Legally Bharat

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Jayant Raghuvanshi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 21 November, 2024

Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia

Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia

          NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656




                                                                1                            MCRC-48530-2024
                                IN     THE     HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                     AT GWALIOR
                                                           BEFORE
                                            HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
                                                 ON THE 21 st OF NOVEMBER, 2024
                                             MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 48530 of 2024
                                             JAYANT RAGHUVANSHI AND OTHERS
                                                          Versus
                                         THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
                           Appearance:
                                 Shri Vibhor Kumar Sahu - Advocate for applicants.
                                 Shri Naval Kishor Gupta - Public Prosecutor for respondent/State.

                                                                 ORDER

This application, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./Section 528 of B.N.S.S.,
2023, has been filed for quashment of FIR in Crime No.537/2024 registered at
Police Station Kotwali Ashok Nagar, District Ashok Nagar (M.P.) for offence
under Section 498-A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2. Undisputedly, applicant No.1 is the husband and applicant No.2 is the
father-in-law of complainant/respondent No.2.

3. Respondent No.2 lodged an FIR alleging that she got married to applicant
No.1 on 22.06.2018. Her father had given Rs.50 lacs in cash and jewellery worth

Rs.20 lacs. However, immediately after marriage, applicants started assaulting her
and they were insisting that respondent No.2 must bring more money from her
father. In order to pressurize her, they used to leave her in the house all alone, by
staying at different places for two to three months. In absence of applicants,
respondent No.2 was forced to manage for her own survival. Because of physical
and mental harassment by the applicants, her father was forced to give Maruti Car
which was also sold by applicant No.1. When her beating by applicants did not

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

2 MCRC-48530-2024
stop, then she came back to her parental home and started residing there.
Accordingly, FIR was lodged.

4. Challenging the FIR lodged by respondent No.2, it is submitted that in
fact the FIR was lodged by way of counterblast. Applicant No.1 has filed a petition
for divorce. Petition was filed on 03.07.2019. Respondent No.2 marked her
presence through her counsel on 20.08.2019. Furthermore, respondent No.2 had
filed an application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. which is also pending. A civil
suit has also been filed by respondent No.2 against applicants for declaration of
title and permanent injunction as well as partition in the house. Thus, it is
submitted that in order to settle down civil liabilities, the present FIR has been
lodged, therefore, it is a by-product of mala fides .

5. Heard learned counsel for applicants.

6. This Court has already reproduced the allegations made in the FIR. There
are specific allegations of demand of dowry, physical and mental harassment. So
far as lodging of FIR after institution of divorce petition is concerned, the question
is no more res integra . The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari
Devi, reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has held as under:-

“14. From a plain reading of the findings arrived at by the
High Court while quashing the FIR, it is apparent that the
High Court had relied on extraneous considerations and acted
beyond the allegations made in the FIR for quashing the same
in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code. We have already noted the illustrations enumerated in
Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
426] and from a careful reading of these illustrations, we are
of the view that the allegations emerging from the FIR are not
covered by any of the illustrations as noted hereinabove. For
example, we may take up one of the findings of the High
Court as noted hereinabove. The High Court has drawn an
adverse inference on account of the FIR being lodged on 31-
12-2001 while the appellant was forced out of the
matrimonial home on 25-5-2001.

15. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case,

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

3 MCRC-48530-2024
the High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse
inference against the appellant wife for lodging the FIR on
31-12- 2001 on the ground that she had left the matrimonial
home at least six months before that. This is because, in our
view, the High Court had failed to appreciate that the
appellant and her family members were, during this period,
making all possible efforts to enter into a settlement so that
Respondent 2 husband would take her back to the
matrimonial home. If any complaint was made during this
period, there was every possibility of not entering into any
settlement with Respondent 2 husband.

16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed only
when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home had failed
and Respondent 2 husband had filed a divorce petition
under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. That
apart, in our view, filing of a divorce petition in a civil court
cannot be a ground to quash criminal proceedings under
Section 482 of the Code as it is well settled that criminal and
civil proceedings are separate and independent and the
pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring to an end a
criminal proceeding even if they arise out of the same set of
facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the view
that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section
482 of the Code has gone beyond the allegations made in the
FIR and has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore,
the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR by
going beyond the allegations made in the FIR or by relying
on extraneous considerations.

22. For the reasons aforesaid, we are inclined to interfere
with the order of the High Court and hold that the High Court
in quashing the FIR in the exercise of its inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code by relying on the investigation
report and the findings made therein has acted beyond its
jurisdiction. For the purpose of finding out the commission of
a cognizable offence, the High Court was only required to
look into the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR
and to conclude whether a prima facie offence had been made
out by the complainant in the FIR or the complaint or not.”

