Supreme Court of India
Kali Charan vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 26 November, 2024
Author: B.R. Gavai
Bench: B.R. Gavai
2024 INSC 898
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 15782 of 2023)
KALI CHARAN AND OTHERS …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 15535 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 19512-19513 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 19510-19511 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 24970 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 20314 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). of 2024)
(D. No. 34908/2023)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
Date: 2024.11.26
16:42:29 IST
Reason:
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). of 2024)
(D.No. 35223/2023)
1
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 24969 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 24971 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 23732 of 2023)
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(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 23727 of 2023)
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(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 25000 of 2023)
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(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 16057 of 2023)
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(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 17876 of 2023)
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(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 17015 of 2023)
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(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 21488 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 17888-17889 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 18703-18704 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 19514-19515 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 18705-18718 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 19222-19226 of 2023)
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CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 18885 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 19904 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 21354 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 20605 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 20486 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 20634 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 21500 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 21330 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 20541 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 21446 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 22041 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 21495 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 7247 of 2024)
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JUDGMENT
Mehta, J.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
BATCH NO. 1- LANDOWNERS’ APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS ……………….. 5
BATCH NO. 2- YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS ……………………………. 6
BRIEF FACTS …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 6
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS (APPELLANTS IN BATCH NO. 1): ……… 15
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF YEIDA (RESPONDENT NO.3 IN BATCH NO. 1): – ………. 26
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS: – ………………………………………………………………………….. 38
CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 44
1. Delay in filing application(s) for setting aside of abatement is
condoned.
2. Abatement is set aside.
3. Delay in filing the application(s) for substitution is condoned.
4. Application(s) for substitution is allowed.
5. Application(s) for transposition is allowed.
6. Application(s) for intervention/impleadment is allowed.
7. Leave granted.
INTRODUCTION
8. The present batch of civil appeals @ special leave petitions arise
out of the land acquisition proceedings initiated by respondent No.1-
4
State of Uttar Pradesh1 for planned development in the District
Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, through respondent No.3-
Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority2 by invoking
‘urgency provisions’ incorporated in Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 18943.
9. Arguments on all the appeals @ special leave petitions have
been heard analogously and are being disposed of vide this common
judgment.
10. In total, 35 civil appeals @ special leave petitions are preferred
both by landowners and YEIDA which can be categorized into two
batches as mentioned below:
BATCH NO. 1- LANDOWNERS’ APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITIONS
11. A total of 29 civil appeals @ special leave petitions have been
filed by the landowners challenging the decision of the Division Bench
of the Allahabad High Court in “Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P. thru
Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors4”. The appeal
1 hereinafter being referred to as ‘State’
2 hereinafter being referred to as ‘YEIDA’
3 hereinafter being referred to as “the Act”
4 Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as ‘Kamal Sharma’
5
@ special leave petition titled “Kalicharan v. State of U.P. and
others5” is being treated as the lead matter in this batch.
BATCH NO. 2- YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS
12. The YEIDA has filed 6 appeals @ special leave petitions
challenging various decisions of the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court invalidating the self-same land acquisition proceedings for
integrated development of notified areas including the decision in
“Shyoraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P.6”. The appeal @ special
leave petition titled “YEIDA v. Shyoraj Singh and Ors.7” is being
treated as the lead matter in this batch.
BRIEF FACTS
13. The chronology of events leading to the filing of these civil
appeals are as follows.
14. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the factual context
as noticed in Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled as “Kamal Sharma v.
State of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and
Ors.8(lead matter in Batch No.1) filed before the Allahabad High Court.
5 SLP(C) No. 15782 of 2023
6 Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as ‘Shyoraj Singh’
7 SLP(C) Nos. 19512-19513 of 2023
8 Supra, Note 4
6
15. Upon receipt of a proposal from the Director, Land Acquisition
Directorate, Rajswa, Uttar Pradesh, with prior approval of the State
Government, a notification dated 26th February, 2009 was issued
under Section 4(1)9 read with Sections 17(1)10 and 17(4)11 of the Act
for the acquisition of the tracts of lands in question for planned
development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid notification is extracted below: –
“Under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894), the Governor hereby notifies for the
information of the general public that the land mentioned in the
Schedule below shall be earmarked for public purposes,
namely, the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development
Authority in District Gautam Budh Nagar for Planned
Development.
Because the Governor is of the opinion that the provisions
or sub-section (1) of section 17 of the said Act apply to the
said land, because the said land is urgently needed for
planned development in district Gautam Buddha Nagar
through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development
Authority and in view of this urgency, it is also necessary
that the possible delay in conducting the Investigation9 4. Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon. –
(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] the land in any locality [is needed
or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose [or for a company], a notification to that effect
shall be published in the Official Gazette [and in two daily newspapers circulating in that
locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language], and the Collector shall cause
public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said
locality [(the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice , being
hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)].
10 17. Special powers in case of urgency. –(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the [appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector,
though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the
publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1). [take possession of any land
needed for a public purpose]. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the [Government],
free from all encumbrances.
11 17. Special powers in case of urgency. –
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the
provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government]
may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a
declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of
the publication of the notification] under section 4, sub-section (1).7
under Section 5-A of the said Act should be avoided.
Therefore, the Governor also directs under sub-section (4)
of Section 17 of the said Act that the provisions of Section
5-A of the said Act shall not apply.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Since the land was sought to be acquired by invoking urgency
provisions under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, the landowners
made representations to the Chief Executive Officer(‘CEO’) of YEIDA
requesting that their land may not be acquired because the status of
the land was ‘Abadi Bhoomi’ which was being used by the landowners
as dwelling units and for rearing their cattle. The
functionaries/authorities concerned did not accede to the request of
the landowners and the State Government issued the notification
dated 19th February, 2010 under Section 6 of the Act.
17. The landowners challenged the acquisition of their lands by
filing numerous writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court,
primarily seeking the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings
undertaken by invoking Sections 4 and 6 read with Sections 17(1) and
17(4) of the Act on several grounds which may be broadly categorized
as below: –
(i) That the State Government arbitrarily invoked Section
17(1) and Section 17(4) of the Act and deprived the
8
landowners of their valuable right to raise objectionsunder Section 5-A of the Act.
