Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gurteshwar Singh @ Gurteshwar Singh … vs State Of Punjab And Others on 30 August, 2024
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:112568
CRM-M-31063-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-31063-2024 (O&M)
Reserved on: 05.08.2024
Date of Pronouncement: 30.08.2024
Gurteshwar Singh @ Gurteshwar Singh Dhillon
... Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of Punjab and others
...Respondent (s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present:- Mr. Gurmeet Singh Saini, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Jasjit Singh, DAG, Punjab.
Mr. Amritpal Singh, Advocate for
Mr. Balraj Singh Sidhu, Advocate for
for respondents no. 2 to 4.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections
8 19.02.1998 Sadar Moga, District Moga 324, 148, 149, IPC (323, 307 IPC
added later on)
The petitioner(s), arraigned as accused in the above captioned FIR, has/have come up
before this Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequential
proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved person(s).
2. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved
person(s) have compromised the matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as
Annexure P-4.
3. After that, the petitioner(s) came up before this Court to quash the FIR,
impleading the aggrieved persons as respondents no.2 to 4.
4. Pursuant to order of this Court dated 04.07.2024, the aggrieved person(s)
(Respondents no.2 to 4), appeared before the District & Sessions Judge, Faridkot and
stated that there would be no objection if the Court quashes this FIR and consequent
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proceedings. The relevant extract of the report of the concerned Court reads as
follows:
Name of the reporting District & Sessions Judge, Faridkot
CourtCriminal Case no.
before trial Court Case No.111 of 21.02.2024 bearing CIS No.SC-62-2024 CNR
No. PBFD01001939-2024
1. Names of the complainant/ victims(s)/ Boota Singh (Complainant)
aggrieved persons(s) Darshan Singh (injured)
Gulwinder Singh (injured)
2. Dates on which the statement(s) of the 09.07.2024
complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved
persons(s) were recorded
3. Has the identity of the complainant/ Yes
victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) been
verified?
4. Whether all the victims/ all the Yes
aggrieved persons have compromised
the matter?
5. Is there pressure, threat, or coercion No
upon the victim(s)/aggrieved
person(s)/complainant?
6. Names of the accused person(s) i) Nidhan Singh
ii) Gurbax singh
iii) Gurnam Singh
iv) Gurtej Singh
v) Chamkaur Singh
vi) Bohar Singh
vii) Gurteshwar Singh
7. Dates on which the statement(s) of the 09.07.2024
accused persons(s) recorded
8. Whether all the accused have Yes
compromised the matter? If no, then
the names of the accused who have
compromised.
9. Whether proclamation proceedings No
are pending against any accused?
10. Has the police report been filed or Yes
not?
11. Notice of accusation /Charges have Yes
been framed or not?
12. Sections of statutes invoked in the 148, 307, 324, 323, 149 of the IPC.
matter
13. Whether the court is satisfied with the Yes
genuineness of the compromise?
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
5. Despite the severe opposition of the State’s counsel to this compromise, the
following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: –
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a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably settled the
matter between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements
recorded before the concerned Court;
b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the settlement has not been
secured through coercion, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious
means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullification of
criminal proceedings;
d) There is no objection from the private respondent in case present FIR
and consequent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or
tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or
involve matters concerning public policy;
f) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of
trial affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an
unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to
work to bring peace to family, community, and society;
i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all
consequential proceedings is justified to secure the ends of justice.
6. In the present case, the offences under sections 307/324/148/149 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860, (IPC) are not compoundable under Section 320 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case,
the prosecution qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the FIR
and consequent proceedings.
7. It shall be appropriate to refer to the relevant portion of compromise deed,
which is extracted as follows:
“11. That both the parties are residents of same village and close relative
with each other. Gurteshwar Singh – Second party is real nephew of
Boota Singh first party. Therefore, now first party does not want to take
further legal proceedings against Gurteshwar Singh Second party. It is
pertinent to mentioned here that as per earlier compromise dated
24.03.2011, both the parties are living peacefully in neighborhood of
each other.
12. That first party is ready to record its statement before the learned
trail court; with regard to the factum of this compromise and first party
have no objection if FIR in question be quashed qua the Gurteshwar
Singh – Second party.”
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8. No doubt offence under Section 307 IPC falls in the category of heinous and
serious offence and therefore, is to be generally treated as crime against the society
and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge
is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether
there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. Given the fact that a compromise has arrived at between the parties, which will
affect the prosecution’s case, it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the
plea of compounding of offence based on settlement between the parties. Admittedly,
the parties belong to the same village and are related to each other and must be living
there for generations and might continue to live, who knows for how long. In the
closely-knit village community, when the parties have buried their hatchets, the
continuation of criminal proceedings will not advance the reformative purposes of
jurisprudence just for the sake of deterrence. The alleged incident had taken place
during election days, and petitioners in heat of the moment must have crossed their
limits to commit the alleged crime, but since better sense has prevailed and they have
compromised the matter, this Court is of the opinion that they deserve a chance to
course correct. Thus, the continuation of criminal proceedings will not advance the
reformative purposes of jurisprudence just for the sake of deterrence. This Court is
satisfied that it is fit case for acceptance of compromise in offence under Section 307
IPC.
