Supreme Court of India
Harshit Harish Jain vs The State Of Maharashtra on 24 January, 2025
Author: Vikram Nath
Bench: Sanjay Karol, Vikram Nath
2025 INSC 104
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.21778 of 2024)
HARSHIT HARISH JAIN & ANR. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
& ORS. …RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal assails the final judgment
and order dated 18.04.2024, rendered by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (C)
No. 2018 of 2024, whereby the writ petition preferred
by the Appellants stood dismissed. The gravamen of
the dispute concerns the rejection of the Appellants’
claim for refund of stamp duty under the provisions
of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (hereinafter “the
Act”).
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2025.01.24
16:38:27 IST
Reason:
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 1 of 20
3. The brief facts leading to the present appeal are
as follows:
3.1. The Appellants entered into an Agreement
to Sell dated 30.08.2014 with a real estate
developer, M/s. Krona Realties Pvt. Ltd.
(hereinafter, “the Developer”), for the purchase of a
residential flat (Flat No. 5102) in the “Lodha
Venezia” project at Mumbai. The total
consideration agreed was ₹5.46 crores, against
which an advance payment of ₹1.08 crores was
made to the Developer.
3.2. Pursuant to the execution of the
Agreement to Sell, the Appellants paid stamp duty
of ₹27,34,500, as mandated under the Act. The
said Agreement was registered on 18.09.2014,
upon payment of an additional registration charge
of ₹30,000.
3.3. Sometime thereafter, on 05.11.2014, the
Developer informed the Appellants of unavoidable
delays tied to issues involving adjacent slums,
thereby making it impossible to hand over
possession of the flat by 31.03.2017, the date
earlier envisaged. The Developer offered three
options to the Appellants: (i) transfer the booking
to another project, (ii) opt for cancellation with a
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 2 of 20
refund along with interest at 12% per annum, or
(iii) continue with the present booking but with a
revised possession timeline.
3.4. Constrained by the uncertainty over timely
possession, the Appellants chose to cancel the
booking. Consequently, a Deed of Cancellation was
executed on 17.03.2015. However, the said
Cancellation Deed came to be registered only on
28.04.2015 before the Sub-Registrar of
Assurances, Mumbai City. Subsequently, on
23.05.2016, a Deed of Rectification was also
executed, clarifying the refund details and other
particulars of the cancellation.
3.5. Meanwhile, by an amendment dated
24.04.2015 to Section 48(1) of the Act, the time
limit for seeking a refund of stamp duty on a
registered cancellation deed was curtailed from two
years to six months (counted from the date of
registration of such deed). On 06.08.2016, the
Appellants filed an application for refund of the
stamp duty amounting to ₹27,34,500, contending
that they were governed by the earlier (pre-
amendment) statutory regime, since their
Cancellation Deed was executed before
24.04.2015.
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 3 of 20
3.6. The refund application was initially
allowed by the Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority, Maharashtra State, Pune (CCRA), vide
its Order dated 08.01.2018. Soon thereafter,
however, the same authority, by a subsequent
Order dated 03.03.2018, recalled its earlier
decision and rejected the refund request as time-
barred, citing the amended limitation period.
3.7. Aggrieved by the 03.03.2018 order
recalling the earlier sanction of refund, the
Appellants first attempted to challenge it before the
Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) by way
of an appeal under Section 53 of the Act. The CCRA
dismissed the appeal on 16.04.2019, prompting
the Appellants to file Writ Petition No. 8276 of 2019
before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. In
its judgment dated 04.10.2022, the High Court set
aside the orders dated 03.03.2018 and 16.04.2019,
noting that the Appellants had not been accorded
proper opportunity of hearing. The matter was
remanded to the CCRA for fresh consideration,
particularly on the question of whether the original
(unamended) or the amended provision under
Section 48(1) of the Act would apply to the
cancellation. Pursuant to that remand, the CCRA
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 4 of 20
passed a fresh order on 16.12.2022, again rejecting
the refund claim on the ground that the amended
six-month limitation governed the Appellants’ case.
3.8. Aggrieved by the CCRA’s stance, the
Appellants filed Writ Petition (C) No. 2018 of 2024
before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,
urging, inter alia, that (i) the right to seek refund
accrued on the date of execution (17.03.2015), thus
invoking the unamended two-year window, and (ii)
the CCRA had no statutory power of review to recall
its initial order granting refund.
3.9. By the impugned judgment dated
18.04.2024, the High Court dismissed the writ
petition, holding, in essence, that the date of
registration (28.04.2015) triggered the Appellants’
claim, which fell under the amended provision
stipulating a six-month limitation. The High Court
further opined that, in the specific facts, the
CCRA’s recall could not be struck down solely on
the ground of no express power of review.
4. Aggrieved with the dismissal of their writ
petition, the Appellants have now approached this
Court by way of the present appeal.
