Delhi High Court
Mohd Zakir vs Sabuddin & Anr on 8 October, 2024
Author: Chandra Dhari Singh
Bench: Chandra Dhari Singh
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on : 12th July, 2024
Pronounced on: 8th October, 2024
+ MAC.APP. 425/2016
MOHD ZAKIR .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.D. Wadhwa, Advocate, with
appellant in person.
versus
SABUDDIN & ANR .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Manpreet Kaur, Advocate for
R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH
JUDGMENT
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.
1. The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 (hereinafter as the “Act”) has been filed on behalf of the appellant
challenging the judgment dated 20th February, 2016 (hereinafter as the
“impugned order/award”) passed by the learned Motor Vehicles Claims
Tribunal, South East District, Saket Court, New Delhi (hereinafter as the
“Tribunal”) in Suit No. 335/14, seeking the following reliefs –
“In the above premises, it is, therefore, respectfully prayed
that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to kindly
uphold the grounds of appeal for the appropriate
modification of the Award passed by the Tribunal below so
that the three cardinal principles of Equity, Justice, Good
Conscience and fair-play are properly met in the real sense
of the terms.
Any other or further relief deemed fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case may also kindly be passed inSignature Not Verified
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Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN
KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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favor of the petitioner and against both the
respondents……’jointly and severally’.”
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. On 1st June, 2004, at about 9:45 AM, Mr. Mohd. Zakir, the
appellant herein/claimant before the learned Tribunal, was riding his
Chetak Scooter bearing registration number DL-3S-D-6493 along with
his brother-in-law, Mr. Mohd. Usman, from Sangam Vihar to Subhash
Camp. When the claimant reached near one shop namely Munna Auto
Welder, Shanny Bazar, Devli, New Delhi, one scooter bearing registration
number DNF-7071 (hereinafter as the “offending vehicle”), coming from
the opposite direction, collided with the claimant‟s vehicle. As an effect,
the claimant and the pillion rider fell from the scooter and the claimant
sustained grievous head injuries. Consequently, the claimant was
immediately moved to the Batra Hospital, Delhi for his medical
treatment.
3. Thereafter, an FIR bearing number 406/2004 was registered with
Police Station – Sangam Vihar and upon completion of the investigation,
chargesheet was registered against the respondent no.1/driver under
Sections 279/338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
4. Subsequently, the claimant filed a claim petition bearing Suit no.
335/14 before the learned Tribunal seeking compensation for the grievous
injuries sustained by him in the accident. In its impugned order, the
learned Tribunal held that the respondent no.1/ driver was driving in a
rash and negligent manner, thereby, causing grievous injuries to the
appellant/claimant, and awarded a compensation of Rs. 2,72,922/- with
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KUMAR BABBAR
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an interest @ 9% to be payable by the respondent no. 1 from the date of
filing of the said claim petition till its realisation.
5. Aggrieved by the impugned award, the appellant has filed the
instant appeal seeking enhancement of the compensation amount.
PLEADINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
6. By way of filing this instant appeal, the appellant/claimant has
challenged the impugned award on the following grounds:
“A. For that the Judgment/Award passed by the MACT is
wholly perverse in every respect i.e. the niggardly
(ungenerous) compensation granted under various Sub-
heads. If rules of prudence are applied and there is
necessary application of mind then, this award will
amount to an act of ‘gross’ impropriety. But the appellant
feels that ‘law’ will keep its promise to justice and the
access of jurisprudence to justice shall be expanded by
this Hon’ble Court and dethroning of reason, logic and
rationale not be allowed by the appellate Court.
B. For that the Award badly suffers from the vice of
irrationality and lack of credibility especially to the
unfortunate victim of RTA who has suffered 75% total
disability visa-a-vis whole body such as virtual heavily
impaired hearing, loss of vision, lack of clarity in speech,
disfigurement of face, total loss of memory. The petitioner
now usually suffers from bouts of psychiatric disorder
and nobody at a hearing distance can make out as to
what he is talking and gives them the impression of being
mental deranged.
C. For that his total incapacity for working physically
what to talk of earning etc. etc.. This way he has, in
totality, suffered a loss of amenities, enjoyment of life,
that of Income not only for the period of his treatment but
also of future earnings for the rest of his life, hence theSignature Not Verified
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KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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imperative need for suitably enhancing the all-round
compensation under all these Sub-heads particularly
under this socially beneficial legislation and also keeping
in view the Apex Court laying emphasis for grant of
liberal compensation with the help of which he can pass
the rest of his life with dignity and smoothness without
any further hassle till the end of his life.
D. For that the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s
message/dictum/advice in this respect to all the
Courts/Tribunals in the Country that if the Courts can not
wholly restore the physical and mental sufferings
undergone by the victim of RTA they should at least grant
him reasonable, adequate, fair, just and proper amount of
compensation to mitigate his financial problems to the
best possible extent due to the damage caused to him
physically also mentally as far as the compensation can
do in the matter of leading his life with grace and dignity.
E. For that it is pertinent to state here that the Award so
passed in favor of the claimant and against the offending
Driver, to say the least, amounts to pittance and that too
not against both the Respondents jointly and severally
particularly when the Offending Driver is dwelling in
Jhugi-Jhonpdi Cluster and working as a plumber who, as
per his version, can hardly make his two ends meet. This
aspect needs in-depth and critical examination especially
when the Registered Owner was bound by the law of the
land to go to the Registering Authority and get his vehicle
formally transferred in the name of the purchaser after
the completion of transaction of sale.
F. For that the Ld. Tribunal has also fallen in serious
error for not taking the sky-rocketing prices prevalent at
the material time of RTA happening in 2004 and granting
the reasonable, fair and just compensation under various
Sub-heads as had been allowed in that particular period,Signature Not Verified
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Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN
KUMAR BABBAR
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hence the urgent need to carry out substantial
rectification / appropriate modification in the matter of
granting compensation. Other relevant legal pleas shall
be taken up by the Counsel at the time of final arguments
in the matter.”
7. Countering the instant appeal, the respondent no.1 has filed a reply
to the same and the relevant extracts of the same are as follows:
“1. That Respondent No.l is a poor person and leaving in
a Juggi bearing No.C-89/A, Janta Jeevan Camp Tigri
with his family consisting of 3 unmarried daughter and 2
son and marinating a BPL Card No BPL33330138 and
only the bread earner running in his family depending on
daily earning as Plumber and not having any other
sources of income except the daily wages work. The copy
of same is enclosed as Annexure -A.
***
3. That in the year 2004 Respondent No.l was working
with Respondent No.2 who is running a business of
manufacturing of spare parts of submersible motor and
pump under the name and style of M/s Deepak
Engineering works at shop No.2/20 Dakshinpuri New
Delhi and the Scooter bearing Registration No.DNF 7071
was provided by the respondent No,2 to the Respondent
No.l for attending the complaint and on 01.06.2004
respondent No.l was attending the complaint between
8:45 AM to 10 AM at the house No. H -273,Dakshinpuri
Delhi.
4. That Respondent No.l has also filed the appeal against
the Claim Petition No.335/14 before the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi bearing MAC Application No.763/2016
which is pending for 23.05.2017 for depositing the sum of
Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh Only) and Respondent
No.l is not having such a huge amount even respondent
No.l has approached for selling the JUGGI but nobody
come forward to the pay the same to the respondent No.lSignature Not Verified
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KUMAR BABBAR
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hence till date he is not in position to pay/deposit the said
amount.
***
7. Further it is also pertinent to mentioned that doctor
has diagnosed Abdominal Tuberculosis and PW-5 Dr
Pradeep Gupta Sr Resident HAH Centenary Hospital
Hamdard Nagar clearly stated that which has no relation
with any kind of physical disability or accidental injuries
the same is due to bacterial infection. Copy of chief is
enclosed as Annexure-C.
***
10. Further it is pertinent to mention that the respondent
No.l was working with Respondent No.2 from January
2004 and he worked upto October 2006 and said scooter
Registration No.DNF 7071 was used for attending the
complaint and the documents i.e. form 29 & 30 are filed
and prepared by the respondent No.2 himself after the
information of the accident as respondent No.l is illiterate
and only knowing to write his name in Hindi and English.
Hence it is humble submission of the Respondent No.l
that the respondent No,2 name may be included liable for
the said compensation.
REPLY ON THE GROUND OF APPEAL ON MERIT:
2. That content of Para No. C & D of the petition under
reply is wrong and specifically denied that petitioner is
incapacity for working physically it is also wrong and
specifically denied that petitioner has suffered totality
suffered a loss of amenities, enjoy of life and it is also
wrong and specifically denied that suitably enhancing the
all round compensation under all these sub-head sunder
socially beneficial legislation. Further, it is submitted
that petitions is still running a meat shop from his house
and such evidence can be brought by the respondent No.l
if Hon’ble Court permit.