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON QUASHING UNDER SECTION 307 IPC:
9. In Ram Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 2 SCC 149, Supreme Court holds,
The appellants, who are the accused and the complainant, Shri
Ram, who was the person injured as a result of firing, have
appeared before us and stated that they wish to compound the
offence. The offence for which both the appellants have been
convicted is one under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, but having regard to the nature of the injury
sustained by Shri Ram, we think that the proper offence for
which the appellants should have been convicted was under
Section 324 read with Section 34. Shri Ram received only one
injury on the shoulder and that was also in the nature of simple
hurt. We would, therefore, convert the conviction of the
appellants to one under Section 324 read with Section 34. Since
the parties belong to the same village and desire to compound
the offence, we think, in the larger interest of peace and
harmony between the parties and having regard to the nature
of the injury, that it would be proper to allow the parties to
compound the offence.
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10. In Mahesh Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1990 SCC 781, Hon’ble Supreme Court
holds as under:
[2]. The accused were acquitted by the trial court, but they
were convicted by the High Court for the offence under section
307 Indian Penal Code This offence is not compoundable under
law. The parties, however. want to treat it a special case, in
view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is said and
indeed not disputed that one of the accused is a lawyer
practising in the lower court. There was a counter case arising
out of the same transaction. It is said that this case has already
been compromised. The decision of this Court in Suresh Babu v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987(2) JT 361, has been also referred
to in support of the plea for permission to compound the
offence.
11. In Dimpey Gujraj v Union Territory, (2013) 11 SCC 497, Supreme Court holds,
[5]. In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh
v. State of Punjab and another, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 :
2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : 2012(5) CTC 526
(SC) we feel that this is a case where the continuation of
criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of
law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences
showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society.
They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would
bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the
circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26/10/2006
registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506
of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh
and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including
the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and
charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed.
12. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014:INSC:217, [Para 24-25, 31], 2014 (6)
SCC 466, a two-member bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[24]. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has
approved the quashing of proceedings under section 307, IPC
whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of
serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in
each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be
justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an
explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in
various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of
judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and
the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India. Stare Decisis is the fundamental principle
of judicial decision making which requires `certainty’ too in law
so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law
shall take is discernable and predictable. Unless that is
achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its
significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare
decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors
of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment
as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar
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circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands
of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of
justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened,
in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by “that curious, almost
universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be
treated alike in like circumstances”.
[25]. As there is a close relation between the equality and
justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two
prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and
therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal
objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at
length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down
some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in
mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what
circumstances it should accept the settlement between the
parties and quash the proceedings and under what
circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear
that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf
as well, the matter is examined in the context of offences under
Section 307 IPC.
[31]. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would be
guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between
the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the
Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction
to continue with the criminal proceedings :
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
is to be distinguished from the power which lies in
the Court to compound the offences under Section
320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash
the criminal proceedings even in those cases which
are not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter between themselves. However,
this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement
and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure :
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to
form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two
objectives.
(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on
society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been
committed under special statute like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
Public Servants while working in that capacity are
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not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes should be quashed
when the parties have resolved their entire disputes
among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal
cases would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore is to be generally treated as crime against
the society and not against the individual alone.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision
merely because there is a mention of Section 307
IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would
lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC.
For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court
to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of
the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical
report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim
can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of
this prima facie analysis, the High Court can
examine as to whether there is a strong possibility
of conviction or the chances of conviction are
remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse
to accept the settlement and quash the criminal
proceedings whereas in the later case it would be
permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete
settlement between the parties. At this stage, the
Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their
future relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of
settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where
the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
alleged commission of offence and the matter is still
under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in
accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the
reason that at this stage the investigation is still on
and even the charge sheet has not been filed.
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Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed
but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is
still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but
after prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is
almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,
normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code,
as in such cases the trial court would be in a
position to decide the case finally on merits and to
come a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already
recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere
compromise between the parties would not be a
ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of
the offender who has already been convicted by the
trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307
IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous
crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing
a convict found guilty of such a crime.
