivalent posts were entitled to a plot size of 175
square yards.
7 For short, “IAS”.
8 For short, “IPS”.
9 For short, “IFS”.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 11 of 64
o Attenders, Record Assistants, drivers, etc., and persons holding
equivalent posts were entitled to plot size of 100 square yards.
o In case sufficient land was not available, Category 1 officers,
namely, those belonging to IAS, IPS and IFS were to retain the
mentioned plot size of 500 square yards, but there would be a
reduction of plot size in terms of ratio of 4 : 3 : 2.5 : 1.75 : 1 for
Categories 2 to 5.
9. Thereafter, on 04.05.2006, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued GoM
No. 522. The GoM stated that based upon representations from various
individuals or groups i.e., Judges of the High Court, MLAs, MPs, officers of the
AIS, people of eminence and journalists, the Collector of Ranga Reddy District
had proposed allotment of government land for housing purpose on payment
of basic value through the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration,
Hyderabad. The Government, after careful examination of the proposal, had
directed allotment of government land to the extent of 245 acres in villages of
Ranga Reddy District in favour of Judges of the High Court, MLAs, MPs,
serving left over officers of pre-1989 AIS batches, AIS officers serving since
1989, serving AIS officers of other cadre with Andhra Pradesh nativity, people
of eminence and working journalists, as a one-time benefit as per their
eligibility. The allotment was made in relaxation of the order issued in GoM No.
243 dated 28.02.2005, subject to the guidelines and filing of affidavit proforma
1 and 2 appended to the order. The stipulations of the GoM were:-
• 72 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 276 of Puppalaguda
Village, Rajendranagar Mandal to the MLAs and MPs.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 12 of 64
• 38 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 149 of NanakramgudaVillage, Rajendranagar Mandal in favour of Judges, people of eminence,
and serving left over officers of pre-1989 AIS batches.
• 32 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 454/1 of Puppalaguda
Village, Rajendranagar Mandal in favour of serving post-1989 AIS officers
and serving AIS officers of other cadre with Andhra Pradesh nativity who
are working or had worked on deputation in Andhra Pradesh.
• 33 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 132 of Vattinagulapalli
Village to AIS officers serving post 1989, in the order of seniority.
• 32 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 332 of Nizampet Village
and 38 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 35/2 of Pet
Basheerabad Village to media persons.
• Judges of the High Court, MPs, MLAs, serving AIS officers and persons
of eminence were to be allotted plots of 500 square yards.
• Former members of the Legislative Assembly, their widows and working
journalists were to be allotted plots of 300 square yards.
• The land was to be allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development Authority,10
which in turn would develop layouts in the five blocks at the respective
locations for allotment of housing sites to individuals.
• Advance possession of the land would be given to HUDA.
• HUDA will commence work from its own reserves. Each allottee would
reimburse the said amount to HUDA as per the time schedule fixed.
• Format of the townships was to be based on the gated community
concept.
10 For short, “HUDA”.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 13 of 64
• Appendix to the GoM stated that the allotment to the members of
Legislature, Judiciary, Executive and the press was a one-time beneficial
measure, irrespective of any other private ownership of land, to ensure
equity and to avoid discrimination.
• The appendix laid down the details including approximate number of
housing sites etc. with stipulation regarding the size of the plots which
would be allotted.
• The general conditions of eligibility read:
o Members of the categories listed at serial no. 3 to 6 under item 1,
i.e. Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, AIS officers,
persons of eminence and journalists, should not have availed any
benefit of allotment of land in the cities of Hyderabad,
Secunderabad, and Ranga Reddy district or any other district.
o All the sitting MLAs and MPs were to be given a plot, provided they
did not have a house or housing site in Hyderabad or
Secunderabad.
o All eligible persons who were being allotted the land would have to
file an affidavit agreeing to the conditions and stipulations.
o No person who was allotted a plot shall alienate or transfer it using
the instrument of General Power of Attorney11 within a period of 10
years from the date of allotment.
• Committees and sub-committees were formed to process allotment
applications.
11 For short, “GPA”.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 14 of 64
• Government would allot land to HUDA at the basic rate, and as already
noted above, HUDA would develop layouts in the five blocks at the
respective locations.
• The allottees were to pay the actual cost of the plot, i.e., the basic value
plus cost of development, as worked out by HUDA, in three equal
instalments, within six months from the date of allotment.
• The plot will not be handed over and registered till full payment is made
by the allottee to HUDA.
• In case of default, the Screening Committee could recommend the
Government to delete such names from the list.
• Construction of houses was to commence within a period of two years
from the date of handing over the plot to the individual allottee.
10. GoM No. 522 dated 04.05.2006, was challenged by Mr. V.S. Bose, Dr. Rao
V.B.J. Chelikani and Mr. O.M. Debara in the High Court in Writ Petition No.
13730 of 2006. It was submitted that:
• Land worth Rs. 700 crores was sought to be allotted to the specified
categories at a throw-away price compared to the market value.
• The government, as a trustee of the public land, cannot dispose of land
except by way of a policy which was consistent with Articles 14, 38 and
39(d) of the Constitution of India.
• Majority of the beneficiaries were affluent persons with good social
standing.
• Land prices have escalated substantially and hence, land allotment at
basic value without auction was detrimental to public interest.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 15 of 64
• There was no rational basis or object which was sought to be achievedthrough such a land allotment policy.
• Lastly, there was no justification for allotting the land to preferred
individuals at a fraction of the market value.
• GoM No. 243 had completely prohibited allotment of land to individuals
who had already received benefit of concessional allotment from the
Government. This requirement was deleted/removed through GoM No.
522. The policy also permitted allotment of land to those who own or
possess land in their own name or in the name of their spouse or
children. Reference was made to the amendment made vide GoM No.
1424 dated 28.09.2006.
11. The Writ Petition was allowed by judgment dated 08.10.2007. At the outset,
we must notice that the judgment of the Division Bench specifically recorded
that the petitioners therein had not questioned the vires of GoM Nos. 242, 243
and 244, which established the policy, categories, and guidelines for land
allocation. Therefore, the validity of these GoMs was not examined. The focus
of the Writ Petition concerning GoM No. 522 was the relaxation of conditions
which had been prescribed in the earlier GoMs.
12. The High Court referred to Rules 3 and 10 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana
Area) Alienation of State Lands & Land Revenue Rules, 1975,12 which pertain
to the alienation of land to local authorities. The Court recorded that according
to the 1975 Rules, land acquired by the State could be alienated to a local
body/authority for unremunerative public purposes without charging a price.
12 For short, “1975 Rules”.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 16 of 64
However, when the land was to be allocated for remunerative public purposes
or to private entities, it could only be done at market value. Rule 10 allows the
Government to deviate from the established procedures. However, any such
deviation must follow a reasonable process for land alienation, including
auction, where such alienation/sale is deemed necessary.
13. The Court noted that a reading of GoM No. 522 made it clear that it relaxed
the conditions of GoM No. 243, with the intent of providing undue benefits to
individuals who would not otherwise qualify for land allotment under GoM No.
243. The relaxation was made in favour of (i) Sitting and former MLAs,
including widows of deceased MLAs; (ii) Sitting MPs from Andhra Pradesh in
Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha; (iii) Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh;
(iv) AIS officers; (v) Persons of eminence and (vi) Journalists. There was no
justification for allotting land to these categories of persons by relaxing
conditions, to make them eligible for allotment of land even if they had a house
in their name, or in the name of their spouse or children, or had earlier been
allotted a plot of land at a concessional rate, provided they did not have any
house in the cities of Hyderabad or Secunderabad. The Appendix to GoM No.
522, which lists the categories of beneficiaries entitled to the relaxation, only
states that the allotment to such categories was done irrespective of their
private possessions, in order to “ensure equity and avoid discrimination”. The
Court found no plausible reason for relaxing the restrictions outlined in GoM
No. 243, stating that the revised policy under GoM No. 522 was contrary to
public interest and it favoured certain individuals at the cost of the public
exchequer. The State was unjustifiably giving the benefit of concessional land
allotment to some affluent persons, who had no pressing need for housing
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 17 of 64
sites, while depriving the persons who were genuinely in need of a housing
plot. Further, the State was also losing out on a substantial amount of revenue
that it could have generated by duly auctioning the Government land instead
of allotting it at such low rates.
14. The Court held that the principle of equality had been undermined by the policy.
GoM No. 1424, dated 28.09.2006, was deemed consistent with GoM No. 243,
with the stipulation that the restrictions outlined in GoM No. 243 would apply to
land allotted by the Cooperative Society to its members. The High Court held
that the Government would be well advised to impose additional restrictions
against allotments to individuals who owned a house in their name or that of
their spouse or children, and this recommendation should apply to the
allotments made to Respondent No. 4 therein. The directive of the High Court
did not preclude the Government from making allotments in accordance with
the policy under GoM No. 243. It was also open for the identified category of
individuals to form a new society and submit the necessary registration
applications.
15. Following this judgment, the State of Andhra Pradesh issued six GoMs (Nos.
419 to 425), all dated 25.03.2008, although GoM No. 421 was later rescinded.