(ii) That a bare reading of the notification issued under
Section 4 would reflect that there was no material with
the State Government for invoking the urgency clause
in the matter of acquisition of land for planned
development.
(iii) That there was no genuine public purpose behind the
acquisition and thus, the impugned action was illegal,
arbitrary and unjustified.
18. These writ petitions were decided by the Allahabad High Court
taking divergent views which are assailed in these appeals by special
leave.
19. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court vide judgment
dated 24th April, 2017 allowed the Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010 titled
Shyoraj Singh and quashed the land acquisition notifications in
question holding that the grounds being taken in the impugned
notifications for invocation of the urgency clause were arbitrary and
bad in law. The learned Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh summoned
the original records from the State Government and perused the same
to arrive at the following conclusions: –
9
(i) The Division Bench referred to two letters issued by the
authorities of the District Gautam Budh Nagar, the details of
which are as follows:
(a) A letter justifying the invocation of the urgency clause
signed by the Additional Chief Executive Officer of
Yamuna Expressway, Tehsildar, Naib Tehsildar, and
Lekhpal. The relevant extract from the said letter is as
below: –
“Yamuna expressway urgently needs the proposed land
for planned industrial development. In the event of delay
in the acquisition, there is a strong possibility of
increasing encroachment on the proposed land, due to
which public interest project of planned industrial
development will adversely be affected.”
“Hearing and disposal of written/oral objections will
definitely take years and there will be unexpected delays
which will stall the planned development.”
(b) A letter issued in 2010 by the District Magistrate,
recording a satisfaction that the prevailing facts and
circumstances justified the invocation of the powers
under Section 17 of the Act for dispensing with the
hearing of objections under Section 5-A of the Act. The
relevant extract from the said letter is as below:
“Due to the need to complete the project without delay
in the acquisition of the said land, it is necessary to take
possession of the proposed land with immediate effect.
In the case of using Section 17 of LAA, the provisions of
10
Section 5-A of the Act become extinct and I fully agree
with the justification of ending the opportunity of
hearing to the land owners.”With reference to the aforesaid letters, the Division Bench
observed that the two grounds mentioned for invoking urgency
clause were: (1) That there are chances of unauthorized
construction/encroachment on the said land. (2) Large number of
landowners would be affected by the acquisition and hearing such
large number of landowners would delay the project.
The Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh held that the above-
noted factors did not furnish legally acceptable justification for the
exercise of power under Section 17(1) of the Act by the State
Government because the acquisition was primarily meant to cater
to private interests in the name of industrial development of the
District and no material was produced on record to show that the
State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities of the State
were intending to establish industrial units on the acquired tracts
of land. Further, the justification for invoking urgency provisions,
that the land will be encroached on, had no substance as the land
was already in possession of the recorded tenure holders.
(ii) The Division Bench also observed that the notification under
Section 4 of the Act was published on 26th February, 2009 but
11
thereafter, the State Government took nearly one year to publishthe notification under Section 612 of the Act. The time of one year
consumed by the State Government in publishing the notification
under Section 6 of the Act was by itself sufficient to infer that there
was absolutely no urgency that could have justified the invocation
of the urgency clause, thereby depriving the landowners of an
opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A of the Act.
20. However, another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court
while dealing with a batch of 73 writ petitions challenging the very
same land acquisition proceedings took a different view from Shyoraj
Singh and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the landowners, the
lead matter being Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled “Kamal Sharma v.
State of U.P.”. The Division Bench while upholding the acquisition
proceedings held that it could not be accepted that the entire exercise
for invocation of urgency clause was mechanical or there was no
material with the State for recording the subjective satisfaction to this
effect. The reasons assigned by the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma
were as follows: –
(i) A perusal of the Master plan and the facts established
that the land required for development of Yamuna
12 Published on 19th Feb, 2010.
12
Expressway [‘Planned development through Yamuna
Expressway’] was for an integrated project. The land
was initially acquired for the Yamuna Expressway
and, thereafter, for developing land parcels alongside
the Expressway as townships.
(ii) The original record of the State contains a categorical
statement that the State Government, after
scrutinizing the record had accepted the proposal
applying mind to the fact that, in case the objections
under Section 5-A of the Act were invited, it would
adversely affect and cause delay in execution of the
project of public importance. The said decision was
made looking at the enormity of the project which
required the acquisition of the lands spread over a
large area of 18,000 hundred acres (approx.)
comprising 16 villages. The development of the village
‘Abadi Bhoomi’s by YEIDA was also linked to the
development of the land alongside the Expressway. It
was not the case of non-application of mind and no
fault in the decision-making process could be
demonstrated.
13
(iii) There was no post-notification delay, inasmuch as, in
two or three acquisition notifications, which were the
subject matter of challenge in the present writ
petitions, wherein one year time has been consumed
in the issuance of the Section 6 notification, the delay
has been duly explained by the State.
21. In Kamal Sharma, the Division Bench distinguished Shyoraj
Singh noting that the said judgment failed to consider the fact that
the acquisition was proposed for an integrated project and that the
Division Bench did not deal with the argument that looking at the large
number of tenure holders, the hearings would have resulted into the
project of tremendous importance being delayed. Further, it was noted
that the reasons given for justifying the invocation of the urgency
clause had not been examined in the context in which they were made,
and also the decision of this Court in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta
and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.13 was not
considered.
22. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while delivering
the judgment in Kamal Sharma, validated the acquisition proceeding
13 (2010) 10 SCC 282; hereinafter referred to as ‘Nand Kishore’
14
in question and granted an enhanced compensation of 64.7% to the
landowners.
23. During the course of arguments, this Court was apprised of the
fact that out of total 410 writ petitioners(landowners) before the High
Court, only 96 have challenged the judgment in Kamal Sharma by
filing civil appeals @ special leave petitions in Batch No. 1.
