Supreme Court of India
Lalu Yadav vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 16 October, 2024
Author: C.T. Ravikumar
Bench: C.T. Ravikumar, Sanjay Karol
2024 INSC 782
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. of 2024
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
Lalu Yadav …Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. …Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
Leave granted.
1. The captioned Appeal is directed against the order
dated 26.07.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.
16825 of 2018. The said Writ Petition was filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking
quashment of FIR dated 21.02.2018 bearing Case Crime
No. 28 of 2018 registered under Sections 376 and 313 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the ‘IPC’) at Police
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by Dr.
Naveen Rawal
Date: 2024.10.16
Station Nandganj in Ghazipur District of the State of Uttar
17:02:11 IST
Reason:
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SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
Pradesh. In view of the fact that quashment of FIR was
sought under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is
relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in Pepsi Foods
Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate1. It was held therein
that the High Court could exercise its power of judicial
review in Criminal matters and it could exercise the
power either under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘Cr.P.C’), to prevent the
abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. Nomenclature under which a petition is
filed is not quite relevant. If the court finds that the
petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court
under Article 226, it may treat the petition under Section
482, Cr. P.C.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the
learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh for
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and also the learned counsel for
respondent No. 4 (the complainant).
3. The gravamen of her complaint, based on which
the above-mentioned crime was registered on
21.02.2018, is revealed from the following allegations
made thereunder: –
1
(1998) 5 SCC 749
Page 2 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
“…My elder sister Meera Devi was married to
Satendra Yadav Village Kukuda P.S.
Nandganj, District – Ghazipur, Lalu Yadav S/o
Seshnath Yadav R/o Atarsuya P.S. Nandganj
District – Ghazipur used to come to my house
along with the brother in law Ravindra Yadav
of my elder sister, at that time about five years
back I was a student of High School, then the
said Lalu Yadav by way of deceiving myself
promise that he will marry me and established
physical relationship with me without my
consent and started living with me as the
husband. He used to say that he would marry
me when he gets a job. My mother Rajvati
Devi and my father Hari Singh Yadav was also
of the knowledge of our relation. When my
father and mother raised an objection about
our relation then Lalu Yadav told her that he
will marry Preeti. He told her that nobody
should object and therefore my parents went
silent and Lalu Yadav kept established with me
the applicant without my consent due to which
I became pregnant after the knowledge of
which he give me a medicine of with which
and abortion has occurred and when the said
Lalu Yadav came to the house of the applicant
on 28.09.2017 then he took the said applicant
to Varanasi on 29.09.2017 and kept me in a
hotel and again made physical relationship
with me due to which I became pregnant in
May 2017 and said Lalu Yadav did my abortionPage 3 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
my pressuring me again, thereafter again
17.12.2017 the said Lalu Yadav took me to a
hotel in Varanasi an made physical
relationship with me their, thereafter Lalu
Yadav got a job in army and after which he is
refusing to marry the applicant…”
4. In the contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to
the details given under item No. 3 in Annexure- P2/FIR,
which read thus: –
“3 (a) occurrence of offence.
1. Day Date from – 05.01.2013
Date To – 05.01.2018
(b) Information received at P.S:
Date: 21.02.2018. Time: 21.34 hr.”
5. Before delving into the rival contentions, it is
relevant to note that though this Court stayed further
proceedings in case Crime No. 28/2018 on 13.11.2018,
this Court virtually modified the same on 18.08.2023 as
under: –
“It is made clear that the interim order passed
by this Court staying further proceedings in
Crime No. 28/2018 registered at P.S.
Nandganj, District Ghazipur, U.P. dated
13.11.2018 will not stand in the way of
investigation for investigating into the offence
under Section 313 of IPC.
List the matter after two months.”
Page 4 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
6. Earlier, on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 counter
affidavit was filed fully justifying the impugned order.
On behalf of the respondent No. 4 also, a counter affidavit
was filed, evidently, on the same line. Pursuant to the
order dated 18.08.2023, virtually, permitting
continuance of investigation in Crime No. 28/2018 in
respect of the allegation of commission of offence under
Section 313 IPC, investigation in that regard was
continued and completed. Thereupon, an additional
affidavit was filed on behalf of the first respondent – State
with respect to the status of investigation and the same,
insofar as it is relevant, reads thus: –
“6. That pursuant to the direction, the
investigating officer had conducted
investigation with respect to offence u/s 313
IPC and after due investigation and material
available on record, including her statement,
medical reports etc. has concluded that there
is no evidence/material available with respect
to offence u/s 313 IPC i.e. no material
substantiating abortion of the victim in the
present offence and hence as on 02.02.2024
omitted offence u/s 313, IPC.
7. That the investigation u/s 376 is still pending
as the same is stayed by this Hon’ble Court.”
Page 5 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
7. In view of the statement in the afore-extracted
paragraph 6 and 7, the undisputed position obtained that
the allegation of commission of offence under Section
313, IPC stands omitted against the appellant. What
survives for consideration is only the question whether
the impugned order invites interference and the subject
FIR be quashed invoking the inherent jurisdiction?
8. We have already taken note of the facts revealed
from the subject FIR itself that the time of occurrence of
offence is allegedly, from 05.01.2013 to 05.01.2018 and
that it was registered only at 21.34 hrs. on 21.02.2018.
That apart, it is evident that even going by respondent
No. 4, the complainant herself and the appellant were
living as husband and wife. The complaint of respondent
no. 4, as is revealed therefrom, is that the appellant had
deceived her by promising to marry and then by
establishing physical relationship. At the risk of
repetition, we will have to refer to the FIR, carrying the
following recitals from her complaint:
“… Lalu Yadav S/o Seshnath Yadav R/o
Atarsuya P.S. Nandganj District- Ghazipur,
used to come to my house along with the
brother-in-law Ravindra Yadav of my elder
sister, at that time about five years back I was
a student of High School, then the said Lalu
Yadav by way of deceiving myself promisePage 6 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
that he will marry me and established physical
relationship with me without my consent and
started living with me as the husband.”