7. So far as pendency of application filed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and
pendency of Civil Suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction as well as
for partition in the house is concerned, they cannot have adverse effect on FIR
lodged by respondent No.2. The findings recorded by the Civil Court are not
binding on the Criminal Court. The Supreme court in the case of Kishan Singh

(Dead) Through LRs. v. Gurpal Singh and Others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

4 MCRC-48530-2024
has held as under:

“16. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah this Court held as
under : (SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)

“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to
avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it
is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the
two proceedings is entirely different. Civil cases are decided on
the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable
doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor
any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding
may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases
have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.”

17. In Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.)
this Court considered all the earlier judgments on the issue and held that
while deciding the case in Karam Chand, this Court failed to take note
of the Constitution Bench judgment in M.S. Sheriff and, therefore, it
remains per incuriam and does not lay down the correct law.
A similar
view has been reiterated by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya
Sapra, wherein it has been held by this Court that the decision in Karam
Chand stood overruled in K.G. Premshanker.

18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised
to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the civil court do not
have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice
versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil
cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any
legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or
criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while
dealing with the same subject-matter and both the cases have to be
decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there
may be cases where the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence
Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in
subsequent cases may be taken into consideration.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam
And Another Vs. State (Delhi Administration) and Another reported in (2009) 5

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

5 MCRC-48530-2024
SCC 528 has held as under :

“24. If primacy is to be given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the
civil suit must be determined on its own merit, keeping in view the
evidence brought before it and not in terms of the evidence brought in
the criminal proceeding. The question came up for consideration in
K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police wherein this Court inter alia
held: (SCC p. 97, paras 30-31)
“30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is–(1) the
previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided
under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits
between the same parties, principle of res judicata may apply; (3)
in a criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that once a
person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for
the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied;
(4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same
cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if conditions
of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that
the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41.

Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of
what is stated therein.

31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous
civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42
or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, the court
has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard
to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of
alleged trespass by A on B’s property, B filed a suit for declaration
of its title and to recover possession from A and suit is decreed.
Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by B against A for trespass,
judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be
relevant and the court may hold that it conclusively establishes the
title as well as possession of B over the property. In such case, A
may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42
which is quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each
and every case, the first question which would require
consideration is– whether judgment, order or decree is relevant,
if relevant–its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose,
such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the
facts of each case.”

25. It is, however, significant to notice that the decision of this Court in
Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India, wherein it was
categorically held that the decisions of the civil courts will be binding
on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled,
stating: (K.G. Premshanker case, SCC p. 98, para 33)
“33.
Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case
that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded
by the finding recorded by the civil court is not
correct enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made
in Karam Chand case are in context of the facts of the case stated

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

6 MCRC-48530-2024
above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision
of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case as well as Sections
40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.”

Axiomatically, if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal
court, a judgment of a criminal court will certainly not be binding on a
civil court.

26. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 43 of the Evidence Act
categorically states that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those
mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence
of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under
some other provisions of the Act. No other provision of the Evidence
Act or for that matter any other statute has been brought to our notice.

27. Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to
consider a similar question in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi
Marwah wherein it was held: (SCC p. 387, para 24)
“24. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind.
Sub-section (1) of Section 340 CrPC contemplates holding of a
preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of
a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding
before the court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding
is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Section 341
provides for an appeal against an order directing filing of the
complaint. The hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is
bound to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a
court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is
brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against the decision
arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter
has arisen. In view of these provisions, the complaint case may not
proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising out of civil
suits where decisions are challenged in successive appellate fora
which are time-consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is no
provision of appeal against an order passed under Section
343(2), whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until the decision
of the appeal. These provisions show that, in reality, the procedure
prescribed for filing a complaint by the court is such that it may
not fructify in the actual trial of the offender for an unusually long
period. Delay in prosecution of a guilty person comes to his
advantage as witnesses become reluctant to give evidence and the
evidence gets lost. This important consideration dissuades us from
accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed upon clause

(b)(ii).”

28. Relying inter alia on M.S. Sheriff, it was furthermore held: (Iqbal
Singh Marwah case, SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to
avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it
is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the
two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on
the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

7 MCRC-48530-2024
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable
doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor
any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding
may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases
have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.”