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 5 of 20
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the
Appellants and the Respondents, the primary issue
for consideration before us is whether the amended
six-month limitation, introduced by the 24.04.2015
amendment to Section 48(1) of the Act governs the
Appellants’ claim for stamp duty refund, particularly
when the Cancellation Deed was executed prior to the
amendment but registered thereafter.
6. Section 48(1) of the Act reads as follows:
“48. The application for relief under section 47
shall be made within the following period, that
is to say,—
(1) in the cases mentioned in clause (c)(5),
within [six months] of the date of the
instruments:
Provided that where an Agreement to
sale immovable property, on which stamp
duty is paid under Article 25 of the Schedule
I, is presented for registration under the
provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 and if
the seller refuses to deliver possession of the
immovable property which is the subject
matter of such agreement the application may
be made within two years of the date of the
Instrument [or where such agreement is
cancelled by a registered cancellation deed on
the grounds of, dispute regarding the
premises concerned, inadequate finance,
financial dispute in terms of agreedCIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 6 of 20
consideration, or afterwards found to be
illegal construction or suppression of any
other material fact, the application may be
made within two years from the date of such
registered cancellation deed.]”Through the amendment on 24.04.2015, the
two-year period was curtailed to six months
from the date of registration of the
cancellation deed, thus altering the time
frame under which a party could claim a
refund.
7. The Appellants assert that, although the
Cancellation Deed was registered on 28.04.2015, it
was executed on 17.03.2015 — prior to the
amendment dated 24.04.2015, which curtailed the
time limit for seeking a refund from two years to six
months. They rely upon Section 47 of the
Registration Act, 1908, emphasizing that “a
registered document shall operate from the time from
which it would have commenced to operate if no
registration thereof had been required or made.” In
other words, the operative date for their right to seek
refund would be 17.03.2015, placing them under the
un-amended regime.
8. In our view, this contention carries substantial
weight. The High Court laid undue emphasis on the
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 7 of 20
registration date without fully appreciating that the
Appellants’ accrued right to claim a refund arose the
moment the Cancellation Deed was validly executed.
The legislative scheme governing the earlier proviso
to Section 48(1) of the Act, contemplated a broader
two-year window. Constricting that window
retroactively, merely because registration happened
post-amendment, unduly defeats a vested cause of
action.
9. Moreover, in M.P. Steel Corporation v.
Commissioner of Central Excise1 , this Court has
held that amendment to provision as to limitation is
inapplicable to accrued cause of action where the
amendment has reduced the period earlier provided.
The relevant paras of this judgement have been
extracted hereunder:
“53. Shri A.K. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the Revenue, has
strongly contended before us that the present
appeal must attract the limitation period as on
the date of its filing. That being so, it is clear
that the present appeal having been filed
before Cestat only on 23-5-2003, it is Section
128 post amendment that would apply and
therefore the maximum period available to the1
(2015)7 SCC 58CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 8 of 20
appellant would be 60 plus 30 days. Even if
time taken in the abortive proceedings is to be
excluded, the appeal filed will be out of time
being beyond the aforesaid period.
54. It is settled law that periods of limitation
are procedural in nature and would ordinarily
be applied retrospectively. This, however, is
subject to a rider. In New India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976)
2 SCR 266] , this Court held : (SCC p. 844, para
5)
5. “On the plain language of Sections 110-A
and 110-F there should be no difficulty in
taking the view that the change in law was
merely a change of forum i.e. a change of
adjectival or procedural law and not of
substantive law. It is a well-established
proposition that such a change of law
operates retrospectively and the person has
to go to the new forum even if his cause of
action or right of action accrued prior to the
change of forum. He will have a vested right
of action but not a vested right of forum. If by
express words the new forum is made
available only to causes of action arising
after the creation of the forum, then the
retrospective operation of the law is taken
away. Otherwise, the general rule is to make
it retrospective.”
55. In answering a question which arose under
Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, this
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 9 of 20
Court held : (Shanti Misra case [(1975) 2 SCC
840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266] , SCC p. 846, para 7)
7. “… ‘(1) Time for the purpose of filing the
application under Section 110-A did not start
running before the constitution of the
tribunal. Time had started running for the
filing of the suit but before it had expired the
forum was changed. And for the purpose of
the changed forum, time could not be deemed
to have started running before a remedy of
going to the new forum is made available.
(2) Even though by and large the law of
limitation has been held to be a procedural
law, there are exceptions to this principle.
Generally the law of limitation which is in
vogue on the date of the commencement of
the action governs it. But there are certain
exceptions to this principle. The new law of
limitation providing a longer period cannot
revive a dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly
extinguish a vested right of action by
providing for a shorter period of limitation.’”
56. This statement of the law was referred to
with approval in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 333]
as follows : (SCC p. 337, para 7).
