Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jagtar Singh vs Pb.State Land Dev.& Reclamation Corp … on 1 October, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:131773
1
CWP-15534
15534 of 1995
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-15534
15534 of 1995
Reserved on
on: 19.09.2024
Pronounced on: 01.10.2024
Jagtar Singh
......Petitioner
Versus
Punjab Seed Corporation and others
......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Argued by: Mr. Yugank Goyal, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Mr. Y.P. Singla, Advocate,
for respondents No.1 to 3.
Mr. Rajesh Sehgal, Addl. A.G., Punjab.
NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by
filing the instant
instant petition under Articles 226/
226/227 of the Constitution of
India, seeking a writ of certiorari, quashing the order of compulsory
retirement of the petitioner dated 25.05.1994 and in the alternative a
writ in the nature of mandamus,, directing the respondents to give all
retiral benefits from the date of suspension till 25.05.1994.
2. Brief facts, as have been pleaded in the petition, are that
petitioner was appointed as Bulldozer Operator in the Punj
Punjab Land
Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Corporation’) on 11.08.1977. The petitioner was
charge-sheeted
sheeted on 17.12.1990 on the following charges: –
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(i) On 30.05.1990 he had interrupted his superiors at
the time of interview for the appointment of
Junior Operators-cum
cum-Helper and while doing so
he was drunk.
(ii) He was habitual of drinking during working
hours.
(iii) Remaining absent from duty.
(iv) Non-keeping
keeping proper stock of diesel.
(v) Non-obeying the orders
rs of his superiors
(vi) At the time of handing over charge of bulldozer
No.23 spares were short.
After enquiry, petitioner was held guilty of misbehaving
with the committee members and for disturbing the office
administration Thereafter, petitioner wass served show
administration. show-cause notice
dated 29.07.1992 (Annexure P-4)
P 4) as to why he should not be dismissed
from service.
service Petitioner filed reply to the show
show-cause notice stating that
he went to the Manager (Machinery) with respect to the early repair of
the machinery and no interview was being held during that period;
neither any candidate was present nor any peon was posted at the gate
of the office and the petitioner entered the office after due permission.
Petitioner never mis-behaved
mis behaved with anybody nor violated the discipline
of the Corporation. After considering the reply of the petitioner, he
was dismissed from service vide order dated 29.09.1992 (Annexure P-
6). Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, petitioner filed an appeal
before the Board of Directors of the Corporation. Vide resolution dated
30.03.1993, the Board of Directors nominated Sh. B.K. Srivastva, IAS,
to hear the appeal of the petitioner. Sh. B.K. Srivastva, IAS
IAS, vide order
dated 02.12.1993 came to the conclusion that instead of dismissal it
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would be more humane if the petitioner is retired compulsorily. It was
further ordered that petitioner be retired compulsorily from the date of
dismissal and all dues be paid to him within one month. The matter
was again placed before the Board of Directors on 01.02.1994. The
Board resolved that the petitioner be compulsorily retired instead of
dismissed and also accepted the report of Sh. B.K. Srivastva, IAS.
Consequently, vide order dated 25.05.1994 (Annexure P
P-10) passed by
the Managing Director, petitioner
petitioner was ordered to be compulsorily
retired with effect from 30.09.1992,
30.09.1992 with all retirement benefits to be
paid by the Corporation except the period of his suspension for which
nothing more was ordered to be paid except subsistence allowance
already paid to him. However, petitioner was deprived of arrears of
suspension period. It is further pleaded that in spite of decision of the
Board of Directors, no money was paid to the petitioner. Hence, the
present writ petition.
3. Pursuant to notice of motion, re
reply on behalf of the
respondents has been filed. It has been averred that petition is not
maintainable as it is the result of an after-thought.
thought. Proper enquiry, as
envisaged under the relevant rules and regulations of the respondent
respondent-
Corporation, was conducted. There is no allegation of the petitioner
that the enquiry was not conducted properly. The petitioner under the
influence of intoxication barged into the room of the interview
committee and demanded that candidate sponsored by him be
appointed as JOCH (Junior Operator-cum
Operator cum-Helper). The petitioner
broke the discipline of the Corporation and misbehaved in a shabby
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manner with the officers of the interview committee. Petitioner was
found guilty
ilty on account of charge No.1 and he was duly served with
the show-cause
cause notice regarding the punishment to be awarded to him.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the
petitioner was wrongly dismissed from service by relying upon th
the
report of the enquiry officer. He further contended that the appellate
authority has erred in compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service.
