Patna High Court – Orders
Krishna Kumari Yadav vs The State Election Commission … on 22 November, 2024
Author: Nawneet Kumar Pandey
Bench: Nawneet Kumar Pandey
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.4137 of 2024
======================================================
Krishna Kumari Yadav wife of Ranveer Yadav, resident of Shambhavi
Sadarm, Bajrangbali, Tole-Chukti, P.O. Mansi, P.S. Mansi, District-Khagaria.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State Election Commission (Panchayat) Sone Bhawan, Birchand Patel
Path, Patna through the State Election Commissioner.
2. The State Election Commissioner, The State Election Commission
(Panchayat), Sone Bhawan, Birchand Patel Path, Patna.
3. The Officer on Special Duty, The State Election Commission (Panchayat),
Sone Bhawan, Birchand Patel Path, Patna.
4. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna.
5. The Additional Chief Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of
Bihar, Patna.
6. The District Magistrate cum District Election Officer (Panchayat), Khagaria,
District-Khagaria.
7. The Deputy Development Commissioner cum Chief Executive Officer,
Khagaria, District-Khagaria.
8. Smt. Nikita Kumari, wife of Deepak Kumar, Resident of Village-Saidpur,
P.O. Saidpur, P.S. Mansi, District-Khagaria.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. S.B.K. Manglam
Mr. Awnish Kumar
For the State Election Mr.Ravi Ranjan
Commission (Panchayat) Mr.Girish Pandey
For the State Mr. Kumar Alok, SC 7
For Zila Parishad Mr.Nikesh Kumar
For Respondent no.8 Mr.Amit Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Prashant Bhushan
Mr. Aditya Anand
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NAWNEET KUMAR
PANDEY
CAV ORDER
10 22-11-2024
I have already heard the learned counsel for the
parties.
2. The present writ application has been preferred by
the petitioner for quashing the order dated 12.01.2024 passed by
respondent no.2 in Case No.72 of 2023, for quashing the order
dated 21.02.2024 passed by respondent no.2 in Case No.13 of
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
2/21
2024, including directing the Respondents-Authorities for
reinstatement of the petitioner to the post of Adhyakash of Zila
Parishad, Khagaria, among other reliefs.
3. The petitioner Smt. Krishna Kumari Yadav was
elected as a member of Khagaria Zila Parishad on 4 th November,
2021. She was elected as the Adhyaksh of the Zila Parishad,
Khagaria on 28.12.2021. She was convicted on 07.10.2023 by
the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-1st, Khagaria in
Khagaria P.S.Case No. 637 of 2005 under Section 387/120(B) of
the IPC. Her husband was also convicted under the same
sections of the IPC. The petitioner and her husband were
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and
a fine of Rs. 10,000/- was also imposed on them.
4. Since the conviction was for a period of more than
six months, the State Election Commissioner (respondent no.2)
declared her as disqualified vide order dated 12.01.2024, under
the provisions of Section 136(1)(g) of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act,
2006, hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act of 2006’. This
order was passed on the application of respondent no.8 Smt.
Nikita Kumari. Her application was registered as Case No. 72 of
2023.
Section 136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of 2006’ is being
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
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extracted hereinbelow:-
“136 Disqualification for Membership._(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
a person shall be disqualified for election or
after election for holding the post as Mukhiya,
member of the Gram Panchayat, Sarpanch,
Panch of the Gram Katchahri, member of the
Panchayat Samit and member of Zila Parishad,
if such person-
…….(g) has been sentenced by a criminal
court whether within or out of India to
imprisonment for an offence, other than a
political offence, for a term exceeding six
months or has been ordered to furnish security
for good behavior under Section 109 or Section
110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Act 2, 1974) and such sentence or order not
having subsequently been reversed”.
5. Against the order of conviction and sentence, the
petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No.18 of 2023 in the court
of Sessions Judge, Khagaria, which is still pending. Prior to
filing of the said criminal appeal, a petition for interim bail and
suspension of sentence was moved by the petitioner before the
learned trial court. The learned trial court allowed the
application. Accordingly, the petitioner furnished the interim
bail bond, which was later on confirmed by the appellate court.