7. “It is true that the appellant earlier could
file an application even more than six months
after the expiry of the period of limitation, but
can this be treated to be a right which the
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 10 of 20
appellant had acquired. The answer is in the
negative. The claim to compensation which
the appellant was entitled to, by reason of
the accident was certainly enforceable as a
right. So far the period of limitation for
commencing a legal proceeding is concerned,
it is adjectival in nature, and has to be
governed by the new Act—subject to two
conditions. If under the repealing Act the
remedy suddenly stands barred as a result
of a shorter period of limitation, the same
cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise
the result will be to deprive the suitor of an
accrued right. The second exception is where
the new enactment leaves the claimant with
such a short period for commencing the legal
proceeding so as to make it unpractical for
him to avail of the remedy. This principle has
been followed by this Court in many cases
and by way of illustration we would like to
mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2
SCR 266] . The husband of the respondent in
that case died in an accident in 1966. A
period of two years was available to the
respondent for instituting a suit for recovery
of damages. In March 1967 the Claims
Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 was constituted, barring
the jurisdiction of the civil court and
prescribed 60 days as the period of
limitation. The respondent filed the
application in July 1967. It was held that not
having filed a suit before March 1967 the
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 11 of 20
only remedy of the respondent was by way
of an application before the Tribunal. So far
the period of limitation was concerned, it
was observed that a new law of limitation
providing for a shorter period cannot
certainly extinguish a vested right of action.
In view of the change of the law it was held
that the application could be filed within a
reasonable time after the constitution of the
Tribunal; and, that the time of about four
months taken by the respondent in
approaching the Tribunal after its
constitution, could be held to be either
reasonable time or the delay of about two
months could be condoned under the proviso
to Section 110-A(3).”
Both these judgments were referred to and
followed in Union of India v. Harnam Singh
[(1993) 2 SCC 162 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 375 :
(1993) 24 ATC 92] , see para 12.
57. The aforesaid principle is also contained in
Section 30(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963:
30. “Provision for suits, etc., for which the
prescribed period is shorter than the period
prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act,
1908.—Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act—
(a) any suit for which the period of limitation
is shorter than the period of limitation
prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act,
1908, may be instituted within a period of
seven years next after the commencement of
this Act or within the period prescribed forCIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 12 of 20
such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
whichever period expires earlier:”
58. The reason for the said principle is not far
to seek. Though periods of limitation, being
procedural law, are to be applied
retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of
limitation is provided by a later amendment to
a statute, such period would render the vested
right of action contained in the statute nugatory
as such right of action would now become time-
barred under the amended provision.”
10. Even if one were to hold that the Appellants’
claim is examined under the amended six-month
period, we are of the considered opinion that a mere
technical delay should not, by itself, extinguish an
otherwise valid claim. The scheme of stamp duty
refund provisions is designed to ensure fairness
when the underlying transaction is rescinded for
bona fide reasons. The Appellants were compelled to
cancel the purchase due to the developer’s inability
to deliver timely possession, and were in no way
remiss or at fault.
11. Denying a legitimate refund solely on technical
grounds of limitation, especially when the timing of
registration fell close to the legislative amendment,
fails to strike the equitable balance ordinarily
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 13 of 20
expected in fiscal or quasi-judicial determinations. A
measure of discretion or consideration for good faith
conduct is not alien to statutory processes that
safeguard citizens from unjust enrichment by the
State. It has been laid down by this Court in Bano
Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority & Inspector General of Registration &
Controller of Stamps2 that the limitation provision
in stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty) should
not be enforced so as to oust the remedy when the
applicant is otherwise not blameworthy. The relevant
paras of the same have been reproduced hereunder:
“14. In Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech
Private Limited3, wherein the issue of refund of
stamp duty under the same Act was in
question, this Court has observed and held
inter alia as under:
“29. This case reminds us of the
observations made by M.C. Chagla, C.J. in
Firm Kaluram Sitaram v. Dominion of India
[1953 SCC OnLine Bom 39: AIR 1954 Bom
50]. The learned Chief Justice in his
distinctive style of writing observed as
under in para 19: (Firm Kaluram case, SCC
OnLine Bom)2
2024 SCC OnLine SC 979CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 14 of 20
“19. … we have often had occasion to say that
when the State deals with a citizen it should
not ordinarily rely on technicalities, and if the
State is satisfied that the case of the citizen is
a just one, even though legal defences may be
open to it, it must act, as has been said by
eminent Judges, as an honest person.”We are in respectful agreement with the
aforementioned observations, as in our
considered opinion these observations apply
fully to the case in hand against the State
because except the plea of limitation, the State
has no case to defend their action.
