Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
K.Subramanya Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 10 January, 2025
APHC010011382022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3310]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY ,THE TENTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE K MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO: 1010/2022
Between:
K.subramanya Reddy ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. MANOJ KUMAR BETHAPUDI
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR SERVICES I
The Court made the following Order:
The Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
seeking the following relief:
“…..to issue an appropriate writ order or direction
more particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus
th
declaring the proceedings of the 4 respondent in
proceedings Rc.No.327/2014/GS, Dt.24.08.2017 and
rd
consequential proceedings of rejection of appeal by the 3
respondent in Rc.No.1662/2017/M2, Dt.Nil.05.2019 and
nd
orders of Revision passed by the 2 respondent in
Rc.No.6182/2019/A&DC-1, Dt.24.12.2019 and Rejection
order of Mercy Petition, Dt.21.09.2021 as illegal, arbitrary
2and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of
India apart from the settled principle of law laid down by
the Apex Court regarding conduct of disciplinary enquiry
and consequently declare that the petitioner is entitled for
reinstatement into service with all consequential
benefits…….”
2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as
Driver under the respondents in the year 1991 and was working as such till
dismissed from service on 24.08.2017 by the 4th respondent. While the
petitioner was working as Driver in the office of Sub-divisional Forest Officer,
Tirupati, he was placed under suspension on 11.02.2014 on the ground that
the petitioner colluded with the red sanders smugglers by collecting bribe.
After a period of 20 months, the petitioner was issued with a charge memo
dated 26.09.2015 framing lone Article of Charge and that the petitioner was
arrested for the same offence by the police of M.R.Palli Police Station. The
petitioner has submitted his explanation dated 17.10.2015 to the 4th
respondent and the disciplinary authority had appointed a presenting officer
vide proceedings dated 01.01.2016 in Rc.No.327/2014/GS. Thereafter, the
enquiry was conducted on 09.01.2016, 23.01.2016 and 29.01.2016 without
any progress in the enquiry proceedings. Subsequently, again the petitioner
was called for enquiry on 13.03.2017 and enquiry proceedings were
concluded on the same day and thereafter, enquiry report had been
communicated to the petitioner in May 2017, for which the petitioner had
submitted final explanation in detail on 12.05.2017. Even though the enquiry
3
was completed, the suspension of the petitioner had also been extended
again, where under the petitioner was continued under suspension for more
than three years. The 4th respondent vide proceedings Rc.No.327/2014/GS,
dated 24.08.2017 issued orders of major penalty of dismissal from service.
Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed an appeal on 17.10.2017 before
the 3rd respondent and the 3rd respondent after two years, rejected the appeal
vide proceedings Rc.No.1662/2017/M2, dated Nil.05.2019. Questioning the
same, the petitioner filed revision before the 2nd respondent on 18.06.2019.
The 2nd respondent rejected the revision vide proceedings dated 24.12.2019.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Mercy Petition before the Government, which
was disposed of on 21.09.2021 vide Memo No.2514/Sec.IV/A2/2018 by the 1st
respondent, which was communicated to the petitioner in third week of
October, 2021. Questioning the inaction of the respondents in reinstating the
petitioner into service, the present writ petition has been filed.
3. The 4th respondent filed counter affidavit denying the allegations
made in the writ petition and stated that the police arrested the persons
namely one Venkatesh, Viod Kumar and Doraswamy Venkatesh, while they
were transporting 9 red sander logs, weight of 244 kgs in Mahendra Xylo Car
bearing No.TN02AN and the police authorities seized the car. During
investigation of the said accused, they informed the name of the petitioner,
who is helping them for this smuggling of Red Sander activities, for which the
4
petitioner has taken bribe of Rs.2,00,000/- per load. It is further stated that the
petitioner had himself accepted that he has colluded with the RS smugglers.