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Since only sentence was suspended, and not the conviction, the
petitioner filed an application before the appellate court on
19.10.2023 with a prayer to stay the conviction. The appellate
court (Sessions Judge, Khagaria) rejected that application on
02.12.2023. Being aggrieved by that order, the petitioner
preferred Cr.Misc.No. 406 of 2024 before this Court. The
coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 31.01.2024,
stayed the conviction of the petitioner till the next date of
hearing which was 11.03.2024, but the coordinate Bench
vacated the stay order dated 31.01.2024, vide order 17.05.2024.
While vacating the order of stay against the conviction, the
coordinate Bench of this Court observed that at the time of
hearing on the stay application on 31.01.2024, it was argued by
the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner would
stand disqualified had the order not been stayed, but as a matter
of fact, she was already disqualified vide order dated 12.01.2024
passed by the State Election Commissioner. Being aggrieved by
the order vacating the stay, the petitioner preferred Special
Leave to Appeal (Crl) No.7964/2024 before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court pleased to stay the
operation of the order, whereby the stay was vacated.
6. It is pertinent to mention here that when the
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coordinate Bench granted the stay on conviction of the
petitioner, vide order dated 31.01.2024, the petitioner filed an
application before respondent no.3 to recall/ review the order of
her disqualification dated 12.01.2024. That application was
registered as Case No. 13 of 2024, but that application was
rejected by respondent no.2, vide order dated 21.02.2024 and
while rejecting the application, the respondent no.2 observed
that he has no jurisdiction to review/recall his earlier order,
since ‘the Act of 2006’ does not make a provision for
review/recall of the order.
7. Mr. S.B.K.Mangalam, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that the order of the coordinate Bench,
vacating the stay, has subsequently been stayed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, meaning thereby the conviction is inoperative
till date. His further submission is that if a candidate is
disqualified only because he is convicted and sentenced for a
period of more than six months and the conviction is stayed by a
superior court, the disqualification does not remain operative
and the candidate is entitled to be reinstated.
8. Mr. Mangalam next submitted that a coordinate
Bench of this Court in case of Hira Lal Sah Vs. The State
Election Commission (Panchayat) and others 2010 (2) PLJR
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page 505 has held that if the sentence is suspended in appeal, it
means that there is no sentence. If there is no sentence, then
Section 136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of 2006’ does not come into play.
In the same decision, the co-ordinate Bench has held that the
State Election Commissioner if possesses the power of
disqualification, it implies that he has also power to recall that
order. The learned counsel also relied on the decision of Navjot
Singh Sidhu Vs. The State of Punjab and another, reported in
(2007) 2 SCC page 574 = 2007(1) PLJR (SC) page 329, which
was considered in Hira Lal Sah (supra).
9. In the case of Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra), the
elected member of Lok Sabha was disqualified due to his
conviction, but his conviction was stayed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. The similar provision is also there in Section 8
of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter to be
referred to as ‘the Act of 1951’). The relevant portion of
Section 8 of ‘the Act of 1951’ is being extracted herein under:-
“8. Disqualification on conviction for
certain offences–*** and sentence to
imprisonment for not less than six months, shall
be disqualified from the date of such conviction
and shall continue to be disqualified for a
further period of six years since his release.
(3) A person convicted of any offence
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
7/21and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than
two years [other than any offence referred to in
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)] shall be
disqualified from the date of such conviction and
shall continue to be disqualified for a further
period of six years since his release…….”
10. In case of Hira Lal Sah (supra) the Hon’ble
coordinate Bench held that the provision of ‘the Act of 2006’ is
pari materia with the provision of Section 8 of ‘the Act of 1951’
which was under consideration in Navjot Singh Sidhu’s case
(supra).