(underline supplied)
9. At the very outset, it is to be noted that there is a
huge irregularity between the statements “established
physical relationship with me without my consent” and
“started living with me as the husband”. Be that as it
may, bearing in mind the allegations raised by
respondent No. 4 reflected in the subject FIR, we will
refer to the relevant decisions of this Court.
10. While dismissing the writ petition under the
impugned order, presumably taking note of the
contentions based on time lag of five years, the High
Court relied on its Full Bench decisions in Ajit Singh @
Muraha v. State of U.P.2, and in Satya Pal v. State of
U.P.3. as well as the decision of this Court in State of
Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.4. It observed
and held that there could be no interference with the
investigation or order staying arrest unless cognizable
offence is not ex-facie discernible from the allegations
contained in the FIR or there exists any statutory
2
2006 (56) ACC 433
3
2000 CrLJ 569
4
AIR 1992 SC 604
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SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
restriction operating against the power of the Police to
investigate a case. There can be no two views on the
exposition of law thus made relying on the said
decisions. In the same breath we will have to say that
those decisions can be no bar for the exercise of power
under Section 482, Cr.P.C., in various other situations
dealt with, in detail, by this Court, including in the
decision in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra).
11. To determine whether the case in hand deserves to
be quashed at the present stage we will refer to some of
the decisions. We have already taken note of the fact that
though there was an allegation in the FIR regarding
commission of offence under Section 313, IPC, on
completion of the investigation, the investigating agency
itself omitted the offence under Section 313, IPC against
the appellant-accused. In paragraph 102 of the decision
in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) this Court held thus: –
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the followingPage 8 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either
to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though
it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined and sufficiently channelised
and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds
of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitutePage 9 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
12. In the decision in Shivashankar alias Shiva v. State
of Karnataka and Anr.5, this Court held thus: –
“4. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, it is difficult to sustain the5
(2019) 18 SCC 204Page 10 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
charges levelled against the appellant who
may have possibly, made a false promise of
marriage to the complainant. It is, however,
difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the
course of a relationship which has continued
for eight years, as “rape” especially in the face
of the complainant’s own allegation that they
lived together as man and wife.”
13. The decision in “XXXX” v. State of Madhya
Pradesh and Anr.6, also assumes relevance in the
contextual situation. This court took into consideration
an earlier decision of this Court in Naim Ahamed v. State
(NCT of Delhi)7, where the allegation was one of alleged
rape on false promise of marriage, made five years after
the complainant and the accused started having relations
and even got pregnant from the accused, of course when
she was having a subsisting marriage, the Court found
that there cannot be any stretch of imagination that the
prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual
relationship under misconception. Having considered
the said decision and finding identity in facts, this court
in the decision reported in (2024) 3 SCC 496 reversed
the order impugned therein dismissing the petition filed
under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashment of FIR and
6
(2024) 3 SCC 496
7
2023 SCC OnLine SC 89
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SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
allowed the appeal by setting aside the impugned order
and quashing the subject FIR.
14. Now, having bestowed our anxious consideration
to the decisions referred supra with reference to the
factual situations obtained in the case at hand, we are of
the considered view that the High Court has palpably
gone wrong in not considering the question whether the
allegations in the complaint reveals prima facie case that
the complainant had given her consent for the sexual
relationship with the appellant under misconception of
fact, as alleged, or whether it reveals a case of
consensual sex. Firstly, it is to be noted that the subject
FIR itself would reveal that there occurred a delay of
more than 5 years for registering the FIR; secondly, the
very case of the complainant, as revealed from the FIR,
would go to show that they lived for a long period as man
and wife and thirdly, the facts and circumstances
obtained from the subject FIR and other materials on
record would reveal absence of a prima facie case that
the complainant viz., respondent No. 4 had given her
consent for sexual relationship with the appellant under
misconception of fact. At any rate, the allegations in the
FIR would not constitute a prima facie case of false
promise to marry from the inception with a view to
Page 12 of 14
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establish sexual relationship and instead they would
reveal a prima facie case of long consensual physical
relationship, during which the complainant addressed
the appellant as her husband. Moreover, it is also the
case of the complainant, revealed from the subject FIR
and the other materials on record that she went along
with the appellant to Varanasi with the knowledge of her
family and stayed with him in hotels during such visits.
The subsequent refusal to marry the complainant would
not be sufficient, in view of the facts and circumstances
obtained in the case at hand, by any stretch of
imagination to draw existence of a prima facie case that
the complainant had given consent for the sexual
relationship with the appellant under misconception of
fact, so as to accuse the appellant guilty of having
committed rape within the meaning of Section 375, IPC.
15. The long and short of the above discussion is that
the case at hand is a befitting case where the High Court
should have exercised the power available under
Section 482, Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of
the Court. Now that the allegation of offence under
Section 313, IPC is omitted, there is absolutely no prima
facie case for proceeding further against the appellant on
the allegation of commission of offence punishable
Page 13 of 14
SLP (Crl.) No. 9371 of 2018
under Section 376, IPC. We are of the considered view
that the High Court should have exercised its inherent
power.
16. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order
dated 26.07.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.
16825 of 2018 is set aside. FIR No. 28/2018 dated
21.02.2018 registered at Police Station – Nandganj,
Ghazipur District of Uttar Pradesh and all further
proceedings on its basis are quashed. The appeal is
accordingly allowed.
……………………, J.
(C.T. Ravikumar)
……………………, J.
(Rajesh Bindal)
New Delhi;
October 16, 2024
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