Punjab-Haryana High Court
M/S R.D Sales Corporation And Anr vs Anoop Singh Gill on 8 November, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:146797
CR No.1662 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146797
CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146800
CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Reserved on: September 23, 2024
Date of Decision: November 08, 2024
(I) CR No.1662 of 2020 (O&M)
M/s R.D. Sales Corpora5on and another ... Pe55oners
Versus
Anoop Singh Gill ...Respondent
****
(II) CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M)
M/s R.D. Sales Corpora5on and another ... Pe55oners
Versus
Anoop Singh Gill ...Respondent
****
(III) CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M)
M/s R.D. Sales Corpora5on and another ... Pe55oners
Versus
Anoop Singh Gill ...Respondent
****
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Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:146797
CR No.1662 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146797
CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146800
CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
(IV) CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M)
M/s R.D. Sales Corpora5on and another ... Pe55oners
Versus
Anoop Singh Gill ...Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Present:- Mr. Sunil Chadha, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Akshay Chadha, Mr. Ni&sh Garg &
Mr. Tara Du*, Advocate for the pe&&oners
in CR Nos.1662 to 1664 of 2024.
Mr. Sharan Sethi, Advocate for the pe&&oners
in CR No.6078 of 2018.
Mr. B.S. Rana, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Ramesh Kumar Bamal, Advocate
for the respondent.
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
This order shall dispose of four revision pe&&ons &tled
above, as all of them are between same par&es and pertain to the same
demised premises. In order to avoid confusion, par&es shall be referred
as “landlord” and “tenant”, i.e. as per their status before the trial Court.
2.1 Admi*edly, the demised premises, i.e. Shed No.433-A,
Industrial Area, Phase-II, Chandigarh was originally allo*ed to Smt.
Swaraj Katari by Chandigarh Small Industries Department Corpora&on
Limited. M/s R.D. Sales Corpora&on through its proprietor Rakesh Gupta
(pe oner herein) was inducted as tenant in the demised premises on
the right side por&on to the extent of 12 Ft. X 60 Ft., vide rent note
dated 19.10.1994 on monthly rent of ₹6,000/- including water and
electricity charges, for a period of 11 months. Said rent was later on
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CR No.1662 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146797
CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146800
CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
enhanced to ₹8,500/-.
2.2 On 18.04.2006, Smt. Swaraj Katari entered into an
agreement to sell (Ex.P-8) with Mr. Anoop Singh Gill – landlord
(respondent herein) for considera&on of ₹30,00,000/-. She also executed
irrevocable general power of a*orney dated 17.04.2006 (Ex.P-9),
affidavit dated 18.04.2006 (Ex.P-7) and Will dated 04.05.2009 (Ex.P-6) in
favour of said Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. The power of a*orney authorised
him to manage the property, to collect rent from tenants and evict them
as per law.
2.3 As per pleaded case of the landlord, Smt. Swaraj Katari vide
le*er dated 10.10.2006 informed the tenant (pe oner herein) to pay
rent directly to landlord Mr. Anoop Singh Gill and also informing him that
possession had been handed over to the said Mr. Gill.
3.1 The landlord Mr. Anoop Singh Gill ins&tuted rent pe&&on
No. 24 of 2015 in January, 2015 before Rent Controller, Chandigarh,
seeking ejectment of the tenants (pe oners herein) under Sec&on 13 of
the East Punjab Urban Rent Restric&ons Act, 1949 (hereinaHer referred
as ‘the Act of 1949’), by submiKng that by virtue of A*ornment and
complete sale, he had become owner/landlord of the demises premises.
3.2 It was pleaded that as per Chandigarh Sale of Sites and
Building Rules, 1960, no site can be used for the purpose other than the
purpose, for which it was allo*ed. It was alleged that respondents were
tenants, who were using the premises for trading in electrical goods,
which was against terms and condi&ons of allotment and on account of
said viola&on, building can be resumed by Chandigarh Administra&on at
any &me. Pe&&oner had received a no&ce from CITCO regarding the
viola&on, i.e. subleKng to the respondents as well as the change of user.
As such, it was alleged that change of the user of the tenanted premises,
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CR No.1662 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146797
CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146800
CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
had also resulted into material impairment in its value and u&lity as the
premises were meant for small scale industry. Request was made to the
tenants to stop the misuse and remove the viola&on, but they refused to
do so, compelling the landlord to file a suit for permanent injunc&on.
3.3 It was further the case of the landlord that condi&on of the
en&re industrial plot was dilapidated and as such, it was not fit for
human habita&on and so, it was required to be demolished and
reconstructed.
3.4 Pe&&oner – landlord further pleaded that the en&re
industrial shed in ques&on was required by him for his personal bonafide
need and occupa&on, as he wanted to do the business in the same as
per terms and condi&ons of the allotment alongwith his father. He
wanted to demolish and reconstruct the building aHer due approval
from the concerned authority for be*er u&liza&on and smooth running
of the business in the premises.
3.5 Thus, the ejectment of the tenants from demised premises
was sought on the ground of change of user; material impairment of its
value and u&lity of the premises; the premises having become unfit and
unsafe for human habita&on; and also that of the bonafide necessity of
landlord. It was also pleaded that tenants had not paid the rent w.e.f.
August, 2007 onwards &ll the filing of the rent pe&&on apart from the
electricity consump&on charges.
4.1 The respondents i.e. tenants resisted the pe&&on, by raising
objec&on in respect of rela&onship of landlord and tenant. According to
him, during the con&nua&on of tenancy rights under Smt. Swaraj Katari,
pe&&oner could not acquire the rights to ins&tute the rent pe&&on. It
was also pleaded that Smt. Swaraj Katari had given her consent to u&lize
the tenanted premises for commercial purpose and ever since the
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CR No.1662 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146797
CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146800
CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
incep&on of tenancy, the respondents, i.e. tenants were u&lizing the
same for trading in electrical goods. It was claimed that the alleged
agreement to sell, power of a*orney, Will etc. were not valid documents
for transferring the ownership rights and these documents could not be
used by the pe&&oner for filing the ejectment pe&&on, as the sale on the
basis of such like documents was prohibited under the law. The
respondents-tenant contended that the rent pe&&on was not
maintainable and that the same had been filed in connivance with the
Smt. Swaraj Katari – landlady of the premises.
4.2 The respondents-tenants further pleaded that they were
paying rent to Smt. Swaraj Katari and that all the rentals from April, 2006
&ll July 2015 had already been paid through account payee cheques
drawn in the name of Smt. Swaraj Katari, which stood encashed by her.
The respondents-tenants further denied to have received any in&ma&on
from Smt. Swaraj Katari to pay the rent to the pe&&oner. The allega&ons
of change of use; material impairment of value and u&lity of the
premises etc. were denied. It was also contended that pe&&oner had
concealed some material facts from the Court to the effect that in the
surrounding plots, only the shops were being operated and that the size
of the demised premises being small, it could not be u&lized for running
of any industry. It was denied that the premises in ques&on were in
dilapidated condi&on, or unfit for human habita&on. The personal
necessity of the landlord was also denied and it was submi*ed that even
the pe&&oner-landlord was running business of electrical good in the
name and style of M/s Preet Electricals alongwith his father and this way,
none of the grounds of evic&on was available to the pe&&oner.
5. In the rejoinder, the pe&&oner-landlord reiterated his case
and controverted the stand of the respondents-tenants.
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CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146800
CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
6. Following issues were framed by learned Rent Controller:-
“1. Whether there exists the rela&onship of landlord and tenant
between the par&es? OPP
2. Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted from the demised
premises on the ground of non-payment of rent? OPP
3. Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted from the demised
premises on the ground of change of user? OPP
4. Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted from the demised
premises on the ground of material impairment? OPP
5. Whether the pe&&oner requires the demised premises for his
personal use and occupa&on? OPP
6. Whether the present pe&&on is not maintainable? OPR
7. Whether the pe&&oner has not approached the Court with clean
hands? OPR
8. Whether the pe&&oner has no locus standi to file the present suit?
OPR”
7. The evidence produced by both the par&es was taken on
record. Learned Rent Controller by way of order dated 10.03.2018
decided Issue No.1 in favour of the pe&&oner by holding that there
existed rela&onship of landlord and tenant between the par&es. Issue
Nos.2 and 5 were also allowed in favour of the landlord by holding that
tenants were liable to be ejected on the ground of non-payment of rent
and the bonafide necessity of the landlord. However, issue Nos.3 and 4
were decided against the pe&&oner-landlord and in favour of the tenants
by denying the ejectment on the ground of change of user or material
impairment. Under Issue No.6, rent pe&&on was held to be
maintainable. Issue Nos.7 and 8 were decided against respondents-
tenants. Consequent to all these findings, the rent pe&&on was accepted
on 10.03.2018 by ordering the ejectment of respondents-tenants on the
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CR No.1662 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146797
CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146800
CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
ground of non-payment of rent and personal necessity.