Hence, the petitioner was placed under suspension as per Rule 8(1)(2)(b) of
CC & A Rules, 1991 in DFO, Chittoor East (WL) Divison, Chittoor vide
Rc.No.327/2014/GS, dated 11.02.2014. The suspension orders were served
on the petitioner on 17.02.2014. The 4th respondent addressed to submit his
investigation report vide Rc.No.327/2014/GS, dated 07.07.2014. Since the
investigation report was delayed, the suspension orders were extended for
further period of six months from 09.08.2014 vide Rc.No.327/2014/GS, dated
05.08.2014. The 3rd respondent ordered to be continue for next six months
vide Progs.No.25/2015/M2, dated 07.01.2015 from 11.02.2015 in terms of
G.O.Ms.No.578, GAD (Ser.3), dated 31.12.1999 and further extension of
suspension period of six months from 11.08.2015 also ordered by
Conservator of Forest, Ananthapuramu vide Rc.No.25/2015/M2, dated
28.08.2015. Later, the 4th respondent appointed the Sub Divisional Forest
Officer, Tirupati as presenting officer vide Rc.No.327/2014/GS, dated
01.01.2016. After completion of all formalities of enquiry, departmental
findings were communicated to the petitioner vide Rc.No.327/2014/GS, dated
28.04.2017 stating that charges were proved. Thereafter, final orders were
passed by the 4th respondent vide Rc.No.327/2014/GS, dated 24.08.2017 with
a punishment of dismissal from service and the same was acknowledged by
5
the petitioner on 19.09.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred appeal and
the same was rejected vide Rc.No.1662/2017/M2, dated Nil.05.2019,
confirming the orders of the 4th respondent and the same was acknowledged
by the petitioner on 12.06.2019. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred revision
petition on 18.06.2019 and the same was rejected vide
Rc.No.6182/2019/A&DC-1, dated 24.12.2019. Thereafter, the petitioner
submitted Mercy Petition before the Government and the same was also
rejected vide Rc.No.2514/Ser-IV/A2/2018, dated 21.09.2021 and the same
was acknowledged by the petitioner on 04.12.2021. Therefore, prays to
dismiss the writ petition.
4. Heard Mr.M.Vijaya Kumar, learned Senior Counsel representing
Mr.Manoj Kumar Bethapudi, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Assistant Government Pleader for Services-I, for the respondents.
5. On hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the
contents urged in the writ petition, submits that, the petitioner in his service of
nearly 30 years, earned several rewards, cash awards and commendations
from the Department, particularly, in respect of the red sanders cases. He was
also issued Certificates of Merit during his service. However, due to
unfortunate events taken place, he was implicated in a false case by
registering an FIR No.26 of 2014, Dt.04.02.2014 in M.R. Palli Police Station
on 04.02.2014 which has lead to the issuance of the charge memo and
6
consequential disciplinary enquiry proceedings. He further submits that, in the
present case, the Disciplinary Authority himself is the Enquiry Officer. The
Disciplinary Authority-cum-Enquiry Officer has taken his own time to conduct
enquiry even though he had summoned the petitioner to his office on three
occasions in January 2016 without any progress in the enquiry and only in the
month of March 2017 enquiry has been commenced and concluded. He
further submits that, while communicating the enquiry report to the petitioner,
the disciplinary authority has not furnished any statements of witnesses. The
statements were not furnished even during the enquiry proceedings.
Therefore, non-supply of statements of witnesses also is fatal to the enquiry
proceedings as held by the Apex Court in catena of judgments. He further
submits that the Government has issued G.O.Ms.No.679, dated 01.01.2010
where under, it has been specifically mandated to the Disciplinary Authorities
to complete the disciplinary enquiries in a reasonable time i.e., within a period
of three months in case of simple nature and six months in the case if charges
are complicated. But in the present case, the allegations were levelled against
the petitioner in February 2014 and the charge memo had been issued after a
period of 1½ years and enquiry proceedings took nearly two years, finally
dismissing the petitioner from service. He further submits that in the event/
allegation of February 2014, the petitioner was subjected to enquiry in March
2017, i.e., after a period of more than three years. Therefore, such delay, as
7
held by the Apex Court amounts to denying reasonable opportunity. Hence,
the impugned proceedings of dismissal and consequential proceedings in
appeal and revision are liable to be set aside.
6. To support his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner
relied on the decision of Nirmala J.Jhala v. State of Gujarat1, wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:
“42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amlendu
Ghosh v. District Traffic Superintendent, North-Eastern
Railway, Katiyar 2 , held that the purpose of holding a
preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct
is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima
facie, to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been
committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in
preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It
may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular
disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be
held.
43. Similarly in Chiman Lal Shah v. Union of India3, a
Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a similar view held
that preliminary inquiry should not be confused with regular
inquiry. The preliminary inquiry is not governed by the
provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
Preliminary inquiry may be held ex-parte, for it is merely for the
satisfaction of the government though usually for the sake of
fairness, an explanation may be sought from the government
servant even at such an inquiry. But at that stage, he has no
right to be heard as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of
the government as to whether a regular inquiry must be held.”1
(2013) 4 SCC 301
2
AIR 1960 SC 992
3
AIR 1964 SC 1854
8
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied on the decision of
ORYX Fisheries Private Limited Vs. Union of India and Others 4, wherein
the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:
“40. In M/s Kranti Associates (supra), this Court after
considering various judgments formulated certain principles in
para 51 of the judgment which are set out below:
a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons,
even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone
prejudicially.