He further contended that the dismissal order once set aside not being
proportionate to the gravity of charge,
charge, cannot be given a new name in
the form of compulsory retirement. He further contended that the
petitioner has wrongly been deprived of the salary of the suspension
period without giving any opportunity of hearing to him. He further
contended that statement
statement of Sh. Khuswant Singh, Manager, Machinery
and Custom was wrongly relied upon by the enquiry officer as he was
never cross–examined.
5. Per contra,, learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 3 has
contended that proper enquiry as envisaged under the relevant rules and
regulations was conducted. The petitioner was found guilty of mis-
behaving with the members of the interview committee and for
disturbing the office administration. Taking a lenient view by the
appellate authority, he was ordered to be ccompulsorily retired from
service, which does not call for any interference by this Court. He
further contended that due to heavy financial losses, Corporation was
closed w.e.f. 30.11.2003 vide order dated 29.10.2003 passed by the
Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Punjab, Chandigarh. He
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further submitted that all the admissible dues have already been
released to the petitioner on 18.09.2024. Therefore, present writ
petition is liable
li to be dismissed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
7. The matter was admitted on 14.05.1996. Vide order dated
22.08.2019, Punjab Seed Corporation was impleaded as respondent
No.1 being successor-in-interest
successor in place of Punjab Land Development
and Reclamation Corporation Limited as the same was wound up w.e.f.
30.11.2003.
8. Out of above-referred
referred charges, petitioner was found guilty
of charge No.1 to the effect that he had interrupted his superiors at the
time off interview for the appointment of Junior Operators
Operators-cum-Helper.
Perusal of the record shows that all the members of the committee were
duly cross-examined
examined and they have stated that the petitioner forcibly
entered the committee room, misbehaved with the me
members of the
interview committee and approached them for selection of some
candidate. After considering the enquiry report, punishing authority
vide order dated 29.09.1992
29.0 .1992 ordered dismissal of the petitioner from
service. However, on appeal, the appellat
appellate authority taking a lenient
view converted the order of dismissal into compulsory retirement of the
petitioner, which is a valid order and does not call for any interference
by this Court.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh
and otherss v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1723 has
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held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal which examines the
merits of the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry and the
power of judicial review is confined to; whether the inquiry was held
by a competent authority; according to the procedure prescribed and
whether rules of natural justice have been followed.
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and
another v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015(1) SCT 5 while considering the
scope of interference
interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India has held as under: –
“13. Despite the well-settled
settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-
appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.
The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise
of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, shall not venture into re
re-appreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether :
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion
nclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
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15534 of 1995e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed
to admit the admissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible eviden
evidence which influenced the
finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate
appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been conducted
in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence
on which findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact how
however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of
punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra
Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963
Supreme Court 1723,, many of the above principles have
been discussed and it has been concluded thus :
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
court of appeal over the decision of the authorities7 of 18
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CWP-15534
15534 of 1995holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Where there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it
is not the function of the High Court in a petition for
a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and
to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.
The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where
the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
inconsistent with
ith the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode
of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled
themselves from reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence and the
merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on
similar grounds. But
ut the departmental authorities
are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the
sole judges of facts and if there be some legal
evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a
matter which can be per
permitted to be canvassed8 of 18
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CWP-15534
15534 of 1995before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ
under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra
Venkata Rao, (1975)2 SCC 557
557, the principles have been
further discussed at paragraph
paragraph-21 to 24, which read as
follows :
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this
Court. Two propositions were laid down by this
Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao
Rao. First,
there is no warrant for the view that in considering
whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct
charged against him, the rule followed in criminal
trials that an offence is not established unless
proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule
be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the
High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not competent to declare the order of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
invalid. The High Court is not a cour
court of appeal
under Article 226 over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against
a public servant. The Court is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf and according to
the procedure
ure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
Second, where there is some evidence which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry
has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion
sion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High9 of 18
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CWP-15534
15534 of 1995Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair decision by some co
considerations extraneous to
the evidence and the merits of the case or by
allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that
no reasonable person could ever have arrived at
that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if
the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole
judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence
on which their findings can be based, the adequacy
or reliability of that eviden
evidence is not a matter which
can be permitted to be canvassed before the High
Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board,
representing the Union of India, New Delhi v.
Niranjan Singh,, (1969) 3 SCR 548 said that the
High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of
the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not
supported by any evidence or it can be said that no
reasonable person could have reached such a
finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that
the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering
with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the
charge that the respondent was instrumental in
compelling the shut-down
down of an air compressor at10 of 18
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CWP-15534
15534 of 1995about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said
that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of
two persons that the respondent led a group of
strikers and compelled them to close down their
compressor could not be accepted at its face value.