8. The above order led to filing of two appeals – one each by
both the par&es. The tenants filed rent appeal bearing No.RA-69-2018
challenging the finding of Rent Controller on the issue of rela&onship of
landlord and tenant, besides the ejectment allowed on the ground of
non-payment of rent and bonafide necessity. On the other hand,
landlord filed appeal bearing No.RA-113 of 2018 assailing the findings of
learned Rent Controller, whereby ejectment was declined on the ground
of change of user and material impairment. Both these appeals were
decided together vide common order dated 02.12.2019 by learned
Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, whereby the finding with regard to the
rela&onship of landlord and tenant between the par&es was upheld. The
finding of ordering ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent was
reversed, as it was found that rent had been paid by way of cheques to
Smt. Swaraj Katari and the same had been received by the pe&&oner-
landlord – Anoop Singh Gill. The finding of learned Rent Controller
allowing the ejectment on the ground of bonafide necessity was upheld.
As such, the appeal filed by the tenants was partly accepted. The appeal
as filed by the landlord was allowed by reversing the findings of learned
Rent Controller on the ground of change of user as well as material
impairment in the value and u&lity of the premises, as it was held that
tenants were liable to be ejected on these grounds as well.
9. The abovesaid order dated 02.12.2019 of the Appellate
Authority led to filing of Civil Revision Nos.1662 and 1663 of 2020 by the
tenants.
10. Here itself, it may be noted that during pendency of Rent
Appeal No.69 of 2018 filed by the tenants, an applica&on of the landlord
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CR No.1663 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146800
CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
for grant of mesne profit was allowed on 30.07.2018 by the Appellate
Authority, whereby the tenants were directed to pay mesne profit @
₹50,000/- per month. This order has been challenged by the tenants by
filing Civil Revision No.6078 of 2018.
11. Another Rent pe&&on No.638 of 2016 was filed by
pe&&oner-landlord – Mr. Anoop Singh Gill seeking ejectment of the
tenants on the ground of non-payment of rent w.e.f. 01.09.2016 onwards
apart from non-payment of electricity consump&on charges. The said
rent pe&&on was allowed on 31.05.2019. Against this order, Rent Appeal
No.81 of 2019 filed by the tenants was dismissed by the Appellate
Authority on 02.12.2019 and this led to filing of Civil Revision No.1664 of
2020.
12. It is how that the aforesaid four revision pe&&ons are before
this court.
13. This Court has considered submissions of both the sides at
length and have appraised the en&re record carefully.
Civil Revision Nos.1662 and 1663 of 2020
14. The main dispute between the par&es is about the
rela&onship of landlord and tenant. The conten&on of learned counsel of
the pe&&oners-tenants herein is that they were inducted as tenants by
Smt. Swaraj Katari way back in 1994 and that at the &me of filing of the
rent pe&&on in January, 2015, she was s&ll the owner. It is contended
that on the basis of agreement to sell, power of a*orney, Will or
affidavit, &tle of the demised premises cannot be conveyed to the
pe&&oner-landlord – Anoop Singh Gill and as such, the pe&&on for
ejectment filed by him was not maintainable. It is also the conten&on
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that earlier the ejectment pe&&on was filed by Smt. Swaraj Katari
through general power of a*orney holder Mr. Anoop Singh Gill and
therein, Swaraj Katari was held to be the landlady. Learned counsel
contends further that in case during pendency of the pe&&on,
conveyance deed has been executed in favour of landlord – Mr. Anoop
Singh Gill pursuant to the decree of specific performance in his favour,
that cannot change the status of the landlord, inasmuch as the
maintainability of the pe&&on is to be considered at the &me of its filing
and the fact remains that at that &me, Mr. Anoop Singh Gill was not the
&tle holder of the premises. S&ll further, it is urged that ejectment on
ground of bonafide need can be sought only by the owner and not the
landlord and as, Mr. Anoop Singh Gill did not acquire the status of owner
of the premises, he could not maintain the ejectment pe&&on.
15. Refu&ng the aforesaid conten&ons, it is argued by learned
counsel of the landlord-respondent herein that by virtue of the
agreement to sell (Ex.P-8), the en&re sale considera&on amount had
been paid to Smt. Swaraj Katari, who had executed an irrevocable power
of a*orney in favour of the landlord. The said power of a*orney
authorizes him not only to collect the rent, but also to seek ejectment of
the tenants also. It is contended that consent of the tenants is not
required for the purpose of a*ornment and so, the conten&on of
counsel for the pe&&oners-tenants to the contrary is against law.
Learned counsel has also drawn a*en&on towards he defini&on of
‘landlord’ as contained in the Act of 1949 so as to contend that the
landlord cannot be equated with owner and that it is the bonafide
necessity of the landlord and not that of the owner, which is a ground for
ejectment. Learned counsel further contends that the fact of evic&on of
conveyance deed subsequent to the filing of the pe&&on is immaterial,
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CR No.1664 of 2020 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146802
CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806
as the execu&on of the conveyance deed only conferred right upon the
landlord to transfer the property to anybody else. As far as the remaining
rights are concerned including the right to recover rent or seek
ejectment etc., these were already granted to the pe&&oner-landlord in
view of the general power of a*orney and other related documents in
his favour and as such, both the Courts below have rightly held that
there existed rela&onship of landlord and tenant between the par&es.
Learned counsel has also cited numerous authori&es, so as to contend
that the High Court cannot interfere in the concurrent findings of facts in
this regard by re-apprecia&ng the evidence, during its revisional
jurisdic&on.
16. Having considered submission of both the sides, this Court
agrees with the conten&ons raised by Ld. Counsel for the landlord
(respondent herein), for following reasons.
17. Sec&on 2(c) of the Act 1949 provides the defini&on of
“landlord” as under:-
“landlord” means any person for the &me being en&tled to
receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his
own account or on behalf or for the benefit, of any other person, or as
a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other
person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land
in the manner hereinaHer authorised, and, every person from &me to
&me deriving &tle under a landlord;”
18. Interpre&ng the aforesaid provision in “K.D. Dewan v.
Harbhajan S. Parihar”, 2002 AIR (SC) 67, it has been held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court as under:-
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CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806“8. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the
following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord : (1)
any person for the &me being en&tled to receive rent in respect of any
building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or
administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sublets any
building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act; and (4)
every person from &me to &me deriving &tle under a landlord. Among
these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of
‘landlord’, Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from the last category.
Even so that category refers to a person who derives his &tle under a
landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the
said category, the transferor of the &tle referred to therein must fall
under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the
meaning of clause (c) of Sec&on 2, a person need not necessarily be the
owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in
many cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It
may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord
under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes
of the Act the legislature has made a dis&nc&on between an owner of a
premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obliga&ons
of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is
immaterial for purposes of the Act.”
19. It is, thus, clear that following persons fall within the
meaning of “landlord”:-
(i) any person for the &me being en&tled to receive rent in respect
of any building or rented land;
(ii) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any
other person;
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(iii) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the
manner authorised under the Act;
(iv) every person from &me to &me deriving &tle under a landlord.
20. It is further clear that to be a landlord within the meaning of
clause (c) of Sec&on 2, a person need not necessarily be the owner.
Though, in a vast majority of cases, an owner will be a landlord but in
many cases, a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It
may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord
under the Act need not be the owner. For purposes of the Act, the
legislature has made a dis&nc&on between an owner of a premises and a
landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obliga&ons of a landlord only
as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes
of the Act.
21. Further, Sec&on 13 (3) (a) (i) of East Punjab Urban Rent
Restric&on Act, 1949, providing bonafide need as a ground of ejectment,
reads as under:
“(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order direc&ng the
tenant to put the landlord in possession –
(i) in the case of a residen&al building if –
(a) he requires it for his own occupa&on;
(b) he is not occupying another residen&al building in the urban
area concerned; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause
aHer the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area;
(d) it was let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his
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tenant has ceased, whether before or aHer the commencement
of this Act, to be in such service or employment:”
22. The above provision make it clear that it is the landlord, who
may apply for ejectment of tenant for his bonafide need. It is not
necessary that said landlord should be the &tle holder of the demised
property or that he should plead the bonafide need of the owner. Once a
person falls within the scope of ‘landlord’ as defined in Sec&on 2 (c) of
the 1949 Act, he is en&tled to apply for ejectment of tenant for his
bonafide need. As explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.D. Dewan’s
case (supra), the 1949 Act deals with the rights and obliga&ons of a
landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial
for purposes of the Act.