GoM No. 419 states that, based on representations from the four wings—
Legislature, Judiciary, Executive, and Media—land allotments for housing sites
had been made under GoM No. 522, albeit the same was subsequently struck
down by the High Court on 08.10.2007. The Court had directed the
Government that it would be well advised to incorporate additional restrictions
for those who owned a house or housing site in their name or that of their
spouse or children.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 18 of 64
16. In issuing GoM No. 1424, which allocated land for Respondent No. 4 therein,
the Government confirmed that all restrictions in GoM No. 243 would apply to
those allotments. The Government decided to accept and implement the order
of the High Court and to allot housing sites to members and societies according
to GoM Nos. 242, 243, and 244. Consequently, 3.25 acres of government land
in Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, was
earmarked for allotment to Uday Civil Services Cooperative Mutually Aided
House Building Society, specifically for AIS officers with Andhra Pradesh
nativity and those who had worked or were working in the State for at least
three years.
17. The allotment was to be done at the basic value of land per acre as on
04.05.2006, for housing purposes. Conditions specified in GoM No. 419
included adherence to the policies outlined in GoM Nos. 242, 243, and 244.
Members who had received any prior allotment at a concessional rate, either
directly or through a society, would not be eligible. Members in service as on
29.04.2006, would qualify, and in cases where both spouses were employed,
only one would be eligible. Development of the land would be carried out by
the Cooperative Society or a designated agency, adhering to applicable zoning
regulations. Each member was eligible for a plot of 500 square yards, and no
allottee could transfer or dispose of the land via GPA for a period of ten years
from the date of allotment. Allotments were to be made within six months of
the alienation date. A member who was allotted a housing site was to complete
the construction of the house within a period of two years. Affidavit would be
furnished by every allottee on a non-judicial stamp paper in accordance with
the prescribed format.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 19 of 64
18. On similar terms and conditions, vide GoM No. 420, an allotment of 72 acres
of land in Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy district,
was made to Indira Legislators Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society
Limited on the basic value of land. It was further stipulated that MLAs and MPs
who have previously been allotted a housing site on a concessional rate, either
directly or as party of any society, would not be eligible for allotment.
19. GoM No. 422 provided for allotment of 48.15 acres of land in Puppalaguda
Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District to Adarshnagar Mutually
Aided Cooperative Housing Society on payment of the basic value of land per
acre as on 04.05.2006 on the same terms and conditions. Allotment of 16 acres
of land at Nanakramguda Village, Serilingapalli Mandal, Ranga Reddy District,
was made in favour of Koh-Ei-Noor Civil Services MACHSL, Hyderabad
Officers of AIS pre-1989 service, vide GoM No. 423 on payment of the basic
value of land per acre on 04.05.2006 on similar terms. GoM No. 424 was for
allotment of 32 acres in village Nizampet and 38 acres in Pet Basheerabad
village in Qutubullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in favour of Jawaharlal
Nehru Journalists Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society Limited on
payment of the basic value of land per acre as existing on 04.05.2006.
However, in this case, each member was eligible for 300 square yards of land.
Other terms and conditions were the same. GoM No. 425 refers to three letters
– two letters written by the Collector, Ranga Reddy District and one by the
Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Hyderabad, furnishing the
Collector’s proposal, which reported the requisition made by the Indian
Revenue Service Officers Housing Society for allotment of 50 acres of
Government land for housing purposes in Puppalaguda Village,
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 20 of 64
Rajendranagar Mandal. The Government had carefully considered the
proposal and had agreed to allot 30 acres of land in Gopannapalli Village,
Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in favour of Indian Revenue
Service13 Officers (Income Tax) Housing Society on payment of the basic
value. The conditions relating to the basic value on allotment within Outer Ring
Road project prescribed in GoM No. 243 were relaxed in favour of the
Cooperative Society. The terms and conditions fixed as per the annexure
stipulate that the IRS officers should be natives of Andhra Pradesh, working in
Andhra Pradesh or any other part of the country. In case of non-Andhra IRS
Officers, one should have worked a minimum of 5 years in Andhra Pradesh
and should be serving in Andhra Pradesh as on 01.01.2008. If not a native of
Andhra Pradesh, one should have declared any place in Andhra Pradesh as
his hometown/place of settlement after retirement, through a formal declaration
to Income Tax Department. Each eligible member was to be allotted 500
square yards. A member already allotted land by any other government was
not eligible. An allottee was not entitled to alienate/transfer/dispose of the land
using the instrument of GPA for a period of 10 years from the date of allotment.
Through GoM No. 451 dated 27.03.2008, land was allotted to A.P. S.P.
MACHS Ltd. to the extent of 21 acres, on somewhat identical terms.
20. After the said notification was issued, the three Writ Petitions mentioned in
paragraph 1 above were filed. The lead Writ Petition No. 7956/2008 was filed
by Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani who was also a co-petitioner in the first Writ Petition
No. 13730/2006. In addition, M/s Campaign for Housing and Tenural Rights
(CHATRI) filed Writ Petition No. 7997/2008 and Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav filed
13 For short, “IRS”.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 21 of 64
Writ Petition No. 23682/2008. It may be relevant to reproduce the prayers
made in the Writ Petitions, which read:
“Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein the
High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction
more particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus
declaring G.O.Ms. No.419 to 425 & 551 Revenue (ASN.V)
Department dated 25.3.2008 & dated 27.3.2008 respectively
issued by 1st respondent as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional,
without jurisdiction, void ab initio and violative of petitioners
fundamental rights guaranteed under article 14 orders dated
8.10.2007 in W.P.No.13730 passed by the Hon’ble High Court
and consequently to set-aside the same and to pass such
other order or orders.
xx xx xx
Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein the
High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, order or, direction
more particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus
declaring the
i) G.O.Ms. No.243, 28.2.2005 issued by the 1st respondent
providing for the allotment of land to persons categorized in Sl.
Nos. i to V & Vii detailed therein.
ii) G.O.Ms. No.244 dated 28.2.2005 issued laying guidelines
for allotment of land to Govt. of Employees and the
methodology ·therefor including the entitlement to varying
extents of land and
iii) The consequential allotment. of lands to the respondents 4
to 11 vide the impugned to G.O.Ms. No.419 to 425
dt.25.3.2008 and G.O.Ms. No.551 dt.27.3.2008 as arbitrary
unreasonable opposed to public interest of violative of Article
14 of the Constitution of India being contrary to the Judgment
of this Hon’ble Court in W.P.No.13730 of 2006 dt.8.10.2007
and also Rule 10(a) of the A.P. Telangana Area Revenue
Rules and to set aside same and consequently direct the
respondents to forthwith forbear from acting in pursuance of
the impugned policy and pass such other order or orders as
are deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of
the case.
xx xx xx
Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein the
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 22 of 64
High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction
more particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus
declaring the
iv) G.O.Ms. No.243, 28.2.2005 issued by the 181 respondent
providing for the allotment of land to persons categorized in
Sl.Nos. i to V & Vii detailed therein.
v) G.O.Ms. No.244 dated 28.2.2005 issued laying guidelines
for allotment of land to Govt. of Employees and the
methodology therefor including the entitlement to varying
extents of land and,
vi) The consequential allotment of lands to the respondents 4
to 11 vide the impugned to G.O. Ms. No.419, 420, 421, 422,
423, 424, 425 dt.27th March, 2008 and all the consequential
actions including the execution the execution of the sale
deeds. as arbitrary, unreasonable, opposed to public interest,
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, being
contrary to the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court in W.P.
No.13730 of 2006 dt.8.10.2007 and the provisions of the A.P.
Telangana Area Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and the Rules
made thereunder and set aside same and consequently direct
the respondents to forthwith forbear from acting in pursuance
of the impugned policy and pass such other or orders.”
21. The housing Cooperative Societies were also made parties to the said Writ
Petitions. In Writ Petition No. 7956/2008, the petitioner prayed for striking down
GoM Nos. 419 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008,
as being illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, void ab initio
and being in violation of the fundamental rights and the judgment of the High
Court dated 08.10.2007 in Writ Petition No. 13730 of 2006. However, in the
Writ Petition filed by M/s Campaign for Housing and Tenural Rights (CHATRI)
and Keshav Rao Jadhav, the petitioners prayed for setting aside the
categorisation and guidelines of the policy itself, as envisaged under GoM No.
243 and GoM No. 244 dated 28.02.2005, along with striking down the
consequential allotment of lands to Respondent Nos. 4 to 11 vide GoM Nos.
419 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008. All the
above GoMs were challenged as being arbitrary and opposed to public
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 23 of 64
interest, as well as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and being
contrary to the judgment dated 08.10.2007, in Writ Petition 13730/2006.
Reference was also made to Rule 10 (a) of the 1975 Rules.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
22. The High Court rejected the preliminary submission made by the Respondents
on the principle of res judicata in the second round of litigation. However, the
Court held that principles of constructive res judicata would apply, emphasizing
that the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 13730/2006 should also have
challenged GoM Nos. 243 and 244. Reference was made to the judgments of
this Court in Forward Construction Company and Others v. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay,14 and State of Karnataka and Another v.
All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others,15 stating that in public
interest litigations, when Writ Petitions are filed on identical grounds, the
principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata are applicable.
23. The question of locus standi was decided in favour of the petitioners, who were
recognized as public-spirited individuals espousing a public cause. The High
Court held that the petitioners could legitimately claim that the measures for
land allotment concern not only them but also the public at large. The plea of
laches was dismissed, as the fresh allotment made after the judgment dated
08.10.2007, in Writ Petition 13730/2006, constituted a fresh cause of action.
The Court further stated that the Writ Petitions acted as a class action.
