Legally Bharat

Allahabad High Court

Kamlesh Kumar vs State Of Up And 2 Others on 2 September, 2024

Author: Rajeev Misra

Bench: Rajeev Misra





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:142683
 
Court No. - 77
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 10880 of 2024
 

 
Applicant :- Kamlesh Kumar
 
Opposite Party :- State Of Up And 2 Others
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Sushil Kumar
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Avdhesh Narayan Tiwari,G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J.
 

1. Heard Mr. Tarun Jha, Advocate, holding brief of Mr. Sushil Kumar, the learned counsel for applicant, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Avdhesh Narayan Tiwari, the learned counsel representing opposite party-2.

2. Perused the record.

3. Applicant-Kamlesh Kumar, who is a charge sheeted accused, has approached this Court by means of present application with the following prayer:-

“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to quash the summoning order dated 17.04.2023 and entire proceedings including charge sheet dated 28.12.2015 of Case No. 2261 of 2023 (State Versus Kamlesh Kumar) arising out of Case Crime No. 1197 of 2015, under Sections 308,323,452,504,506 I.P.C, Police Station- Kotwali Orai, District-Jalaun pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Jalaun at orai on the basis of compromise between the parties /or pass any other suitable and proper order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.

It is, further prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to stay the further proceedings of Case No. 2261 of 2023 (State Versus Kamlesh Kumar) arising out of Case Crime No. 1197 of 2015, under Sections 308,323,452,504,506 I.P.C, Police Station-Kotwali Orai, District-Jalaun pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Jalaun at orai, on the basis of compromise between the parties, during the pendency of this application, otherwise the applicant shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.”

3. Record shows that during the pendency of aforementioned criminal case, parties have amicably settled their dispute outside the Court. On the basis of settlement so arrived at between the parties, a compromise deed dated 02.02.2024 was drawn. Subsequently, an application has been filed before Court below with the prayer that the criminal case pending against applicant be decided in terms of compromise so entered into by the parties. Photo copy of the same has been brought on record as Annexure-8 to the affidavit.

4. Present application came up for admission on 10.06.2024 and this Court passed the following order:-

“1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned counsel for the informant, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.

2. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the proceedings of the impugned summoning order dated 17.04.2023 and entire proceedings including charge-sheet dated 28.12.2015 of Case No.2261 of 2023 (State Vs. Kamlesh Kumar) arising out of Case Crime No.1197 of 2015, under Sections 308, 323, 452, 504, 506 I.P.C., P.S.- Kotwali Orai, District- Jalaun, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai on the basis of the compromise between the parties.

4. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that both the parties have entered into compromise.

5. Learned counsel for the informant does not dispute with the compromise entered into between the parties.

6. Let the original record of the compromise deed be sent to the Court below for its verification and the Court below after verifying the same will send a report to this Court on or before the date fixed in the matter.

7. Put up this case on 25.07.2024, as fresh.

8. Till the next date of listing, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant.”

4. Pursuant to above order dated 10.06.2024, Court below has duly verified the compromise, vide order dated 21.06.2024. Subsequently, Court below has transmitted the report dated 16.07.2024 regarding verification of the compromise entered into by the parties.

5. On the above premise, the learned counsel for applicant submits that the dispute between the parties is a purely private dispute and not against state. During the pendency of criminal proceedings, referred to above, parties have amicably settled their dispute outside the Court. On the basis of above settlement, arrived at between the parties, compromise deed was filed before Court below, which has been verified by Court below. As such, the compromise entered into by the parties has been acted upon. It is then contended by the learned counsel for applicant that the dispute between the parties is a purely private dispute and not against state. Since the parties have entered into a compromise, the chances of conviction of applicant, who is a charge sheeted accused, are not only remote but also bleak. On the above conspectus, learned counsel for applicant thus submits that no useful purpose shall be served in prolonging the criminal prosecution of applicant. He, therefore, contends that present application is liable to be allowed.