b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider
principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must
also appear to be done as well.
d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any
possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even
administrative power.
e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the
decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component
of a decision making process as observing principles of natural
justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative
bodies.
g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior
Courts.
h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of
law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned
decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood
of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is
the soul of justice.
i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as
different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the
litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery system.
j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough
about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to4
(2010) 13 SCC 427
9know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or „rubber-stamp reasons‟ is not
to be equated with a valid decision making process.
m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of
restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision
making not only makes the judges and decision makers less
prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100
Harward Law Review 731-737).
n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the
broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and
was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994)
19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of
Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to
Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which
requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for
judicial decisions”.
o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in
setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development
of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the
essence and is virtually a part of “Due Process”.
41. In the instant case the appellate order contains
reasons. However, absence of reasons in the original order
cannot be compensated by disclosure of reason in the appellate
order.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the above
decisions, submits that, in the present case, in the enquiry there is no
evidence lead in favour of the prosecution and there is no statement by any
witness against the charge framed against the petitioner. A perusal of the
enquiry report would clearly shows that the Disciplinary Authority though
extracted in detail the defence and explanation of the petitioner and his
meritorious contribution to the department, particularly in red sanders cases
had brushed aside cogent explanation of the petitioner and simply stated that
10
the charge against the petitioner is proved. While coming to such conclusion,
the Disciplinary Authority has not cited a single statement of any witness nor
any document examined in the enquiry on behalf of the prosecution. Hence,
the entire proceedings of enquiry report concluding the charge against the
petitioner as proved, is without any evidence and hence, the findings of the
Disciplinary Authority/Enquiry Officer are perverse. Therefore, any action
taken against an employee while imposing punishment based on perverse
findings as stated above cannot stand to the scrutiny of law, particularly, in
disciplinary cases while imposing a capital punishment of dismissal from
service. Therefore, the order of punishment of dismissal dated 24.08.2017
suffers from vice of arbitrariness as it is without any basis.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed a reliance upon a
decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab
National Bank and Others5, Wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:
“10. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi
judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial
function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be
found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at
a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on
record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during
investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by
itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary
5
(2009) 2 SCC 570
11
proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents.
The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did
not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the
Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as
evidence. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence
whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the
purported confession made by the appellant before the police.
According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said
confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being
an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been
proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show
that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there
was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The
tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up
his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded
on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no
evidence was left.
11. In Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel6, it was held:
“…….The two infirmities are separate and distinct
though, conceivably, in some cases, both may be present. There
may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting
bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government
is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the
Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of
mala fides, but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is
no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of
certiorari will not issued without further proof of mala fides. That is
6
(1964) 4 SCR 718
12why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney-General’s
argument that sine no mala fides are alleged against the appellant
in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of
the respondent.
That takes us to the merits of the respondent’s
contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third
charged framed against the respondent has been proved, is based
on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before
us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the
fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out
corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant
is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal
over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would
have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt
absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in
dealing with this part of the respondents case is, is there any
evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent
that charge No. 3 was proved against him ? In exercising its
jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot
consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of
evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter
which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the
question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is
any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other
words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as
true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in question is
proved against the respondent ? This approach will avoid weighing
the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only
examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion
follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the
13
respondent’s grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the
finding which is implicit in the appellant’s order dismissing the
respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on
no evidence.”
12. In Moni Shankar V. Union of India7, this Court held:
“17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one.
Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in
the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be
complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are
entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of
misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of
evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts
have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based
on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The
Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the
premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is
taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the
requirements of burden of proof, namely – preponderance of
probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of
proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its
domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of
unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.”
….This Court referred to its earlier decision in Capt. M. Paul
Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd8 to opine:
“41. We may not be understood to have laid down a law
that in all such circumstances the decision of the civil court or the
criminal court would be binding on the disciplinary authorities as
this Court in a large number of decisions points point that the same
7
(2008) 3 SCC 484
8
(1999) 3 SCC 679
14would depend upon other factors as well. See e.g. Krishnakali Tea
Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and Anr. (2004) 8
SCC 200 and Manager, Reserve Bank of India Bangalore v. S.
Mani and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 100. Each case is, therefore, required
to be considered on its own facts.