24. Regarding the validity of GoM Nos. 419, 420, and 422 to 425, the High Court
noted that the earlier decision dated 08.10.2007, in Writ Petition 13730/2006,
14 (1986) 1 SCC 100.
15 (2006) 4 SCC 683.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 24 of 64
had outlined restrictions on land allotment for individuals who had already
received similar government concessions, either directly or through
Cooperative Societies. Contrary to the Respondents’ claims, the Division
Bench did not leave the final decision solely to the Government. It observed
that the new GoM Nos. 419 to 425 failed to bar allotment to individuals who
already owned land in their own name or that of their spouse or children. The
earlier decision was unequivocal in stating that the principle of equality had
been violated, as it did not restrict allotment of land to those who had already
been allotted land at concessional rates or who privately owned a house or
housing site.
25. The High Court further noted that while the earlier Division Bench could have
quashed GoM No. 522, it chose to give the government an opportunity to
comply with its directions. It went on to observe that the government improperly
issued the new GoMs, rendering them invalid. It held that the allotment of land
to those who already owned land in their own name or in the name of their
spouse or children, cannot be sustained. As a result, the Division Bench
quashed all the GoMs in its judgment dated 05.01.2010, and directed that the
various parcels of land be restored to the Government. Fresh allotments could
be made only after issuing new GoMs in accordance with the High Court’s
directions.
CONTENTIONS AND ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE PARTIES
26. To avoid prolixity and repetition, we will not separately refer to the arguments
raised by the counsels for Cooperative Societies and their members as well as
State of Telangana on one side, and the counsel for the Writ Petitioners, who,
as noted above, have also challenged the impugned judgment.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 25 of 64
27. The contentions and pleas raised by the counsel for the Cooperative Societies,
its members, and State of Telangana, can be crystallised as:
(i) Successive governments have allotted lands in Hyderabad at
concessional rates till 1989.
(ii) The GoM Nos. 419 to 425 were issued after almost 18 years for
allotment of housing sites as a one-time benefit.
(iii) Allotment to members of AIS, government service, etc. on preferential
basis does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as these
officers constitute a separate class. Government servants play a vital
role in governance and contribute to the society through their toil and
sacrifice. They have an unwavering commitment towards societal
welfare and public services. However, at the same time, their salary and
pay structures never match those of their counterparts in the private
sector. Their carry home pay is much less than the persons with similar
level of education and experience in the private sector. There is much
less scope for wealth accumulation. Post-retirement benefits are also
limited. They suffer on account of opportunity cost. Due to the
transferable nature of their jobs, they do not have a permanent
residence and, therefore, the scheme envisages allotment of housing
sites to enable them to have a semblance of residential security.
(iv) The allotment of housing sites, in view of the aforesaid differentiation
and classification, has a rational nexus and objective. The policy
provides stability to the lives of these officers and reduces dependence
on government accommodation. It is a symbolic gesture of the
government’s commitment to the welfare of the officers given the
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 26 of 64
importance of their role and the challenges they face. No governmentlargesse is given to the government employees.
(v) The Cooperative Societies to whom land has been allotted have made
substantial payments towards the price of the plots as also towards
stamp duty.16 In many cases, the employees have retired and in some
cases they have even died without getting benefit of the plots though
they had made payments. Some of the societies have also undertaken
development work at their own expense.
(vi) Since journalists constitute a separate class, several Governments
have allotted housing sites to them at concessional rates.
(vii) Allotment of plots at the basic rate, is legal and valid. Price
determination falls within the exclusive domain of the Executive.
Procedure under the law has been duly followed. Reliance is placed
upon Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F17
and the alienation rules framed thereunder which we shall refer to
subsequently.
(viii) Basic market value is determined by the Collector as per the Telangana
Revision of Market Value Guideline Rules, 1998 which have been made
in exercise of the power under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act,
16 The details of the payments made by some of the Cooperative Societies towards the land cost and
infrastructure development and conversion charges is as under:
• Respondent No. 4 – M/s Indira Legislators Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society has
spent more than Rs. 20 crores.
• Respondent No. 6 – Adarshnagar Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society has spent
more than Rs. 10 crores.
• Respondent No. 7 – Koh-Ei-Noor Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. has spent
around Rs. 9.75 crores.
• Respondent No. 8 – Jawaharlal Nehru Journalists Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing
Society has spent around Rs. 13.8 crores.
• Respondent No. 9 – M/s Indian Revenue Services Officers’ (Income-Tax) Housing Society has
spent around Rs. 3.9 crores.
17 Year 1906 according to the Gregorian Calendar.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 27 of 64
1899. Sale value cannot be less than the basic value. Since market
value is highly volatile, there cannot be any uniform system of
determining the market value. It cannot be argued, therefore, that the
land has been granted at a concessional rate as it has been sold at
basic market value.
(ix) There are enough safeguards in the impugned GoMs which ensure that
the allotments made are not maliciously converted into a profiteering
exercise. One such safeguard is that allotment is not made directly to
individuals, but through a society. Further, an employee is entitled to
such allotment only once during her/his service. A cut-off date is also
prescribed. If both spouses are in government service, only one of them
is eligible for land allotment. The allotment is not alienable or
transferable by any instrument, including GPA, for a period of ten years
from the date of allotment.
(x) Allotments to specified categories also includes family members of AIS
officers who died in harness prior to their retirement, including those
killed by Naxalites while on duty, and had not availed facilities of
allotment of housing sites at concessional rates.
28. On behalf of the Writ Petitioners, it is submitted that:
(i) A policy or an executive decision should be backed by a social and
welfare purpose. It should not be for the profit or benefit of private
individuals or a particular class. Public interest should be the paramount
consideration. Departure from these principles should be for compelling
reasons that must be rational and not suggestive of discrimination, bias,
jobbery or nepotism.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 28 of 64
(ii) Land is a natural resource and being so it should be expended to best
subserve the common good. It should not be dissipated at a
consideration lower than the actual worth. One set of citizens, without
good reason and justification, cannot prosper at the cost of the other set
of citizens.
(iii) Valuable government property of around Rs. 10,000 crores belonging
to the people of the State, which is held in trust by the State
Government, is sought to be transferred in favour of the privileged
section or class of persons without an overwhelming or legitimate public
purpose. The eight categories of persons include MLAs, MPs, officers
of the AIS, journalists, Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court,
State Government employees, etc.
(iv) The size of plots which are being sold at the basic price clearly shows
arbitrariness and discrimination as Judges of the Supreme Court and
High Court, MPs, MLAs, and officers of the AIS are being allotted plots
of 500 square yards, whereas others have been allotted smaller plots.
(v) Almost all MPs, MLAs, Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court,
officers of the AIS and even journalists, already own a plot or a house
within the State. Therefore, they should not be shown any indulgence in
distribution of the State’s largesse which would allow them to profiteer
at the cost of the State and the common man.
(vi) The State Government had acquired 5,000 (five thousand) acres of land
in various villages in Ranga Reddy District for Information Technology
projects, Biotech Park, Apparel Park, Discovery City and Hardware Park
etc. The landowners were poor agriculturists who were paid meagre
amounts when their lands were acquired. The land is now being
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 29 of 64
transferred to the privileged section of the society without a publicauction, on payment of an amount which is much less than the market
value. While the allottees will become rich overnight, the villagers and
the agriculturists who were the erstwhile owners of the land, along with
the general public and the society, will be denied the benefits of the
surged land prices.
(vii) Past allotments, if any, made contrary to law, would not justify
allotments in the present date, if the same were in violation of the rule
of law and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While the State is
entitled to frame and take policy decisions, such decisions cannot be
arbitrary and violate the principles of equity and fairness. The
Constitution of India does not vest absolute discretion with the
Executive. Public interest is the paramount consideration. Land,
including property, should be sold and disposed of by public auction or
by inviting tender. It is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong
right, and not allow perpetuation of the wrongdoing.
(viii) Land in the concerned area is scarce, as is accepted by the Cooperative
Societies, its members and others. This cannot be a reason to make
preferential allotment to a select few who are the privileged or better off
members of our society. Allotment of government land to such members
is contrary to public interest, when a considerable portion of the
population of the State lives below the poverty line, struggling for basic
amenities, and is without shelter. The impugned land allotment policy is
a cloaked attempt of the Executive at the aggrandisement of certain
privileged groups such as bureaucrats, Judges, journalists etc.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 30 of 64
(ix) Allotment of individual housing plots to persons belonging to weaker
sections of the society in Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy district was
prohibited by the Government Memo dated 17.11.2004 on the ground
that there is paucity and dearth of government land in those areas.
Construction of only G+3 multi-storeyed flats was allowed. However, in
case of the respondents, except for Respondent No. 1 – M/S Campaign
for Housing and Tenural Rights (CHATRI) in C.A. No. 3792/2011, all
Cooperative Societies have been allowed to make allotment of plots to
its members. No principle has been followed and there is no justification
for taking the said decision, which is without any rhyme or reason.
(x) Reliance placed upon the 1975 Rules is misplaced as they do not have
any application. Allotment of housing sites is governed by Assignment
of House Sites in Villages & Towns in Telangana Area Rules, 1975. This
aspect, as mentioned above, will be referred to subsequently.
ANALYSIS – RES JUDICATA AND CONSTRUCTIVE RES JUDICATA
29. The issue with regard to res judicata and constructive res judicata has been
raised before us and was also argued before and considered by the High Court
in the impugned judgment. The plea of res judicata was rejected by the High
Court, but it upheld the plea of constructive res judicata raised by the
Cooperative Societies, their members and the State Government.