24. It is in this backdrop of the conflicting decisions rendered by
the Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court, that the two
batches of civil appeals @ special leave petitions i.e. Batch No.1 and
Batch No.2, have been preferred by the landowners and YEIDA before
this Court.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS (APPELLANTS IN
BATCH NO. 1): –
25. Learned counsel representing the landowners implored the
Court to grant relief in favour of the appellants as prayed for in Batch
No.1 wherein lead matter is “Kalicharan and others v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh and others14” and negate the challenge to the
judgment in Shyoraj Singh. They advanced the following pertinent
14 supra
15
submissions for assailing the questioned land acquisition
proceedings:-
(i) That the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, while
rendering the judgment dated 26th May, 2023 in Kamal
Sharma, in effect sat in appeal over the judgment dated 24th
April, 2017 in Shyoraj Singh rendered by a coordinate bench
of the same High Court which dealt with an identical
controversy both in facts and law. It was fervently contended
that the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, while
dealing with the subsequent batch of writ petitions in Kamal
Sharma should have followed the judgment passed in
Shyoraj Singh as a matter of judicial discipline.
(ii) That if at all the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma was of a
view that Shyoraj Singh did not lay down the correct
position of law, then the question of law should have been
referred to a larger Bench rather than taking a divergent view
in a Bench with a composition of same number of Judges.
(iii) That the land acquisition notifications under Sections 4 and
6 of the Act were dated 26th February, 2009 and 19th February
2010, respectively. The above-mentioned dates demonstrate
that about one years’ time was taken by the State
16
Government for issuance of the final declaration notificationunder Section 6 after the proposal under Section 4 of the Act
was issued and thus, there was pre and post notification
delay which could not have been ignored and had to be taken
into account. In this background there could not have been
any justification for the dispensation of few weeks’ time to the
landowners to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act, on
the ground of urgency. On this aspect, reliance was placed
upon Radhy Shyam(dead) through LRs. and Others v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others15, wherein this Court
observed as follows: –
“82. In this case, the Development Authority sent the
proposal sometime in 2006. The authorities up to the level of
the Commissioner completed the exercise of survey and
preparation of documents by the end of December 2006 but
it took one year and almost three months for the State
Government to issue notification under Section 4 read with
Sections 17(1) and 17(4). If this much time was consumed
between the receipt of proposal for the acquisition of land and
issue of notification, it is not possible to accept the argument
that four to five weeks within which the objections could be
filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A and the time spent
by the Collector in making enquiry under sub-section (2) of
Section 5-A would have defeated the object of the
acquisition.”
15 (2011) 5 SCC 553; hereinafter referred to as ‘Radhy Shyam’
17
Reliance in this regard was also placed on Dev Sharan and
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others16, wherein
this Court observed as below: –
“37 [Ed.: Para 37 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2011 dated 16-3-2011.]. Thus the time
which elapsed between publication of Section 4(1) and
Section 17 notifications, and Section 6 declaration in the
local newspapers is 11 months and 23 days i.e. almost one
year. This slow pace at which the government machinery had
functioned in processing the acquisition, clearly evinces that
there was no urgency for acquiring the land so as to warrant
invoking Section 17(4) of the Act.
38. In Para 15 of the writ petition, it has been clearly stated
that there was a time gap of more than 11 months between
Section 4 and Section 6 notifications, which demonstrates
that there was no urgency in the State action which could
deny the petitioners their right under Section 5-A. In the
counter which was filed in this case by the State before the
High Court, it was not disputed that the time gap between
Section 4 notification read with Section 17, and Section 6
notification was about 11 months.”Learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on
Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others17, wherein, this Court, while dealing
with a post-notification delay of almost two years, held as
follows:
“28. In the facts and circumstances of the present case,
it is clear that this Court, vide its order dated 17-8-2004
[(2011) 12 SCC 572], has issued a direction to the
respondents to relocate the bone mills and allied industries
causing environment pollution and health hazards as per the
recommendations of CPCB and, inter alia, the respondents
16 (2011) 4 SCC 769
17 (2011) 9 SCC 164
18
were also directed to identify the area for relocation.
Pursuant to this, the respondents have filed an affidavit in
the month of December 2004 specifying the construction of
the Leather City Project at Hapur in Ghaziabad.
Subsequently, it was only after the lapse of two years, the
State Government had issued a Notification under Section 4
on 3-7-2006 and the same was published on 4-7-2006.
Thereafter, the State Government took more than 17 months
in order to make a declaration of the notification under
Section 6 from the date of publication of the notification
under Section 4 of the LA Act. In view of the above
circumstances, it is crystal clear that the government
functionary has proceeded at very slow pace at two levels,
that is, prior to the issuance of the notification under Section
4 and post the issuance of the notification under Section 4,
for acquisition of the land for construction of the Leather City
Project, which undoubtedly is a public purpose. Therefore,
the above series of the events amply exhibit the lethargical
and lackadaisical attitude of the State Government. In the
light of the above circumstances, the respondents are not
justified in invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17
of the LA Act, thereby, depriving the appellants of their
valuable right to raise objections and opportunity of hearing
before the authorities in order to persuade them that their
property may not be acquired.
Further reliance was placed on the case of Darshan Lal
Nagpal(Dead) by LRs. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and
Others18, wherein, this Court observed as below:
“36. It needs no emphasis that majority of the projects
undertaken by the State and its agencies/instrumentalities,
the implementation of which requires public money, are
meant to benefit the people at large or substantially a large
segment of the society. If what the High Court has observed
is treated as a correct statement of law, then in all such cases
the acquiring authority will be justified in invoking Section
17 of the Act and dispense with the inquiry contemplated
under Section 5-A, which would necessarily result in
depriving the owner of his property without any opportunity
to raise legitimate objection. However, as has been repeatedly
held by this Court, the invoking of the urgency provisions can
be justified only if there exists real emergency which cannot
18 (2012) 2 SCC 32719
brook delay of even few weeks or months. In other words, the
urgency provisions can be invoked only if even small delay of
few weeks or months may frustrate the public purpose for
which the land is sought to be acquired. Nobody can contest
that the purpose for which the appellants’ land and land
belonging to others was sought to be acquired was a public
purpose but it is one thing to say that the State and its
instrumentality wants to execute a project of public
importance without loss of time and it is an altogether
different thing to say that for execution of such project,
private individuals should be deprived of their property
without even being heard.”