3. That content of Para No. E of the petition under reply
matter of record and it is true that respondent No.l isSignature Not Verified
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KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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dwelling in Jhugi cluster and working as plumber and
struggling for his and his family livelihood to make his
two ends meet.
4. That content of Para No. E of the petition under reply
is wrong and specifically denied that any urgent need to
carry out substantial rectification/appropriate
modification in the matter of granting the compensation.
Further respondent No.1 respectfully submit that he is
poor person residing in Jhugi and did not have such a big
amount and not in position to pay the awarded
compensation sum of Rs.2,47,922/- along with interest @
9% per annum. Respondent No.l in the folded hand
prayed to the Hon’ble Court kindly consider the position
of the respondent No.2 before passing any verdict in the
present petition.”
8. The written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant are also
taken on record. However, no reply was filed on behalf of the respondent
no.2 and therefore, this Court is adjudicating the instant appeal on the
basis of the material placed on record.
SUBMISSIONS
(on behalf of the appellant))
9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted
that the learned Tribunal erred in granting meagre amount of
compensation under all the sub-heads of the compensation, without
taking into account the grievousness of the injuries sustained by the
appellant.
10. It is submitted that at the time of passing the impugned order, the
learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the appellant herein incurred
75% permanent disability vis-à-vis his whole body, however, the learned
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KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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Tribunal erroneously considered that the appellant sustained 38%
functional disability.
11. It is submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned
Tribunal is not in accordance with the settled principles of law as it did
not adequately compensate for the injuries sustained by the appellant,
who has been suffering from cognitive impairment due to the accident
and seems to be mentally deranged, thereby experiencing psychiatric
outbreaks.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the
permanent disability incurred by him has incapacitated him in such a way
that it is affecting his earning capacity, which further affects his loss of
amenities, enjoyment of life, income for the duration of treatment as well
as the future income, and in view of the same, the appellant is entitled to
get an enhancement of the compensation amount under all the sub-heads.
13. It is further submitted that if the Courts cannot restore the mental
and physical sufferings of the appellant, a fair, reasonable and adequate
compensation is to be awarded in order to mitigate such sufferings and
financial problems.
14. It is submitted that the appellant is entitled to overall enhancement
of the compensation award as the medical documents and reports on
record indicate that the appellant has incurred grievous injuries to the
head, thereby affecting his physical as well as psychiatric activities. It is
submitted that the appellant is additionally entitled to compensation under
the heads of „loss of care and guidance for minor children‟ and „loss of
consortium‟ as the children and spouse of the appellant are affected by the
inability of the appellant to share affection and companionship with them.
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KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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15. It is submitted that upon relying on various case laws of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the Courts are entitled to grant a liberal
compensation to upkeep the dignity and hassle-free life of the claimant.
16. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to make the
respondent no.2 liable for paying the compensation amount along with
respondent no.1, as the former is a registered owner of the offending
vehicle and therefore, is liable to pay the compensation amount jointly
and severally.
17. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal has perused the testimonies
of the witnesses in detail in the impugned order, which also includes the
averments made with respect to the liability of registered owner.
However, the said issue on liability has not been discussed by the learned
Tribunal while passing the impugned order and has failed to make the
respondent no. 2 liable to pay the compensation amount.
18. It is submitted that as per the settled position of law, the registered
owner of a vehicle is bound by law to visit the Registering Authority for
formally transferring the vehicle in the name of the purchaser after the
completion of the sale transaction.
19. It is submitted that the respondent no.2 is jointly and severally
liable along with the respondent no.1 to pay the overall compensation
awarded to the appellant/ claimant.
20. Therefore, in view of the foregoing submissions, it is submitted
that the instant appeal may be allowed and the compensation granted vide
the impugned order may be enhanced.
(on behalf of the respondent no. 1)
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21. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent no.1/driver vehemently opposed the instant appeal submitting
to the effect that the same is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any
merits.
22. It is submitted that the respondent no. 1 has filed an appeal bearing
no. MAC APPL.763/2016 against the impugned order as the liability of
the driver was determined without taking into account the facts and
circumstances, and the said appeal is pending for adjudication before this
Court.
23. It is submitted that the instant appeal filed by the appellant is bereft
of any merits as the appellant is not entitled for an overall enhancement
of the compensation under the sub-heads.
24. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in considering the
medical expenses emanating in the year 2010, wherein the appellant
underwent treatment of abdominal tuberculosis, which has no relation
with respect to the injuries sustained in the accident. The same has also
been testified by PW – 5, Dr. Pradeep Gupta, Senior Resident at HAH
Centenary Hospital, Hamdard Nagar, New Delhi, and therefore, the same
cannot be taken into account for compensating the appellant‟s medical
expenses.
25. It is submitted that the respondent no.1 is economically and
socially underprivileged, who is dwelling in a Jhuggi cluster and works as
a plumber, which makes it difficult for him to make his two ends meet on
a daily basis. Therefore, it is submitted that the respondent no.1 cannot
pay the compensation of Rs. 2,47,922/- along with an interest @ 9% per
annum.
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26. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted that the instant
appeal may be dismissed being devoid of any merits.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
27. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
28. The instant appeal is admitted.
29. It is the case of the appellant that the learned Tribunal has awarded
an inadequate compensation under all the sub-heads without
contemplating the grievous injuries suffered by the appellant due to the
said accident while passing the impugned order. It is further contented
that the respondent no.2, who is the registered owner of the offending
vehicle, is liable to be held jointly and severally liable along with the
respondent no.1/driver.
30. In rival submissions, it is contended by the respondent no.1 that the
instant appeal is bereft of any merits and that the appellant herein is not
entitled for an enhancement qua the compensation. However, it is the
case of the respondent no.1 that he is not financially equipped to pay the
compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal. Hence, it is prayed that
the instant appeal may be dismissed.
31. Taking into consideration the aforesaid arguments, the following
issues arise before this Court for adjudication:
1. Whether the appellant/claimant is entitled for overall
enhancement of the compensation granted by the learned
Tribunal?
2. Whether Mr. Deepak Ray/respondent no. 2, allegedly being a
registered owner of the offending vehicle, be made jointly and
severally liable to pay the compensation to the claimant?
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Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN
KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
12:09:52
32. Before delving into the issues at hand, this Court deems it apposite
to peruse the findings and reasons recorded by the learned Tribunal in the
impugned order. The relevant portion of the same is reproduced as
follows :
“Issue no. 1 (Negligence)
20. PW1 Mohd. Zakir in his affidavit of evidence
(Ex.PW1/A) categorically stated that he got injuries due to
the rash and negligent driving of respondent no. 1. Nothing
came in his cross examination to disbelieve his version. His
version is duly corroborated by police investigation. Police
during investigation also found respondent no.1 accused of
rash and negligent driving, hence chargesheeted him for
commission of offence under section 279/338 of Indian
Penal Code.
21. To determine the negligence of the driver of the
offending vehicle, I am being guided by the judgment of
Hon’ble High Court (MP) in case titled as “Basant Kaur &
Ors Vs. Chattar Pal Singh and Ors” [2003 ACJ 369 MP
(DB)], wherein it has been held that registration of a
criminal case against the driver of the offending vehicle is
enough to record the finding that the driver of offending
vehicle is responsible for causing the accident. Further it
has been held in catena of cases that the proceedings under
the Motor Vehicles Act are not akin to the proceedings as in
civil suit and hence strict rules of evidence are not required
to be followed in this regard. I am also being guided by the
judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in “National
Insurance Company Limited V5. Pushpa Rana” (2009 ACJ
287), wherein it was held that in case the petitioner files the
certified copy of the criminal record or the criminal record
showing the completion of the investigation by the police or
the issuance of charge sheet under Section 279/304 A IPC or
the certified copy of the FIR or in addition the recovery
memo or the mechanical inspection report of the offendingSignature Not Verified
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KUMAR BABBAR
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vehicle, these documents are sufficient proof to reach to the
conclusion that the driver was negligent. It is also settled
law that the term rashness and negligence has to be
constructed lightly while making a decision on a petition for
claim for the same as compared to the word rashness and
negligence as finds mention in the Indian Penal Code. This
is because the chapter in the Motor Vehicle Act dealing with
compensation is a benevolent legislation and not a penal
one.