11. Mr. Mangalam, the learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted further that it has been held in the case of
Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra) that generally criminal appellate
court does not stay the conviction invoking its jurisdiction under
Section 389(1) of the CrPC, but it does not mean that the
appellate court is not vested with the power of granting stay
against conviction.
12. The relevant portion of para-4 of Navjot Singh
Sidhu’s Case (supra) is being extracted hereinbelow:-
“4. Before proceeding further it may be seen
whether there is any provision which may
enable the Court to suspend the order of
conviction as normally what is suspended is the
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
8/21execution of the sentence. Sub-section (1) of
Section 389 says that pending any appeal by a
convicted persons, the appellate court may, for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order
that the execution of the sentence or order
appealed against be suspended and, also, if he
is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or
on his own bond. This sub-section confers
power not only to suspend the execution of
sentence and to grant bail but also to suspend
the operation of the order appealed against
which means the order of conviction. This
question has been examined in considerable
detail by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Rama Narang v Ramesh Narang and Ahmadi,
C.J., speaking for the Court, held as under
(para 19 of the reports): (SCC p. 527)
“19. That takes us to the question whether
the scope of Section 389(1) of the Code extends
to conferring power on the appellate court to
stay the operation of the order of conviction. As
stated earlier, if the order of conviction is to
result in some disqualification of the type
mentioned in Section 267 of the Companies Act,
we see no reason why we should 30 give a
narrow meaning to Section 389(1) of the Code
to debar the court from granting an order to
that effect in a fit case. The appeal under
Section 374 is essentially against the order of
conviction because the order of sentence is
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
9/21merely consequential thereto; albeit even the
order of sentence can be independently
challenged if it is harsh and disproportionate to
the established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal
is preferred under Section 374 of the Code the
appeal is against both the conviction and
sentence and therefore, we see no reason to
place a narrow interpretation on Section 389(1)
of the Code not to extend it to an order of
conviction, although that issue in the instant
case recedes to the background because High
Courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code if the power was not to
be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench
of the High Court of Bombay was not right in
holding that the Delhi High Court could not
have exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code if it was confronted with a situation of
there being no other provision in the Code for
staying the operation of the order of conviction.
In a fit case if the High Court feels satisfied
that the order of conviction needs to be
suspended or stayed so that the convicted
person does not suffer from a certain
disqualification provided for in any other
statute, it may exercise the power because
otherwise the damage done cannot be undone;
the disqualification incurred by Section 267 of
the Companies Act and given effect to cannot be
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
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undone at a subsequent date if the conviction is
set aside by the appellate court. But while
granting a stay or suspension of the order of
conviction the Court must examine the pros and
cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made
out for grant of such an order, it may do so and
in so doing it may, if it considers it appropriate,
impose such conditions as are considered
appropriate to protect the interest of the
shareholders and the business of the company.
5. The aforesaid view has recently been
reiterated and followed by another three-Judge
Bench in Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S.
Bagali. After referring to the decisions on the
issue viz. State of T.N. v. A. Jaganathan, K.C.
Sareen v. CBI, B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N and
State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan, this Court
concluded (SCC p. 681, para 16.5)
“16.5. All these decisions, while recognizing
the power to stay conviction, have cautioned
and clarified that such power should be
exercised only in exceptional circumstances
where failure to stay the conviction would lead
to injustice and irreversible consequences.”
13. From perusal the above-noted decision of Hon’ble
the Supreme Court, it is clear that the criminal appellate court is
vested with the power to grant stay also on the conviction and
not only against the sentence. So, if the sentence is stayed and
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
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conviction is also stayed, it means that the conviction and
sentence both are rendered in an inoperative and dormant state.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ravikant S Patil
(2007) 1 SCC 673 has though recognized the power of criminal
appellate court to grant stay on the conviction, but cautioned
that such power should be exercised only in exceptional
circumstances.