(iv) That one of the grounds taken by the State for invoking the
urgency clause was that there were chances of unauthorized
construction/encroachments on the land subject to
acquisition. This stand was questioned by placing reliance on
Radhy Shyam, wherein this Court observed that it is highly
unlikely that the recorded tenure holders would encroach or
allow encroachments on their own land when they are
admittedly in the possession of the same. The relevant extract
as relied upon is quoted hereinbelow: –
“83. The apprehension of the respondents that delay in the
acquisition of land will lead to enormous encroachment is
totally unfounded. It is beyond the comprehension of any
person of ordinary prudence to think that the landowners
would encroach their own land with a view to frustrate the
concept of planned industrial development of the district.”
(v) That there was no material before the State Government to
show the existence of any unforeseeable emergency
20
warranting invocation of the urgency clause under Sections17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, thereby denying the landowners of
their right to file objections against acquisition of their lands.
(vi) That the lands under acquisition were to be utilized for
commercial and residential purposes and such development
work, would take ample time in planning and execution, thus
there could have been no justification for the invocation of
urgency clause. Reliance in this regard was placed on the
following observations in Radhy Shyam:-
“80……Even if planned industrial development of the district
is treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4,
there was no urgency which could justify the exercise of
power by the State Government under Section 17(1) and
17(4). The objective of industrial development of an area
cannot be achieved by pressing some buttons on the
computer screen. It needs a lot of deliberations and planning
keeping in view various scientific and technical parameters
and environmental concerns. The private entrepreneurs, who
are desirous of making investments in the State, take their
own time in setting up the industrial units. Usually, the State
Government and its agencies/instrumentalities would give
them two to three years to put up their factories,
establishments, etc. Therefore, time required to ensure
compliance with the provisions contained in Section 5A
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be portrayed as delay
that will frustrate the purpose of acquisition.”21
Reliance was also placed upon the decision of Anand Singhand Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others19,
wherein this Court observed as follows: –
“46. As to in what circumstances the power of emergency
can be invoked are specified in Section 17(2) but
circumstances necessitating invocation of urgency under
Section 17(1) are not stated in the provision itself. Generally
speaking, the development of an area (for residential
purposes) or a planned development of city, takes many years
if not decades and, therefore, there is no reason why
summary enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A may
not be held and objections of landowners/persons interested
may not be considered. In many cases, on general
assumption likely delay in completion of enquiry under
Section 5-A is set up as a reason for invocation of
extraordinary power in dispensing with the enquiry little
realising that an important and valuable right of the person
interested in the land is being taken away and with some
effort enquiry could always be completed expeditiously.”
(vii) That the judgment of this Court in Radhy Shyam holds the
field on the issue of invocation of urgency clause in
acquisition proceedings for planned development for
commercial, residential, industrial purposes and the decision
in Kamal Sharma has been rendered while glossing over the
law settled in Radhy Shyam.
(viii) That the right to be heard as provided under Section 5-A of
the Act is in the nature of a fundamental right and the same
cannot be dispensed with, so as to justify the lackadaisical
19 (2010) 11 SCC 242
22
approach of the State Government. It was also contendedthat Section 5-A is not to be superseded ipso facto even if the
provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Act are being
invoked. Reliance in support of this contention was placed
upon the decision of this Court in the case of Dev Sharan v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others20, wherein it was held
that even in cases of ‘urgency’ or ‘unforeseen emergency’,
enquiry contemplated by Section 5-A cannot ipso facto be
dispensed with and even if the case is covered under sub-
sections (1) or (2) of Section 17, sub-Section (4) of Section 17
would not necessarily apply. The relevant extracts relied
upon are as below:-
“32. In a recent judgment of this Court in Essco Fabs,
(2009) 2 SCC 377, this Court, after considering previous
judgments as also the provisions of Section 17 of the Act
held: (SCC P. 839, para 41)“41. Whereas sub-section (1) of Section 17 deals with
cases of ‘urgency’, sub-section (2) of the said section
covers cases of ‘sudden change in the channel of any
navigable river or other unforeseen emergency’. But
even in such cases i.e. cases of ‘urgency’ or
‘unforeseen emergency’, enquiry contemplated by
Section 5-A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with
which is clear from sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the
Act.”This Court, therefore, held that once a case is covered
under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17, sub-section (4) of20 (2011) 4 SCC 769
23
Section 17 would not necessarily apply: (SCC P. 395, para
54)
“54. In our opinion, therefore, the contention of the
learned counsel for the respondent authorities is not
well founded and cannot be upheld that once a case
is covered by sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 17 of
the Act, sub-section (4) of Section 17 would
necessarily apply and there is no question of holding
inquiry or hearing objections under Section 5-A of the
Act. Acceptance of such contention or upholding of
this argument will make sub-section (4) of Section 17
totally otiose, redundant and nugatory.”
(ix) That the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court
committed grave error in law while placing reliance upon the
judgment of Nand Kishore, for denying relief to the
landowners. That on a conjoint reading of paras 3 and 96 of
Nand Kishore, it would become evident that the land in
question therein admeasured 1604 Hectares, which was to be
acquired for the construction of the Yamuna Expressway
itself and it is in that background that the invocation of the
urgency clause was upheld, whereas the question as to the
invocation of urgency clause to acquire land for commercial,
residential or industrial purpose was not posed for
adjudication in Nand Kishore, although it held the
acquisition to be for public purpose. Paras 3 and 96 of Nand
Kishore read as follows: –
24
“3. The High Court, in the judgment dated 30-11-2009
passed in Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. [ CMWP No.
31314 of 2009 decided on 30-11-2009 (All)] , basically
pointed out that out of 12,282 landowners, 11,397 had
already received their compensation under the agreement
and the challenge related only to 21.03 ha out of 1604 ha of
land. The High Court also took the view that the scales of
justice must tilt towards the right to development of the
millions who will be benefited from the road and the
development of the area, as against the human rights of 35
petitioners therein, whose main complaint was that they
were not heard before the declaration under Section 6 of the
Act. The High Court also declined to give any direction to the
State Government to consider to exempt 21.03 ha of land
relating to the 35 petitioners therein on account of the fact
that the construction of the road had to be made in an
alignment and that alignment could not be changed.