30. In Forward Construction Company (supra), this Court, relying upon
Explanation (IV)18 to Section 11 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908,19
18 Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack
in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such
suit.
19 For short, “CPC”.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 31 of 64
observed that any matter that might or ought to have been made a ground of
attack in a former suit is deemed to have been made a matter directly or
substantially an issue in the said suit. Therefore, res judicata impacts not only
the actual matter determined, but every other matter which the parties might
or ought to have litigated and have decided as incidental to, or essentially
connected with the subject matter of the litigation. It includes every matter
coming into the legitimate purview of the original action, both in respect of the
matters of claim and defence. The judgment explains that the underlying
principle in Explanation (IV) is that where the parties have had an opportunity
of controverting a matter, that should have been taken to be the same thing as
if the matter had been actually controverted and decided.
31. However, in the said case the contention relying upon Explanation (IV) was
rejected observing that when a matter has been constructively in issue, it
cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. Reference was also
made to Explanation (VI) to Section 11.20 It is observed that the said
explanation will apply when the conditions mentioned in that explanation are
satisfied. This means that the Court should be satisfied that the decision in the
litigation shall bind all persons interested in the right litigated. Onus of proving
want of bona fides in respect of the previous litigation is on the parties seeking
to avoid the said decision. Referring to the Explanation, it is said that Section
11 applies to public interest litigation as well. Such litigation has to be a bona
fide litigation in respect of a right which is common and agitated in common
with others. In the said case, this Court approved the decision of the High Court
20 Explanation VI.—Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right
claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the
purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 32 of 64
that Section 11 will not be applicable in view of the finding recorded by the High
Court, observing that the first Writ Petition was not a bona fide one.
32. In All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others (supra), this Court
examined the question of res judicata observing that it is based upon larger
public interest, being founded on two grounds: firstly, no one should be vexed
twice for one and the same cause; and secondly, there should be an end to
the same litigation. This Court further observed that Section 11 is a statutory
recognition of the principle of res judicata and, therefore, not a complete code,
or exhaustive of the general law and principle of res judicata. This Court
thereafter observed, that a judgment in public interest litigation, when the
litigation is bona fide, operates in rem. It binds the public at large. Thereafter,
it examined Explanations (III) and (IV) to Section 11. Specific reference is
made to the judgment in Greenhalgh v. Mallard,21 which observes that it would
be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started
in respect of the same issue which has already been decided. This principle
will equally apply to every other matter where the parties might or ought to
have litigated. The principle applies when issues have been decided
incidentally or essentially connected with the subject matter of litigation so as
to come within the purview of the original action both in respect of the matter
of claim and defence.
33. In V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India and Others,22 a question that arose
before this Court was whether the principle of constructive res judicata should
be applied as there was an earlier judgment. The contention was rejected as
21 (1947) 2 All England Reporter 255 (CA).
22 (2001) 10 SCC 305.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 33 of 64
being devoid of any substance, by observing that the earlier Writ Petition under
Article 32 was regarding cancellation of 15 allotments of petroleum and gas
dealerships and final directions given to the High Court to dispose of the
pending Writ Petition after examining the individual cases. Clearly, in the
present matter also, in the first litigation and decision which has been quoted
above, allotments made were quashed and therefore, the effect thereof was
that none of the Cooperative Societies or its members would have been
entitled to any benefit.
34. A more authoritative pronouncement on the said subject is to be found in a
recent decision of this Court in National Confederation of Officers
Association of Central Public Sector Enterprises and Others v. Union of
India and Others,23 wherein it takes notice of the argument relating to
applicability of res judicata and constructive res judicata to PILs. This judgment
not only examines the provisions of Section 11 of the CPC but the judgment of
this Court in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. ,24
wherein it is observed that in PILs, every technicality in procedural law is not
available in defence. Therefore, it would be wrong to dismiss a matter involving
grave public importance, to entertain the plea of res judicata. Reference was
also made to All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others (supra)
which also elucidates the question of bona fides. It is observed that the
petitioner therein who had filed the first litigation had special technical expertise
on the matter to impute the project on the ground that he did. Further, the first
judgment had references to the issue of plan, types of plan required, etc.
23 (2022) 4 SCC 764.
24 1989 Supp (1) 504.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 34 of 64
Lastly, the claims and the arguments raised in the second petition were largely
and substantially same in the first petition. After referring to the first judgment,
it is observed:
“35. As a matter of fact, in a public interest litigation, the petitioner
is not agitating his individual rights but represents the public at large.
As long as the litigation is bona fide, a judgment in a previous public
interest litigation would be a judgment in rem. It binds the public at
large and bars any member of the public from coming forward before
the court and raising any connected issue or an issue, which had
been raised should have been raised on an earlier occasion by way
of a public interest litigation. It cannot be doubted that the petitioner
in Somashekar Reddy was acting bona fide. Further, we may note
that, as a retired Chief Engineer, Somashekar Reddy had the
special technical expertise to impugn the Project on the grounds that
he did and so, he cannot be dismissed as a busybody. Thus, we are
satisfied in principle that Somashekar Reddy, as a public interest
litigation, could bar the present litigation.”
35. The main argument raised on behalf of the Cooperative Societies and its
members is that the principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata would
apply in the present case. We are of the opinion that the question of res judicata
will certainly not apply, as the previous judgment did not, as accepted by
everyone, examine the constitutional validity of GoM Nos. 243 and 244. GoM
Nos. 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 had not been issued at the time the
said judgment was pronounced and hence, could never have been challenged.
On the question of constructive res judicata, we must accept that the same will
have limited application to public interest litigation.
36. The contention is that Writ Petition No. 13730 of 2006 was filed in public
interest by Mr. V.S. Bose, Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani and Mr. O.M. Debara, which
petition was disposed of vide judgment dated 08.10.2007. The judgment, as
noticed above, specifically records that the petitioners therein had not
challenged GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005. However, this judgment
had in fact quashed the allotment made in terms of GoM No. 522 dated
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 35 of 64
04.05.2006, insofar as the GoM had permitted allotment of land to individuals,
who are not members of Cooperative Societies and groups, or who may have
received benefit of concessional allotment, either in individual capacity or as a
member of a Cooperative Society or group to which preferential allotment had
been made. The said judgment directed that the Government should identify
the category of persons who may form a new Cooperative Society, get the
same registered and make an application as a group for the purpose of
allotment of land in terms of the policy contained in GoM Nos. 242 and 243
dated 28.02.2005. It further ruled that all allotments must be in accordance with
the stipulations in GoM Nos. 242, 243 and 244. Further, the Court observed
that the Government would be well advised to incorporate a condition of
inapplicability of the policy to those who own a house or housing site in their
own name, or in the name of their spouse or children, so as to make it
applicable to all future allotments. We would like to quote the relevant
paragraphs from the judgment:
“In the result, the writ petition is allowed and G.O.Ms.No.522, dated
04.5.2006 is quashed insofar as it provides for allotment of land to
individuals, who are not members of the societies/groups and who
may have received the benefit of concessional allotment from the
government earlier or as member of any society or group to which
concessional allotment was made. G.O.Ms.No.1424, dated
28.9.2006 whereby the land has been earmarked for respondent
No.4 is declared to be in consonance with the policy contained in
G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.2.2005 subject to the rider that all the
restrictions contained in that G.O. will apply to the allotment of land
by respondent No.4 to its members. The government will also do
well to incorporate an additional restriction against the allotment of
land to those who own house or house-site in their own name or in
the name of their spouse or children and make the same applicable
to the allotment made to respondent No.4 and all future allotments,
which may be made in accordance with the policy enshrined in
G.0.Ms.Nos.242 and 243 dated 28.2.2005.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 36 of 64
However, it is made clear that this order of ours will not preclude the
government from making allotment to societies or groups of the
identified categories in accordance with the policy contained in
G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.2.2005 and it will be open to the identified
categories of persons to form new society and get the same
registered or make applications as groups for the purpose of
allotment of land in terms of the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243,
dated 28.2.2005.
Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary to mention
that the provision contained in the impugned G.O. for processing of
the applications of the individual High Court Judges by the sub-
committee comprising Advocate General, Secretary, Legal Affairs
and Registrar General, A.P. High Court, with senior-most among
them being its Chairman had the pernicious effect of demeaning the
status of the members of the superior judiciary and seriously eroding
the confidence of the common man in the system of administration
of justice because, then the individual Judges would have been
required to make applications for allotment of land to the
government and their applications would have been processed by a
committee comprising two officers who are constitutionally
subordinate to the High Court. It is a matter of satisfaction that the
government has taken corrective measure, removed the offending
clause and earmarked the land for respondent No.4, which is bound
to be allotted to the members of the said respondent, who do not
suffer from any disability incorporated in G.O.Ms.No.243 and the
restriction, which may be imposed by the government in terms of
the observations made in this order.”
37. In view of the legal position, we reject the contention of the Cooperative
Societies etc. that the principle of constructive res judicata should apply to our
examination of the challenge to GOM Nos. 243 and 244. We, therefore, set
aside the reasoning of the High Court to this extent.
38. We believe that the principles of constructive res judicata should not have been
applied, given the significant public interest at stake in this public interest
litigation. It is clear that GoM Nos. 243 and 244 were not part of the challenge
in the first litigation, as the petitioners then believed that simply quashing the
allotments would suffice. Once the allotments were cancelled and the Writ
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 37 of 64
Petition was allowed, the State of Telangana had the opportunity to re-evaluate
the entire issue in light of the findings recorded.