13. In State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149, Hon’ble Supreme
Court holds,
[14] We notice that the gravity of the injuries was taken note of
by the Sessions Court and it had awarded the sentence of 10
years rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under
Section 307 IPC, but not by the High Court. The High Court has
completely overlooked the various principles laid down by this
Court in Gian Singh , and has committed a mistake in taking the
view that, the injuries were caused on the body of Abdul Rashid
in a fight occurred at the spur and the heat of the moment. It
has been categorically held by this Court in Gian Singh that the
Court, while exercising the power under Section 482, must have
“due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime” and “the
societal impact”. Both these aspects were completely
overlooked by the High Court. The High Court in a cursory
manner, without application of mind, blindly accepted the
statement of the parties that they had settled their disputes
and differences and took the view that it was a crime against
“an individual”, rather than against “the society at large”.
[15] We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged to have
been committed by the accused persons was a crime against an
individual, on the other hand it was a crime against the society
at large. Criminal law is designed as a mechanism for achieving
social control and its purpose is the regulation of conduct and
activities within the society. Why Section 307 IPC is held to be
non-compoundable, because the Code has identified which
conduct should be brought within the ambit of non-
compoundable offences.
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Such provisions are not meant, just to protect the individual,
but the society as a whole. High Court was not right in thinking
that it was only an injury to the person and since the accused
persons had received the monetary compensation and settled
the matter, the crime as against them was wiped off. Criminal
justice system has a larger objective to achieve, that is safety
and protection of the people at large and it would be a lesson
not only to the offender, but to the individuals at large so that
such crimes would not be committed by any one and money
would not be a substitute for the crime committed against the
society. Taking a lenient view on a serious offence like the
present, will leave a wrong impression about the criminal
justice system and will encourage further criminal acts, which
will endanger the peaceful co-existence and welfare of the
society at large.
[16] We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set
aside the judgment of the High Court. The High Court was
carried away by the settlement and has not examined the
matter on merits, hence, we are inclined to direct the High
Court to take back the appeal to its file and decide the appeal
on merits.
14. In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 2014:INSC:496, [Para 4], 2, 1.7.2014,
Supreme Court holds,
[4]. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court
can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the
IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that
offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded
by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences
from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be
strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(4)
R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.)
549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given case, the High
Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power
under section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the
parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has
no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable.
In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to
quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances
of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave
offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing
the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the
society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two
individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may
send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High
Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in
nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity
and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on
account of compromise would bring about peace and would
secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In
such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution.
Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and
energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct
restoration of peace.
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15. In Kailash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 2018(4) R.C.R (Criminal) 292, Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[7]. Upon perusal of the record, it appears that the incident has
occurred almost 30 years ago. Since the complainant/s and the
appellant-accused belong to the same family and are living in
the same house, they have buried their animosity and settled
their disputes amicably in writing under an agreement letter
dated 28.07.2017, copy of which is already placed on the file.
The injured victims are brother and sister-in-law of the
appellant. It is also stated in the aforesaid application for
compromise/compounding of offence that there is no
untoward incident has ever taken place after the date of
incident.
[8]. Though the offences under sections 307 and 326 of the IPC
are non-compoundable, having regard to the fact that the
incident in the present case did not have an impact on the
society in general, and having regard to the fact that the
dispute between the parties has been settled amicably and
there is no likelihood of the repetition of such incident, we
allow the application for compromise/compounding of offence
and set aside the orders of conviction and sentence passed by
the courts below against the appellant by exercising our
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The
appellant is ordered to be acquitted of the charges levelled
against him. Since the appellant is confined in jail, he is ordered
to be released from custody forthwith if not required in any
other case.
16. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dhruv Gurjar, 2019:INSC:254 [Para 16.1], (2019)
5 SCC 570, the FIR was registered under S 307, 294 and 34 IPC based on the allegations
that Dhruv Gurjar (accused) armed with a 12-bore gun, and his gang, visited the house
of the complainant with a view to take revenge with his nephew. When the
complainant told them that his nephew was not present at home, on this Dhruv Gurjar
fired, and the pellets struck on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear. Disagreeing with
the order of High Court quashing the FIR, Hon’ble Supreme Court held,
[16.1] However, the High Court has not at all considered the
fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable
offences as per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned
judgments and orders, it appears that the High Court has not at
all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case,
more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social
impact. From the impugned judgments and orders passed by
the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically
quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the
distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social
wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the
case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, 2014
15 SCC 29, the Court’s principal duty, while exercising the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal
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proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the
thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As
observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid
and the said experience should be used with care, caution,
circumspection and courageous prudence.
17. In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not
compoundable under Section 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself
no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power
under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in
our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of
recording a conviction against the accused and the entire
exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There
is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the
parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the
exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution
under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While
a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against
conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of
an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the
parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable
under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution
even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand
charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the
High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not
for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Criminal Procedure
Code Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude
of the power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code by
itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the
same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature
of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only
in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of
the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be
nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither
necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in
which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified.