14. Mr. Mangalam, the learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted further that the effect and consequence of
the stay on conviction has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Lok Prahari Vs. Election Commission of
India and others reported in (2018) 18 SCC 114 and also in
case of Rama Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang and others, (1995)
2 SCC 513. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lok
Prahari (supra) has held that once the conviction has been
stayed by the appellate court, the disqualification cannot remain
in effect. Para-16 of this judgment is being extracted
hereinbelow:-
“16. These decisions have settled the position
on the effect of an order of an appellate court
staying a conviction pending the appeal. Upon
the stay of a conviction under Section 389 CrPC,
the disqualification under Section 8 will not
operate. The decisions in Ravikant S. Patil and
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
12/21Lily Thomas conclude the issue. Since the
decision in Rama Narang, it has been well settled
that the appellate court has the power, in an
appropriate case, to stay the conviction under
Section 389 besides suspending the sentence. The
power to stay a conviction is by way of an
exception. Before it is exercised, the appellate
court must be made aware of the consequence
which will ensue if the conviction were not to be
stayed. Once the conviction has been stayed by
the appellate court, the disqualification under
sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 will not
operate. Under Article 102(1)(e) and Article
191(1)(e), the disqualification operates by or
under any law made by Parliament.
Disqualification under the above provisions of
Section 8 follows upon a conviction for one of the
listed offences. Once the conviction has been
stayed during the pendency of an appeal, the
disqualification which operates as a consequence
of the conviction cannot take or remain in effect.
In view of the consistent statement of the legal
position in Rama Narang and in decisions which
followed, there is no merit in the submission that
the power conferred on the appellate court under
Section 389 does not include the power, in an
appropriate case, to stay the conviction. Clearly,
the appellate court does possess such a power.
Moreover, it is untenable that the disqualification
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
13/21which ensues from a conviction will operate
despite the appellate court having granted a stay
of the conviction. The authority vested in the
appellate court to stay a conviction ensures that a
conviction on untenable or frivolous grounds
does not operate to cause serious prejudice. As
the decision in Lily Thomas has clarified, a stay
of the conviction would relieve the individual
from suffering the consequence inter alia of a
disqualification relatable to the provisions of sub-
sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8.”
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rama
Narang (supra) has also considered the effect of stay of
conviction on disqualification. It has been held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that if the conviction is stayed, the
disqualification is not operative because the continuation of the
disqualification shall cause damage to the candidate. The
relevant portion of para-19 of the said case is being extracted
hereinbelow:-
“……In a fit case if the High Court feels
satisfied that the order of conviction needs to
be suspended or stayed so that the convicted
person does not suffer from a certain
disqualification provided for in any other
statute, it may exercise the power because
otherwise the damage done cannot be undone;
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
14/21the disqualification incurred by Section 267 of
the Companies Act and given effect to cannot
be undone at a subsequent date if the
conviction is set aside by the Appellate Court.
But while granting a stay of (sic or)
suspension of the order of conviction the Court
must examine the pros and cons and if it feels
satisfied that a case is made out for grant of
such an order, it may do so and in so doing it
may, if it considers it appropriate, impose such
conditions as are considered appropriate to
protect the interest of the shareholders and the
the business of the company…..”
16. Mr. Ravi Ranjan, the learned Counsel for the
Respondent-State Election Commission has submitted that the
impugned orders dated 12.01.2024 passed in Case No. 72 of
2023 and 21.02.2024 passed in Case No. 13 of 2024 by the
State Election Commission are based on the disqualification of
the petitioner due to her conviction and sentence for more than
six months. He submitted further that bare perusal of Section
136(1) (g) of ‘the Act of 2006’ clarifies that the convict
becomes disqualified as soon as he/she is convicted and
sentenced for a period of more than six months. The
disqualification cannot be wiped out/obliterated merely because
the stay has been granted on conviction. The learned counsel
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submitted that the phrase used in Section 136(1)(g) of ‘the Act
of 2006’ “…such sentence or order not having been
reversed” clarifies that unless the order of conviction and
sentence is reversed, the disqualification attached to the
conviction and sentence shall continue. The disqualification
shall only be wiped out on reversion of conviction and sentence.