39. It will not be correct to put fetters on the members of the public in filing a Writ
Petition challenging GoM Nos. 243 and 244 in this factual background.
Constructive res judicata applies only when the cause of action is identical. In
our view, the causes of action in the two litigation proceedings should not be
considered identical, as the first litigation focused on the allotment and its terms
and conditions. GoM Nos. 243 and 244 are separate and distinct from the
allotment itself, and challenging these notifications constitutes a separate and
independent cause of action.
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF IMPUGNED GOVERNMENT MEMORANDA
40. To assess the constitutional validity of GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated
28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551
dated 27.03.2008; it is crucial to consider the factual context of their
stipulations.25 The core issue at hand pertains to the distribution of State
largesse—the generosity exercised by the State in distributing public
resources—in this instance, public land in the State of Telangana. The term
“State largesse” often implies a level of discretion in how these resources are
allocated and can be seen as a reflection of a government’s priorities or
policies. Consequently, the exercise of such “generosity” or “discretion” has
significant implications for the citizenry, their rights, and the functioning of
democracy.
25 See paragraphs 7 and 8 of this judgment for specifics of GoM Nos. 243 and 244.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 38 of 64
41. The question that arises is – Can the Government, like any private individual,
have the absolute discretion to frame policy, distribute resources and enter into
a contract with whomsoever it pleases, on any terms and conditions it so
desires?
42. In Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal,26 this
question was posed to this Court. The then Chief Justice,27 on behalf of the
Bench, responded that the Government is not like a private individual who can
pick and choose the person with whom it will deal. When the Government is
trading with the public, the democratic nature of Government demands equality
coupled with an absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such
transactions. The activities of the Government have a public element and,
therefore, they should be conducted with fairness and equality. The State need
not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly,
without discrimination and without adopting an unfair procedure.
43. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India,28
relying upon the principle established by Erusian Equipment (supra), this
Court, observed:
“…This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the
Government with the public, where the interest sought to be
protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be taken to be the law
that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by
way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or
licences or granting other forms of largesse, the Government
cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual,
deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in
conformity with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational
or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the
matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs, contracts,26 (1975) 1 SCC 70.
27 A.N. Ray, CJI.
28 (1979) 3 SCC 489.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 39 of 64
quotas, licences, etc. must be confined and structured by
rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if
the Government departs from such standard or norm in any
particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be
liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the
Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based
on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational,
unreasonable or discriminatory.”
44. These principles were reiterated in Common Cause, A Registered Society
v. Union of India,29 where this Court quashed certain petroleum pump
allotments made by the Minister in exercise of his discretionary power. This
Court observed:
“22. The Government today — in a welfare State — provides
large number of benefits to the citizens. It distributes wealth in
the form of allotment of plots, houses, petrol pumps, gas
agencies, mineral leases, contracts, quotas and licences etc.
Government distributes largesses in various forms. A Minister
who is the executive head of the department concerned
distributes these benefits and largesses. He is elected by the
people and is elevated to a position where he holds a trust on
behalf of the people. He has to deal with the people’s property in
a fair and just manner. He cannot commit breach of the trust
reposed in him by the people.”
45. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,30 this Court unequivocally
rejected the argument of absolute discretion of the administrative authorities
and immunity of their action from judicial review. The Court observed:
“21. … In our opinion, it would be alien to the constitutional
scheme to accept the argument of exclusion of Article 14 in
contractual matters. The scope and permissible grounds of
judicial review in such matters and the relief which may be
available are different matters but that does not justify the view
of its total exclusion. This is more so when the modern trend is
also to examine the unreasonableness of a term in such
contracts where the bargaining power is unequal so that these
are not negotiated contracts but standard form contracts
between unequals.
xx xx xx
29 (1996) 6 SCC 530.
30 (1991) 1 SCC 212.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 40 of 64
29. It can no longer be doubted at this point of time that
Article 14 of the Constitution of India applies also to matters
of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the
Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the
test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional.”
(emphasis supplied)
46. Thus, time and again, this Court has held that while the power to distribute and
redistribute public assets and resources lie within the State’s discretion, such
discretion is not absolute. Article 14 and the logic of equality impose fetters on
the exercise of this discretionary power. Therefore, it cannot be questioned or
contested that state policy and executive action must satisfy the rigours of
Article 14.
47. This leads us to the subsequent inquiry – how do we ascertain whether a State
policy or executive action has violated the fetters imposed by Article 14? In
other words, what are the tests applicable to evaluate the legality of State
conduct in terms of Article 14? Do GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005;
GoM Nos. 420, 422-425 dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008
pass the constitutional muster?
48. The test of reasonable classification, developed several decades ago,
continues to be a dominant test permeating our constitutional discourse. It
consists of two prongs:
(i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others
that are left out of the group; and
(ii) the differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be
achieved by the statute/policy in question.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 41 of 64
49. Referring to the two-fold classification test, a Constitution Bench of this Court
in Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation,31
emphasised that there must be a nexus between the basis of the classification
and the object of the legislation/policy under consideration. The Court also
referred to its earlier Constitution Bench decision in Ram Krishna Dalmia v.
Justice S.R. Tendolkar,32 which observes that the legislature is free to
recognise varying degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions on
classification to those cases where the need is most evident. However, the
courts can interfere when there is nothing on the face of law or the surrounding
circumstances which reasonably support the classification. In such cases, the
presumption of constitutionality does not extend to suggesting that there are
always undisclosed reasons for subjecting certain individuals or entities to
discriminatory legislation. The rationale for classification may be specified in
the statute, policy etc., or inferred from the surrounding circumstances known
or brought to the notice of the court.
50. In Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao and Others,33 a Constitution
Bench of this Court emphasised that the object itself should be lawful and
cannot be discriminatory. If the object is to discriminate against a section of the
minority, such discrimination cannot be justified on the grounds of reasonable
classification, even if it has a rational connection to the intended objective.
51. In a reference made to this Court under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of
India regarding the constitutional validity of the Special Courts Bill, 1978, a
31 (2014) 8 SCC 682.
32 AIR 1958 SC 538.
33 (1973) 1 SCC 500.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 42 of 64
seven-Judge bench of this Court in In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978,34
concluded that the State possesses the authority to enact laws that operate
differently on various groups or classes of individuals to achieve specific ends.
Constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of laws sets a
goal that cannot be achieved through rigid formulae. Therefore, courts should
not demand delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests. Classification is
justified as long as it is not palpably arbitrary. Laws must be applied equally to
all individuals placed in similar situations, and reasonable classification
involves segregating groups based on shared properties and characteristics.
This power of classification enables the State to recognise and deal with the
needs and exigencies of the society as suggested by experience, which
includes recognition of given degree of evil. What is necessary is that there
should be a nexus between them.
52. The basis of classification, and object of the legislation are distinct things.
Article 14 postulates the need for a rational nexus. Therefore, mere designation
of a classification based on an identified objective does not lead to an
automatic satisfaction of Article 14. Such an approach can devolve into legal
formalism, which risks disregarding the substantive implications of the
constitutional guarantee of equality. This Court, to avoid such formalism, has
transitioned from an exclusive reliance on the test of classification to a
concurrent application of the doctrine of arbitrariness when actions are not
grounded in valid reasons. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits class
discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities on individuals
arbitrarily selected from a larger group in similar circumstances concerning the
34 (1979) 1 SCC 380.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 43 of 64
privileges sought or the liabilities imposed. The classification must never be
arbitrary, artificial or evasive.
53. The foundations of arbitrariness in the context of the classification test were
laid by Bose J. in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar35 and
subsequently in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra36. Bose J. has
questioned the propriety of the classification test by propounding that mere
classification by itself is not enough, for the simple reason that anything can be
classified and every discriminatory action must of necessity fall in some
category of classification. Classification is nothing more than dividing of one
group of things from another, and unless some difference or distinction is made
in a given case, no question under Article 14 can arise. Mere classification is
only a means of attaining the desired result. Therefore, the ends cannot be
entirely ignored and consequently, the Court in a limited way is not precluded
from examining the legitimacy of the legislative object.
54. In a number of decisions of this Court, a similar approach has been taken. In
State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa,37 this Court cautioned
that classification can pose a danger of creating artificial inequalities and thus
to overdo classification is to undo equality. Therefore, classification has to be
demonstrably based upon substantive differences and should promote
relevant goals that have constitutional validity.38 The legitimacy of the object,
in a limited way, is a necessary element to be considered for assessing validity
35 (1952) 1 SCC 1.
36 (1952) 1 SCC 215.
37 (1974) 1 SCC 19.
38 Also see Hiral P. Harsora and Others v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Others, (2016) 10 SCC
165, and Union of India v. N.S. Rathnam & Sons, (2015) 10 SCC 681, where similar views have been
expressed.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 44 of 64
of any classification. The classification must be just and fair, which
necessitates that the court scrutinizes the underlying purpose of the law. Many
a case will ex-facie or demonstrably meet the equity compliance, some will be
declared constitutional after in-depth judicial examination. This Court in LIC v.