Xxxxxxxxx
32. In our considered opinion, even if we find
that applications for claiming refund of stamp
duty amount were rightly dismissed by the
SDM on the ground of limitation prescribed
under Section 50 of the Act yet keeping in view
the settled principle of law that the expiry of
period of limitation prescribed under any law
may bar the remedy but not the right, the
applicants are still held entitled to claim the
refund of stamp duty amount on the basis of
the grounds mentioned above. In other words,
notwithstanding dismissal of the applications
on the ground of limitation, we are of the view
that the applicants are entitled to claim the
refund of stamp duty amount from the State in
the light of the grounds mentioned above.”CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 15 of 20
15. The legal position is thus settled in Libra
Buildtech (supra) that when the State deals
with a citizen it should not ordinarily rely on
technicalities, even though such defences may
be open to it.
16. We draw weight from the aforesaid
judgment and are of the opinion that the case
of the appellant is fit for refund of stamp duty
in so far as it is settled law that the period of
expiry of limitation prescribed under any law
may bar the remedy but not the right and the
appellant is held entitled to claim the refund of
stamp duty amount on the basis of the fact that
the appellant has been pursuing her case as
per remedies available to her in law and she
should not be denied the said refund merely on
technicalities as the case of the appellant is a
just one wherein she had in bonafide paid the
stamp duty for registration but fraud was
played on her by the Vendor which led to the
cancellation of the conveyance deed.”
12. We also find merit in the Appellants’ submission
that the CCRA, having once granted a refund by its
order dated 08.01.2018, lacked any express statutory
power to review or recall that decision. A quasi-
judicial authority can only exercise such powers as
the statute confers. There is no provision in the Act
enabling the CCRA to sit in review of its own orders.
In the absence of any enabling clause, the
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 16 of 20
subsequent orders dated 03.03.2018, 16.04.2019,
and ultimately 16.12.2022, reversing the earlier
sanction of the refund, cannot be sustained solely
because the Appellants participated in the
proceedings.
13. We are unable to concur with the High Court’s
reasoning that the Appellants “submitted
themselves” to the authority’s review process or
somehow acquiesced in the second decision.
Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver.
The law does not permit a statutory functionary to
assume powers not conferred upon it, regardless of
how the parties engage in subsequent litigation.
Hence, we see clear infirmity in the High Court’s
endorsement of the CCRA’s review-like exercise.
14. In light of the above, the findings recorded by
the High Court in the impugned judgment warrant
interference. The High Court’s focus on the date of
registration as determinative of the applicable legal
regime under Section 48(1) of the Act overlooks the
accrued right crystallizing at the time of execution of
the Cancellation Deed. Further, its refusal to disturb
the recall of the earlier refund order, despite
acknowledging the absence of statutory review
power, is difficult to sustain. Participation in an
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 17 of 20
erroneous procedure cannot, in our considered view,
confer review jurisdiction upon the CCRA where none
exists in law.
15. For the reasons discussed, we conclude that
the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of the un-
amended proviso of Section 48(1) of the Act. Their
refund application, therefore, cannot be repelled as
time-barred merely because the deed’s registration
was post-amendment. Equally, the subsequent
orders recalling the already sanctioned refund stand
vitiated, given the CCRA’s lack of statutory mandate
to review its own final orders.
16. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the
Appellants’ claim for refund falls under the un-
amended proviso to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra
Stamp Act, 1958. Consequently, the impugned
judgment dated 18.04.2024 of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, in W.P. No. 2018 of 2024, is
hereby set aside and the writ petition stands allowed.
17. The subsequent orders of the Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority (CCRA) recalling the earlier
sanction of refund, including the Order dated
16.12.2022, are accordingly quashed. The Order
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 18 of 20
dated 08.01.2018, which allowed the Appellants’
refund, shall stand restored.
18. The appellant had applied for refund of the
stamp duty on 6th August, 2016. The same had been
allowed by the CCRA vide order dated 08.01.2018.
Instead of refunding the amount, the CCRA, by a
subsequent order dated 03.03.2018 illegally recalled
its earlier decision of 08.01.2018 and rejected the
request for refund. We have already held above that
the subsequent order dated 03.03.2018 was vitiated
in law and secondly that the appellant was entitled to
refund. In such circumstances, we find that the
amount of Rs.27,34,500/- had been wrongly retained
by the State from 08.01.2018 for almost seven years.
As such, we are of the view that the appellant would
be entitled to simple interest @ 6 per cent per annum
on the above amount from the date of the first order
of CCRA dated 08.01.2018 till the date it is paid.
19. The Respondents are directed to process and
disburse the refund of stamp duty, already paid by
the Appellants along with accrued interest as
directed above within a period of four weeks from
today, in accordance with law. Any further delay will
entail further interest component @ 12% p.a.
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 19 of 20
20. The appeal stands allowed.
21. There shall be no order as to costs.
21. Pending applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of.
…………………………………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
…………………………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…………………………………………J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 24, 2025
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 20 of 20