Identical view was taken in another writ petition filed by one
Balbir Singh. The High Court also expressed its concern that
any direction to exempt the land covered by the construction
might seriously jeopardise the Project. The High Court also
reiterated that the acquisition of the land for interchange of
the road was the essential part of the Project, as also the
construction of bridges, culverts and interchanges, which
were essential for the fast-moving six-lane Expressway.
96. We are not impressed by the argument that the
encroachment issue was not a relevant factor. This argument
was based on the reported decision in Om Prakash v. State
of U.P. [(1998) 6 SCC 1] It must be said that the actual
scenario in that case was different. In that case, the Court
was considering the acquisition of area of about 500 acres
comprising of 437 plots, whereas, in the present case, the
area to be acquired for the Expressway alone was more than
1600 ha. This is apart from the 25 million sq m of land which
was liable to be acquired for the purposes of development of
five land parcels. There was interlinking between the
acquisition of land for the highway and the acquisition of
land for establishing the five townships.”
(x) That the judgment in Radhy Shyam carves out a clear
distinction by observing that the judgment in Nand Kishore
related to the lands proposed to be acquired for construction
of the expressway itself and not to the lands acquired for
25
commercial, residential, and industrial purposes, for whichthe invocation of urgency clause was held to be untenable
and bad in law.
(xi) That neither the appellants have received any amount
towards compensation for acquisition of the lands nor have
they parted with the possession of the subject lands, and
thus, quashing of the land acquisition notification would not
have any adverse impact as no development has taken place
on the lands in question.
(xii) That the mere ploy of the grant of adequate compensation to
the landowners with an escalation of 64.7% could not justify
the grave illegalities committed by the authorities under the
garb of urgent acquisition because the same cannot obviate
or supersede the substantive fundamental right of the
landowners to file objections against the acquisition of the
privately owned lands.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF YEIDA (RESPONDENT NO.3 IN
BATCH NO. 1):-
26. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, Shri
Ranjit Kumar, Shri Gopal Jain, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of YEIDA implored the Court to uphold the judgment passed in
26
Kamal Sharma and to reverse the judgment passed in ShyorajSingh as being unsustainable in the eyes of law. They advanced the
following pertinent submissions seeking the above relief:-
(i) YEIDA is a statutory authority formed under Section 3 of the
U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, which has been
established to ensure planned development of the ‘industrial
development area’. In furtherance of this objective, YEIDA
prepared the Master Plan of 2021 and the Master Plan of
2031 with the intent to develop the eastern side of river
Yamuna by construction of a six-lane Expressway joining
Noida to Agra and also for integrated development of five
distinct regions along the said Expressway for residential,
industrial, institutional and recreational purposes. The
construction of the Jewar Airport is also a part and parcel of
the very same integrated project.
(ii) That a bare perusal of the Master Plan(Phase-1-2031) clearly
establishes that the land acquired for development across
Yamuna Expressway, is an integrated project. The land was
initially acquired for the Yamuna Expressway and thereafter,
for developing land parcels alongside the Yamuna
Expressway as residential townships, industrial areas,
27
amusement zones, etc. The development is strictly beingcarried out in accordance with the Master Plan prepared by
YEIDA.
(iii) The Yamuna Expressway is a vital project of seminal
importance providing access to millions of commuters by
connecting the National Capital to Agra and nearby areas.
The Yamuna Expressway is poised to become even more
important with the upcoming Jewar Airport. A project of this
magnitude would require the involvement of the adjoining
areas which would lead to an overall development of the
State.
(iv) That the legality of the acquisition of the lands in question by
YEIDA for integrated and complementary planned
development is no longer res integra as the same has been
consistently upheld by this Court vide various judicial
pronouncements over time, the landmark case being Nand
Kishore.
(v) That the judgment in Nand Kishore squarely covers the
controversy at hand, wherein it was observed that the
planned development of 25 million square meter of land (2500
Hectares) being acquired for creation of the five zones for
28
industry, residence, amusement zones, etc. would be
complementary to the creation of the Expressway and is a
part of an integrated project and it was urged that similarly
in the present case, land has been acquired for the planned
development of the region.
(vi) That it is settled law that the decision on invocation of
urgency clause is an administrative decision requiring
subjective satisfaction of the State Government and scope of
judicial review in the matters of invocation of the urgency
clause under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act is limited to
the decision-making procedure and not to the decision itself.
The Court is required to examine the record just to arrive at
a satisfaction regarding existence of material to form an
opinion about invoking the urgency clause.
(vii) That the controversy involved in the present case is ad idem
to the facts of the case in Nand Kishore and the factors that
weighed with this Court in upholding the invocation of the
urgency clause in Nand Kishore, also exist in the present
case, and therefore, the invocation of the urgency clause in
the present case was fully justified. The Court’s attention was
drawn to the following factors: –
29
(a) Enormity of the project: The acquisition therein in
‘Nand Kishore’ case, involved 1604 Hectares of
land affecting 12,283 farmers. Similarly, in the
present case, the acquisition involves approximately
2,979 Hectares of land affecting 12,868
farmers/landowners. Thus, the present acquisition
is of greater magnitude than the one considered in
Nand Kishore.
(b) Likelihood of encroachments: The area for the
expressway alone exceeded 1600 Hectares, not
including the 25 million square meter parcel of land
required for developing the five additional zones. In
the present case, out of the 2,979 Hectares of land
acquired, only 456.74 Hectares of land is under
litigation. Therefore, there is an imminent likelihood
of encroachment on 2,522.26 Hectares of land
where landowners have already received
compensation and YEIDA has taken the possession.
(c) Number of Landowners to be heard: The total
number of landowners to be heard could delay the
project further. In the present case, 12,868
30
landowners would need to be heard, significantlydelaying the project. Only 140 landowners are
before this Court (inclusive of both batches of civil
appeals @ special leave petitions), claiming they
were not heard before the issuance of notification
under Section 6 of the Act, whereas, the others have
accepted the escalated compensation of 64.7%
directed to be paid by the High Court in Kamal
Sharma. Thus, hearing all the landowners was
bound to unnecessarily delay the developmental
works of great importance without causing any real
prejudice to the large number of landowners and
would also lead to escalation of cost of development.
(viii) That there was sufficient material before the State
Government to justify the invocation of urgency clause, and
there was no malice on part of the State Government in
invoking the same. Stress was laid upon the observations
made in Nand Kishore, wherein it was held that the
executive’s subjective satisfaction in dispensing with the
enquiry under Section 5-A can be subjected to judicial review
only on the grounds of insufficient material to justify
31
dispensing with the enquiry or malice in the impugned action,neither of these elements exist in the present case.
(ix) That the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case
of Shyoraj Singh clearly erred while relying upon the case of
Radhy Shyam to hold that the acquisition notifications are
bad in law and that the urgency clause was wrongly invoked.
That Radhy Shyam is not applicable to the lands acquired
for integrated planned development project at hand and is
clearly distinguishable on facts as the said judgment was
passed in the context of an acquisition for private purposes,
serving private interests and the chunk of land was acquired
in a standalone exercise for development of residential,
commercial and industrial projects, unlike the present case
where the acquisition is being done in the national interest
for a project meant to create public infrastructure of huge
magnitude. In this regard, it was submitted that Nand
Kishore was distinguished in Radhy Shyam in the following
terms: –
“76. In Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. [(2010) 10 SCC
282] the acquisition was upheld because the land was
urgently needed for construction of Yamuna Expressway and
by the time the matter was decided by this Court, huge
amount had been spent on the project. As against this, the
exercise of power under Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4) for the32
acquisition of land for residential, industrial and commercial
purposes, construction of sewage treatment plant and
district jails was held to be legally impermissible in Raja
Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. [AIR 1967 SC 1081 :
(1967) 1 SCR 373] , Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of
Maharashtra [(1977) 1 SCC 133 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 49] , Om
Prakash v. State of U.P. [(1998) 6 SCC 1] , Union of India v.
Krishan Lal Arneja [(2004) 8 SCC 453] , Essco Fabs (P) Ltd.
v. State of Haryana [(2009) 2 SCC 377 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ)
537] , Babu Ram v. State of Haryana [(2009) 10 SCC 115 :
(2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 69] and Anand Singh v. State of U.P.
[(2010) 11 SCC 242 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 423].”
(x) That this Court in Natthi v. State of U.P. & Ors.21 and
Narendra Road Lines Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP and
Others22, has dismissed the SLPs preferred against the
judgments passed by the Allahabad High Court in the self-
same acquisition while relying on the law laid down in Nand
Kishore, wherein it was held that the acquisition in question
in District Gautam Budh Nagar through YEIDA is for planned
development and the subject lands are contiguous to the land
parcels, which were acquired for the purpose of residential,
industrial, amusement, etc. along with Yamuna Expressway.
(xi) The attention of the Court was also drawn to the fact that the
SLP in Natthi v. State of U.P. & Ors.23 was dismissed on 9th
21 SLP(C) No. 014705-014710 of 2011
22 SLP(C) No. 17808 of 2010
23
(Supra, Note 22)
33
May, 2011, just a month after the decision of Radhy Shyam
which was delivered on 15th April, 2011.
(xii) That another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
the case of Yogesh Kumar v. State of U.P.24 considered the
applicability of Radhy Shyam on invocation of urgency
clause for planned development through YEIDA, and vide
judgment dated 1st March, 2013, it was held that in view of
judgment in Natthi v. State of U.P. Thru. Secr. Industrial
Devp. & Ors.25, the decision in Radhy Shyam will have no
application on the present acquisition. The decision of
Allahabad High Court in Yogesh Kumar was also affirmed by
this Court while dismissing the SLP26 by a Bench presided
over by Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Singhvi (who authored
Radhy Shyam) vide order dated 23rd September, 2013.
(xiii) That it was correctly held by the Division Bench of Allahabad
High Court in Kamal Sharma that the right of the tenure
holders to object against the acquisition provided under
Section 5-A of the Act cannot be said to be a fundamental
24 CMWP No.10782/2013, hereinafter referred to as ‘Yogesh Kumar’
25 Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010, hereinafter referred to as ‘Natthi’
26
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. CC 16505/2013
34
right or a right akin to fundamental right protected by the
Constitution of India.
(xiv) That the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
Kamal Sharma has meticulously reviewed the material on
record, and held that the same justified the invocation of the
urgency clause, recording its conclusions as follows:
(a) The lands of nine villages were acquired through
different notifications issued over a span of two years
between 26th February, 2009 to 22nd March, 2011.
(b) Majority of the declaration notifications were issued
in a gap of 3 to 4 months.
(c) It was specifically mentioned in the Certificate of the
Collector that the acquisition of different parcels of
land was being proposed as contiguous part of the
project. If an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A
of the Act was granted, the same would have resulted
in legal proceedings and eventual non-availability of
contiguous land which would have hampered the
execution of the integrated project in a time bound
manner. The original record of the State provides
categorical statements to this effect.
35
(d) The aforesaid decision was taken on account of the
enormousness of the project in question and the area
of the land sought to be acquired.
He thus urged that the Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court, therefore, rightly held that the invocation of the
urgency clause was not a mechanical exercise and was
undertaken pursuant to the subjective satisfaction of the
State Government being arrived at after due application of
mind to material available on record.
(xv) That the judgment in Shyoraj Singh does not lay down good
law and is liable to be set aside, since it failed to take note of
the earlier Division Bench decisions of the Allahabad High
Court in the cases of Natthi27, Narendra Road Lines Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Others28 and Yogesh Kumar29,
wherein the validity of self-same land acquisition for
integrated planned development by YEIDA was upheld.
Ignoring an earlier judicial precedent rendered by a Bench
presided by co-equal number of judges and taking a totally
27 Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010
28 Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29682 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as ‘Narendra Road
Lines’
29 supra
36
contrary view itself amounts to a fundamental error rendering
the subsequent view per incuriam as held in case of Karnail
Singh v. State of Haryana30.
(xvi) That there is no pre or post notification delay in the present
acquisition inasmuch as there are only three notifications,
where a period of nearly one year has been consumed in
issuing the Section 6 notification. For other seven
notifications, Section 6 notification was issued within two to
four months.