22. In view of the above discussion, petitioner is able to
prove that he suffered injuries due to rash and negligent
driving of the respondent no. 1. Accordingly the issue no. 1
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Issue no. 2 (Compensation)
23. In injury cases, the claimants are entitled to pecuniary
as well as non pecuniary damages. Apex court in Raj Kumar
Vs. Ajay Kumar 2011 (1) SCC 343 held that compensation
awarded must be “just compensation” means to the extent
possible Tribunal fully and adequately restore the claimant
to the position which he/she was having prior to the
accident. The person is not only to be compensated for
physical injury, but also for loss which he /she suffered as a
result of such injury. Apex court in R.D.Hatangadi Vs Press
Control (India) Pvt Ltd (1995) 1 SCC 551 held that
pecuniary and non pecuniary compensation to be assessed
separately. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim
has actually incurred, which are capable of being calculated
in terms of money, whereas non pecuniary damages are
those which are not capable of being assessed by
arithmetical calculation, however no amount of
compensation can restore the physical frame of the victim,
therefore object to compensate such injury is “so far as
money can compensate”, because it is impossible to equate
money with the human suffering or personal deprivation. To
compute compensation involved some guess work, some
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KUMAR BABBAR
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hypothetical considerations, some amount of sympathy
linked with the nature of disability caused. In Nagppa Vs
Gurdayal Singh 2003 (2) SCC 274 apex court observed that
while calculating such damages Tribunal required to have
some guess work taking into account the inflation factor.
24. In the light of aforesaid guidelines and parameters, this
Tribunal has to assess the compensation to-be awarded to
the claimant/petitioner.
25. Medical Expenses: PW1 petitioner in his affidavit of
evidence stated that after accident, he was immediately
removed to Batra Hospital, New Delhi in an unconscious
state where O/E, he was found to be drowsy, restless and
incontinent by the M/E as per the detail inscribed on the
enclosed Medico Legal Report of dated 01.06.2004 at
10.59am. He further stated that he remained under treatment
in Batra hospital from 01.06.2014 to 12.06.2014. He further
stated that thereafter, he was admitted in IHBAS from
09.04.2010 to 06.05.2010. Discharge summary of Batra
hospital (Mark X) shows that petitioner admitted on
01.06.2004 and discharged on 12.06.2004 and diagnosed to
have suffered ”head injury-left temporal contusion”. Medical
Board Report of Patient Mohd. Zakir ( Ex. PW2/B)
mentioned that “Patient Mohd. Zakir was examined by the
Medical Board at IHBAS on 31.03.2010. The board opines
that patient needs inpatient evaluation for resolving some
clinical issues and for other relevant investigations for final
medical board opinion. The patient will be taken up for
review Medical Board after 4-6 weeks Another Medical
Board Report of Patient Mohd. Zakir says that ” patient
Mohd. Zakir was examined by the Medical Board at IHBAS
on 05.05.2010. The board opined that based on evidence
from clinical history and ward behavior observation,
neuropsychological assessment and neuro imaging findings
the patient is diagnosed as a case of “post traumatic
cognitive impairment”. Discharge summary of IHBAS shows
that petitioner admitted on 09.04.2010 and discharged on
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Signing Date:15.10.2024
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06.05.2010. In the discharge summary mentioned that
“patient sustained significant head injury. Remained in coma
for 3 weeks and had to be operated. After gaining
consciousness, he c/o memory impairment/inability to plan a
head/ADL &dys function in work”. During proceedings,
petitioner was examined for disability. Discharge card of
HAH Centernary hospital shows that petitioner admitted on
16.05.2013 and discharged on 22.05.2013 and final
diagno.sis is ”Tuberculosis ABD”. Disability certificate
dated 28.02.2012 issued by the medical board of Pandit
Madan Mohan Malviya hospital opined that petitioner
suffered 75% permanent disability in relation to his whole
body. This condition is non progressive, not likely to
improve and reassessment is not recommended. Petitioner
for claiming expenses relied upon medical bills (Ex. PW1/C)
of Rs. 16,764/-. Nothing material has come in his in cross
examination to dispute the veracity of these bills. Hence a
sum of Rs. 17,000/- is granted to the petitioner towards
medical expenses.
26. Compensation for Pain & Sufferings: Petitioner has
suffered 75% permanent disability in relation to his whole
body, therefore, keeping in view the nature of injuries,
duration of treatment and trauma of accident, a sum of Rs.
5,000/- is granted to the petitioner towards pain and
sufferings.
27. Loss of Amenities and enjoyment of Life: Petitioner
suffered permanent disability in relation to his whole body,
this injury will definitely hamper his daily activities and
enjoyment in every walk of life. Hence, a sum of Rs. 10,000/-
is granted towards loss of amenities and enjoyment of life.
28. Loss of income/leaves during treatment:- Petitioner in
his affidavit of evidence stated that at the time of accident,
he had been engaged /occupied in the trade of selling meat
by running a shop in Subhash Camp, Dakshinpuri, New
Delhi-62 and earning about one lac a year with the co-
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Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN
KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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operation and active assistance of his wife prior to his
involvement in RTA but since the date of accident, he is
totally unemployed and his family is being fed by his father,
four brothers and his in laws. In his cross examination, he
stated that he was having his own meat shop. He has not
filed any document regarding his ownership on the said
shop. He further stated that it is correct that there is no
document filed on record regarding his meat business. He
further stated that it is also correct that there is no document
filed on record regarding his monthly income. He did not file
any documentary evidence regarding his salary. In these
circumstances, income of the petitioner is to be assessed
under minimum wages act applicable for unskilled on the
date of accident i.e 01.06.2004 is Rs. 2862.90/–(round
figure as Rs. 2863/-). Keeping in view the nature of injuries
and duration of treatment a lump sum amount of Rs 2863X6
=Rs. 17,178/- is granted to the petitioner towards loss of
income during treatment.
29. Loss of future income: In the claim petitioner, age of
injured and disability certificate is mentioned as 30 years. In
the ration card , age of injured is mentioned as 45 years. In
the election I card , age of injured is mentioned as 25 years
as on 01.01.1994, therefore, he is around 39 years at the
time of accident i.e. 01.06.2004. The age of injured is taken
as 39 years on the basis of election I card. Due to the
present injuries his entire carrier is ruined. It is natural that
with this disability and injuries the petitioner entire future
career/earning capacity has been destroyed. However,
present injury will somehow diminish his earning capacity.
As per disability certificate, petitioner suffered 75%
permanent disability in relation to his whole body, in view of
the judgment of Delhi High Court titled as “Laxmi Narain
Vs. Trilochan Singh & Ors., FAO No. 289/99, dated
04.05.2009, Delhi”, the total functional disability towards
whole body is assessed around 38%.
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Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN
KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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30. Petitioner’s income is assessed at the rate of Rs. 2863/-
per month. Petitioner being aged around 39 years, also
entitled for 50% increase in income towards future prospect
[relied upon Sanjay verma Vs Haryana Roadways 2014 ACJ
692 (SC), Mirajuddin Vs Shonki Ram & Ors MAC App
604/2011 dated 03.12.2013 (Delhi), Reliance General
Insurance Company Litimed Vs Haresh Kumar @ Harish
Kumar MAC App no. 399/12 dated 27.05.2014 (Delhi),
Uttranchal Transport Corporation Vs. Navneet Jerath 2013
ACJ 1966 (Delhi), Neerupam Mohan Mathur Vs New India
Assurance Company 2013 (14) SCC 15J. Therefore, his
monthly income is assessed around (Rs. 2863/-+ Rs.50% of
Rs.2863/-= Rs.4294.5/-). Apex court in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay
Kumar 2011(1) SCC 343, mandated multiplier method for
calculation of compensation for future loss of earning
capacity which is as follows:
(a) Annual income= Rs.4294.5/-X12=Rs. 51,534/-
(b) loss of future earning per annum (38% of the prior
annual income) =Rs.
Rs. 51,534/-X 38% =Rs 19,582.92/-
(c) Petitioner is found to be around 39 years of age at the
time of accident, Therefore, applicable multiplier as per
Sarla Verma Case is 15.
(d) Loss of future earnings= Rs 19,582.92/- X 15= Rs.
2,93,743.8/-(round figure as Rs. 2,93,744/-
Thus sum of Rs. 2,93,744/- is granted towards loss of
future income.
31. Attendant Charges: Petitioner suffered disability
injuries and will require attendant for most number of
occasions throughout entire life. Hence a lump sum amount
of Rs.10,000/- is granted towards attendants charges.
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32. Special Diet and Conveyance Charges:- Keeping in view
the nature of injuries and duration of treatment, a sum of Rs.
5,000/- each is granted towards special diet and conveyance
charges. Total sum of Rs. 10,000/- is granted under this
head.
33. Disfigurement: Petitioner suffered permanent disability
in relation to his whole body which causes disfigurement of
the body, therefore a sum of Rs.10,000/- granted to him
towards disfigurement.
34. The total compensation is assessed for injured as under:-
1 Compensation Rs. 17,000/-
for Medical
expenses
2 Compensation Rs.5,000/-
for pain
&suffering
3 Compensation Rs.10,000/-
for special
diet&
conveyance
4 Loss of future Rs. 2,93,744/-
earning
capacity /future
income
5 Compensation Rs. 10,000/-
for loss of
amenities and
enjoyment of
life
6 Attendant Rs. 10,000/-
Charges
7 Compensation Rs. 10,000/-
for
disfigurement
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8 Loss of income Rs. 17,178/-
during
treatment
Total Rs.3,72,922/-
Interim Award Rs. 25,000/-
Net Total Rs. 3,47,922/-
35. The petitioner is hereby awarded a sum of Rs. 3,47,922/-
(Rupees Three lacs forty seven thousand nine hundred
twenty two only) with interest @ 9% per annum from the
date of filing of the present petition, till the date of
realization of the amount in favour of petitioner and against
the respondent no. 1 Mohd. Sabuddin on account of their
liability being joint and several.
36. The driver R-1 Mohd. Sabuddin is the principal tort
feasor as well as fully liable for his act as he is the owner of
the vehicle also and the offending vehicle is not insured also.
37. In view of the above discussion, the respondent Mohd.
Sabuddin is directed to discharge the liability of the award
amount within a period of 30 days from today along with the
interest @9% per annum, failing which interest @12% per
annum shall be charged for the period of delay.”
33. At the outset, the learned Tribunal categorically dealt with the issue
of negligence as well as the compensation to be awarded to the claimant.
While determining the issue of negligence, the learned Tribunal has
placed reliance on the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the material
on record and concluded its findings based on the principle of
preponderance of probabilities that the respondent no.1/driver was
driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, which
caused grievous injuries to the claimant/appellant herein.
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34. In order to determine the compensation for the injuries sustained by
the claimant/appellant, the learned Tribunal assessed various documents
placed on record such as the medico-legal report, discharge summaries,
medical board report, election identity card, disability certificate etc.
Upon consideration of the aforesaid documents and situational difficulties
surrounding the claimant/appellant, the learned Tribunal awarded a sum
of Rs.2,72,922/- as compensation to the claimant, which is to be payable
by the driver/respondent no.1. However, out of the said total
compensation, the respondent no. 2/Mr. Deepak Ray paid Rs. 25,000/- as
interim relief.
ISSUE – 1: Whether the appellant/claimant is entitled for overall
enhancement of the compensation granted by the learned Tribunal?
35. It is the case of the appellant that the compensation amount ought
to be enhanced overall under all the heads as the learned Tribunal erred in
not granting „just‟ and „reasonable‟ compensation thereto.
36. Therefore, for the purpose of convenience, this Court shall firstly
deal with the pecuniary expenses and later, non-pecuniary expenses as
awarded by the learned Tribunal.
37. However, while awarding compensation under these expenses,
multiple factors need to be taken into consideration as the primary aim is
to provide for just and reasonable compensation to the victim of motor-
vehicle accidents and ensure that the factors affecting the needs of the
claimant are taken into account. In the case of Raj Kumar vs. Ajay
Kumar1, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court laid out different factors to be
1
(2011) 1 SCC 343.
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considered under the pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads while
determining the compensation. In the said case, it was observed by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the assessment of pecuniary damages is
usually based on the evidence placed on record as it includes
reimbursement of the amount spent and medical records of the treatment,
whereas the assessment of non-pecuniary damages is subjective and
depends on the nature of injuries and surrounding circumstances of the
victim.
PECUNIARY EXPENSES
Medical expenses:
38. While granting compensation for medical expenses, only those
documents which pertain to the injuries sustained by the appellant in the
instant case shall be taken into consideration and the injuries arising out
of the said documents have to be in relation to the concerned accident.
39. As per the material available on record, it is revealed that the
appellant met with an accident and was immediately rushed to the Batra
Hospital, Delhi for medical treatment, wherein he was hospitalised from
1st June, 2004 to 12th June, 2004. As per the medico-legal report, the
appellant incurred grievous injuries, wherein it was stated that his left ear
was bleeding and affected his level of consciousness. It is further revealed
that the appellant also consulted the NCCT of Brain on 22nd March, 2005
and was later admitted to Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied
Sciences (hereinafter as the “IHBAS”) from 5th April, 2010 to 6th May,
2010, wherein he was examined by the medical board at IHBAS for
disability report on 5th May, 2010. Moreover, the appellant was also
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hospitalised in HAH Centenary Hospital from 16 th May, 2013 to 22nd
May, 2013 for abdominal tuberculosis.
40. This Court has also perused evidence and examination of witnesses
before the learned Tribunal. PW – 5, Dr. Pradeep Gupta, Senior Resident
at HAH Centenary Hospital, Hamdard Nagar, New Delhi testified before
the learned Tribunal that the appellant was admitted in their hospital from
16th May, 2013 to 22nd May, 2013 and was diagnosed for abdominal
tuberculosis. He further stated that the said diagnosis has no relation with
the physical disability or accidental injuries caused due to the motor
vehicle accident.
41. However, the medical bills pertaining to the appellant‟s treatment
of abdominal tuberculosis is also placed on record and the same has been
considered by the learned Tribunal while granting compensation under
this head. In light of PW-5‟s testimony, the bills arising from 16th May,
2013 to 22nd May, 2013 cannot be considered while determining the
medical expenses as the same is with respect to the abdominal
tuberculosis, which is not relevant to the injuries sustained in the accident
in question.
42. Even so, the appellant has placed additional evidence on record
with respect to the medical treatment of grievous injuries sustained,
which is inclusive of medical bills from Batra Hospital as well as other
miscellaneous receipts.
43. The learned Tribunal relied upon the testimony of PW-1, and
medical bills and documents on record such as the medico-legal report,
discharge summaries of IHBAS and HAH, while granting a sum of
Rs. 17,000/- for medical expenses. However, while granting the same,
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the learned Tribunal has failed to take into account the medical bills of
Batra Hospital, which are placed on record, and erroneously considered
the medical bills of HAH, wherein the appellant underwent medical
treatment for abdominal tuberculosis, which is not related to the injuries
incurred in the accident.
44. It is observed herein that the learned Tribunal erred in law by
wrongly taking the medical bills for the „treatment of abdominal
tuberculosis‟ into consideration while awarding the compensation under
the head of „medical expenses‟ as the same is not relevant to the injuries
sustained by the appellant in the accident, as testified by PW-5. Moreover,
it failed to take into account the medical bills from Batra Hospital, where
the appellant was initially admitted for treatment of accidental injuries.
45. Therefore, for computing the medical expense, this Court has relied
upon the testimony of PW-5 as well as the additional medical bills on
record, and the same stands modified from Rs.17,000/- to Rs. 59,000/.
The compensation of the same is given as under –
DETAILS AMOUNT
Bill no. 104169 dated 12th June, Rs. 54,052/-
2004 [from 1st June, 2004 to 12th
June, 2004]
Miscellaneous Bills - which are Rs. 1000/-
considered by the learned Tribunal,
but exclusive of HAH bills
Additional miscellaneous bills - Rs. 3853.50/-
which are not considered by the
learned Tribunal
TOTAL Rs. 58,905.50/-, rounded off to Rs.
59,000/-
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Loss of income during the treatment:
46. In order to assess the loss of income during the treatment, it is
pertinent for this Court to determine the income of the appellant and the
duration of his medical treatment.
47. It has been testified by PW-1/appellant in his cross examination
that at the time of the accident, he was the owner of a meat shop which is
within his residential premises. However, it was admitted that he did not
place any document on record pertaining to his ownership over the meat
shop as well as the income generation thereof. Moreover, it was deposed
that the appellant studied only upto 5 th standard and barely knows how to
read and write.
48. Therefore, in absence of any documents proving the income and
profession of the appellant, the learned Tribunal has rightly taken the
minimum wages of an unskilled worker, which is Rs. 2,863/- per month,
prevailing at the time of the accident, for the calculation of loss of income
during the treatment as well as future income.
49. For determining the duration of medical treatment, this Court
further perused the medical documents such as discharge summaries,
medical board reports, medical bills etc. The aforesaid documents reflect
that the appellant was hospitalised from 1 st June, 2004 to 12th June, 2004
in Batra Hospital and was further admitted in IHBAS from 5 th April, 2010
to 6th May, 2010. It is observed that the aforesaid documents reflect that
the appellant has procured medical assistance at different points of time
and the same is not consistent.
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50. However, upon bare perusal of the aforementioned documents, it
can be estimated that the appellant must have been in medical
surveillance at least for 12 months, given that his bills and discharge
summaries indicating that the appellant procured medical examination
from various hospitals over a period of time.
51. In absence of any substantial proof to determine the duration of
treatment, and in the interest of justice, this Court, considering the gravity
of the injuries incurred by the appellant and the treatment that is required
for the same, is inclined to consider 12 months as the duration of
treatment.
52. Therefore, in view of the above, this Court finds that the learned
Tribunal erred in taking the period of treatment for assessing loss of
income as merely 6 months, which indicates the learned Tribunal failed to
acknowledge the severity of injuries sustained by the appellant and the
treatment required for the same. Accordingly, this Court is of the view
that the compensation for the loss of income during treatment stands
modified from Rs. 17,178/- to a sum of Rs. 34,356 /- [=Rs. 2,863/-
(monthly income) x 12 (months)].