He next submitted that under Section 386(c) (i) of the CrPC
only, the criminal appellate court can reverse the sentence. In
the present case, the appeal of the petitioner is still pending
before the Sessions Judge, Khagaria and till date the conviction
and sentence has not been reversed, so the disqualification of
the petitioner attached to the conviction cannot be wiped out.
The further submission of the learned counsel is that Section
136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of 2006’ is within the legislative
competence and this provision has been held intra vires in the
case of Manoj Bind @ Manoj Kumar Bind Vs. The State of
Bihar and others [(2009) 4 PLJR 35] and also in the case of
Tapendra Kumar Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others (2020
SCC OnLine Pat 4234). His further submission is that the
legislative wing of the State in its wisdom had enacted this
provision with an intent to oust a person of criminal background
from holding the post in Panchayat and if the disqualification is
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wiped out due to stay of conviction, the legislative intent shall
be rendered otiose. He has also submitted that there is no
provision of review/recall of the order promulgated by the State
Election Commissioner, as such, he could not recall or review
his earlier order.
17. Mr. Amit Shrivastava, the learned senior counsel
for respondent no.8 is in agreement with the submissions of the
learned counsel for the Respondent-State Election Commission
He also submitted that bare perusal of Section 136(1) (g) of ‘the
Act of 2006’ shows that the legislative intent is to disqualify a
candidate on his (the candidate’s) conviction and sentence for a
period of more than six months and disqualification continues
till its reversion by the appellate court. He submitted further that
the criminal appeal preferred by the petitioner is still pending
and the conviction and sentence is not reversed by the appellate
court till date, consequently the petitioner is disqualified as per
the provision of Section 136(1) (g) of ‘the Act of 2006’. He also
submitted that the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court
in Hira Lal Sah’s case (supra) is per incuriam since it was in
utter disregard of two earlier decisions of the coordinate
Benches of this Court. The first decision is of Chandeshwari
Prasad Vs. State Election Commission and others reported in
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2005 (1) PLJR 560 and the second decision is of Md. Neyaz Vs.
The State of Bihar and others, reported in 2010 (2) PLJR 453.
18. From perusal of para-8 of Chandeshwari
Prasad’s case (supra) it appears that only sentence of the
accused (Chandeshwari Prasad) was suspended, and not the
conviction. Similar is the fact in Hira Lal Sah’s case (supra)
and in the case of Md. Neyaz Ahmad (supra).
19. The case of the present petitioner is quite
distinguishable from those cases. In the present case, the
conviction of the petitioner was stayed by the coordinate Bench
of this Court, vide order dated 31.01.2024 passed in
Cr.Misc.No. 406 of 2024. Subsequently, it was
withdrawn/vacated vide order dated 17.05.2024, but the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has been pleased to stay the operation of the
order dated 17.05.2024 passed by the coordinate Bench of this
Court. It means that the position prior to 17.05.2024 was
restored, so the order dated 31.01.2024 passed by the coordinate
Bench in Cr.Misc.No. 406 of 2024 becomes operative, when the
order dated 17.05.2024 was stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
20. Mr. Shrivastava, the learned Sr. Counsel for the
respondent no.8 has submitted further that the decision of Hira
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Lal Sah (supra) is based on the case of Navjot Singh Sidhu
(supra). The case of Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra) was relating to
Section 8 of ‘the Act of 1951’. The coordinate Bench, while
rendering the decision in Hira Lal Sah (supra) has observed that
the provision of Section 8 of ‘the Act of 1951’ is in pari
materia with Section 136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of 2006’. The learned
counsel submitted that the decision of Hira Lal Sah’s Case
(supra) is per incuriam on this score because Section 8 of ‘the
Act of 1951’ is not in pari materia with Section 136(1)(g) of
‘the Act of 2006’. The distinguishable feature between the
provisions of these two enactments is that Section 8(4) of ‘the
Act of 1951’ makes a special provision, by virtue of which the
disqualification on the basis of conviction under Section 8 of
‘the Act of 1951’ does not take effect immediately after
conviction. A grace period of three months (under Section 8(4)
of ‘the Act of 1951’) has been provided to the convict for
preferring the appeal. In these three months, the disqualification
shall not take effect and if the appeal/application or revision is
preferred against the conviction, the disqualification shall not
take effect until disposal of the appeal on the application. But
so far as Section 136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of 2006’ is concerned, it
takes effect immediately after conviction. There is no such grace
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
19/21
period in Section 136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of 2006’, similar to
Section 8(4) of ‘the Act of 1951’. As such, these two provisions
cannot be said to be in pari materia with each other.