Learned Solicitor General concluded his submissions urging
that it is now futile to oppose the acquisition, particularly when the
same is unequivocally accepted by all except a few, inasmuch as the
majority of the landowners have accepted the enhanced
compensation without raising any further challenge to the
acquisition. Learned Solicitor General urged that the entire process
was wholly transparent and that there was pressing necessity for
acquisition of lands, considering the public purpose involved. He
thus implored the Court to accept the appeals filed by the YEIDA
and dismiss the appeals filed by the landowners.
30 (2009) 8 SCC 539
37
27. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
advanced at bar and have gone through the impugned judgments and
the material placed on record.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS: –
28. The issues which arises for our consideration in the present
batches of appeal are as follows: –
(i) Whether the present acquisition is a part of the
integrated development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway”
undertaken by respondent No.3-YEIDA?
(ii) Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of
the Act was legal and justified in the instant case,
thereby justifying the decision of the State
Government to dispense with the enquiry under
Section 5-A of the Act?
(iii) Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating
the questioned acquisition while relying upon Nand
Kishore lays down the correct proposition of law or
whether the Division Bench in the case of Shyoraj
Singh was justified in applying the principles laid
38
down in Radhy Shyam and quashing the acquisitionproceedings in question?
29. Before adverting to the above issues, we may take note of the
fact that the State Government had formulated a “Policy for Planned
Development along the Taj Expressway31” and the notification to this
effect was issued by the Infrastructure & Industrial Development
Commissioner, Government of Uttar Pradesh on 29th December, 2007.
The Policy dealt with the formation of Special Development Zone32 and
the development thereof. As per clause 3.2 of the said Policy, the land
use of SDZ is divided in the following terms: –
“3.2. Land use of SDZ (special development zone)
The permissible break-up of the total land area under SDZ for
different activities shall be as under:
%age of total area of SDZ
A. Core Activity Sports Not less than 35%
(including road & open spaces)B. Other activities
(i) Commercial Not more than 20%
(ii) Institutional & amenities Not less than 5%
(iii)Roads, open and Not less than 25%
Circulation areas
(iv) Residential including Not less than 15%
Group Housing and
Plotted Development
Area ”31
In short, ‘Policy’
32 In short ‘SDZ’.
39
30. A bare perusal of the aforesaid clause makes it clear that while
the development of roads and open spaces which was to constitute
35% of the land area was considered to be the core activity, the allied
activities such as commercial, institutional & amenities, roads, open
and circulation areas, residential including group housing and plotted
development areas were to constitute the remaining 65% of the land
under the SDZ. Hence, undeniably, the authorities were required to
develop the entire SDZ in an integrated manner. This aspect was
precisely taken note of by this Court in the case of Nand Kishore. The
relevant extracts from the judgment of Nand Kishore are reproduced
hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference: –
“57. The Expressway is a work of immense public importance.
The State gains advantages from the construction of an
expressway and so does the general public. Creation of a
corridor for fast-moving traffic resulting into curtailing the
travelling time, as also the transport of the goods, would be
some factors which speak in favour of the Project being for the
public purpose. Much was stated about the 25 million sq m of
land being acquired for the five parcels of land. In fact, in our
opinion, as has rightly been commented upon by the High
Court, the creation of the five zones for industry, residence,
amusement, etc. would be complementary to the creation of the
Expressway.
58. It cannot be forgotten that the creation of land parcels
would give impetus to the industrial development of the State
creating more jobs and helping the economy and thereby
helping the general public. There can be no doubt that the
implementation of the Project would result in coming into
existence of five developed parcels/centres in the State for the
use of the citizens. There shall, thus, be the planned
development of this otherwise industrially backward area. The
creation of these five parcels will certainly help the maximum
utilisation of the Expressway and the existence of an40
Expressway for the fast-moving traffic would help the industrial
culture created in the five parcels. Thus, both will be
complimentary to each other and can be viewed as parts of an
integral scheme. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is not a
public purpose.”
31. Learned counsel for the landowners sought to draw a
distinction, urging that Nand Kishore only dealt with the issue as to
whether the acquisition was for public purpose and not with the issue
as to whether the invocation of the urgency clause for commercial,
residential, industrial purpose was justified. However, we are of the
view that this contention is bereft of merit as no such distinction is
permissible.
32. The core question which requires this Court’s consideration is
whether the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of
Shyoraj Singh was justified in relying upon Radhy Shyam, so as to
quash the acquisition notification pertaining to the development of the
land adjoining the Yamuna Expressway. The relevant extracts from
Radhy Shyam which are reproduced supra would make it clear that
in the said case, this Court was considering a controversy relating to
the land acquisition for the purpose of planned industrial development
in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial
Development Authority. Hence, the project did not contemplate a
planned and integrated development of an Expressway and the
41
adjoining areas. It was a standalone project pertaining to the
development in industrial Gautam Budh Nagar. However, it cannot
be gainsaid that Yamuna Expressway is a vital heartline providing
access to millions of commuters from National Capital Delhi to Agra.
The Expressway also connects the prestigious upcoming Jewar Airport
to adjoining areas. To assume that the Yamuna Expressway is a
simple highway without any scope for simultaneous development of
the adjoining lands for commercial, residential and other such
activities would be unconceivable. A project of such magnitude and
enormity would definitely require the involvement of the adjoining
areas which would lead to an overall development of the State of Uttar
Pradesh at large.
33. As observed above, the purpose behind the acquisition was
unquestionably the integrated development of lands abutting the
Yamuna Expressway. The acquisition of the lands for the Expressway
could not be isolated or separated from the acquisition of the abutting
lands. This was precisely held in the case of Nand Kishore.
34. It may be noted that the entire edifice of Shyoraj Singh is based
on Radhy Shyam, wherein a two-Judge Bench of this Court decided
the controversy arising from land acquisition pertaining to the planned
industrial development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar. Another
42
Division Bench of this Court considered the acquisition pertaining to
the Yamuna Expressway in the case of Natthi. Placing reliance on
Nand Kishore, the Division Bench of the same composition as in
Radhy Shyam vide order dated 9th May, 2011 rejected the special
leave petition(s) laying challenge to the invocation of the urgency
clause in the self-same acquisition proceedings.