Consumer Education Centre,39 had accordingly struck down an insurance
policy which was limited to employees of the Government or reputed
commercial firms, as violating Article 14 on the ground that it did not meet the
test of equality, fairness and justice. Significantly, the Court had observed that
the doctrine of classification is simply a subsidiary rule that the judiciary has
evolved to give practical content to the doctrine of equality. In Indian Council
for Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India,40 the stipulation that
advocates must be under the age of 45 for enrolment was invalidated as being
discriminatory, despite its intention to address specific demographics. The
criterion was found to be unreasonable and consequently, impinging upon the
principle of equality.
55. Thus, it is crucial to recognise that the unreasonableness of a law, policy or
state action can be both relative and absolute. First, unreasonableness can be
comparative, meaning it is assessed in relation to something else. In Ajay
Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi,41 this Court stipulated that a policy in
question must satisfy two requirements under the reasonable classification test
– (a) the classification must be reasonable; and (b) it must fulfil the twin
conditions of intelligible differentia and rational nexus. Second, a policy may
perpetrate discrimination inherently, instead of inter se discrimination vis-à-vis
39 (1995) 5 SCC 482.
40 (1995) 1 SCC 732.
41 (1981) 1 SCC 722.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 45 of 64
others. In A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.,42
this Court held that one need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative
evaluation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory
treatment. An action/policy can per se be arbitrary, and such arbitrariness in
itself constitutes a violation of the equal of protection under law.
56. It follows that the rigours of Article 14 cannot be interpreted in a narrow,
pedantic or lexicographical manner.43 The doctrine of classification is neither a
mere restatement of Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that Article. 44
In a catena of judgments, this Court has held that the reasonable classification
doctrine is a judicial formula to assess whether legislative or executive actions
are arbitrary, thus amounting to a denial of equality.45 It is arbitrariness that lies
at the heart of the reasonable classification test. The principle of
reasonableness – both legally and philosophically – is an essential element of
equality or non-arbitrariness, pervading Article 14 like a “brooding
omnipresence”.46
57. In recent pronouncements, this Court has clearly expounded India’s equality
jurisprudence – from a reliance on the test of classification and arbitrariness to
a more substantive interpretation of equality. For instance, A.K. Sikri J., in
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and Others,47 had
referred to the relationship between equality and dignity. In Navtej Johar v.
42 (1984) 3 SCC 316, 328.
43 Ibid.
44 Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1.
45 Ajay Hasia (supra); Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra).
46 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248. Also see Shayara Bano v. Union of India,
(2017) 9 SCC 1.
47 (2014) 5 SCC 438.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 46 of 64
Union of India,48 D.Y. Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordship then was) explicitly
articulated the principle of substantive equality and remarked:
“Equating the content of equality with the reasonableness of a
classification on which a law is based advances the cause of legal
formalism. The problem with the classification test is that what
constitutes a reasonable classification is reduced to a mere formula:
the quest for an intelligible differentia and the rational nexus to the
object sought to be achieved. In doing so, the test of classification
risks elevating form over substance. The danger inherent in legal
formalism lies in its inability to lay threadbare the values which guide
the process of judging constitutional rights. Legal formalism buries
the life-giving forces of the Constitution under a mere mantra. What
it ignores is that Article 14 contains a powerful statement of values
– of the substance of equality before the law and the equal
protection of laws. To reduce it to a formal exercise of classification
may miss the true value of equality as a safeguard against
arbitrariness in state action. As our constitutional jurisprudence has
evolved towards recognizing the substantive content of liberty and
equality, the core of Article 14 has emerged out of the shadows of
classification. Article 14 has a substantive content on which,
together with liberty and dignity, the edifice of the Constitution is
built. Simply put, in that avatar, it reflects the quest for ensuring fair
treatment of the individual in every aspect of human endeavor and
in every facet of human existence.”
58. Similarly, in Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India,49 the Court referred to
jurisprudence relating to indirect discrimination which may also be a valid
reason to strike down a legislation. This decision refers to the principle of
substantive equality and that the right of equality should not be seen through
a narrow lens. The court should examine the impact of the law, and whether
the law or a policy adversely affects members of a particular disadvantaged
group disproportionately. In other words, when the courts examine the
question of rationality of a classification, they in a way also examine non-
classificatory arbitrariness. No doubt, in doing so, the court does show a
degree of deference. There are decisions of this Court which hold that under-
48 (2018) 10 SCC 1.
49 (2021) 15 SCC 125.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 47 of 64
inclusiveness will not result in invalidity of a statute, and that the State is not
obligated to extend a policy to all such cases to which it would otherwise
apply.50 These decisions are based on the premise that a legislation is
permitted to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions or
benefits to those cases where the need is the clearest. Legislative or executive
action does not deal with absolutes.
59. Thus, over the years, there is a discernible and marked shift from mere formal
equality to the broader concept of substantive equality, which encompasses
various dimensions of the principle of equality.51 On one hand, substantive
equality focuses on correction of historical wrongs, checking stereotypes,
stigma, prejudice etc.,52 while on the other, it also scrutinizes if a law or policy
is inherently discriminatory. The latter principle applies when the legitimacy of
the objective is flawed and manifests arbitrariness. We shall subsequently
elaborate on the legal meaning of substantive equality.
60. This evolution of the law under Article 14 aligns with judicial decisions in the
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa. For our purposes,
we will refer to some decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that exemplify
the development of Canada’s approach to equality as articulated in Section 15
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982.53
50 See Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) and Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
51 Jahnavi Sindhu and Vikram Aditya Narayan, “Equality under the Indian Constitution: Moving away
from Reasonable Classification” (November 29, 2022).
52 Sandra Fredman, “Substantive Equality Revisited”, I.CON (2016), Vol. 14 No. 3, 712-738.
53 For short, “Canadian Charter”.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 48 of 64
61. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter54 aims to provide substantive equality.55 To
begin, in 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Andrews v. Law Society of
British Columbia,56 interpreted Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter to
include both direct and indirect discrimination. Subsequently, in Law v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),57 a three-fold test was
laid down.58 This included identifying a comparator group of individuals in
similar circumstances and determining whether the law’s disadvantage
constituted an impairment of human dignity. The Supreme Court of Canada
later modified the test in R. v. Kapp,59 reframing the doctrine of substantive
equality and held that it should prevail over formal equality. The court noted
that the human dignity aspect, included in the third part of the Law v. Canada
(supra) test, had not achieved the intended philosophical enhancement.
54 Section 15 – (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration
of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because
of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or mental or physical disability.
55 A literal reading of the Constitution of India shows that our founders envisaged a progressive and
substantive framework of equal protection of laws. See Article 14, read with Articles 15, 16, 17, and 18
of the Constitution of India.
56 [1989] 1 SCR 143.
57 [1999] 1 SCR 497.
58 The three-part test is as follows:
A court that is called upon to determine a discrimination claim under s. 15(1) should make the following
three broad inquiries:
A. Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the
basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s
already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal
characteristics?
B. Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated and
analogous grounds?
and
C. Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a
benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed
group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or
promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a
human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and
consideration?
59 [2008] 2 SCR 483.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 49 of 64
However, human dignity remains a fundamental value underlying the principle
of equality.
62. In the context of Section 15, which is divided into subsections (1) and (2)—the
latter addressing reverse discrimination and ameliorative measures—the
inquiry for classification under Kapp (supra) requires the government to
demonstrate that a program has an ameliorative and remedial purpose and
specifically targets a disadvantaged group identified by enumerated or
analogous grounds. The test was further refined in Withler v. Canada
(Attorney General),60 wherein the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly
rejected the notion that formal equality alone is adequate, emphasizing the
necessity of substantive equality, stating:
“Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, rejects the mere
presence or absence of difference as an answer to differential
treatment. It insists on going behind the facade of similarities and
differences. It asks not only what characteristics the different
treatment is predicated upon, but also whether those characteristics
are relevant considerations under the circumstances. The focus of
the inquiry is on the actual impact of the impugned law, taking full
account of social, political, economic and historical factors
concerning the group. The result may be to reveal differential
treatment as discriminatory because of prejudicial impact or
negative stereotyping. Or it may reveal that differential treatment is
required in order to ameliorate the actual situation of the claimant
group.”
63. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has significantly reshaped the comparator
group requirement, providing a broader and wider meaning to equality claims.
The test poses two questions – (1) Does the law create a distinction based on
an enumerated or analogous ground? and (2) Does the distinction create a
disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotypes? The purpose of the
distinction component is to demonstrate that the claimant has been treated
60 [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 50 of 64
differently from others—specifically, that they have been denied a benefit
available to others or are burdened in a way that others are not, due to personal
characteristics that qualify as enumerated or analogous grounds.
64. In Quebec (Attorney General) v. A,61 the court observed that substantive
equality is not compromised merely because a disadvantage is imposed;
rather, it is denied when that disadvantage is unfair or objectionable. This is
often the case when the disadvantage perpetuates prejudice or stereotypes.
Such discrimination can overlook significant harms, including marginalization,
oppression, and the deprivation of essential benefits. The focus should be on
the execution and impact of the law, rather than the government’s intent, when
applying this test.
65. Section 15 is violated when distinctions lead to the perpetuation of arbitrary
disadvantages based on an individual’s membership in an enumerated or
analogous group. Importantly, the test requires a flexible and contextual
inquiry. Lastly, we will refer to the decision of Fraser v. Canada (Attorney
General),62 where the court summarized the law on the adverse effects of
discrimination, noting that this occurs when a seemingly neutral law
disproportionately impacts members of groups protected on the basis of
enumerated or analogous grounds.