All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for
securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to
exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of
law. The High court may be justified in declining interference if
it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the
role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the
above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and
circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case
in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
18. In State of M.P. v. Rajveer Singh, 2016:INSC:337, 2016(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 176,
Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[7]. Considering allegations and counter-allegations, it was not
such a case which could have been compromised by the
complainant and the accused and FIR could not have been
quashed in such a serious case as that would be against public
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policy and administration of criminal justice system. The FIR
discloses commission of cognisable offence under Section
307/34 IPC. Considering the nature of allegation, it is necessary
to investigate further in the facts and circumstances of the
instant case.
19. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003, [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC
641, a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for
quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: –
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarized in the following
propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere
in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While
compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by
the provisions of section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if
the offence is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the
ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any
court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High
Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the
victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
founded on the overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so
far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
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CRM-M-31063-202416 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the
dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression
and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the state have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be justified
in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an
activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour.
The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial
or economic system will weigh in the balance.
20. In The state of Madhya Pradesh v. Kalyan Singh, 2019:INSC:8 [Para 3.1], 2019 (4)
SCC 268, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[3.1] It is required to be noted that the original Accused was
facing the criminal proceedings under Sections 307, 294 read
with Section 34 of the IPC. It is not in dispute that as per Section
20 of the Cr.PC offences under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34 of the IPC are non-compoundable. It is also required
to be noted that the allegations in the complaint for the
offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the
IPC are, as such, very serious. It is alleged that the accused fired
twice on the complainant by a country-made pistol. From the
material on record, it appears that one of the accused persons
was reported to be a hardcore criminal having criminal
antecedents. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
accused was facing the criminal proceedings for the offences
under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC and
that the offences under these sections are not non-
compoundable offences and, looking to the serious allegations
against the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court
has committed a grave error in quashing the criminal
proceedings for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34 of the IPC solely on the ground that the original
Complainant and the accused have settled the dispute. At this
stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Gulab Das and
Ors. V. State of M. P., 2011 12 Scale 625 is required to be
referred to. In the said decision, this Court has specifically
observed and held that, despite any settlement between the
Complainant on the one hand and the accused on the other,
the criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 307 of
the IPC cannot be quashed, as the offence under Section 307 is
a non-compoundable offence. Under the circumstance, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
quashing the criminal proceedings against the original Accused
for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34
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of the IPC cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be
quashed and set aside.
[4] In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.
6075 of 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside.
21. In The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & others, 2019:INSC:307, [Para
13-14], 2019 (5) SCC 688, a two-member bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[13] Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of
this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed
and held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and
when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst
themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involved heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on
society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while working in
that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would
fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the
Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society
cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of
the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their
entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to
whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake
of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which
if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go
by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court
would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after
investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed
and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when
the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate
conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this14
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CRM-M-31063-2024Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-
compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not
have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender,
the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the
accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the
accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he
had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise
etc.
[14] Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court
has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under
Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the
investigation was under progress. Somehow, the accused
managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant and
sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The
allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in
commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the
offence and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered
by the High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement
between the accused and the complainant, the High Court has
mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under
Section 482 of the Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of
law. The High Court has also failed to note the antecedents of
the accused.
22. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on
29.09.2021, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[11]. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’
cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported
exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such
attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and
modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive
domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in
the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider
interpretation and include such offences in the docket of
‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out
as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to
compound an offence within the framework of Section 320
Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by
the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High
Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a
case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in
aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to
secure the ends of justice.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of
the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their
dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the
nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such
proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The
High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects
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of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter
adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if
goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very
object of the administration of criminal justice system.
[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-
heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a
private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial
has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against
conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of
delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is
always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that
the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High
Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping
in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion
in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due
regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the
conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The
touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice.
There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the
High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or
specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a
case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in
cases where heinous offences have been proved against
perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as
cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs.
State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, 29], and Laxmi
Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences
which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the
social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters
concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two
individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential
to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences
through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal
to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to
unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can
secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts,
bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty
man escape, if it can be avoided.”
23. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642,
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously
when parties, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or
reunion.
24. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of
compromise, placement of parties, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents
of the compromise deed and its objectives point towards its acceptance.
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25. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh,
2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon’ble, Supreme Court holds
“[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the
appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because
of the reason that matter was already pending as the appellants had filed the
Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court rejecting their
petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar
facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that
FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stands
vitiated.”
26. Considering the entire facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-
mentioned judicial precedents, I believe that continuing these proceedings will not
suffice any fruitful purpose whatsoever.
27. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the
inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent
proceedings qua the petitioner. The bail bonds of the petitioner are accordingly
discharged. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
Petition allowed in the terms mentioned above.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
August 30, 2024
AK
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : No
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