Loss of future income:
53. For computation of compensation for loss of future income, factors
such as income, age and functional disability of the appellant are taken
into consideration. However, it is imperative for this Court to firstly
determine the functional disability sustained by the appellant due to the
accident caused.
54. In Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar (Supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court laid emphasis on the adverse impact of permanent disability on the
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claimant‟s earning capacity for computing the compensation for loss of
future income. The aforesaid observation has been further reiterated by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sandeep Khanuja v. Atul Dande and
Anr.2, wherein it was observed as under –
“15. The crucial factor which has to be taken into
consideration, thus, is to assess as to whether the permanent
disability has any adverse effect on the earning capacity of
the injured. In this sense, the MACT approached the issue in
right direction by taking into consideration the aforesaid
test. However, we feel that the conclusion of the MACT, on
the application of the aforesaid test, is erroneous. A very
myopic view is taken by the MACT in taking the view that
70% permanent disability suffered by the Appellant would
not impact the earning capacity of the Appellant. The MACT
thought that since the Appellant is a Chartered Accountant,
he is supposed to do sitting work and, therefore, his working
capacity is not impaired. Such a conclusion was justified if
the Appellant was in the employment where job requirement
could be to do sitting/table work and receive monthly salary
for the said work. An important feature and aspect which is
ignored by the MACT is that the Appellant is a professional
Chartered Accountant. To do this work efficiently and in
order to augment his income, a Chartered Accountant is
supposed to move around as well. If a Chartered Accountant
is doing taxation work, he has to appear before the assessing
authorities and appellate authorities under the Income Tax
Act, as a Chartered Accountant is allowed to practice up to
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Many times Chartered
Accountants are supposed to visit their clients as well. In
case a Chartered Accountant is primarily doing audit work,
he is not only required to visit his clients but various
authorities as well. There are many statutory functions under
various statutes which the Chartered Accountants perform.
Free movement is involved for performance of such
functions. A person who is engaged and cannot freely move
2
(2017) 3 SCC 351.
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to attend to his duties may not be able to match the earning
in comparison with the one who is healthy and bodily abled.
Movements of the Appellant have been restricted to a large
extent and that too at a young age. Though the High Court
recognised this, it did not go forward to apply the principle
of multiplier.”
55. In the instant case, Dr. Rajesh Kumar, Assistant Professor,
Department of Psychiatry, IHBAS/PW-2 has testified that the appellant
has been receiving treatment at their institute from 27 th January, 2010
onwards and remained admitted from 9th April, 2010 to 6th May, 2010. He
stated that the appellant was examined by the Medical Board of IHBAS
on 5th May, 2010 and was awarded a certificate regarding his condition.
He further stated that the appellant was diagnosed with “post traumatic
cognitive impairment”, wherein the patient faces difficulty in performing
daily activities due to the impairment in cognitive faculties. It was also
testified that the appellant shows a lot of fluctuations in behaviour and
orientation, thereby being dis-orientated and having the tendency to stay
aloof. It was further stated that the appellant needs to be coaxed even for
his basic activities in daily living.
56. This Court has perused the disability certificate, medical board
report as well as other reports on record, which describe the physiological
and behavioural tendencies of the appellant in detail. The disability
certificate states that the appellant has incurred 75% permanent disability
with respect to the whole body, which is non-progressive and the
condition is not likely to change.
57. Further, the psychiatric diagnosis has also been placed on record,
wherein his behavioural tendencies such as numbness, aggressiveness,
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forgetfulness etc. at different situations have been thoroughly assessed.
Moreover, this Court has also perused the final report of the IHBAS vide
letter No. F.19(3)/Recep/IHBAS/2010/84/51821 dated 13th May, 2010,
wherein the board opined that the appellant is diagnosed with “post
traumatic cognitive impairment” based on the clinical history,
behavioural observation, neuropsychological assessment and neuro-
imaging findings.
58. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Jithendran v. New
India Assurance Co, Ltd.3 observed that 100% functional disability is to
be taken in cases of cognitive impairment after assessing its impact on the
earning capacity. The relevant portion is reproduced hereinunder –
“10. While the permanent disability as certified by the
doctors stands at 69%, the same by no means, adequately
reflects the travails the impaired claimant will have to face
all his life. The 21 year old’s youthful dreams and future
hopes were snuffed out by the serious accident. The young
man’s impaired condition has certainly impacted his family
members. Their resources and strength are bound to be
stressed by the need to provide full time care to the claimant.
For the appellant to constantly rely on them for stimulation
and support is destined to cause emotional, physical and
financial fatigue for all the stakeholders.
14. The courts should strive to provide a realistic
recompense having regard to the realities of life, both in
terms of assessment of the extent of disabilities and its
impact including the income generating capacity of the
claimant. In cases of similar nature, wherein the claimant is
suffering severe cognitive dysfunction and restricted
mobility, the courts should be mindful of the fact that even
though the physical disability is assessed at 69%, the3
(2022) 15 SCC 620.
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functional disability is 100% insofar as the claimant’s loss of
earning capacity is concerned.
18. As noted earlier, the impact on the earning capacity for
the claimant by virtue of his 69% disability must not be
measured as a proportionate loss of his earning capacity.
The earning life for the appellant is over and as such his
income loss has to be quantified as 100%. There is no other
way to assess the earning loss since the appellant is
incapacitated for life and is confined to home. In such
circumstances, his loss of earning capacity must be fixed at
100%. As his monthly income was Rs 4500, adding 40%
future prospect thereto, the monthly loss of earning is
quantified as Rs 6300. We therefore deem it appropriate to
quantify Rs 13,60,800 (Rs 6300 × 12 × 18) as compensation
for 100% loss of earning for the claimant. Accordingly,
under this head, the amount awarded by the High Court is
enhanced proportionately.”
59. However, in the instant case, although the appellant has suffered
severe injuries to the head and has been diagnosed with “post traumatic
cognitive impairment”, it is observed that the Department of Imaging of
Batra Hospital examined the appellant wherein it stated that the joints and
bones appear to be normal vide document dated 16th July, 2005. It is also
to be borne in mind that the appellant is an unskilled worker and
therefore, the severity of the cognitive impairment is relatively less on the
appellant as compared to a skilled worker, thereby not having an absolute
impact on the future earning capacity.
60. In the case of Jithendran v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
(supra), the Hon‟ble Court emphasised on the impact of cognitive
impairment on the future income of the claimant, however, the same is
slightly different to the appellant‟s case herein, who is an unskilled
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worker with a better physical condition, which sheds light on the slim but
definite chances of earning an income in his future.
61. Therefore, relying on Raj Kumar (supra) and upon perusal of the
aforementioned documents on record and the testimony of PW-2, this
Court is of the view that the functional disability for calculating the loss
of future income is to be taken as 75% instead of 38% as erroneously
taken by the learned Tribunal.
62. The learned Tribunal has held in the impugned order that different
date of births are detected in the disability certificate, ration card and
election identity card, however, has taken the date of birth mentioned in
the election identity card, thereby observing that the appellant must have
been 39 years of age at the time of accident.
63. However, the election identity card and ration card on which the
learned Tribunal has relied upon are not part of the Lower Court Record.
The disability certificate, which is placed on record, displays that the
appellant was 30 years of age at the time of the accident. It is pertinent to
understand that the disability certificate is not a conclusive document for
the identification of the person‟s age and therefore, for the purpose of
convenience, this Court takes the findings of learned Tribunal as
conclusive with respect to the age of the appellant, which is determined
as 39 years of age, for further calculation of the compensation.
64. Accordingly, in view of the findings stipulated in Sarla Verma &
Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corp. & Anr.4, the learned Tribunal has rightly
taken the multiplier as 15 as the age of the appellant i.e., 39 years, falls
within the said category of multiplier.
4
AIR 2009 SC 3104.
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65. It is observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sidram vs. The
Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.5 that
awarding loss of future income as well as future prospects are imperative
in the cases of permanent disability. The relevant portion of the same is as
follows –
“31. It is now a well-settled position of law that even in
cases of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a
motor accident, the claimant can seek, apart from
compensation for future loss of income, amounts for future
prospects as well. We have come across many orders of
different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different
High Courts, taking the view that the claimant is not entitled
to compensation for future prospects in accident cases
involving serious injuries resulting in permanent
disablement. That is not a correct position of law. There is no
justification to exclude the possibility of compensation for
future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries
resulting in permanent disablement. Such a narrow reading
is illogical because it denies altogether the possibility of the
living victim progressing further in life in accident cases —
and admits such possibility of future prospects, in case of the
victim’s death.