66. In this manner, the development of equality jurisprudence in Canada bears
resemblances with the progressive development of constitutional
jurisprudence in India. In the Indian context, the mere fact that a policy caters
61 [2012] 1 SCR 61.
62 [2020] 3 SCR 113.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 51 of 64
to a distinct, intelligible class, does not automatically imply that the rigours of
Article 14 are satisfied. The second prong of the reasonable classification test
mandates that the distinction created by the policy between the two classes
must have a rational nexus with the object that policy seeks to achieve.
Furthermore, the objective of the classification should not itself be illogical,
unfair and unjust.
67. The substantive equality test, as enunciated in our recent pronouncements, is
broader and is not confined to a single principle. No doubt, it accommodates
the legislature and the executive’s right to achieve structural change, but this
right should be exercised to benefit those who are disadvantaged,
marginalized, or those in need or grouped, while excluding others from the
benefit or for imposition of the burden or obligation. It is crucial for the Court to
consider both the intent behind legislation or policy and its practical impact,
especially when it reflects discrimination based on proscribed grounds.63
68. Substantive equality is satisfied when the law or policy genuinely intends to
and provides, an equal chance of satisfying the criteria for access to a
particular social or economic good. It respects individual dignity, which
encompasses three characteristics: (i) a sense of self-worth, (ii) protection of
basic choices an individual makes, and (iii) protection of individuals against
harmful stereotypes. Lastly, substantive equality is achieved when legislation
or policies enhance participation and representation, countering both political
and socio-economic exclusion. The last aspect permits anti-subordination, as
it focuses on the group which has suffered the disadvantage and examines
63 The expression “proscribed grounds” has reference to Articles 15 to 18 of the Constitution of India.
These Articles and their impact on Article 14, have been examined later.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 52 of 64
whether the legislation or policy aims at neutrality or incorporates affirmative
action to rectify the disadvantage or discrimination. Anti-subordination
promotes structural change and aims to rectify disadvantages. In this sense,
substantive equality factors in multiple aspects of inequality offering a
multidimensional approach that allows the Court to address the interplay of
various aspects of equality, and equally accommodate differences instead of
masking them with formal equality.64
69. A literal reading of the Constitution’s equality provisions – Articles 14, 15, 16,
and 17 which collectively form the core of equality – supports an interpretation
of substantive equality. While these Articles are broadly interconnected, they
also confer independent rights. Article 18, which prohibits the granting of titles
to Indian citizens, aligns with this objective, serving as a response to the
colonial practice of elevating certain Indians over others.
70. Article 15(1) explicitly bars discrimination on the grounds of race, religion,
caste, sex, and place of birth. These can be loosely called proscribed grounds
for classification.65 Classifications based on these criteria will be
unconstitutional, unless permitted by clauses (3), (4), (5), and (6) of Article 15
of the Constitution of India, when they are justified on the ground of anti-
subordination. Latter clauses specifically permit the State to create special
provisions for women and children, and for the advancement of socially and
educationally backward classes, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
64 Supra note 50.
65 However, as held, classification on the basis of proscribed grounds is not forbidden vide Article 14,
albeit it should satisfy principles of anti-subordination and non-arbitrariness. Classification based on
proscribed grounds must at the same time, to be valid, independently meet the mandate of Articles 15
to 18 of the Constitution. Articles 15 to 18 confer independent rights to equality, which are not diluted
or foregone in compliance to Article 14. However, it would be rare that such a situation would arise,
once the test of substantive equality is satisfied.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 53 of 64
Tribes. These are anti-subordination grounds.66 The clauses permit provisions
for their admission to educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the
State, with the exception of minority educational institutions. Under Article
15(6), the State is authorized to enact laws for the economically weaker
sections, allowing for up to ten percent reservation in employment. Article 16,
which deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment,
prohibits discrimination of any citizen on the ground or religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or residence. However, it permits the State to make
provisions for reserving appointments for backward classes that are
inadequately represented, as well as for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes in State services.
71. Article 14, which provides for equality before the law, and mandates that the
State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection
of laws, does not specifically refer to a particular classification unlike Articles
15 and 16 of the Constitution, allowing greater legislative flexibility. This design
is intentional; the framers understood that rigid classifications could hinder the
legislature’s ability to address emerging societal issues and adapt to the
evolving needs of future generations. By avoiding specificity, the Constitution
enables lawmakers to make laws on futuristic grounds which may arise with
the struggles and challenges faced by the new generation.67
66 Anti-subordination grounds refer to the objectives of the legislation. They are not classifications. As
in case of proscribed grounds for classification, in case of anti-subordination grounds, the court’s
scrutiny is not totally prohibited, albeit substantive equality test will be satisfied when anti-subordination
principle is not violated, and the classification does not result in indirect discrimination.
67 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, which dealt with the 14th amendment to the United States
Constitution, observes that the framers knew that times could blind them to certain truths and later
generations could see the laws once thought necessary and proper, in fact, serve only the oppressed.
The Constitution endures, a person of every generation can invoke its principles in search for greater
freedom.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 54 of 64
72. Therefore, this Court has taken the view that Article 14 allows for reasonable
and fair classification but prohibits class legislation. Classifications based on
the categories outlined in Articles 15 and 16 are acceptable as long as they
have a rational connection to their intended objectives. These classifications—
such as those pertaining to other backward classes, scheduled castes and
tribes, and women and children—aim to fulfil the principle of equal ends. This
approach accepts and accommodates the said difference. They adopt an anti-
subordination approach, treating these groups differently to promote greater
equality. In this manner, Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India explicitly
recognize the necessity for legislative measures aimed at uplifting certain
disadvantaged sections to achieve equality.
73. The substantive equality test will also fail in case the legislation or the policy,
in its operation, results in indirect discrimination.68 The principle of indirect
discrimination comes into play when legislation or policy applies equally to all
but disproportionately disadvantages individuals or groups based on protected
characteristics, which cannot be justified. It refers to inequality of results and
outcomes. Substantive equality also encompasses equality of opportunity,
addressing institutional discrimination and rejecting policies that promote
imbalances rather than equalize starting points. Policies should not impose
additional obstacles for those requiring protection, or who have faced historical
discrimination or do so in the present.
74. Therefore, unless a law meets these criteria of substantive equality, it would
violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
68 See Lt. Col. Nitisha (supra). Also see Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel Association of India and Others,
(2008) 3 SCC 1.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 55 of 64
75. At this juncture, we will apply the law to the facts of the case. To quote from
the GoM No. 242, the land allotment policy seeks to serve the following
objective:
“Providing shelter is amongst the top priorities of the
Government. There are well defined schemes for providing
housing for the poor. In so far as meeting the requirement of the
other deserving sections of the society, there is no fixed
policy and mechanism for alienation of land to such sections and
Allotment was done case by case, for the land identified.
Therefore, Government have decided to have a comprehensive
policy of meeting housing requirement of targeted sections of
society by creation of land bank and· accordingly order the
following…”We would like to emphasise that the policy, while not targeted towards the
poor, is also aimed towards “other deserving sections of the society”, to meet
their “housing requirement”.
76. The category of people who have been identified as beneficiaries of this State
largesse as “other deserving sections of the society” are: Judges of the
Supreme Court and High Court, MPs, MLAs, journalists, State and Central
Government employees. It would be apt to note that, not only are these classes
of people being allotted land preferentially, the price of such land is also
discounted to the basic rate, instead of the prevalent market rate.
77. The State of Telangana, in its defence, has contended that the
abovementioned category of people forms a distinct class. However, we have
already enunciated above that, not only must a distinct classification exist but
such classification should not be arbitrary, artificial or artful, and should be
rationally tailored to serve the objective.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 56 of 64
78. In the present case, the principle of arbitrariness, as expounded in E.P.
Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu in its puritan form, is applicable.69 The
classification giving State largesse to Judges of Constitutional Courts, MPs,
MLAs, officers of the AIS, journalists, etc. favours a privileged segment of
society, which is already better off compared to the vast majority of
marginalized and socio-economically disadvantaged individuals. The benefits
granted to these privileged and well-off classes come at a cost, as they
effectively deprive and deny the essentials to the marginalized and socially
vulnerable populations.
79. The allocation of land at basic rates to select privileged groups reflects a
“capricious” and “irrational” approach. This is a classic case of executive action
steeped in arbitrariness, but clothed in the guise of legitimacy, by stating that
the ostensible purpose of the policy was to allot land to “deserving sections of
society”. Shorn of pretence, this policy of the State Government, is an abuse
of power meant to cater exclusively to the affluent sections of the society,
disapproving and rejecting the equal right to allotment of the common citizen
and the socio-economically disadvantaged. It would not be wrong to say that
the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness, as expounded in Shayara Bano v.
Union of India is applicable.70
80. The arbitrariness inherent in the land allocation policy is further reflected in
GoM No. 244. This order stipulates that if the available land is insufficient to
meet the prescribed allocations for AIS officers, the size of the plots may be
reduced according to a specified ratio. However, an exception is carved out for
69 (1974) 4 SCC 3.
70 (2017) 9 SCC 1; also see Navtej Johar (supra) and Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC
39.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 57 of 64
Category 1 beneficiaries, which includes IAS, IPS, and IFS officers. This
category is afforded preferential treatment without any justification for such a
distinction, highlighting an undue bias in favour of the most privileged subset
within an already irrational classification.