23.1 Learned counsel for the pe&&oners-tenants relies upon
“Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash”, 2002(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 351, in
order to contend that when the ejectment is sought on the ground of
bonafide requirement, it is only the owner-landlord, who can maintain
the suit for evic&on on the said ground of bonafide requirement and that
a person filing suit on the ground of bonafide requirement has to prove
ownership apart from the landlord-ship.
23.2 Though on the first blush, the aforesaid conten&on appears
to have some force, but it is no&ced that in the aforesaid case before
Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommoda0on Control Act, 1961, which were being interpreted. The
relevant por&on of Sec&on 12 of the aforesaid Act provided as under:-
“Sec5on 12. Restric5on on evic5on of tenants. – (1) Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suitPage no.13 out of 47 pages
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CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his evic&on from any
accommoda&on except on one or more of the following grounds only
namely:-
(a) to (e) xxx xxx xxx xxx [not relevant]
(f) that the accommoda&on let for non-residen&al purpose is required
bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of con&nuing or star&ng his
business or that any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is
the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the
accommoda&on is held and that the landlord or such person has no
other reasonably suitable non-residen&al accommoda&on of his own in
his occupa&on in the city or town concerned.
(g) & (h) xxx xxx xxx xxx [not relevant]
23.3 Besides, the landlord is defined in the aforesaid Madhya
Pradesh Act of 1961 as under:-
“landlord” means a person who for the &me being is receiving or is
en&tled to receive, the rent of any accommoda&on, whether on his
own account or on account of or for the benefit of any other person or
as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so
receive the rent or be en&tled to receive the rent, if the
accommoda&on were let to a tenant and includes every person not
being a tenant who from &me to &me derives &tle under a landlord.
23.4 Interpre&ng Sec&on 12 (f) of Madhya Pradesh
Accommoda on Control Act, 1961 in the light of the defini&on of the
landlord, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:-
“While seeking an ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement
under clause (f) abovesaid, the landlord is required to allege and prove
not only that he is a ‘landlord’ but also that he is the ‘owner’ of the
premises. The defini&on of ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ as given in clauses (b)
and (i) of Sec&on 2 of the Act make it clear that under the Act thePage no.14 out of 47 pages
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may be a ‘landlord’ though not an ‘owner’ of the premises. The factor
determina&ve of landlord-ship is the factum of his receiving or his
en&tlement to receive the rent of any accommoda&on. Such receiving
or right to receive the rent may be on the own account of the landlord
or on account of or for the benefit of any other person. A trustee, a
guardian and a receiver are also included in the defini&on of landlord.
Such landlord would be en&tled to seek an evic&on of the tenant on
one or more of such grounds falling within the ambit of Sec&on 12(1) of
the Act which do not require the landlord to be an owner also so as to
be en&tled to successfully maintain a claim for evic&on. Clause (f)
contemplates a claim for evic&on being maintained by an owner-
landlord and not a landlord merely. Though of course, we may hasten to
add that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant li&ga&on
governed by Rent Control Law has to be dis&nguished from the one in a
&tle suit. Ownership is a rela&ve term the import whereof depends on
the context in which it is used. In Rent Control Legisla&on, the landlord
can be said to be owner if he is en&tled in his own legal right, as
dis&nguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the
tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for
himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in a
landlord tenant li&ga&on probably may or may not be enough to
successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a &tle suit………..”
23.5 It is, thus, clear that in the Madhya Pradesh Act, it is
necessary that ejectment on the ground of bonafide requirement can be
sought only when the landlord is the owner of the premises. However,
there is no such words “if he is the owner thereof” in the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restric&on Act of 1949 and as such, the authority cited by
learned counsel for the pe&&oners-tenants is not applicable to the facts
of the present case.
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24. It is further the conten&on of learned counsel for the
pe&&oners-tenants that when the owner authorizes his agent to receive
rent, such an agent is though a landlord in such a case, but he cannot file
the pe&&on for ejectment of tenant on the ground of bonafide
requirement and that such a pe&&on can be filed by the owner-landlord
himself. For this proposi&on, learned counsel refers to “Smt. Ram Piari
v. M/s. Delhi Fruit Company and Ors.”, 1980(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 512; “M/s
Industrial Trade Links and another v. Col. D.S. Ahuja and others” (CR
No.6638 of 2013, decided by this Court on 21.02.2015).
25. Learned counsel for the pe&&oners further refers to “Apollo
Zipper India Limited v. W. Newman and Co. Ltd.”, 2018(1) R.C.R. (Rent)
512, in which it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that though tenant
is estopped from challenging &tle of his landlord, yet tenant is en&tled to
challenge deriva&ve &tle of assignee of original landlord in ac&on
brought by the assignee. However, this right of tenant is subject to
caveat that tenant has not a*orned to assignee. If the tenant pays rent
to the assignee or otherwise accepts assignee’s &tle over demised
property, then it results in crea&on of a*ornment depriving tenant to
challenge deriva&ve &tle of landlord.
26. Learned counsel for the pe&&oners-tenants further refers to
“Bismillah Be (Dead) by L.R.s v. Majeed Shah”, 2017(1) R.C.R.(Rent)
113, wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:-
“25. Law rela&ng to deriva&ve &tle of the landlord (Lessor) and
challenge, if made, to such &tle by the tenant (Lessee) during
subsistence of tenancy in rela&on to demised property is fairly well
se*led. Though by virtue of Sec&on 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the
tenant is estopped from challenging the &tle of his landlord during
con&nuance of the tenancy, yet the tenant/lessee is en&tled toPage no.16 out of 47 pages
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landlord (Lessor) of the demised property in an ac&on brought by the
Assignee/Vendee against the tenant for his evic&on from the demised
property under the Rent laws. This right of a tenant is, however, subject
to one caveat that the tenant/lessee has not a*orned to the
Assignee/Vendee. In other words, if the tenant/lessee pays rent to the
Assignee/Vendee of the tenanted property then it results in crea&on of
an a*ornment between the par&es which, in turn, deprives the
tenant/lessee to challenge the deriva&ve &tle of an Assignee/Vendee in
the proceedings.
26. However, once the Assignee/Vendee proves his &tle to the demised
property, the original tenancy devolves on the Assignee/Vendee and
tenant/lessee by opera&on of law on the same terms and condi&ons on
which it was entered into with the original landlord/lessor and
con&nues &ll either modified by the par&es or is determined by the
landlord in accordance with law. It enables the Assignee/Vendee to
acquire the status of a “new landlord” in place of the original landlord
of the demised premises qua tenant/lessee. (See Law of Evidence by
Sarkar, 16th Edi5on, pages 2106-2108).”
27. Further contending that the landlord herein was only the
power of a*orney holder on behalf of the owner; and that power of
a*orney cannot even appear as a witness on behalf of the owner,
learned counsel for the pe&&oners-tenants has relied upon “Janki
Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd.”, 2005(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 240,
wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that statement and cross-
examina&on of power of a*orney on behalf of the plain&ff or defendant
is not permissible. He cannot be allowed to appear and depose as a
witness on behalf of the principal in the ma*ers of his personal
knowledge. He can appear only as a witness in his own capacity to
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depose with regard to the acts done by him on behalf of the principal. In
that case before Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that whether a
person was a co-sharer in the property purchased and had the source of
income to contribute to its purchase price are the ma*er of personal
knowledge of such person and that his power of a*orney cannot depose
in that regard.
28. I am afraid that the none of the aforesaid conten&ons have
any merit. In the present case, the agreement to sell dated 18.04.2006
Ex.P8 would reveal that Smt. Swaraj Katari agreed to sell the en&re
industrial shop No.433-A measuring 25 Ft. x 80 Ft., of which the demised
property forms a part, for total considera&on of ₹30,00,000/- and this
en&re considera&on was paid by the purchaser Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. The
symbolic possession of the occupied por&on was delivered to the
purchaser; whereas, the physical vacant possession of the rest of the
building was given. Clause No.8 of the agreement provides that
purchaser became absolute lawful owner of the industrial shed in
ques&on with full Proprietory rights immediately upon the execu&on of
this agreement.
29. Ex.P9 is the General power of a*orney dated 17.05.2006
executed by Smt. Swaraj Katari in favour of Mr. Anoop Singh Gill giving
almost all the powers of a &tle holder to said Mr. Anoop Singh Gill.