The General Manager did not agree with the
Enquiry Committee on that point. The General
Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said
that it was open to the General Manager to do so
and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by
the committee. This Court held that the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary aut
authority should prevail
and the High Court should not have interfered with
the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The
Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The
findings of fact reached by an inferior court or
tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence
are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error
of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a
writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the
said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to
admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously
usly admitted inadmissible evidence which
has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would
be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on11 of 18
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15534 of 1995the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or
inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the
inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan
Radhakrishnan.
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the
entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The
High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from
the aspect that the High Court does not correct a
finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not
sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present
case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot
be scanned by the High Court to jus
justify the
conclusion that there is no evidence which would
justify the finding of the Tribunal that the
respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal
gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible
for the High Court to say that no reasonable person
could have arrived at these conclusions. The High
Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the
evidence and then rejected the evidence as no
evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
should not do.”
These principles have been succinctly summed
summed-up by the
living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in
State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2
SCC 491. To quote the unparalled and inimitable
expressions:
“4. …. in a domestic
stic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian12 of 18
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logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence
provided it has reasonable nexu
nexus and credibility. It
is true that departmental authorities and
Administrative Tribunals must be careful in
evaluating such material and should not glibly
swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under
the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is
not necessary to cite decisions nor text books,
although we have been taken through case
case-law and
other authorities by counsel on both sides. The
essence of a judicial approach is objectivity,
exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations
and observance
rvance of rules of natural justice. Of
course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or
arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of
judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such
finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot
be held good. …”
11. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force and others v.
Abrar Ali, 2017(1) SCT 682 wherein it has been held as under: –
“8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the
High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he
fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without
assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary
Authority that the Unit hadd better medical facilities which
could have been availed by the Respondent if he was
really suffering from illness. It was further held that the
delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a
local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into13 of 18
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re-appreciation of
evidence. It is settled law that re
re-appreciation of evidence
is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur
ipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in
2011(2) S.C.T. 782 : 2011(3) Recent Apex Judgments
(R.A.J.) 28 : (2011) 4 SCC 584
584, this Court held as
follows:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act
as an appellate court and reassess the evidence lled
in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground
that another view is possible on the material on
record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly
held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliab
reliable
nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries,
except where such findings are based on no
evidence orr where they are clearly perverse. The
test to find out perversity is to see whether a
tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at
such conclusion or finding, on the material on
record. The courts will however interfere with the
findings in disciplinary
ry matters, if principles of
natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India, 1996(1) S.C.T. 617 : (1
(1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44, Union of
India v. G. Ganayutham, 1997(4) S.C.T. 214 :
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CWP-15534
15534 of 1995(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806, Bank
of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999(3) S.C.T.
669 : (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036
and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v.
Shashikant S. Patil.”
The said view has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and
others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(1) SCT 285 and in the said
judgment it has been held as under: –
“23. The power of judicial review in the matters of
disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the
departmental/appellate authorities discharged by
constitutional Courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or
Article 136 of the Constitution
ion of India is circumscribed by
limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors
leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case
on merits as an appellate authority which ha
has been earlier
examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V.
Venuaopalan, 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government
of T.N. and Another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216
and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this
Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others,
1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under:
under:-
“13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the natur
nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not
relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed15 of 18
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H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718] this Court held at p.
728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the
evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is
perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of
the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued.”
24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision
of this Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity
Board Limited v. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017(1) SCC 768 and
recently by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin
Kumar v. Union of India and Others, 2020(9) SCC 471
471.
25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of
the Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision
decision-
making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It
is to ensure fairness
ness in treatment and not to ensure
fairness of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere
in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in
any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice
or in violation of the statutory rules presc
prescribing the mode
of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the
face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial
review cannot be extended to the exami
examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as
a matter of fact.
26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the
alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is
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to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was
held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of
natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the
findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and
authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of
fact or conclusion.
27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not
the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of
enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree
with the findings recorded by the former, in case of
disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the
reasons for disagreement and after affording an
opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his
own findings if the evidence available on record be
sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the
enquiry officer for further
her enquiry.
28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable
to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only
requirement of law is that the allegation against the
delinquent must be established by such evidence acting
upon which a reasonable
easonable person acting reasonably and
with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the
gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is
true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the
finding of guilt even in the departmental en
enquiry
proceedings.
29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its
jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article
136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry
proceedings exceptt in a case of malafides or perversity,
i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or
where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and
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CWP-15534
15534 of 1995
with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so
long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion
arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to
be sustained.”
12. Needless to mention here that all the admissible dues have
already been released to the petitioner on 18.09.2024.
13. In view of the above, finding no merit in tthe present writ
petition, the same is dismissed.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
01.10.2024 JUDGE
R.S.
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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