42. It is equally well settled that the power of judicial
review would not be refused to be exercised by the High Court,
although despite it would be lawful to do so. In Manager, Reserve
Bank of India Bangalore (supra) this Court observed:
„39. The findings of the learned Tribunal, as noticed
hereinbefore, are wholly perverse. It apparently posed unto
itself wrong questions. It placed onus of proof wrongly upon
the appellant. Its decision is based upon irrelevant factors not
germane for the purpose of arriving at a correct finding of fact.
It has also failed to take into consideration the relevant
factors. A case for judicial review, thus, was made out.”
14. In that case also, the learned single judge proceeded on
the basis that the disadvantages of an employer is that such
acts are committed in secrecy and in conspiracy with the person
affected by the accident, stating:
“……..No such finding has been arrived at even in the
disciplinary proceedings nor any charge was made out as against
the appellant in that behalf. He had no occasion to have his say
thereupon. Indisputably, the writ court will bear in mind the
distinction between some evidence or no evidence but the question
which was required to be posed and necessary should have been
as to whether some evidence adduced would lead to the
conclusion as regard the guilt of the delinquent officer or not. The
evidence adduced on behalf of the management must have nexus
with the charges. The Enquiry Officer cannot base his findings on
15mere hypothesis. Mere ipso dixit on his part cannot be a substitute
of evidence.
45. The findings of the learned Single Judge to the effect
that ‘it is established with the conscience (sic) of the Court
reasonably formulated by an Enquiry Officer then in the eventuality’
may not be fully correct inasmuch as the Court while exercising its
power of judicial review should also apply its mind as to whether
sufficient material had been brought on record to sustain the
findings. The conscience of a court may not have much role to play.
It is unfortunate that the learned Single Judge did not at all
deliberate on the contentions raised by the appellant. Discussion
on the materials available on record for the purpose of applying the
legal principles was imperative. The Division Bench of the High
Court also committed the same error.”
15. Yet again in M.V. Biljani v. Union of India9, this Court
held:
“……..Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are
not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all
reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry
Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the
documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a
preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of
materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into
consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the
relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject
the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of
surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations
with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.”
9
(2006) 5 SCC 88
16
16. Yet again in Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank &
ors10, this Court followed Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors, stating:
“12. In a case of this nature, therefore, the High Court
should have applied its mind to the fact of the matter with reference
to the materials brought on records. It failed so to do.”
Therefore, learned counsel requests this Court to allow the writ petition.
10. Per Contra, learned Assistant Government Pleader while
reiterating the contents made in the counter affidavit, submits that, when the
subject matter involved in this case is different from other cases. The enquiry
reports are required from various departmental authorities and hence, there is
lot of information to be gathered on the case and procedure has to be
completed in this case for which major punishment may have to be imposed.
Hence, more time was required for disposal of the case. Therefore, the
contention of the petitioner that there is delay in passing the dismissal order is
not correct. He further submits that the petitioner has exhibited serious breach
of the reputation of the A.P. Forest Department, by giving information about
the movements of the forest officials and safety routes to the R.S. Smugglers
and extended co-operation for passing away the loaded vehicles smoothly
without any interruption and encouraging them for transporting of R.S. Wood
illegally by collecting Rs.2,00,000/- per load and this was accepted by the
10
(2007) 1 SCC 566
17
petitioner for which he was arrested by the police authorities of M.R. Palli
Police Station. Thus, the petitioner has failed to maintain absolute integrity,
discipline and sense of property in violation of Sub rule (1) of Rule 3 of APCS
(conduct) Rules, 1964. Hence, the petitioner was given punishment of
dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be disqualified for future
employment under the Government. The punishment was confirmed in the
appeal, revision and mercy petition. Therefore, learned Assistant Government
Pleader prays to dismiss the writ petition.