Clause No.11 of the said power of a*orney is par&cularly relevant and
important for the purpose of the present ma*er. It reads as under:-
“11. To apply for and obtain comple&on/occupa&on cer&ficate of
the Shed, to let out the same and all other machinery, plant and all
other assets of the above said firm to any tenant/s, to enter into such
rent agreements, lease deeds, to receive and recover the rents or toPage no.18 out of 47 pages
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personally or through court or law under his/her own signatures”
30. Ex. P6 is the Will by Smt. Swaraj Katari, whereas Ex.P7 is the
affidavit of Smt. Swaraj Katari dated 18.04.2006, para No.2 of which
reveals that aHer receiving full and final payment from the purchaser Mr.
Anoop Singh Gill, the executant, i.e. Smt. Swaraj Katari had executed an
irrevocable Will and irrevocable general power of a*orney for
management in favour of Mr. Anoop Singh Gill, in respect of the Shed.
31. When all the aforesaid documents [Ex.P6 to Ex.P9] are read
together, the inten&on of the seller/Smt. Swaraj Katari becomes quite
evident that all the rights in the industrial shed in ques&on were
transferred by her in favour of Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. It is no doubt true
that in view of the legal posi&on, unless a proper conveyance deed/sale
deed is executed and registered in favour the purchaser, i.e. Mr. Anoop
Singh Gill, as per Sec&on 54 of the Transfer of Property Act to be read
with Sec&on 17 of the Registra&on Act, the purchaser Mr. Gill did not
acquire right to convey the &tle of the property to anybody else, but
except for this right, he acquired all the rights in the property in dispute.
He is thus not only the power of a*orney holder on behalf of the owner,
but the full and final agreement to sell was executed in his favour. Will
and affidavit were also executed by the owner in his favour authorizing
him not only to collect the rent, but also to file ejectment pe&&on, as has
already been no&ced. It has already been no&ced that the defini&on of
“landlord” as given in the Act, 1949 is quite wide and it certainly includes
a person such as the respondent in the present case and it is the
landlord, whose legal necessity is to be seen and not that of the owner.
32. Apart from above, it is a ma*er between landlord – Mr.
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Anoop Singh Gill and owner – Smt. Swaraj Katari and the tenant has
nothing to do with it, as to whether the complete ownership rights have
been transferred or not. As far as the landlord and tenant is concerned,
all the rights including the right of receiving rent and seeking ejectment
were conveyed by owner Smt. Swaraj Katari to Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. Not
only this, the le*er dated 10.10.2006 clearly indicates that Smt. Swaraj
Katari had informed the tenants, i.e. pe&&oners herein regarding the said
sale and had asked him to pay further rent in favour of said Mr. Anoop
Singh Gill. There is ample evidence on record to support this conten&on,
which has been duly appreciated by both the Courts below.
33.1 In “Amar Nath v. T.C. Mi@al” CR No.4030 of 2012 (O&M)
[decided on 23.07.2012], similar were the facts as in the present case. In
that case also, the landlord claimed to be owner of the demised house
by virtue of an agreement to sell executed by the previous owner in his
favour apart from general power of a*orney and that he was en&tled to
maintain the ejectment pe&&on. Ejectment was sought for the bonafide
use and occupa&on. The tenant denied the rela&onship of landlord and
tenant between the par&es, besides the necessity of the landlord. The
Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority allowed the evic&on
pe&&on. Tenant approached this Court by raising the conten&on that the
landlord was not en&tled to maintain the pe&&on only on the basis of
the power of a*orney executed in his favour by the original owner.
33.2 Refu&ng the above said conten&on, it was held by this Court
that when a power of a*orney as well as an agreement to sell is
executed in favour of a person then that person has an interest in the
property concerned as envisaged under Sec&on 202 of the Indian
Contract Act and that for all intents and purposes, such person becomes
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the owner of the property and the powers of an owner are transferred in
the said person. Holding that since agreement to sell as well as power of
a*orney had not been disputed, therefore, there could be no hesita&on
in holding that the objec&on raised in this regard did not hold any forte.
33.3 It will not be out of place to men&on that above order dated
23.07.2012 passed by this Court in CR No.4030 of 2012 was challenged
by the tenant before Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave to
Appeal (Civil No.26553 of 2012), but the same was dismissed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court on 17.09.2012.
34. Similar were the facts before the Delhi High Court in “J.C.
Mehra v. Smt. Kusum Gupta”, 2006(1) R.C.R. (Civil) 31. Sale of the
property was made in 1993 through power of a*orney and agreement to
sell. Symbolic possession was delivered. Conveyance deed was executed
in 1995. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, purchaser could evict
tenant aHer expiry of 05 years from the date of purchase. The ques&on
was as to whether the year of sale will be of 1993 or 1995. It was held by
Delhi High Court as under:-
“18. It is clear from the aforesaid that the concept of power of a*orney
sale has been recognised as a mode of transac&on. These transac&ons
are different from mere agreement to sell since such transac&ons are
accompanied by other documents including General Power of A*orney,
wills, affidavits and payment of full considera&on and transfer of
possession. A perusal of documents shows that power a*orney was for
considera&on within a meaning of Sec&on 202 of the Contract Act.
Interest was thus created in the property in favour of the respondent in
the year 1993. Possession was also handed over so was the right to
recover rent. Thus the respondent acquired the premises by transfer in
part performance of agreement to sell and got no&onal possession ofPage no.21 out of 47 pages
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intents and purposes. Execu&on of conveyance deed is a subsequent
event aHer the acquisi&on of the premises by the respondent by virtue
of power of a*orney sale. The respondent thus became a landlord on
the date when agreement to sell was executed and he got symbolic
possession of the suit premises. Sec&on 14(6) of Delhi Rent Control Act
will not stand in the way of the respondent in asking of recovery of
possession on the basis of power of a*orney sale. Because the period
has to be reckoned not from the date of the conveyance but from the
date the power of a*orney sale was made.”
35. In yet another case before this Court &tled as “Jeet Kumari
v. Girdhari Lal”, 2003(2) R.C.R. (Rent) 124, house was sold on the basis
of power of a*orney, agreement to sell and Will. Possession was
delivered to the vendee. It was held by this Court that though the &tle
will not pass to the vendee without registra&on of the sale deed, but the
possession of the vendee is protected under Sec&on 53A of the Transfer
of the Property Act and in case, vendee aHer geKng the possession gives
the house on rent to the vendor, the vendor would be tenant of the
vendee and liable to evic&on.
36. It is next argued by Ld. Counsel for the pe&&oners-tenants
that in the present case, pe&&oners never accepted assignee’s i.e.,
landlord Mr. Gill’s deriva&ve &tle. However, this conten&on of learned
counsel to the effect that consent of the tenant was required for
a*ornment in favour of the landlord, is devoid of any merit. The similar
issue was considered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in “Pardeep
Kumar v. Rajesh Bhanot and another”, 2019(1) Law Herald 208 and it
was held as under:-
“6. As regards submission of learned counsel that there is no
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that as per sec&on 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, by opera&on of
law, the tenant has become tenant under the transferee. sec&on 109 of
the Transfer of Property Act provides that if the lesser transfers the
property leased in absence of a contract to the contrary the transferee
shall possess all the rights. Learned counsel for the pe&&oner submi*ed
that there is no a*ornment by the tenant in favour of the landlord. In
this context, it is to be considered that whether consent of the tenant is
required for a*ornment or not. Sec&on 109 of the Transfer of Property
Act does not require any posi&ve ac&on on the part of the tenant for
a*ornment. There is no need for a consensual a*ornment. A*ornment
is brought about by opera&on of law. A*ornment by a tenant is not a
condi&on precedent to create a rela&onship of landlord and tenant
between the transferee landlord and the exis&ng tenant in possession
of the tenanted premises. Sec&on 109 does not operate only if the
tenant has a*orned. Once the transfer of the ownership of the property
which is already on lease has been transferred, the tenancy stands
transferred in favour of the transferee. In view of the aforesaid, there is
no substance in the second submission of learned counsel.”
37. To contend that documents like GPA/Will/agreement to sell
etc. do not create any &tle, learned counsel for the pe&&oners-tenants
relies upon “Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and
another”, 2011(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 669, in which it was held by Hon’ble
Supreme Court that no immovable property can be legally transferred or
conveyed through a General Power of A*orney, agreement to sell /sale
agreement or Will. In that case, it was concluded by Hon’ble Supreme
Court as under:-
“15. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transac&on does not convey any &tle
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CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806the Delhi High Court, in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank – 94 (2001) DLT
841, that the “concept of power of a*orney sales have been recognized
as a mode of transac&on” when dealing with transac&ons by way of
SA/GPA/WILL are unwarranted and not jus&fied, unintendedly
misleading the general public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL
transac&ons are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of
transfer and that it can be a valid subs&tute for a sale deed. Such
decisions to the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL
transac&ons as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement
to transfer, are not good law.
16. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and
lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance.
Transac&ons of the nature of `GPA sales’ or `SA/GPA/WILL transfers’ do
not convey &tle and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be
recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The
courts will not treat such transac&ons as completed or concluded
transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey &tle nor create any
interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds
of &tle, except to the limited extent of sec&on 53A of the TP Act. Such
transac&ons cannot be relied upon or made the basis for muta&ons in
Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only
to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to
transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only
under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is &me that an end is put to
the pernicious prac&ce of SA/GPA/WILL transac&ons known as GPA
sales.”
38. It is no doubt true that &tle of the immovable property
cannot be legally conveyed through a general power of a*orney or
agreement to sell or Will, as has been held in Suraj Lamp’s (supra), but
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the said proposi&on will not be applicable to the facts of the present
case, as have been no&ced earlier that it is not required for the
pe&&oner-landlord to prove that he was the &tle holder to the demised
property to seek ejectment on the ground of the bonafide necessity. It is
sufficient that he falls in the category of ‘landlord’ as defined under the
Rent Act so as to seek the ejectment of the tenant. In present case, the
landlord fulfills the said condi&ons.
39. Apart from this, as has been no&ced earlier that by virtue of
the four documents, i.e. affidavit, power of a*orney, Will and agreement
to sell, all the powers were transferred by the owner in favour of the
landlord. The only embargo on the right of the landlord was that he
cannot further convey the &tle to suit property in favour of anybody else,
unless a proper conveyance deed is executed in his favour. Even that
embargo has gone in the present case as it is undisputed that during
pendency of the evic&on proceedings, the landlord had filed a suit for
specific performance based on agreement to sell Ex.P8 against the
previous owner Smt. Swaraj Katari. That the suit was decreed in the Lok
Adalat on 12.12.2015 and later on, conveyance deed was duly executed
in favour of landlord Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. These subsequent events
cannot be ignored by the Courts and so, have been rightly taken into
considera&on by the Courts below.
40. It is further important to no&ce that judgment in the case of
Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was announced by Hon’ble
Supreme Court on 11.10.2011. One of the submissions made before
Hon’ble Supreme Court was that this decision to the effect that
SA/GPA/Will transfers are not legally valid modes of transfers, be made
applicable prospec&vely to avoid hardship, as large number of persons
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had already entered into such transac&ons. To deal with the said
situa&on, it was observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:
“17. It has been submi*ed that making declara&on that GPA sales and
SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to
create hardship to a large number of persons who have entered into
such transac&ons and they should be given sufficient &me to regularize
the transac&ons by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submi*ed
that this decision should be made applicable prospec&vely to avoid
hardship.
18. We have merely drawn a*en&on to and reiterated the well-se*led
legal posi&on that SA/GPA/WILL transac&ons are not `transfers’ or
`sales’ and that such transac&ons cannot be treated as completed
transfers or conveyances. They can con&nue to be treated as exis&ng
agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected par&es from geKng
registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their &tle. The said
`SA/GPA/WILL transac&ons’ may also be used to obtain specific
performance or to defend possession under sec&on 53A of TP Act. If
they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for
regulariza&on of allotments/leases by Development Authori&es. We
make it clear that if the documents rela&ng to `SA/GPA/WILL
transac&ons’ has been accepted acted upon by DDA or other
developmental authori&es or by the Municipal or revenue authori&es
to effect muta&on, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of
this decision”
41. Hon’ble Supreme Court, has thus made it clear that though
such transac&ons based upon SA/GPA/WILL cannot be treated as
complete transfers or conveyances but they can con&nue to be treated
as exis&ng agreement to sell and that nothing prevents affected par&es
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from geKng registered deeds of conveyances to complete their &tle and
that these transac&ons could also be used to obtain specific
performances or to defend possession under Sec&on 53A of the Transfer
of Property Act. Thus, such transac&ons i.e. SA/GPA/Will sales entered
into prior to the decision of the Supreme Court were not declared as
invalid but were made subject to the par&es geKng registered deeds of
conveyances to complete their &tle.
42. In this case, as no&ced above that agreement to sell, GPA,
Will and affidavit had been executed by Smt. Swaraj Khatri in favour of
landlord Anoop Singh Gill in 2006 i.e., prior to the decision in Suraj Lamp
case (supra). Suit for specific performance filed by Anoop Singh Gill in
2015 has already been decreed and conveyances deed dated 6.9.2016
Ex.PW4/1 has already been executed in his favour. As such, even the plea
that the landlord was not the &tle holder, is no longer available to the
pe&&oner-tenant.
43. Consequently, no fault can be found with the concurrent
findings of the courts below holding that there existed rela&onship of
landlord and tenant between the par&es.
44. Proceeding further, once it is found that ejectment pe&&on
filed by landlord Mr. Gill was maintainable, it is required to be considered
as to whether ejectment of pe&&oners – tenants has been rightly
ordered by courts below on various grounds.
45. On ground of bonafide necessity of the landlord, as no&ced
earlier that tenant had denied the rela&onship of the landlord and
tenant between the par&es. However, both the Courts found that
rela&onship of landlord and tenant existed between the par&es and this
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finding has been sustained by this Court as above. In these
circumstances, pe&&oners-tenants cannot now be allowed to raise the
plea of denial of the personal necessity as pleaded by the landlord and
as such, it does not lie in their mouth to plead that personal necessity of
the landlord is not bonafide. Even if the said fact is ignored, there is
sufficient overwhelming evidence on record, which remains unrebu*ed,
proving the personal necessity of the landlord.
46. It is the specific case of the landlord i.e., respondent herein
that he requires the en&re industrial shed including the demised
premises for his personal use and occupa&on. As per his tes&mony, the
shed is required to be demolished and thereaHer, new construc&on is
required to be raised so as to facilitate carrying on the business/
industrial ac&vity in the premises aHer obtaining due permission from
the competent authority. Law is well se*led that when the landlord
pleads bonafide necessity in respect to the demised premises that
necessity is to be presumed and Rent Controller is not to proceed with
any adverse presump&on to the effect that necessity so pleaded is not
bonafide. Once, if it is so, the onus shiHs upon the tenants to bring
evidence on record to prove otherwise.
47. In the present case, the tenants having denied even the
rela&onships of landlord and tenant between the par&es, they did not
even bring any reliable evidence to controvert the case of the pe&&oner
regarding his plea of bonafide necessity. The landlord is the best judge of
his requirement. Neither tenant nor the Court can dictate the terms to
the landlord in this regard. As such, the finding of both the Courts below
regarding the bonafide necessity is hereby affirmed.
48. Coming to the ground of change of user and material
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impairment in the value and u&lity of the demised premises, although
the Rent Controller had decided the issues against the landlord, but the
Appellate Authority has reversed this finding and ordered the ejectment
on these grounds also. In this regard, it will be relevant to refer to the
observa&ons made by the Appellate Authority, which are as under:-
“32. There is no dispute regarding the fact that industrial shed in
ques&on was allo*ed in favour of Smt. Swaraj Katari vide allotment
le*er Ex.P1. Condi&on No.(xix) thereof provides that the allo*ee will
not carry on or permit to be carried on in the industrial shed any trade
or business other than establishment of a small scale industry. This
condi&on is also there in the lease deed Ex.P3. In this view of the
ma*er, in case a tenant uses the premises for a purpose other than the
one men&oned in the allotment le*er/lease deed, he cannot resist his
evic&on on the ground of change of user by saying that he started using
the demised premises for a purpose contrary to the condi&ons of
allotment le*er/lease deed with the consent and approval of the
landlord. Tenant, for howsoever long, may use the premises for a
par&cular purpose but if the said user is against the terms and
condi&ons of the allotment le*er/lease deed, he cannot take the plea
of acquiescence by the landlord and, therefore, if landlord applies for
evic&on of the tenant on the ground of change of user and impairment
of value and u&lity of the demised premises, he can successfully take
the plea of change of user notwithstanding his silence to the user of
premises for a purpose other than the one prescribed in the allotment
le*er/lease deed. This is based upon the principle of law that there can
never be estoppel against statute or terms of the allotment le*er/lease
deed.
33. In the present case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that
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and parcel of the industrial shed No.433-A, which as per the condi&ons
of the allotment le*er and lease deed was required to be used for
running a small scale industry, for carrying on business of trading in
electrical goods which admi*edly is not an industrial ac&vity. Thus,
there certainly was change of user and this is no defence that erstwhile
owner of the industrial shed namely Smt. Swaraj Katari had permi*ed
the appellant to use the premises for said purpose or that she never
raised any objec&on. It is also no defence that in the surrounding area,
similar premises are being used for the purposes which do not amount
to industrial ac&vity. It is also relevant to men&on here that due to use
of demised premises for purpose other than the one prescribed in the
allotment le*er and lease deed, a no&ce Ex.P10 has also been issued to
the owner of the industrial shed wherein it is clearly men&oned that
user thereof has been changed and, therefore, owner has been called
upon to stop the illegal user failing which it was warned that premises
shall be resumed. Thus, act of the appellants in using the demised
premises for business of trading in electrical goods, has put the
industrial shed at the peril of resump&on. Even if, &ll date, no
resump&on has taken place but all the same, there certainly is viola&on
of condi&ons of the allotment le*er and lease deed and hence,
possibility of resump&on looms large on the head of landlord and,
therefore, he has a right to seek evic&on of the appellants on the
ground of change of user.
34. In any case, vide applica&on Ex.PXY-2 dated 19.06.1980, Smt. Swaraj
Katari had applied for allotment of an industrial shed for manufacturing
of steel furniture and as per le*er dated 08.03.2000 Ex.PXY-5 issued by
the competent authority, Smt. Swaraj Katari was granted permission to
sub-let the demised premises to the appellants respondents for
manufacturing of machines etc. as described therein. Hence, as per said
le*er, appellants-respondents could use the premises in ques&on only
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for industrial purpose and not trading in electrical goods. Further, the
pe&&oner filed a Civil Suit No.3135 of 04.07.2014 for permanent
injunc&on against the appellants-respondents for restraining them from
misusing the tenanted premises which was decreed vide judgment and
decree dated 12.09.2017. This all proves that appellants-respondents
indulged into misuse of the demised premises by changing the user
thereof and, therefore, ld. Rent Controller fell into an error by not
deciding issue No.3 in favour of the pe&&oner.
35. It may also be men&oned here that since the change of user has
exposed the demised premises to peril of resump&on, it can also be
said without any hesita&on that such act on the part of appellants has
the effect of impairing the value and u&lity of the demised premises.
Thus, on both the grounds, rent pe&&on deserves to succeed. Ld. Rent
Controller wrongly decided issues No.3 & 4 against the pe&&oner under
a misplaced premise that no evidence to prove these issues was led by
him. Hence, findings on issues No.3 & 4 are reversed and both these
issues are decided in favour of pe&&oner and it is consequently held
that appellants are liable to be evicted from the demised premises on
the grounds of change of user and impairment of value and u&lity as
well.”
49. It is clear from the aforesaid observa&ons that as the
allotment in favour of the erstwhile owner was for running a small-scale
industry, therefore, carrying on the business of trading electrical goods,
which was not an industrial ac&vity, was certainly the change of user. The
conten&on of the pe&&oners herein, i.e. tenants that the erstwhile
owner Smt. Swaraj Katari had permi*ed them to use the premises for
the said purpose and that she never raised any objec&on in this regard, is
without any merit, as no such wri*en consent is placed or proved on
record. Even otherwise, there cannot be any estopple qua consent
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against the statutory requirement. Simply because in the surrounding
area, similar premises are being used for the similar purpose, not
amounting to industrial ac&vity, has absolutely no force. The premises
are required to be used only for the purpose as per the allotment le*er.
Even in the no&ce (Ex.P-10) issued to the owner of the industrial shed, it
is clearly men&oned that user thereof had been changed and therefore,
the owner was called upon to stop the illegal user. The tenant cannot be
allowed to plead that no resump&on order has been passed &ll date. It
cannot be denied that there certainly is viola&on of the condi&ons of the
allotment le*er and lease deed and therefore, learned Appellate
Authority has rightly observed that the possibility of resump&on loomed
large on the head of landlord and therefore, he has the right to seek
evic&on of the tenants on the ground of change of user.
50. As such, the finding the Appellate Authority ordering the
ejectment of the tenants on the ground of change of user and material
impairment in the value and u&lity of the demised premises, is also
upheld.
51. Apart from the above, it is most important to no&ce that
the findings of the Courts below regarding the rela&onship of landlord &
tenant and bonafide necessity of the landlord are concurrent finding of
fact. Whether this Court exercising in its revisional jurisdic&on can
interfere in the said finding or not, is to be seen.
52.1 The provisions rela&ng to revisional powers of the High
Court in other Rent Legisla&ons came up for considera&on before the
Cons&tu&on Bench of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpora0on
Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh 2014(4) RCR (Civil) 162: 2014(2) RCR (Rent) 210″
(2014) 9 SCC 78. The ma*er was referred to the larger Bench because of
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from the referral order quoted in opening of the decision.
“The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a three-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs.
Kallyani Sulochana and others, (1993) 1 SCC 499, wherein Sec&on 20 of
the Kerala Rent Control Act was in ques&on. It was held in the said
decision that though Sec&on 20 of the said Act provided that the
Revisional Court can go into the ‘propriety’ of the order but it does not
en&tle the Revisional Court to re-appreciate the evidence. A similar
view was taken by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ubaiba vs.
Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC 645.
On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon
a decision of this Court in the case of Ram Dass Vs. Ishwar Chander
and Others, AIR 1988 SC 1422 which was also a three Judge Bench
decision. It has been held in that case that the expression “legality and
propriety” enables the High Court in revisional jurisdic&on to re-
appraise the evidence while considering the findings of the first
appellate Court. A similar view was taken by another three Judge Bench
of this Court in the case of Moti Ram Vs. Suraj Bhan and others AIR
1960 SC 655.
From the above it is clear that there are conflic&ng views of coordinate
three Judge Benches of this Court as to the meaning, ambit and scope
of the expression ‘legality and propriety’ and whether in revisional
jurisdic&on the High Court can re-appreciate the evidence. Hence, we
are of the view that the ma*er needs to be considered by a larger
bench since this ques&on arises in a large number of cases as similar
provisions conferring power of revision exists in various rent control
and other legisla&ons, e.g. Section 397 of the Code of Criminal
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52.2 AHer referring to numerous precedents on the issue, the
Cons&tu&onal Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Hindustan
Petroleum Corpora0on Limited v. Dilbahar Singh” (supra) approved the
legal posi&on explained in Rukmini Amma Saradamma’s case (supra)
and held as under:
“45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts
en&tles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by
the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-
apprecia&on of the evidence, its view is different from the
Court/Authority below. The considera&on or examina&on of the
evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdic&on under these Acts is
confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the
Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any
error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if
perverse or has been arrived at without considera&on of the material
evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the
evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result
in gross miscarriage of jus&ce, is open to correc&on because it is not
treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in
exercise of its revisional jurisdic&on under the above Rent Control Acts
shall be en&tled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or
proper. The High Court is en&tled to sa&sfy itself the correctness or
legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as
indicated above. However, to sa&sfy itself to the regularity, correctness,
legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High
Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-
appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on
facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power ofPage no.34 out of 47 pages
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the High Court is required to be sa&sfied that the decision is according
to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers
from procedural illegality or irregularity.”
53. In another case &tled Vaneet Jain Vs. Jagjeet Singh, 2000(5)
SCC 1, Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the scope of the revisional
power of the High Court. The ma*er had arisen out of the ejectment
pe&&on filed under Sec&on 13 of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and
Evic&on Act, 1973. Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to sub-Sec&on (6) of
Sec&on 15 of the Act, which confers the revisional jurisdic&on upon the
High Court and held as under:-
“4. Sub-sec&on (6) of Sec&on 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to
exercise its revisional jurisdic&on for the purpose of sa&sfying itself if an
order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in
accordance with law. The ques&on that arises for considera&on is
whether the High Court in its revisional jurisdic&on can reassess or re-
evaluate the evidence only to come to a different finding than what has
been recorded by the Court below. This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup
Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999 (6) SCC 222) held, that the
High Court cannot enter into apprecia&on or re-apprecia&on of
evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the
facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to
test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such
an order is in accordance with law. For that limited purpose the High
Court would be jus&fied in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 1998 (8) SCC 119, it was held that the
High Court while exercising the jurisdic&on can reappraise the evidence
only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion
arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.
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5. A perusal of sub-sec&on (6) of Sec&on 15 of the Act shows that the
power of the High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power,
but it is also true that it is not akin to power exercisable under Sec&on
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is no doubt true that the
High Court would be jus&fied in interfering with the order passed by the
appellate authority if the legality or propriety of such order demands
such interference. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not
permissible for the High Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to
arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court
below……….”
54. Yet another case &tled Ajit Singh and another Vs. Jeet Ram
and another, 2008(4) RCR (Civil) 390, reached before Hon’ble Supreme
Court out of the proceedings of evic&on filed under East Punjab Urban
Rent Restric&on Act, 1949 (like the present case), wherein also it has
been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that a finding of fact as recorded by
the Appellate Authority on the ques&on of bonafide requirement of the
demised shop cannot be interfered with by the High Court. The High
Court under its revisional jurisdic&on could have interfered with such
findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority only if the High
Court had found that the finding of the Appellate Authority on the
ques&on of bonafide requirement was either perverse or arbitrary.
55. In Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash, 1993 AIR (SC) 275, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot act as a third Appellate
Court in the revision before it, so as to reverse the concurrent findings of
facts. Same view has been taken in Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal, 2001(2) SCC
762; and Boorugu Mahdev & Sons and Anr. v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao and
Ors., 2016 AIR (Supreme Court) 433.
56. Thus, the legal posi&on as explained above make it clear
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that:
• The revisional power of the High Court under the Rent Legisla&on is not
appellate power and so, the high court cannot re appreciate the
evidence on record, whether oral or documentary only because it is
inclined to take a different view of facts as it were a court of facts.
• The High Court can interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the
Rent Controller/ Appellate Authority, only if it finds that the said finding
on the ques&on of bonafide requirement is either perverse or arbitrary,
or there is illegality or perversity of such a nature that it demands
interference.
57. In the light of above legal posi&on qua scope of interference
by this court under its revisional jurisdic&on, when the findings of courts
below are examined, it is found that the Courts below have rightly
appreciated the en&re evidence on record on the issues of the
rela&onship of landlord & tenant between the par&es; and bonafide
necessity of the landlord and there is no scope for interference in the
well-reasoned findings, as this Court does not find any illegality or
perversity so as to interfere in the impugned orders. Even the findings of
the appellate authority allowing the ejectment of tenants on the
grounds of change of user and material impairment in the value and
u&lity of the demised premises, do not call for any interference. Both the
pe&&ons are hereby accordingly dismissed.
CR No.6078 of 2018
58. Coming to CR No.6078 of 2018, the conten&on of learned
counsel for the pe&&oners herein/tenants is that excessive mesne profit
@ ₹50,000/- per month has been fixed by learned Appellate Authority,
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more than ₹30,000/- per month. It is also the conten&on of learned
counsel that the instances of the market rent in the locality, as produced
by the pe&&oners-tenants were wrongly ignored by Appellate Authority.
59. AHer considering submissions of both the sides, this Court
does not find any merit in the above conten&on. It may be noted that
the reply to CR No.6078 of 2018 has been filed by the respondent-
landlord alongwith photographs in respect of the premises, regarding
which the copies of lease agreements were placed on record by both the
par&es.
60.1 As the impugned order would reveal, the landlord produced
the following two instances to show the market rent.
Sr. Date of lease Indust. Plot Area Rent Period
No. deed No. (sq. feet) (per sq. feet)
1. 04.02.2015 447 1000 ₹96,800/- 01.02.2017 to
31.01.2018
(₹96.8 per sq. H)
2. 26.10.2012 402 450 ₹40,824/- 01.08.2014 to
31.07.2015
(₹90.72 per sq. H)
60.2 On the other hand, the tenants, i.e. pe&&oners herein relied
upon the following instances :-
Sr. Date of lease Indust. Plot Area Rent Period
No. deed No. (sq. feet) (per sq. feet)
1. 24.03.2017 28/1 1000 ₹44,000/- 01.03.2017 to
28.02.2018
(₹44/- per sq. H)
2. 04.12.2002 431/A 400 ₹5,500/- Irrelevant
(₹13.75 per sq. H)
3. 23.11.2015 136 2550 ₹90,000/-
(₹35.29 per sq. H)
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61.1 The mesne profits are to be assessed by keeping in view the
market rate of rent in the locality at the &me, when the ejectment
pe&&on was allowed. As held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Atma Ram
Proper0es (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., 2005 (1) RCR (R) 1, once a
decree for evic&on has been passed, in the event of execu&on of decree
for evic&on being stayed, the appellants can be put on such reasonable
terms, as would in the opinion of the appellate court reasonably
compensate the decree holder for loss occasioned by delay in execu&on
of the decree by the grant of stay in the event of the appeal being
dismissed. It has also been held that with effect from the date of decree
of evic&on, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensa&on for
use and occupa&on of the premises at the same rate at which the
landlord would have been able to let out the premises on being vacated
by the tenant. While determining the quantum of the amount so
receivable by the landlord, the landlord is not bound by the contractual
rate of rent which was prevalent prior to the date of decree.
61.2 The said principle was further confirmed by the Apex Court
in State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Super Max Interna0onal Pvt. Ltd., 2009
(2) RCR (R) 246.
62. In the present case, the ejectment pe&&on was allowed by
learned Rent Controller in March, 2018 and so the Court is required to
assess the mesne profits accordingly.
63. A perusal of the instances as placed on record by both the
par&es before the Appellate Authority would reveal that all of them
pertain to Industrial Area, Phase -II, Chandigarh, i.e. the area, in which
the demised premises are situated. But at the same &me, the premises
bearing plot No.28/1 and plot No.136, which have been placed on record
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by the tenants are located far away from the demised premises and not
in the nearby locality. On the other hand, the industrial plot Nos.447,
402 and 431 are in the nearby locality, as demised premises bear
industrial plot No. 433A.
64. As per the lease deed dated 04.02.2015, the market rent for
the period from 01.02.2017 to 31.01.2018 for an area of 1000 sq. feet of
plot No.447 was ₹96,800/- per month, i.e. ₹96.8 per sq. feet. Similarly,
for the area of 450 sq. feet falling in the plot No.402, the market rent for
the period from 01.08.2014 to 31.07.2015 was ₹90.72 per sq. feet.
65. The tenant also relied upon lease agreement of 04.12.2002
in respect of plot No.431A with area of 400 sq. feet and at that &me, its
rent was ₹5,500/- per month. However, this instance is absolutely
irrelevant as it is much earlier than the period, for which the market rent
is to be seen. Incidentally, the respondent-landlord before this Court has
placed on record the latest lease agreement in respect of the same
premises, i.e. plot No.431-A with the area of 12Ft. X 80 Ft., i.e. 960 sq.
feet and as per the said lease agreement Annexure R-7 dated
07.05.2018, the rent was fixed to be ₹75,000/- per month for the period
w.e.f. 01.06.2018 to 31.05.2019, i.e. @ ₹78.125 per month.
66. The area of the demised plot is 720 sq. feet and so, @
₹78.125, the market rent works out to be ₹56,250/- per month.
67. Keeping in view all the aforesaid circumstances, par&cularly
the fact that plot No.431-A is situated just nearby the demised premises
i.e., 433/A, this instance Annexure R-7 is considered to be most
appropriate so as to assess the market rent and by keeping in view the
said instance of the market rent, this Court finds that learned Appellate
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Authority did not commit any error whatsoever to assess the market
rent of the demised premises @ ₹50,000/- per month, which is payable
from 10.03.2018, i.e. the date of ejectment order as passed by the Rent
Controller, &ll date. As such, finding no merit in CR No.6078 of 2018, the
same is hereby dismissed.
CR No.1664 of 2020
68. Coming to CR No.1664 of 2020, as no&ced earlier that this
revision has arisen out of the order dated 02.12.2019 of the Appellate
Authority, dismissing the appeal against the ejectment order dated
31.05.2019 in Rent Pe&&on No.638 of 2016, whereby ejectment was
allowed on the ground of non-payment of rent w.e.f. 01.09.2016
onwards, besides the electricity consump&on charges.
69. The stand taken by the tenant in that case was not only the
denial of rela&onship of landlord and tenant, but further that no arrears
of rent were due as the same stood paid in the account of Smt. Swaraj
Katari, the erstwhile owner.
70. AHer apprecia&ng the evidence placed on record by both
the par&es, the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority came
to the same conclusion to the effect that with a mischievous mo&ve, the
tenants had deposited the rent in the account of erstwhile owner Smt.
Swaraj Katari, despite knowing that all the rights in respect of the
demised premises had already been sold by her in favour of Mr. Anoop
Singh Gill. In this regard, it will be relevant to reproduce the observa&ons
made by the Appellate Authority in its order dated 02.12.2019, which
reads as under:-
“25. Rent pe&&on was filed on 15.10.2016 and respondent Rakesh
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CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806Gupta had entered appearance in person on the very next date i.e.
23.11.2016. ThereaHer, respondents con&nued to obtain adjournments
and did not file wri*en statement. They filed wri*en statement only on
09.05.2017 aHer being warned by the Rent Controller by the order
dated 27.04.2017 that defence shall be closed, if wri*en statement was
not filed on the next date. Thus, wri*en statement came to be filed
aHer more than five months of their appearance before learned Rent
Controller. Prior to that, on 06.05.2017, they transferred an amount of
₹1,02,000/- i.e. rent w.e.f. 01.09.2016 to 31.08.2017 through NEFT in
the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari and nothing was explained by them as
to what was the reason behind deposi&ng the said amount in the
account of Smt. Swaraj Katari aHer so much delay. In fact, as becomes
clear from the evidence on the record, respondent very well knew that
erstwhile owner of the demised premises Smt. Swaraj Katari had
already sold her lease hold rights in the shed in ques&on in favour of
pe&&oner Anoop Singh Gill. In this behalf, reference may be made to
award passed by the Na&onal Lok Adalat dated 12.12.2015 Ex.P5 on the
basis of statements of Anoop Singh Gill and Smt. Swaraj Katari Ex.P3
and Ex.P4 respec&vely. In this connec&on, it is also per&nent to have a
look at the order dated 24.08.2014 Ex.P6 passed by the Execu&ng Court
whereby objec&ons filed by the appellants-respondents against
enforcement of award Ex.P5 were dismissed with the following
observa&ons:
“….Rather, as per opera on of law, once the landlady has
transferred her en re interest in the property in favour of third
person, such person steps into the shoes of landlady and becomes
landlord of the person coming as tenant in the property in ques on.
7. Moreover, the objectors have even ques oned the tle/right of
their landlady i.e. defendant/JD to transfer the suit property in
favour of a third person which the objectors are clearly estoppedPage no.42 out of 47 pages
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CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806from doing. At any rate, I am of the considered opinion that the
present applicants/objectors have absolutely no locus standi to
challenge the transfer of property/lease hold rights from the JD to
DH in pursuance to the award/decree. Objec ons as they have been
filed are en rely misconceived and the ques on of framing issues
and receiving evidence thereon does not arise.”
26. Thus, objec&ons filed by the appellants-respondents on 25.04.2016
(see zimni order dated 25.04.2016 Ex.PW4/A) came to dismissed on
24.08.2016 well before the filing of the present evic&on pe&&on and
hence, as on the date of the appearance of appellants-respondents
before ld. Rent Controller and filing of the wri*en statement, they very
well knew the factum of pe&&oner-respondent having purchased the
leasehold rights qua the industrial shed in ques&on by way of registered
deed Ex.P7 dated 06.09.2016 which too is prior in &me than the filing of
the present rent pe&&on. However, they s&ll were not prepared to
accept him as their landlord and hence, did not pay rent to him. They
rather deposited the rent for the period from 01.09.2016 to 31.08.2017
in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari, the erstwhile owner through NEFT
whereas being leH with no rights in the shed in ques&on aHer passing
of the Award Ex.P5 and execu&on and registra&on of deed Ex.P7, she no
more was a landlady qua the demised premises. In fact, on finding
deposit of an amount of ₹1,02,000/- through NEFT in her account on
06.05.2017, she immediately made a complaint Ex.PW5/5 dated
20.05.2017 to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Chandigarh against
the appellants-respondents in which she stated as under:
“….. They are well aware that Deed of Transfer of Lease Holds
Rights in favour of Anoop Singh Gill has been executed and I have
transferred all rights to Anoop Singh Gill by making statements in
the Hon’ble Court also. I have made number of requests to them
not to send the cheque of monthly rent to me and pay the rent toPage no.43 out of 47 pages
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CR No.6078 of 2018 (O&M) 2024:PHHC:146806Shri Anoop Singh Gill. I am not responsible for any kind of loss, if
they have deposited the amount in my account illegally and
unlawfully without my consent and knowledge. Kindly take
appropriate ac on against the above said person as per law.”
27. AHer the above complaint, statement of Smt. Swaraj Katari
Ex.PW5/6 was also recorded by the police wherein as well, she
reiterated her above stand. On these complaints made by Anoop Singh
Gill and Smt. Swaraj Katari, enquiry was conducted by the police.
Appellants were also associated in said enquiry whose versions too
were recorded. Thus, from the incep&on, they knew that Smt. Swaraj
Katari was no more their landlady and it was respondent-pe&&oner
Anoop Singh Gill who had acquired the status of landlord and in these
circumstances, they were required to pay rent to him only. But having
not done so and they being in arrears of rent w.e.f. 10.09.2016 and
having not tendered the rent in court under the ill-conceived plea of
absence of rela&onship of landlord and tenant between the par&es,
they were rightly held to be liable for evic&on from the demised
premises. Rakesh Kumar Gupta RW1 in cross-examina&on, though knew
all the facts, conveniently feigned ignorance about afore-discussed
police complaints and other facts of the case while sta&ng his counsel
knew the facts and he was not aware. Appellant-Respondent No.2
Rakesh Kumar Gupta, proprietor of M/s R.D.Sales Corpora&on is a well-
educated person and he having deposed in such a fashion in cross-
examina&on, clearly goes to show that he wanted to hide true facts. His
such conduct makes it very much clear that he out of malafides was not
admiKng respondent-pe&&oner as their landlord and as such, due to
oblique mo&ve, he deposited rent in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari
which was not at all required. Rent was required to be paid to the
respondent-pe&&oner and having not done so, transfer of amount of
1,02,000/- in ₹ the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari cannot be taken as a
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valid tender of rent. Learned Rent Controller, thus, upon apprecia&on of
evidence correctly came to the conclusion that there was subsis&ng
rela&onship of landlord and tenant between the par&es and as on the
date of filing of the rent pe&&on, appellants-respondents were in
arrears of rent w.e.f. 01.09.2016. Learned Rent Controller, therefore,
correctly ordered their evic&on on the ground of non-payment of rent.
28. It also needs to be men&oned here that in the grounds of appeal,
finding of ld. Rent Controller as to rela&onship of landlord and tenant
has not been assailed. Appellants-respondents have rather challenged
the impugned order of evic&on on the ground that en&re rent stood
paid through challans Ex.DA, DB and DC.
29. These deposits were made on account of order passed by the
Appellate Authority in another rent appeal between the par&es on an
applica&on for fixa&on of mesne profits. All payments have been
deposited in the name of respondent-pe&&oner and by doing so, plea
being raised is that en&re arrears of rent having been cleared,
appellants-respondents could not have been evicted from the demised
premises on the ground of nonpayment of rent.
30. Plea so raised is absolutely mis-conceived inasmuch as the
appellants-respondents having denied the rela&onship of landlord and
tenant, cannot subsequently be allowed to avoid being evicted by
deposi&ng the arrears of rent in the name of respondent-appellant. Do
they now admit him as their landlord? If yes, they should have done so
at the beginning of the rent pe&&on and tendered rent. In that case, on
tender of rent, the rent pe&&on itself would have become infructuous
leaving the respondent-appellant with no op&on but to withdraw the
same. However, appellants-respondents persisted with their illegal
stand of denial of rela&onship of landlord and tenant between the
par&es and hence, now they cannot be allowed to take a somersault in
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order to emerge successful in this appeal.”
71. This Court does not find any reason to interfere in the well-
above said reasoned findings as recorded by the Appellate Authority,
affirming the findings of the Rent Controller. It has been rightly observed
that despite fully knowing that Smt. Swaraj Katari was no longer the
owner of the demised premises, the pe&&oners herein deposited the
rent in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari and that too much aHer filing of
the ejectment pe&&on and not at the relevant &me. As such, the
ejectment order as passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the
Appellate Authority, are hereby affirmed. Holding the present revision to
be devoid of any merit, the same is hereby dismissed.
72. On account of the en&re discussion as above, this Court
does not find merit in any of the four revision pe&&ons. All of them are
hereby dismissed.
73. Before par&ng, it may be no&ced that ejectment order in
the first pe&&on was passed in March, 2018. The appeal was dismissed
by the Appellate Authority in December, 2019. The pe&&oners are
con&nuing their unauthorized possession &ll date, i.e. November, 2024.
74. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the pe&&oners
herein, i.e. tenants, are hereby directed to vacate the premises on or
before 31.12.2024 posi&vely. In case, they fail to vacate the premises up
to 31.12.2024, they will be liable to pay the user & occupa&on charges /
mesne profits @ ₹2,00,000/- per month w.e.f. 01.01.2025 onwards. It is
also hereby clarified that from the date of ejectment order passed by the
Rent Controller, i.e. 10.03.2018, &ll 31.12.2024, they have to pay the user
charges/mesne charges @ ₹50,000/- per month as was allowed by the
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Appellate Authority vide order dated 30.07.2018 in Rent Appeal No.69 of
2018, which has been upheld by this Court in CR No.1664 of 2020.
75. Ordered accordingly. Photocopy of this order be placed on
the connected case files.
November 08, 2024 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Sarita JUDGE
Whether reasoned/speaking: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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