32. This Court has emphasised time and again that “just
compensation” should include all elements that would go to
place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in,
before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of
money or other material compensation can erase the trauma,
pain and suffering that a victim undergoes after a serious
accident, (or replace the loss of a loved one), monetary
compensation is the manner known to law, whereby society
assures some measure of restitution to those who survive,
and the victims who have to face their lives.”
5
2022 INSC 1204.
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66. In light of the aforesaid observations, it is just and reasonable to
award future prospects to the appellant as the instant case is that of
permanent disability. Therefore, the factors to be considered while
calculating future prospects has been observed in National Insurance Co.
Ltd vs Pranay Sethi6, wherein it was held as follows:
“61.
… (iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed
salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should
be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40
years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between
the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was
between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the
necessary method of computation. The established income
means the income minus the tax component.”
67. In light of the above extract, this Court finds that the appellant was
39 years of age at the time of the accident and was an unskilled labour,
and therefore, an addition of 40% of the established income is liable to be
made towards future prospects.
68. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the learned Tribunal erred
in taking 38% functional disability instead of 75%, thereby wrongly
determining the compensation under loss of future income head. Thus,
the compensation granted for the loss of future income, which is inclusive
of future prospects, stands modified from Rs. 2,93,744/- to Rs.5,41,110/-.
The aforementioned reasonings and calculation of the same have been
encapsulated in the following table –
Income earned per annum Rs. 2,863/- (monthly income)
x 12 months = Rs. 34,356/-
6
AIR 2017 SC 5157.
Signature Not Verified MAC APP. 425/2016 Page 32 of 55 Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN KUMAR BABBAR Signing Date:15.10.2024 12:09:52 Additional 40% of the Rs. 34,356 + 13,742.40 (40% established income for future of the established income) = prospects Rs. 48,098/- Multiplier (age of 39 at the 15 time of accident) Functional disability incurred 75% = Rs. 48,098 x 15 x 75% =Rs. 5,41,102.50/- Total loss of future income Rs. 5,41,110- (rounded off) NON-PECUNIARY EXPENSES
69. Adverting to the non-pecuniary expenses, this Court finds it
pertinent to mention the case of K. Suresh vs. New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. & Anr.7, wherein it was observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that
while granting compensation under non-pecuniary heads, the Courts may
not be able to ascertain correct value of compensation given that
numerous factors affect the daily life of the victim of the motor-vehicle
accident. It additionally emphasises on granting just and reasonable
compensation by encompassing all the facts and circumstances subjected
to the victims. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced
hereunder:
“10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority,
while determining quantum of compensation, has to keep in
view the sufferings of the injured person which would
include his inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy
the normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for
the injuries and his ability to earn as much as he used to7
(2012) 12 SCC 274.
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earn or could have earned. Hence, while computing
compensation the approach of the tribunal or a court has to
be broad based. Needless to say, it would involve some
guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical exactitude
or a precise formula to determine the quantum of
compensation. In determination of compensation the
fundamental criterion of “just compensation” should be
inhered.”
Attendant charges:
70. In the instant case, while granting compensation for attendant
charges, the learned Tribunal considered the veracity and severity of the
appellant‟s injuries and its impact on the future. Although the testimonies
of the witnesses pertaining to the said head were mentioned in the
impugned order, the same was not discussed by the learned Tribunal
while granting the same. Therefore, this Court finds that the same
warrants discussion before proceeding further.
71. As per the material on record, PW-3/Ms. Ramratti testified to the
effect that she was a domestic assistant in the petitioner‟s house from
June, 2004 to July, 2011. It has been stated that her primary duty was to
do domestic chores such as cleaning utensils, washing clothes, preparing
food etc, however, she further stated that she looks after the wife of the
petitioner as well. Regarding her work as a domestic attendant, she
testified that she was being paid Rs. 4,000/- per month, however, she later
stated that she started with a monthly salary of Rs. 2,500/-, increased to
Rs. 3,000/- and further to Rs. 3,500/-. It was testified that she used to
work from 9:00 AM to 8:00 PM and that she worked there for five to six
years. However, she deposed that she does not remember the name of the
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other person who attends the appellant and that she did not know the
appellant prior to the accident.
72. Mr. Raj Kumar/PW-4 has deposed in his affidavit that he was
working as an attendant at the appellant‟s house from 12 th June, 2004 to
31st December, 2011 and that his main job was to take the petitioner in
and out of the toilet, arrange his bath, change his clothes and ensure his
medicines are being administered properly. Regarding his salary, he
testified that he was receiving Rs.3,500/- per month for the initial two
years and was later increased to Rs.4,000/- per month over the last five
years. However, in his cross examination, he deposed that he was paid
Rs. 3,500/- per month. It was also stated that PW-4 used to work from
8:00 PM to 8:00 AM. Contradicting to the aforementioned testimony of
PW-3, it was testified that PW-3 is the wife of PW-4 and that PW-4 has
known the appellants for nearly two decades and has shared a friendly
relationship.
73. Upon perusal of the aforementioned depositions of PW-3 and PW-
4, it is made out that the testimonies therein are contradictory in nature. It
was mentioned by PW-3 in her testimony that she does not know the
identity of the other person who attends the appellant whereas it was
testified by PW-4 that PW-3 is his wife. Moreover, in her testimony, PW-
3 stated that she has never known the appellant until the accident,
however, PW-4‟s testimony suggest otherwise wherein he knows the
appellant from the last two decades.
74. Therefore, this Court cannot take the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-
4 into consideration while determining the compensation under the head
of attendant charges as the said testimonies appear to be contradictory.
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75. However, considering the gravity of injuries sustained by the
appellant, this Court is of the view that the appellant must have required
assistance of either an attendant or family members, during his treatment
and the same is required in the future as well.
76. In Jithendran v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (Supra), it was
observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that in absence of any material
pertaining to the attendant charges, a conservative estimate of Rs. 5,000/-
per month appears to be the bare minimum. However, in the aforesaid
case as well as in the case of Kajal v. Jagdish Chand8, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court observed that the multiplier system is not only essential to
be considered while determining the loss of future income but also
attendant charges. In light of the same, taking the multiplier as 15 (since
the appellant was 39 years of age at the time of the accident) and an
annual income of Rs. 60,000/-, this Court grants an amount of Rs.
9,00,000/- (Rs. 60,000/- (annual income) x 15(multiplier)) for attendant
charges.
77. Upon perusal of the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal
under the remaining non-pecuniary expenses, that is, pain and suffering;
special diet and conveyance; loss of amenities and enjoyment of life;
disfigurement, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Tribunal erred
in granting meagre amount of compensation for the aforesaid heads.
78. Since this is a case of cognitive impairment, it is important to
mention the case of Kajal v. Jagdish Chand (Supra), wherein the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that especially in cases of mental
8
(2020) 4 SCC 413.
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disability, liberal view must be adopted while granting compensation and
the relevant paragraph of the same is as follows:
“27. One factor which must be kept in mind while assessing
the compensation in a case like the present one is that the
claim can be awarded only once. The claimant cannot come
back to court for enhancement of award at a later stage
praying that something extra has been spent. Therefore, the
courts or the Tribunals assessing the compensation in a case
of 100% disability, especially where there is mental
disability also, should take a liberal view of the matter when
awarding the compensation. While awarding this amount, we
are not only taking the physical disability but also the mental
disability and various other factors.”
79. Therefore, giving utmost consideration to the fact that the appellant
herein has sustained cognitive impairment due to the accident in question,
as well as the fact that the appellant must have faced situational
difficulties in enjoying the fruits of his life, this Court is of the view that
the compensation under the aforesaid heads ought to be enhanced.
Moreover, this Court has also taken into account the medico-legal report
as well as other medical documents on record, which suggest that the
appellant sustained grievous head injuries, thereby making the appellant
entitled for compensation for disfigurement as well.
80. The enhanced compensation under the aforesaid heads shall now
be read as under –
Heads Compensation granted Enhanced
by the learned Tribunal compensation
granted by this
Court
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Pain and suffering Rs. 5,000/- Rs. 1,00,000/-
Special diet and Rs. 10,000/- Rs. 75,000/-
conveyance
Loss of amenities and Rs. 10,000/- Rs. 1,00,000/-
enjoyment of life
Disfigurement Rs. 10,000/- Rs. 50,000/-
81. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant has additionally
sought for compensation under „loss of care and guidance for minor
children‟ and „loss of consortium‟. However, it is also important to note
that the instant case is that of permanent disability and not that of death
and hence, considering that the compensation is granted under all
adequate heads herein, this Court is inclined to refrain from awarding
additional compensation under the „loss of care and guidance for minor
children‟ and „loss of consortium‟.