35. Much stress was laid by the learned counsel for the landowners
on the issue that the Division Bench while deciding the impugned
judgment in the case of Kamal Sharma could not have taken a
different view from Shyoraj Singh and if at all, there was any doubt
on the correctness of the view taken in Shyoraj Singh, then, the
question of law was mandatorily required to be referred to a larger
Bench. We feel that the said argument is fallacious on the fact of it.
Much prior to Shyoraj Singh’s decision, three different Division
Benches of the Allahabad High Court by detailed judgments in the
cases of Natthi, Narendra Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar had
already affirmed the validity of invocation of the urgency clause in the
land acquisition notifications for the integrated development plan of
‘Yamuna Expressway’ by respondent No.3-YEIDA. It is trite to mention
that in Shyoraj Singh, the Division Bench failed to consider the
earlier Division Bench judgments in the cases of Natthi, Narendra
43
Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar. In this background, the view taken
by the Division Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh is per incuriam,
rather than that in Kamal Sharma.
36. At the cost of repetition, it may be mentioned that the Division
Bench judgments rendered by the Allahabad High Court in the cases
of Natthi, Narendra Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar have been
affirmed by this Court with the dismissal of SLPs assailing the
impugned judgments in those cases.
CONCLUSION
37. In the wake of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in
holding that the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court correctly
interpreted the legal position while deciding the batch of writ petitions
in the case of Kamal Sharma and the judgment in the case of
Shyoraj Singh does not lay down the correct proposition of law.
38. The issues framed above are answered in the following terms:
(i) Whether the present acquisition is part of the integrated
development plan of the ‘Yamuna Expressway’ undertaken by
respondent No. 3-YEIDA?
• Yes, the present acquisition forms part of the integrated
development plan for the Yamuna Expressway initiated by
44
YEIDA. As observed in the case of Nand Kishore, the
development of land parcels for industrial, residential, and
recreational purposes is complementary to the construction
of the Yamuna Expressway. The objective of the acquisition
is to integrate land development with the Yamuna
Expressway’s construction, thereby promoting overall
growth serving the public interest. Consequently, the
Expressway and the development of adjoining lands are
considered to be inseparable components of the overall
project.
(ii) Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act
was legal and warranted in the instant case, thereby justifying the
Government’s decision to dispense with the inquiry under Section
5-A of the Act?
• Yes, the invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, was legal and justified in this case.
The urgency clause was applied in accordance with the
planned development of the Yamuna Expressway, as held in
Nand Kishore.
(iii) Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Kamal Sharma while relying on Nand Kishore lays
45
down the correct proposition of law, or whether the Division Bench
in Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles laid
down in Radhy Shyam and quashing the acquisition proceedings
in question?
• The view expounded by the Division Bench in Kamal
Sharma, which relied upon Nand Kishore, sets forth the
correct proposition of law, and the judgment of the High
Court in Shyoraj Singh, which relied on Radhy Shyam, did
not present a correct legal interpretation. The judgment in
Shyoraj Singh is set aside as it does not lay down good law
and was passed while overlooking at the earlier precedents,
rendering it per incuriam.
39. The High Court while deciding Kamal Sharma extensively
considered the factual matrix and also examined the original records
of the State Government to arrive at the satisfaction that the
invocation of the urgency clause was absolutely justified with regard
to the acquisition in question. The High Court also exhaustively
considered the entire sequence of judicial pronouncements in respect
of the acquisition in question before arriving at the aforesaid
conclusion and acted in an equitable manner while affirming the
acquisition proceedings and directing the grant of additional
46
compensation. We appreciate the endeavour made by the High Court
to resolve the controversy objectively and equitably and grant our full
imprimatur to the judgment in Kamal Sharma.
40. Now, we are called upon to consider as to whether the escalated
compensation formula as arrived at by the Division Bench of the High
Court in the case of Kamal Sharma would subserve the ends of
justice or the landowners whose lands have been acquired would be
entitled to better compensation.
41. It is pertinent to note that the overwhelming majority of
landowners have refrained from seeking judicial intervention in this
matter, as manifested by the fact that only 140 out of 12,868
landowners(covered in both batches of civil appeals @ special leave
petitions) have opted to challenge the acquisition by approaching this
Court. This indicates that the majority of the landowners have
accepted the escalated compensation granted by the High Court in
Kamal Sharma.
42. This Court, in the cases of Savitri Devi v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others33, Sahara India Commercial Corporation
Limited and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh34, and Noida
33 (2015) 7 SCC 21
34 (2017) 11 SCC 339
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Industrial Development Authority v. Ravindra Kumar and
Others35, despite holding the invocation of the urgency clause under
Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act to be illegal, nonetheless upheld
the acquisition proceedings and directed enhancement of
compensation so as to compensate the land owners. However, in the
present case, we have concluded that the action of the State in
invocation of the urgency clause is in consonance with the law.
43. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, while
delivering its decision in Kamal Sharma has already granted
additional compensation of 64.7% to the landowners, to be offered as
‘No Litigation Bonus’ in consonance with the Government order dated
4th November, 2015, thus there is no scope to direct further
enhancement in compensation.
44. In light of the Government order dated 4th November, 2015 and
the precedents set in Savitri Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh36 and
Yamuna Expressway Industrial Authority v. Shakuntla
Education and Welfare Society37, it is directed that 64.7%
enhancement in compensation shall apply in rem, ensuring uniform
benefits to all affected landowners under the present land acquisition.
35 (2022) 13 SCC 468
36 supra
37(2022) SCC OnLine SC 655
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45. The question of non-issuance of the final award and its effect
on the acquisition is left open ensuring that any affected party would
retain the right to challenge or seek appropriate remedy on this
specific issue independently, in accordance with law.
46. As a result of the above discussion, the appeals filed by the
landowners i.e. Batch No. 1, are dismissed, and the appeals filed by
YEIDA i.e. Batch No. 2, are hereby allowed.
47. No order as to costs.
48. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
………………….……….J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
………………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
New Delhi;
November 26, 2024.
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