21. I am not in agreement with the submissions of Mr.
Shrivastava, the learned senior counsel for respondent no.8
because Section 8(4) of ‘the Act of 1951’ has been declared
ultra vires in the case of Lily Thomas Vs. Union of India and
others [(2013) 7 SCC 653]. The reason for declaring it as ultra
vires is that according to Article 101 of the Constitution of India,
the seat of a convicted member becomes vacant on his
disqualification owing to conviction under Article 102(1) & (2)
of the Constitution of India. The parliament ignoring the
specific provision of the Constitution had enacted Section 8(4)
of the ‘the Act of 1951’, giving a grace period to a convicted
member for filing appeal. After declaring Section 8(4) of ‘the
Act of 1951’ as ultra vires, Section 136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of
2006’ and Section 8 of ‘the Act of 1951’ are in pari materia
with each other.
22. Section 8 of the ‘the Act of 1951’ and Section
136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of 2006’ both relate to disqualification of
a candidate on his conviction. So the basis of disqualification in
both these enactments are on similar ground i.e. the conviction
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
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and sentence for minimum period prescribed in these two
enactments are equal. Therefore, in my view, both the
provisions in these two enactments are in pari materia and the
ratio dicidendi of a decision in case of Section 8 of ‘the Act of
1951’ is applicable to the case of Section 136(1)(g) of ‘the Act
of 2006’.
23. So far as the submissions of the learned senior
counsel Mr. Amit Shrivastava for respondent no.8 and Mr. Ravi
Ranjan for the Respondent-State Election Commission
(Panchayat) that the disqualification of the petitioner can be
wiped out only on the reversion of the sentence by the appellate
court is concerned, I am not in agreement with their submissions
for the reasons that it is true that the condition precedent of
obliteration of disqualification is the reversion of conviction and
sentence by the appellate court, as provided under Section
136(1)(g) of ‘the Act of 2006’. Similarly, under Section 8 of ‘the
Act of 1951’, there is also condition precedent that
disqualification under Section 8 of ‘the Act of 1951’ shall
continue for a period of six years. The relevant portion of
Section 8(1) of ‘the Act of 1951’ is extracted hereinbelow:-
“…….and sentenced to imprisonment for not
less than six months, shall be disqualified from
the date of such conviction and shall continue
Patna High Court CWJC No.4137 of 2024(10) dt.22-11-2024
21/21to be disqualified for a further period of six
years since his release….”
24. So in both the enactments, there is condition
precedent for wiping out/obliteration of the disqualification.
25. The effect of the stay on conviction has already
been discussed in the case of Lok Prahari (supra) and Rama
Narang (supra). In these two cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that if the conviction is stayed, the disqualification
attached to the conviction goes.
26. On the basis of above-mentioned observation, the
order passed by respondent no.2 dated 12.01.2024 in Case No.
72 of 2023 as well as the order dated 21.02.2024 in Case No. 13
of 2024 are set aside. Accordingly, the writ application is
allowed and the petitioner is directed to be reinstated to the post,
from which she was removed.
27. Needless to say that this order shall be subject to
the final outcome of the Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.
7964/2024 pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(Nawneet Kumar Pandey, J)
HR/-
U