82. Therefore, in view of the foregoing findings, the overall
compensation is enhanced as under:
S.No Heads of Compensation Amount
PECUNIARY EXPENSES
1. Medical expenses Rs. 59,000/-
2. Loss of income during the treatment Rs. 34,356/-
3. Loss of future income Rs. 5,41,110/-
NON-PECUNIARY EXPENSES
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4. Pain and suffering Rs. 1,00,000/-
5. Loss of special diet and conveyance Rs. 75,000/-
6. Nursing/ Attendant charges Rs. 9,00,000/-
7. Loss of amenities and enjoyment of Rs. 1,00,000/-
life
8. Disfiguration Rs. 50,000/-
TOTAL Rs. 18,59,466/-
83. Considering the findings made hereinabove, the total compensation
awarded to the appellant by the learned Tribunal stands enhanced from
Rs. 2,72,922/- to Rs. 18,59,466/- along with interest @ 9% per annum
within the period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of this order,
after deducting/adjusting the amount already paid/deposited.
84. Accordingly, the issue no. 1 stands decided in favour of the
appellant.
ISSUE – 2: Whether Mr. Deepak Ray/respondent no. 2, allegedly
being a registered owner of the offending vehicle, be made jointly and
severally liable to pay the compensation to the claimant?
85. Now adverting to the second issue at hand, it is imperative to
reiterate that after addressing the issues on negligence and compensation
award, the learned Tribunal directed the driver/respondent no.1 to pay the
compensation amount to the claimant.
86. However, a contention has been raised before this Court by the
appellant/claimant that the registered owner of the offending vehicle, the
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respondent no. 2 herein, must be held jointly and severally liable to pay
the compensation amount.
87. Before delving into the issue of ascertaining the liability of
respondent no.2, it is appropriate to firstly determine whether the
respondent no. 2 is the rightful owner of the offending vehicle. In light of
the same, it is apposite to delve into the statutory provisions pertaining to
„ownership‟.
88. As per the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the definition of the term
“owner” is enumerated in Section 2(30), which is as follows:
“2. Definitions
xxxxx
(30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor
vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor,
the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor
vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement,
or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation,
the person in possession of the vehicle under that
agreement”
89. The bare perusal of the provision indicates that the term “owner”
refers to the person in whose name the motor vehicle is registered. It can
be observed that the legislature intended that the registered owner as
reflected in the records of the Registering Authority will primarily be
considered as the “owner” for the purposes of this Act, except in cases of
minor or an agreement of hire-purchase, lease, or hypothecation, as
explicitly stated in the latter part of the Section 2(30) of the Act, wherein
mere possession of the vehicle is sufficient to fall within the ambit of the
provision.
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90. The distinction between the definition of the “owner” of the
erstwhile Act of 1939 and that of the new Act of 1988 was discussed by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar v. Vijay
Kumar9, wherein the former did not include the registration of the owner,
which came into existence only with the enactment of the Act of 1988.
This distinction clearly sheds light on the legislative intent behind the
specific change brought forth by the new Act of 1988, which gives
primacy to the registered owner rather than the possessory owner.
91. The said legislative intent has also been discussed in the case of
Surendra Kumar Bhilawe vs. The New India Assurance Company
Limited10, where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
“35. The National Commission overlooked the definition of
‘owner’ in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. In
Section 2(30) ‘owner’ has been defined to mean “a person in
whose name a motor vehicle stands registered and, where
such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in
relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire
purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an
agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the
vehicle under that agreement”. Even assuming that
Mohammad Iliyas Ansari was in possession of the said truck
at the time of the accident, such possession was not under
any agreement of lease, hire purchase or hypothecation with
ICIC Bank.
36. It would also be pertinent to note the difference between
the definition of owner in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 and the definition of owner in Section 2(19) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which has been repealed and
replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under the old Act
‘owner’ meant the person in possession of a motor vehicle.
9
(2018) 3 SCC 1.
10
2020 INSC 434.
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The definition has undergone a change. Legislature has
consciously changed the definition of ‘owner’ to mean the
person in whose name the motor vehicle stands.”
92. The introduction of „registered owner‟ within the ambit of Section
2(30) of the Act establishes that it is presumed that the person whose
name is reflected in the records of the Registering Authority is to be
regarded as the owner of the vehicle. The position of law has been further
discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa alias
Leela and Ors. v. Shakuntala and Ors11, wherein for the purposes of
liability, the Hon‟ble Court addressed the question of who shall be
considered as the owner of the offending vehicle. The relevant paragraphs
of the same are as follows:
“9. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of the
vehicle has to be examined under different provisions of the
Act. Section 2(30) of the Act defines “owner” in the following
terms:
2(30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor
vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor,
the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor
vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or
an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the
person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;
(Emphasis added)
10. Then, Section 50 of the Act lays down the procedure for
transfer of ownership. It is a long section and insofar as
relevant it is reproduced below:
50. Transfer of ownership.
11
(2011) 2 SCC 240.
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(1) Where the ownership of any motor vehicle registered
under this Chapter is transferred,-
(a) the transferor shall,-
(i) in the case of a vehicle registered within the same State,
within fourteen days of the transfer, report the fact of
transfer, in such form with such documents and in such
manner, as may be prescribed by the Central Government to
the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the
transfer is to be effected and shall simultaneously send a
copy of the said report to the transferee; and
(ii) xxxx
(b) the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer,
report the transfer to the registering authority within whose
jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where
the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, and shall
forward the certificate of registration to that registering
authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the
report received by him from the transferor in order that
particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in
the certificate of registration.
(2) xxxx
(3) xxxx
(4) xxxx
(5) xxxx
(6) On receipt of a report under Sub-section (1), or an
application under Sub-section (2), the registering authority
may cause the transfer of ownership to be entered in the
certificate of registration.
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(7) A registering authority making any such entry shall
communicate the transfer of ownership to the transferor and
to the original registering authority, if it is not the original
registering authority.
11. It is undeniable that notwithstanding the sale of the
vehicle neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor the
transferee Salig Ram took any step for the change of the
name of the owner in the certificate of registration of the
vehicle. In view of this omission Jitender Gupta must be
deemed to continue as the owner of the vehicle for the
purposes of the Act, even though under the civil law he
ceased to be its owner after its sale on February 2, 1993.
12. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of a
vehicle after its sale to another person was considered by
this Court in Dr. T.V. Jose v. Chacko P.M.
MANU/SC/1691/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 748. In paragraphs 9
and 10 of the decision, the Court observed and held as
follows:
9. Mr. Iyer appearing for the Appellant submitted that the
High Court was wrong in ignoring the oral evidence on
record. He submitted that the oral evidence clearly showed
that the Appellant was not the owner of the car on the date of
the accident. Mr. Iyer submitted that merely because the
name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. did
not mean that the ownership of the vehicle had not been
transferred. Mr. Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car
was Mr. Roy Thomas. Mr. Iyer submitted that Mr. Roy
Thomas had been made party-Respondent No. 9 to these
Appeals. He pointed out that an Advocate had filed
appearance on behalf of Mr. Roy Thomas but had then
applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance.
He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had been duly served
and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that
Mr. Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these Appeals.
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He submitted that the liability, if any, was of Mr. Roy
Thomas.
10. We agree with Mr. Iyer that the High Court was not right
in holding that the Appellant continued to be the owner as
the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O.
There can be transfer of title by payment of consideration
and delivery of the car. The evidence on record shows that
ownership of the car had been transferred. However the
Appellant still continued to remain liable to third parties as
his name continued in the records of R.T.O. as the owner.
The Appellant could not escape that liability by merely
joining Mr. Roy Thomas in these Appeals. Mr. Roy Thomas
was not a party either before MACT or the High Court. In
these Appeals we cannot and will not go into the question of
inter se liability between the Appellant and Mr. Roy Thomas.
It will be for the Appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings
against Mr. Roy Thomas if, in law, he is entitled to do so.
(Emphasis added)
13. Again, in P.P. Mohammed v. K. Rajappan and Ors.
(2008) 17 SCC 624, this Court examined the same issue
under somewhat similar set of facts as in the present case. In
paragraph 4 of the decision, this Court observed and held as
follows:
4. These appeals are filed by the Appellants. The insurance
company has chosen not to file any appeal. The question
before this Court is whether by reason of the fact that the
vehicle has been transferred to Respondent 4 and thereafter
to Respondent 5, the Appellant got absolved from liability to
the third person who was injured. This question has been
answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) v. Chacko P.M.
wherein it is held that even though in law there would be a
transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would
not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in
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agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because
the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the
Appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person.
So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains
liable to a third person.
(Emphasis added)
14. The decision in Dr. T.V. Jose was rendered under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But having regard to the
provisions of Section 2(30) and section 50 of the Act, as
noted above, the ratio of the decision shall apply with equal
force to the facts of the case arising under the 1988 Act. On
the basis of these decisions, the inescapable conclusion is
that Jitender Gupta, whose name continued in the records of
the registering authority as the owner of the truck was
equally liable for payment of the compensation amount.