81. In this regard, members of the AIS have asserted that they are
“underprivileged”, or have made “sacrifices”, which entitles them to the
privilege of preferential land allotment at a discounted rate. We reject this
argument as fallacious and untenable. Government servants, elected
legislators, Judges in the Supreme Court and High Court, and prominent
journalists do not belong to the “weaker” or per se deserving sections of our
society, warranting special State reservations to land allotment.
82. Land is a finite and highly valuable resource, particularly in densely populated
urban areas, where access to land for housing and economic activities is
increasingly scarce. When the government allocates land at discounted rates
to the privileged few, it engenders a system of inequality, conferring upon them
a material advantage that remains inaccessible to the common citizen. This
preferential treatment conveys the message that certain individuals are entitled
to more, not due to the necessities of their public office or the public good, but
simply because of their status. Such practices foster resentment and
disillusionment among ordinary citizens, who perceive these actions as corrupt
or unjust, thereby eroding trust in democratic institutions. This policy
undermines solidarity and fraternity, reinforcing societal hierarchies rather than
actively working to dismantle them.
83. The policy has wider economic ramifications as well. When land is offered at a
discounted rate, it distorts the natural market forces that govern the value of
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 58 of 64
land. The true market price of land reflects its demand and utility, but when
individuals receive land at a discount, it artificially devalues the property and
consequently diminishes public revenue. This has severe financial
ramifications for the public exchequer.
84. In Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana,71 this Court observed that, typically,
the State is under an obligation to sell public property only at the market price,
with the sole exception of achieving a constitutionally recognised public
purpose:
“…Disposal of public property partakes the character of a trust in
that in its disposal there should be nothing hanky panky and that
it must be done at the best price so that larger revenue coming
into the coffers of the State administration would serve public
purpose viz. the welfare State may be able to expand its
beneficient activities by the availability of larger funds. This is
subject to one important limitation that socialist property may be
disposed at a price lower than the market price or even for a
token price to achieve some defined constitutionally recognised
public purpose, one such being to achieve the goals set out in
Part IV of the Constitution. But where disposal is for
augmentation of revenue and nothing else, the State is under an
obligation to secure the best market price available in a market
economy…A welfare State exists for the largest good of the
largest number more so when it proclaims to be a socialist State
dedicated to eradication of poverty. All its attempt must be to
obtain the best available price while disposing of its property
because the greater the revenue, the welfare activities will get a
fillip and shot in the arm…”
85. We are also of the opinion that, accredited journalists cannot be treated as a
separate class for such preferential treatment. In fact, a careful study of the
policy indicates that higher echelons of all the three wings of the government,
—legislators, bureaucrats, and Judges of the Supreme Court and High
Courts—have been afforded such preferential treatment. Journalists, who are
considered the fourth pillar of democracy, have also been included. These four
71 (1985) 3 SCC 267.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 59 of 64
pillars of democracy are expected to act as checks and balances on the
arbitrary exercise of the State’s power. However, the distribution of such
extraordinary State benefits renders nugatory the very optics of healthy checks
and balances within our democratic system.
86. Thus, the core framework of these policies suffers from the malaise of
unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It reeks of colourable exercise of power
whereby the policymakers are bestowing valuable resources to their peers and
ilk, triggering a cycle of illegal distribution of State resources. The State holds
all its resources in trust for its citizens, to be utilised in larger public and social
interest. The State, including the three organs – Legislature, Executive and the
Judiciary, are de facto trustees and agents/repositories which function and
govern for the benefit of the citizens who are the beneficiaries.72
87. Thus, the allotment policy fails to satisfy the requirements of the two-pronged
classification test coupled with arbitrariness. As noted earlier, the
jurisprudence surrounding equality law has evolved beyond a purely technical
analysis, embracing an approach that considers not only the intent behind
legislation or policy but also its real-world impact. We are of the opinion that
the policies in question are a relevant example to show that merely likes being
treated alike can lead to injustice. The pursuit of consistency through
classification, while appealing in theory, does not ensure that the classification
is either appropriate or equitable in practice. The substantive equality in
contemporary equality jurisprudence calls not for a conceptually tidy “test”, but
a multi-pronged approach to equality, which acknowledges the diverse ways
72 NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA and Others, (2011) 6 SCC 508.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 60 of 64
in which inequality and discrimination may be perpetuated.73 To test the facts
against the standards of substantive equality, we are of the opinion that Judges
of the Supreme Court and the High Court, MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS,
journalists etc. cannot be treated as a separate category for allotment of land
at a discounted basic value in preference to others. The object of the policy
perpetuates inequality. The policy differentiates and bestows largesse to an
advantaged section/group by resorting to discrimination and denial. It bars the
more deserving, as well as those similarly situated, from access to the land at
the same price. It promotes social-economic exclusion, to favour a small and
privileged section/group. The policy does not meet the equality and fairness
standards prescribed by the Constitution.
88. Of course, the State has the discretion and duty under the Constitution, to
distribute its resources to marginalised sections of society, or other imminent
and deserving personalities, to the extent necessary to discharge their public
functions. Personalities who contribute to the nation’s progress through
excellence in sports or other public activities may also be compensated
through reasonable and non-arbitrary distribution of State largesse. We would
also like to clarify that a policy or law allotting land to public servants may be
justifiable provided such allotment is within the confines of Article 14. Unless
the classification satisfies the twin prong test and the substantive equality
benchmark, the mandate of Article 14 is not met. The State cannot exercise
discretion to benefit a select few elites disproportionately, especially ones who
are already enjoying pre-existing benefits and advantages.
73 The impugned policies are not in furtherance of anti-subordination principle, and they do not raise a
presumption of constitutionality.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 61 of 64
89. Reliance placed by some of the Cooperative Societies and members on the
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F, and the 1975
Rules, including Section 25,74 is misconceived. Section 25 states that the land
can be assigned for special purposes and such assignment shall be lawful.
However, it does not mean that the land can be allotted in violation of principle
of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
90. Further, Rule 2(b) of the 1975 Rules states that alienation of land means
placing land at the disposal of a third person for a public purpose or a specified
cause. Alienation of land revenue, as defined in Section 2(c), means the grant
of exemption from payment. Section 2(i) defines market value to mean value
of the land that would fetch in the open market if sold, subject to appropriate
charge for land revenue. Rule 10, which is relied upon by the Cooperative
Societies and its members, states that notwithstanding anything contained in
the rules, the Government, if it so desires, can sell or otherwise alienate the
land or other property in Telangana area by following reasonable procedure,
including public auction where alienation is deemed necessary. This rule does
not support or assist the Cooperative Societies and their members in their
argument.
91. At this juncture, it is worth noting that during the pendency of the Writ Petition
before the High Court, several members of the Judiciary, to their credit,
decided to withdraw their applications for allotment of land. Recognizing the
74 25. Assigning of land for special purpose to be lawful – When a village is under settlement, the
Commissioner of Survey Settlement or the Commissioner of Land Records in that Village and in other
cases with the sanction of the Board of Revenue, the Collector may, subject to the orders of the
Government, set apart any Khalsa land not in the lawful occupation of any person or class for pasturage
of cattle or for grass reserves or for other Government purposes or for the purposes of public benefit;
provided that it does not interfere with any right of any person or class. The land so set apart shall not
be otherwise appropriated without the order of the Board of Revenue.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 62 of 64
constitutional limitations and acknowledging that such allotment would violate
Article 14, they made this decision upon thoughtful consideration. However,
many others continued to defend the allotment, vigorously presenting
arguments that they constituted a separate class with a rational nexus to the
policy. These arguments, however, are devoid of merit and must be
unequivocally rejected.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
92. In view of the aforesaid findings and discussion, we dismiss the appeals
preferred by the State of Telangana, the Cooperative Societies and their
members, and we allow the appeal preferred by Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav
challenging the judgment dated 05.01.2010 passed by the Division Bench of
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition Nos. 7956, 7997 and 23862
of 2008. The said Writ Petitions are allowed, thereby issuing a Writ of certiorari
and quashing GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005 to the extent they
classify MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS/State Government, Judges of the
Constitutional Courts, and journalists as a separate class for allotment of land
at the basic rate. As a sequitur, GoM Nos. 419, 420, 422 to 425 dated
25.03.2008, and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008, are declared to be bad in
law, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and are quashed
by issuing a Writ of certiorari.
93. The interim directions passed by this Court in some of these cases will now
stand merged with the final direction. Parties will be accordingly bound by the
same.
C.A. Nos. 3791-3793 of 2011 & Ors. Page 63 of 64
94. We also deem it appropriate to pass an order of restitution and direct that the
Cooperative Societies and their members, as the case may be, will be entitled
to a refund of the entire amount deposited by them, including the stamp duty
and the registration fee paid by them, along with the interest which may be
quantified by the State of Telangana. The rate of interest will not exceed the
Reserve Bank of India’s rate of interest applicable from time to time, as may
be deemed fit by the State of Telangana. The lease deeds executed by the
State of Telangana in favour of the societies/members will be treated as
cancelled. Similarly, development charges/expenses paid by the Cooperative
Societies/members, as reflected in the books of accounts of the Cooperative
Societies /members, duly certified by the income-tax returns, will be refunded
to them along with interest at the rates specified.
95. It will be open to the State of Telangana to deal with the land in the manner it
deems fit and proper and as per law, keeping in mind the observations and
findings recorded in this judgment.
96. The appeals and the contempt petitions are accordingly disposed of. All
pending applications also stand disposed of.
………………………………..CJI.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
………………………………..J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 25, 2024.
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