6. Per contra, the learned Learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Avdhesh Narayan Tiwari, the learned counsel representing opposite party-2 have no objection to the prayer made by the learned counsel for applicant. They submit that once the first informant-opposite party-2 has himself entered into a compromise with accused-applicant and has also been acted upon and verified by Court, they cannot have any grievance in terms of compromise so entered into by the parties.

7. Be that as it may, this Court is not unmindful of the following judgements of Apex Court:

i. B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC 675

ii. Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582

iii. Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[2008)9 SCC 677]

iv. Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others ( 2008) 16 SCC 1

v. Shiji @ Pappu and Others VS. Radhika and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 705

vi. Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303

vii. K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226

viii. Dimpey Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory through Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2013) 11 SCC 497

ix. Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab ( 2014) 6 SCC 466

x. Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and another (2014) 9 SCC 653

xi. Shlok Bhardwaj Vs. Runika Bhardwaj, (2015) 2 SCC 721

xii. C.B.I. Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389

xiii. C.B.I. Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 350

xiv. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641

xv. Anita Maria Dias and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2018) 3 SCC 290

xvi. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar and Another Vs. Union of India and others, (2018) 10 SCC, 443 (Constitution Bench)

xvii. State of M.P. VS. Dhruv Gurjar and Another, (2019) 5 SCC 570

xviii. State of M.P. V/s Laxmi Narayan & Ors., (2019) 5 SCC 688

xix. Rampal Vs. State of Haryana, AIR online 2019 SC 1716

xx. Arun Singh and Others VS. State of U.P. and Another (2020) 3 SCC 736

xxi. (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.), 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834

xxii. Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat, 2022 SCC Online 936.

xxiii. State of Kerala VS. Hafsal Rahman N.R., Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary Nos. 24362 of 2021.

wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be made between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non compoundable offences. However, Apex Court in State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra) held that no compromise can be made in respect of offences against society as they are not private in nature. Similarly in Ram Pal Vs. State of Haryana (Supra) it has been held that no compromise can be made in cases relating to rape and sexual assault. Recently, the Apex Court in Daxaben (supra) has held that no compromise can be made in matter under Section 306 IPC. In state of Kerala Vs. Hafsal Rahman (Supra), Court has held that no compromise can be entertained in matters under the POCSO Acts. Reference may also be made to the decision given by this Court in Shaifullah and others Vs. State of U.P. And another [2013 (83) ACC 278] in which the law expounded by the Apex court in some of the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.

Recently Apex court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur (Supra) has laid down the following guidelines with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings as well compromise in criminal proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10 of the report, which read as under:

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following propositions

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

Recently in Ramgopal and another (supra), Court has again reiterated the guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-

“18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.

19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.”

8. In State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra), the Apex Court held that mere mention of Section 307 IPC cannot be sole basis for not quashing the proceedings. Court has to examine whether the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence for framing of charge under Section 307 IPC. The Court has further required to examine the weapons used and nature of injury and whether injury has been inflicted on vital/delicate parts of the body, the previous antecedents of accused and whether they are absconding and how the compromise was got entered into by the parties are relevant factors, which must be considered. The above observations can be clearly delineated from the recital occurring in paragraphs 11 to 18 of the aforementioned report.

9. Having heard the learned counsel for applicants, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1, the learned counsel representing first informant-opposite party-2, upon perusal of record and in view of above and the observations made by the Apex Court as noted herein above, this Court finds that there does not exist any legal impediment in accepting the compromise entered into by the parties. In view of the compromise entered into by the parties, the chances of conviction of accused-applicant is remote and bleak. As such, no useful purpose shall be served in prolonging the criminal proceedings pending against accused-applicant.

10. In view of the discussion made above, the present application succeeds and is liable to be allowed.

11. It is, accordingly, allowed.

12. The entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 2261 of 2023 (State Versus Kamlesh Kumar), under Sections 308, 323, 452, 504, 506 IPC, Police Station- Kotwali Orai, District-Jalaun now pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai are, hereby, quashed.

Order Date :- 2.9.2024

Vinay

 

 

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