11. Perused the record.
12. On a perual of the material on record, it appears that the 4th
respondent vide proceedings Rc.No.327/2014/G2, dated 28.04.2017 made
the following observations:
“He has submitted that he was accompaining with the
Sub Divisional Forest Officer, Tirupati and attended Divisional
Forest Officer camp at Srikalahasti on 04.02.2014. After
completion of Divisional Forest Officer camp, returned back to
Tirupati. On 04.02.2014 evening, while parking the vehicle in
the Office premises of Sub Divisional Forest Officer, Tirupati,
the Task Force Staff surrounded me and instructed to come to
the Office of the Task Force, Tirupati. As per their instructions,
he has followed them and appeared before the O.S.D., Task
Force, Tirupati. The staff of Task Force, Tirupati have taken his
Mobile phone and verified and checked. Then they produced
one of the accused involved in Cr.No.26/2014 and asked him
“Do you know him”, the accused who has seen the Charged
Officer stated to the Task Force staff “No” and never seen the
Charged Officer he replied. Then the staff sent the Charged
Officer to his home with instructions to come to the Office on
05.02.2014 at about 10.00 AM. They enquired him in several
angles about the seizure of nine (9) Red Sanders logs weighing
244 Kgs. Along with XYLO Car No. TN 02 AW 4441 and the
accused involved in Cr.No.26/2014, Dt.04.02.2014. He told to
18the Task Force staff that he don‟t know. The Task Force staff
warned Charged Officer, if not admitted the Offence, a case will
be booked against the sons of Charged Officer. But, no
statement was recorded on 05.02.2014 and sent the Charged
Officer to his home on 05.02.2014 and directed to come to
Office on 06.02.2014 at about 10.00 AM. As per their directions,
the Charged Officer has turned up to the Office of Task Force,
Tirupati for enquiry on 06.02.2014 at about 10.00 AM. The Task
Force Police have again and again enquired about the case in
Cr.No.26/2014, DL.04.02.2014. During the enquiry on
07.02.2014, the Charged Officer told to the Task Force, Tirupati
that he don’t know about the Cr.No.26/2014, Dt.04.02.2014. No
statement was recorded by them on 07.02.2014 also but
obtained signature on empty papers only. Thus the Task Force
Police have kept the Charged Officer at Office of the Task
Force, Tirupati from 04.02.2014 to 07.02.2014.
Finally on 07.02.2014, the Task Force staff have
handed over the Charged Officer to the Police Station,
M.R.Palli, immediately, they have brought the panchayatdars
from the surrounding areas of his residence. They came over to
the Police Station, M.R. Palli and obtained their signatures. But
they don’t know what they recorded in the mahazarnama. The
Police have not enquired the Charged Officer about the case
and also what they recorded in the Mahazarnama. Thus, they
taken time from 07.02.2014 to 09.02.2014 for preparation of
case records. The Charged Officer was in the Police Station
from 07.02.2014 to 10.02.2014 morning.”
13. It is further observed from the material on record, that the
Analysis and Assessment of evidences by the Inquiry Officer reads as follows:
“(iii) The Charged Officer while submitting reply to the
Article of Charge has stated that he has signed on the empty
papers provided by the M.R. Police just before sending him to
remand is absolutely false. If such type of situation was there,
why he has not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Judge
during sending him to the remand and why he was silent over
the matter at that time. Further, if the situation was brought to
the notice of the Hon’ble Judge, the arrest of the Charged
Officer would be stopped at the time itself. But the Charged
Officer has accepted his arrest at that time and it is evident that
he has given confession statement with his knowledge only.
Hence, he has signed on the white sheet before the police
authorities is after thought and blaming the police staff on their
integrity.
19
(iv) The Panchayatdhars 1.Sri V.Prakash Reddy, S/o
Late V.Madhav Reddy, aged about 35 years, D.No.20-3-18/21,
Sivajyothinagar, Tirupati, Urban Mandal, Chittoor District and 2.
Sri Y.Nagi Reddy, S/o Late Y.Konda Reddy, aged about 45
years, D.No.20-3-18/21-A, Sivajyothinagar, Tirupati, Urban
Madal, Chittoor District are the witnesses in the case of the
Charged Officer in Cr.No.26/2014, Dt.04.02.2014 M.R.Palli PS,
Tirupati. They have signed on the confession statement
recorded by the M. R.Palli Police on 10.02.2014 but now during
the enquiries, they are denying the confession given by the
Charged Officer is after thought.”
14. The Conservator of Forests, Ananthapuramu vide
Rc.No.1662/2017/M2, dated Nil.05.2019, held that “the appeal petition of Sri
K.Subramanyam Reddy, Driver, (U/d) against the punishment of “Dismissal
from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment
under the Government” awarded by the Divisional Forest Officer, Chittoor East
(WL) Division, Chittoor vide Proc.Rc.No.327/2014/G2, Dt:24.08.2017, is
hereby sustained.”
15. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and on
considering the submissions of both the learned counsels, this Court is of the
opinion that, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate
authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them
have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been
assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the
petitioner, a decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally
admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a
departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report
20
of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and
conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn
by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence.
Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no
circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. Hence, this Court is
inclined allow the writ petition, setting aside the impugned proceedings dated
24.08.2017.
16. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned
proceedings vide Rc.No.327/2014/GS, dated 24.08.2017 issued by the 4th
respondent is hereby set aside. Further, the respondents are directed to
reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits. No costs.
17. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall
stand closed.
__________________________
Dr. K. MANMADHA RAO, J
BMS