29. The question yet again came up for consideration in P. Swaroopa
Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, wherein it was categorically held: (SCC p.
769, para 11)
“11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously.
Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed
depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Prem Raj Vs. Poonamma Menon and
Another decided on 02.04.2024 in S.L.P.(Cr.) No.9778/2018 has held as under :

“9. In advancing his submissions, Mr. K. Parameshwar, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant, placed reliance on certain
authorities of this Court. In M/s. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad and Anr.
vs. Union of India and Ors.(1970)3 SCC 694, this Court observed that:

“…….It is a well-established principle of law that
the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the
criminal courts. The converse is not true.”

In K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr, (2002)8 SCC
87, a Bench of three learned Judges observed that, following the M.S.
Sheriff vs. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397, no straight-jacket
formula could be laid down and conflicting decisions of civil
and criminal Courts would not be a relevant consideration except for the
limited purpose of sentence or damages.

10. We notice that this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Daya Sapra
(Smt.) (2009)13 SCC 729, had observed as under:

“26. It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this
Court in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India
(1970) 3 SCC 694, wherein it was categorically held that the
decisions of the civil court will be binding on the criminal
courts but the converse is not true, was overruled therein…”

This Court in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja (2021)1 SCC 414,
considered a numerous precedents, including Premshanker (supra) and
Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra), to opine that there is no embargo for a
civil court to consider the evidence led in the criminal proceedings.

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

8 MCRC-48530-2024

The issue has been laid to rest by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh
Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005)4 SCC
370 :

“32. Coming to the last contention that
an effort should be made to avoid conflict
of findings between the civil and criminal
courts, it is necessary to point out that
the standard of proof required in the
two proceedings are entirely different.

Civil cases are decided on the basis
of preponderance of evidence, while in
a criminal case, the entire burden lies on the
prosecution, and proof beyond reasonable
doubt has to be given. There is neither any
statutory provision nor any legal principle
that the findings recorded in one proceeding
may be treated as final or binding in the
other, as both the cases have to be decided on
the basis of the evidence adduced therein.

While examining a similar contention in
an appeal against an order directing filing
of a complaint under Section 476 of the
old Code, the following observations
made by a Constitution Bench in M.S.
Sheriff v. State of Madras [1954 SCR 1144:

AIR 1954 SC 397: 1954 Cri LJ 1019] give a
complete answer to the problem posed: (AIR
p. 399, paras 15-16)

“15. As between the civil and
the criminal proceedings, we are of
the opinion that the criminal
matters should be given precedence.

There is some difference of opinion in
the High Courts of India on this
point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down but we do not consider that
the possibility of conflicting decisions
in the civil and criminal courts is
a relevant consideration. The law
envisages such an eventuality when it

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

9 MCRC-48530-2024
expressly refrains from making the
decision of one court binding on
the other, or even relevant, except for
certain limited purposes, such as
sentence or damages. The only relevant
consideration here is the likelihood of
embarrassment.

16. Another factor which weighs with
us is that a civil suit often drags on for
years and it is undesirable that a
criminal prosecution should wait till
everybody concerned has forgotten all
about the crime. The public interests
demand that criminal justice should be
swift and sure; that the guilty should be
punished while the events are still fresh
in the public mind and that the innocent
should be absolved as early as is
consistent with a fair and impartial
trial. Another reason is that it is
undesirable to let things slide
till memories have grown too dim to
trust.

This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special
considerations obtaining in any particular case might
make some other course more expedient and just. For
example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding
may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay
it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered
under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view
that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal
proceedings have finished.”

(Emphasis Supplied)”

8. Even otherwise in the light of judgments passed by the Supreme Court in
the cases of XYZ v. State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337 , State of
Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718 , Ajay Kumar Das
v. State of Jharkhand , reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319 , Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v.
State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350 , State of A.P. v. Gourishetty

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:20656

10 MCRC-48530-2024
Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226 , M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana ,
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373 , CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported in (2019) 10
SCC 686 , State of MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in
Cr.A. No.709/2021 , Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan , reported in (2018) 5 SCC
678, Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221 , State of
Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan , reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547 , S. Khushboo v.
Kanniammal reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600 , Sangeeta Agrawal v. State of U.P. ,
reported in (2019) 2 SCC 336 , Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in
(2012) 9 SCC 460 , Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy
reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437 and M.N. Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported
i n (2009) 9 SCC 682 , this Court can quash the proceedings only if the
uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence. Furthermore, this Court in
exercise of powers under S..482 of Cr.P.C. (S.528 of BNSS) cannot conduct a
roving enquiry to hold as to whether the allegations made in the FIR are correct or
not.

9. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court
is of the considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference in the
investigation for offence under Section 498A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act.

10. Accordingly, the application fails and is hereby dismissed.

(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE

pd

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN
DHARKAR
Signing time: 11/26/2024
7:07:32 AM

Source link

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *