Punjab-Haryana High Court
Meena Kumari Alias Meena Yadav vs State Of Haryana And Another on 30 August, 2024
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:112605
CRM-M-31753-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-31753-2024 (O&M)
Reserved on: 05.08.2024
Date of Pronouncement: 30.08.2024
Meena Kumari @ Meena
... Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of Haryana and another
...Respondent (s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present:- Mr. Navjit Singh, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Ashish Bishnoi, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. Ram Bhati, Advocate
for respondent no.2.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections
844 21.11.2020 Ambala City, District 120-B & 420 IPC (Sections 467, 468 &
Ambala. 471 IPC added later on)
The petitioner(s), arraigned as accused in the above captioned FIR, has come up before
this Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequential
proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved person(s).
2. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved
person(s) have compromised the matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as
Annexure P-2.
3. After that, the petitioner(s) came up before this Court to quash the FIR,
impleading the aggrieved persons as respondent no.2.
4. Pursuant to order of this Court dated 08.07.2024, the aggrieved person(s)
(Respondent no.2), appeared before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala and stated
that there would be no objection if the Court quashes this FIR and consequent
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proceedings. The relevant extract of the report of the concerned Court reads as
follows:
Name of the reporting Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala
CourtCriminal Case no. CHI/1298 dated 06.10.2021
before trial Court
1. Names of the complainant/ victims(s)/ Arpana w/o Pankaj Sahotra
aggrieved persons(s)
2. Dates on which the statement(s) of the 18.07.2024
complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved
persons(s) were recorded
3. Has the identity of the complainant/ Yes
victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) been
verified?
4. Whether all the victims/ all the No
aggrieved persons have compromised
the matter?
5. Is there pressure, threat, or coercion No
upon the victim(s)/aggrieved
person(s)/complainant?
6. Names of the accused person(s) I) Meena Kumari
ii) Rajat Kumar
iii) Sunder Lal
7. Dates on which the statement(s) of the Meena Kumari and Rajat Kumar on
accused persons(s) recorded dated 12.08.2021 and Sunder Lal on
dated 18.08.2021.
8. Whether all the accused have No, only accused Meena Kumari
compromised the matter? If no, then
the names of the accused who have
compromised.
9. Whether proclamation proceedings No
are pending against any accused?
10. Has the police report been filed or Yes
not?
11. Notice of accusation /Charges have Yes
been framed or not?
12. Sections of statutes invoked in the Yes
matter
13. Whether the court is satisfied with the Yes
genuineness of the compromise?
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
5. Despite the severe opposition of the State’s counsel to this compromise, the
following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: –
a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably settled the matter
between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded
before the concerned Court;
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b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the settlement has not been
secured through coercion, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious
means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings;
d) There is no objection from the private respondent in case present FIR and
consequent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or
tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or
involve matters concerning public policy;
f) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial
affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an
unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work
to bring peace to family, community, and society;
i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequential
proceedings is justified to secure the ends of justice.
6. In the present case the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. However, in
the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecution qua the non-
compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent
proceedings.
7. In C.B.I., New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta, 1996(5) SCC 591,
Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[26]. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and
circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the
respective counsel for the parties, it appears to us that for the
purpose of quashing the complaint, it is necessary to consider
whether the allegation in the complaint prima facie make out
an offence or not. It is not necessary to scrutinise whether the
allegations are likely to be upheld in the trial. Any action by way
of quashing the complaint is an action to be taken at the
threshold before evidences are led in support of the complaint.
For quashing the complaint by way of action at the threshold, it
is, therefore, necessary to consider whether on the face of the
allegations, a criminal offence is constituted or not.
[29]. In the facts of the case, it appears to us that there is
enough justification for the High Court to hold that the case
was basically a matter of civil dispute. The Banks had already
filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of
credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on
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receiving the payments from the concerned Companies. Even if
an offence of cheating is prima facie constituted, such offence
is a compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in
the suits instituted by the Banks, for all intents and purposes,
amount to compounding of the offence of cheating. It is also to
be noted that long time has elapsed since the complaint was
filed in 1987. It may also be indicated that although such FIRs
were filed in 1987 and 1989, the Banks have not chosen to
institute any case against the alleged erring officials despite
allegations made against them in the FIRs. Considering that the
investigations had not been completed till 1991 even though
there was no impediment to complete the investigations and
further investigations are still pending and also considering the
fact that the claims of the Banks have been satisfied and the
suits instituted by the Banks have been compromised on
receiving payments, we do not think the said complaints should
be pursued any further. In our view, proceeding further with
the complaints will not be expedient. In the special facts of the
case, it appears to us that the decision of the High Court in
quashing the complaints does not warrant any interference
under Article 136 of the Constitution. We, therefore, dismiss
these appeals.
8. In Manoj Sharma v. State, 2008(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 827: 2008(16) SCC 1, Hon’ble
Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings holding as follows,
[8]. In our view, the High Court’s refusal to exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing
the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The First
Information Report, which had been lodged by the complainant
indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused
which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true that the First
Information Report was the basis of the investigation by the
Police authorities, but the dispute between the parties
remained one of a personal nature. Once the complainant
decided not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could
have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter. We do not
suggest that while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution the High Court could not have refused to quash
the First Information Report, but what we do say is that the
matter could have been considered by the High Court with
greater pragmatism in the facts of the case. As we have
indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power under Section
482 Criminal Procedure Code or Article 226 of the Constitution
is discretionary to be exercised in the facts of each case.
9. In Nikhil Merchant vs C.B.I. & Anr, Cr.A 1302 of 2008, Hon’ble Supreme Court
holds,
[22]. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an
offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, the same
has been made compoundable under Sub-section (2) of Section
320 Cr.P.C. with the leave of the Court. Of course, forgery has
not been included as one of the compoundable offences, but it
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is in such cases that the principle enunciated in B.S. Joshi’s case
(supra) becomes relevant.
[23]. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company
and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the
compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the
Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have
any further claim against the Company. What, however,
remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have
been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit
facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled.
The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute
with certain criminal facets. The question which is required to
be answered in this case is whether the power which
independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal
proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at
all be exercised?
[24]. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove
and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi’s
case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the
Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms
filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a
fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the
way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our
view, the continuance of the same after the compromise
arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.
10. In Jayrajsinh Digvijaysingh Rana v. State of Gujarat, 2012 (12) SCC 401, Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[6]. It is also relevant to point out that the averments in the FIR
disclosed the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471,
420 and 120- B of Indian Penal Code.
[7]. The only question for consideration before this Court at this
stage is that inasmuch as all those offences are not
compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code (except
Section 420 of Indian Penal Code that too with the permission
of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is
pending), whether it would be possible to quash the FIR by the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code or by this Court
exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India?
[8]. The above question was recently considered by this Court
in Shiji @ Pappu&Ors. v. Radhika & Anr., 2011(6) Recent Apex
Judgments (R.A.J.) 210 : 2012(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 9 : (2011)10
SCC 705. The question posed in that case was “Whether the
criminal proceedings in question could be quashed in the facts
and circumstances of the case having regard to the settlement
that the parties had arrived at.” After adverting to Section 482
of the Code and various decisions, this Court concluded as
under :
“17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is
not compoundable under Section 320 Criminal
Procedure Code is by itself no reason for the High
Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section
482 Criminal Procedure Code. That power can in our5
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CRM-M-31753-2024opinion be exercised in cases where there is no
chance of recording a conviction against the
accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined
to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle
distinction between compounding of offences by
the parties before the trial court or in appeal on the
one hand and the exercise of power by the High
Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a
court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against
conviction, may not be competent to permit
compounding of an offence based on a settlement
arrived at between the parties in cases where the
offences are not compoundable under Section 320,
the High Court may quash the prosecution even in
cases where the offences with which the accused
stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent
powers of the High Court under Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code are not for that purpose
controlled by Section 320 Criminal Procedure Code.
18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the
plenitude of the power under Section 482 Criminal
Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the
High Court to exercise the same with utmost care
and caution. The width and the nature of the power
itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only
in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be
recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the
prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for
us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise
of power under Section 482 may be justified. All
that we need to say is that the exercise of power
must be for securing the ends of justice and only in
cases where refusal to exercise that power may
result in the abuse of the process of law. The High
Court may be justified in declining interference if it
is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot
assume the role of an appellate court while dealing
with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High
Court will have to consider the facts and
circumstances of each case to determine whether it
is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be
invoked.”
[9]. On going through the factual details, earlier decision,
various offences under Section 320 of the Code and invocation
of Section 482 of the Code, we fully concur with the said
conclusion. In the case on hand, irrespective of the earlier
dispute between Respondent No. 2-the complainant and the
appellant being Accused No. 3 as well as Accused Nos. 1 and 2
subsequently and after getting all the materials, relevant details
etc., the present appellant (Accused No. 3) sworn an affidavit
with bona fide intention securing the right, title and interest in
favour of Respondent No. 2 herein-the Complainant. In such
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bona fide circumstances, the power under Section 482 may be
exercised. Further, in view of the settlement arrived at between
Respondent No. 2-the complainant and the appellant (Accused
No. 3), there is no chance of recording a conviction insofar as
the present appellant is concerned and the entire exercise of
trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. Inasmuch as the
matter has not reached the stage of trial, we are of the view
that the High Court, by exercising the inherent power under
Section 482 of the Code even in offences which are not
compoundable under Section 320, may quash the prosecution.
However, as observed in Shiji (supra), the power under Section
482 has to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the
High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that
continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse
of the process of law. In other words, the exercise of power
must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where
refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the
process of law.
[10]. In the light of the principles mentioned above, inasmuch
as Respondent No. 2-the Complainant has filed an affidavit
highlighting the stand taken by the appellant (Accused No. 3)
during the pendency of the appeal before this Court and the
terms of settlement as stated in the said affidavit, by applying
the same analogy and in order to do complete justice under
Article 142 of the Constitution, we accept the terms of
settlement insofar as the appellant herein (Accused No. 3) is
concerned.
[11]. In view of the same, we quash and set aside the impugned
FIR No. 45/2011 registered with Sanand Police Station,
Ahmedabad for offences punishable under Sections 467, 468,
471, 420 and 120B of Indian Penal Code insofar as the appellant
(Accused No. 3) is concerned. The appeal is allowed to the
extent mentioned above.
11. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Jagjit Singh, (2013) 10 SCC 686, Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[14]. In the present case, the specific allegation made against
the respondent-accused is that he obtained the loan on the
basis of forged document with the aid of officers of the Bank.
On investigation, having found the ingredients of cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property of the bank (Section
420 Indian Penal Code) and dishonestly using as genuine a
forged document (Section 471 Indian Penal Code), charge sheet
was submitted under Sections 420/471 Indian Penal Code
against the accused persons.
[15]. The debt which was due to the Bank was recovered by the
Bank pursuant to an order passed by Debts Recovery Tribunal.
Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a compromise
between the offender and the victim. The offences when
committed in relation with Banking activities including offences
under Sections 420/471 Indian Penal Code have harmful effect
on the public and threaten the well being of the society. These
offences fall under the category of offences involving moral
turpitude committed by public servants while working in that
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capacity. Prima facie, one may state that the bank as the victim
in such cases but, in fact, the society in general, including
customers of the Bank is the sufferer. In the present case, there
was neither an allegation regarding any abuse of process of any
Court nor anything on record to suggest that the offenders
were entitled to secure the order in the ends of justice.
12. In Gold Quest International Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu,
2014:INSC:611 [Para 3], (2014) 15 SCC 235, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[3]. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant is an
International Numismatic Company which has operations in
over sixty countries. It is pleaded that it conducts its business
with necessary licence. The multi level marketing through direct
selling of products is being adopted by the Company in the
interest of the consumers by eliminating the middleman and
rewarding the consumer by reducing the prices. The appellant-
company has over sixteen thousand members/consumers in
and around the city of Chennai alone. A complaint was made in
the year 2003 by Respondent No. 7 against the appellant-
company alleging non-compliance of issuance of numismatic
gold coin on receipt of L 16,800/- from wife of Respondent No.
7 as per the promise made by the appellant-company. Some
other customers also had complaints on the basis of which
Respondent No. 4 registered a case under Section 420 of the
Indian Penal Code read with Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Prise Chits
and Money Circulation (Banning) Act, 1978. The appellant-
company filed a writ petition being W.P.No. 26784 of 2003
before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying therein
that the FIR registered against it be quashed. Since all the
claimants including the complainant settled the dispute with
the appellant-company and entered into an agreement, learned
Single Judge of the High Court by its order dated 19th April,
2005 quashed the FIR, and disposed of the aforesaid writ
petition. However, the State-respondents challenged the said
order dated 19th April, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge
whereby the FIR No. 307 of 2003 was quashed, before the
Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench allowed
the writ appeal being W.A.No. 1178 of 2005 filed by the State-
respondents and directed Respondent No. 4 to investigate the
crime. Hence, this appeal.
[8]. In view of the principle laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid cases, we are of the view in the disputes which are
substantially matrimonial in nature, or the civil property
disputes with criminal facets, if the parties have entered into
settlement, and it has become clear that there are no chances
of conviction, there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Article 226 of the
Constitution. However, the same would not apply where the
nature of offence is very serious like rape, murder, robbery,
dacoity, cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, cases under
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and other
similar kind of offences in which punishment of life
imprisonment or death can be awarded. After considering the
facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view
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that learned Single Judge did not commit any error of law in
quashing the FIR after not only the complainant and the
appellant settled their money dispute but also the other alleged
sufferers entered into an agreement with the appellant, and as
such, they too settled their claims.
13. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003 [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC
641, a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for
quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: –
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarized in the following
propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere
in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While
compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by
the provisions of section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if
the offence is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the
ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any
court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High
Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the
victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
founded on the overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so
far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
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CRM-M-31753-202416 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the
dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression
and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the state have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be justified
in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an
activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour.
The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial
or economic system will weigh in the balance.
14. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on
29.09.2021, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[11]. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’
cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported
exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such
attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and
modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive
domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in
the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider
interpretation and include such offences in the docket of
‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out
as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to
compound an offence within the framework of Section 320
Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by
the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High
Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a
case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in
aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to
secure the ends of justice.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of
the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their
dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the
nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such
proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The
High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects
of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter
adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if
goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very
object of the administration of criminal justice system.
[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-
heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a
private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial
has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against
conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of
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delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is
always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that
the cases where compromise is struck postconviction, the High
Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping
in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion
in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due
regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the
conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The
touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice.
There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the
High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or
specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a
case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in
cases where heinous offences have been proved against
perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as
cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. vs.
State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, 29], and Laxmi
Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences
which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the
social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters
concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two
individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential
to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences
through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal
to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to
unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can
secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts,
bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty
man escape, if it can be avoided.”
15. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, Hon’ble Supreme
Court holds,
[5]. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application
was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which
has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a
reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the
dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting
parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings
between them and that there was absolutely no public policy
involved in the nature of the allegations made against the
accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful
purpose would be served in continuing with the proceedings in
the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that
the complainant has, on 11th January 2004, passed away and
the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be
ruled out. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable
that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely
personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of
the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the
matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the
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Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:112605
CRM-M-31753-2024
prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened
as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be
utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation.
This is a common sense approach to the matter based on
ground of realities and benefit of the technicalities of the law.
16. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642,
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously
when parties, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or
reunion.
17. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of
compromise, placement of parties, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents
of the compromise deed and its objectives point towards its acceptance.
18. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh,
2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds “[47]. As
far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this
Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that matter was
already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Petitions against the order
of the High Court rejecting their petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having
regard to these peculiar facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In any case, once
we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stand
vitiated.”
19. Considering the entire facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-
mentioned judicial precedents, I believe that continuing these proceedings will not
suffice any fruitful purpose whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this
case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC and quashes
the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the petitioner(s). The bail bonds of the
petitioner are accordingly discharged. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
Petition allowed in the terms mentioned above. All pending applications, if any, stand
disposed of.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
August 30,2024
AK
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : No
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