Further, since an insurance policy in respect of the truck was
taken out in his name he was indemnified and the claim will
be shifted to the insurer, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.”
93. The aforementioned judgment has clearly distinguished the
position of law under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, wherein the latter Act requires the existence of the
transfer, however, mere existence of transfer does not absolve the liability
of the registered owner as required by the former Act. The said
distinguishing requirement has been further dealt in the case of Naveen
Kumar v. Vijay Kumar (Supra) by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court,
interpreting the mandate of Section 2(30) of the Act, which stipulates that
the registered owner is liable to compensate the victim of motor vehicle
accident. The relevant portion is reproduced hereinunder:
“12. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from
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expression ‘owner’ in Section 2(30), it is the person in whose
name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the
purposes of the Act, would be treated as the ‘owner’.
However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the
minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle
is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or
hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under
that agreement is treated as the owner. In a situation such as
the present where the registered owner has purported to
transfer the vehicle but continues to be reflected in the
records of the registering authority as the owner of the
vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament
has consciously introduced the definition of the expression
‘owner’ in Section 2(30), making a departure from the
provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier Act of 1939. The
principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that
the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the
legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state
of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be
burdened with following a trail of successive transfers,
which are not registered with the registering authority. To
hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and
purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed
must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the
present case, the First Respondent was the ‘owner’ of the
vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of
Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation stands
fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured.
The High Court has proceeded upon a misconstruction of the
judgments of this Court in Reshma and Purnya Kala Devi.
13. The submission of the Petitioner is that a failure to
intimate the transfer will only result in a fine Under Section
50(3) but will not invalidate the transfer of the vehicle. In Dr.
T.V. Jose, this Court observed that there can be transfer of
title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. But
for the purposes of the Act, the person whose name is
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owner. The owner within the meaning of Section 2(30) is
liable to compensate. The mandate of the law must be
fulfilled.”
94. In light of the above discussions, it is pertinent to examine the
testimony of the witnesses relevant to the said issue. As per the record,
R2W2/respondent no. 2 stated in his examination that he had purchased
the offending vehicle i.e., two-wheeler scooter bearing registration
number DNF-7071, to which he was the owner, up until the year 1998,
and the same was sold to the respondent no.1/ driver in the very same
year. He further testified that all the necessary documents pertaining to
the vehicle were handed over to the respondent no.1 /driver after getting
his signature on one delivery receipt. In his cross-examination, R2W2
also deposed that he sold the vehicle to the driver/respondent no.1 at a
sale consideration of Rs. 10,000/-, however, stated that the receipt of the
same has not been acquired, hence, not placed on record. Further, he
deposed that all the requisite documents have been handed over to the
driver, including the insurance as well as Form nos. 29 and 30. However,
he admitted that he neither went to the Registering Authority nor did he
attempted to formally transfer the vehicle in the name of the transferee
i.e., driver.
95. The aforementioned transaction of sale has been starkly rejected by
RW1/ respondent no. 1 herein in his deposition stating that the respondent
no. 2 did not sell the vehicle to him and no Form Nos. 29 and 30 were
handed over to him regarding the said sale.
96. In view of the foregoing deposition, this Court has further, perused
the relevant documents on record, i.e., the delivery receipt and Certificate
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of Registration (Form-G). The contents of the former document reveals
that the offending vehicle bearing number DNF-7071 of 1989 model
along with the registration documents have been delivered to Mr. Mohd.
Sabuddin/ respondent no.1 by Mr. Deepak Rai/ respondent no. 2. The said
receipt bears the signature of respondent no. 1 and is dated 19 th
December, 1998. However, the document in question seems vague as it
holds no authenticity of the contents mentioned therein as there is no
other document on record pertaining to the alleged sale transaction
between the respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 2. Therefore, in view of
the same, the delivery receipt cannot be taken into consideration for
proving the ownership of the offending vehicle.
97. On the other hand, the latter document i.e., the Certificate of
Registration reveals that the registration of vehicle bearing no. DNF-7071
was transferred from one Mr. Balbir Singh to Mr. Deepak Rai/ respondent
no. 2, thereby officiating the respondent no. 2 as the registered owner as
per the records.
98. Since there is no other document on record contradicting the
aforesaid contents of the documents, and placing reliance on the
judgments cited herein, it is evident that respondent no. 2 remains the
registered owner of the offending vehicle as he falls within the definition
of “owner” as per Section 2(30) of the Act.
99. Now adverting to the issue of liability.
100. It has already been discussed in the aforementioned judgments that
the liability to pay the compensation is fastened upon the registered
owner of the offending vehicle. However, a question arises as to the
extent of liability of the registered owner.
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101. Therefore, what needs to be addressed at this stage is whether the
registered owner of the offending vehicle i.e., respondent no. 2 shall be
solely liable or jointly and severally liable along with the driver of the
offending vehicle i.e., respondent no. 1.
102. To determine the aforesaid question of liability, it is imperative to
look into the findings of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
Godavari Finance Company vs. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors.12,
wherein it was categorically stated that the person who is in possession
and control over the offending vehicle will be held liable for the payment
of the compensation amount. However, the test mentioned in the said case
law must be construed subject to the factual scenario of each case. For the
purpose of convenience, the relevant paragraph of the judgment is
reproduced as under:
“15. An application for payment of compensation is filed
before the Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Act
for adjudicating upon the claim for compensation in respect
of accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to,
persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages
to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Use of
the motor vehicle is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim
for compensation. Ordinarily if driver of the vehicle would
use the same, he remains in possession or control thereof.
Owner of the vehicle, although may not have anything to do
with the use of vehicle at the time of the accident, actually he
may be held to be constructively liable as the employer of the
driver. What is, therefore, essential for passing an award is
to find out the liabilities of the persons who are involved in
the use of the vehicle or the persons who are vicariously
liable. The insurance company becomes a necessary party to
such claims as in the event the owner of the vehicle is found12
(2008) 5 SCC 107.
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to be liable, it would have to reimburse the owner inasmuch
as a vehicle is compulsorably insurable so far as a third
party is concerned, as contemplated under Section
147 thereof. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that the possession or control of a vehicle plays
a vital role.”
103. Similarly, in the recent judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
the case of Vaibhav Jain vs. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd13, it was
discussed in length that at the time of the accident, if the person who has
the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose
direction and command the driver is obliged to operate the same, shall be
subjected to the liability of pay the compensation.
104. Keeping in view of the aforementioned principles, this Court has
perused the testimonies of the witnesses, wherein, it was testified by RW1
that he was working as an employee of respondent no. 2‟s proprietary
firm i.e., M/s Deepak Engineering Works from the January, 2004 to
October, 2006, drawing a salary of Rs. 2,500- 3,000/- per month. He
further testified that he used to work from 10 AM to 5 PM as a plumber
and that the respondent no. 2 would lend his scooter bearing number
DNF-7071 for attending complaints.
105. The said deposition of RW1 has been patently refuted by R2W2/
respondent no. 2 in his testimony. It was stated that the respondent no. 1
was working as an employee of respondent no. 2 till the year 1998 and
that the respondent no. 2 was not working for him in the year 2004. He
further stated that he maintained all the records pertaining to the
employment of the workers, however, later admitted that he is not in
13
2024 INSC 652.
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possession of documents such as attendance register, salary slips etc. upto
the year 2004. He further denied that the scooter bearing no. DNF-7071
was not given to the workers for attending the complaints.
106. Upon perusal of the aforesaid testimonies, it is observed that the
employer-employee relationship between respondent no. 1 and 2 cannot
be proved as the same has been utterly contradicted by the parties in its
testimonies. Moreover, no such document was placed on record showing
that on the day of the accident, the respondent no. 1 was driving in the
course of employment or under the direction of the respondent no. 2.
107. Therefore, applying the principles enunciated in the cases of
Godavari Finance Company vs. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors.
(Supra) and Vaibhav Jain vs. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) to the
facts of the instant case, it is observed that the since the driver/
respondent no. 1 was held liable for the rash and negligent driving of the
offending vehicle, and in absence of any evidence pertaining to the
control of respondent no. 2 on the driver, this Court is of the view that the
driver herein is also liable to pay the compensation amount to the
claimant.
108. Although the possession and control of the offending vehicle is
with the driver/ respondent no. 1, it does not mean that the registered
owner is not liable for the same just on the pretext of non-possession and
non-control, thereby making both the driver as well as the registered
owner jointly and severally liable. The said stance has been taken by the
co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal and
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Ors. vs. Manish Kumar and Ors.14, where the Court observed that the
registered owner shall continue to remain liable to pay the compensation
to the victim of motor accident and the mere possession and control of the
vehicle shall not absolve the person from paying the said compensation to
the victim. It further stated that the liability would remain joint and
several in such cases between the registered owner and the person who
was in actual possession of the vehicle at the time of the accident.
109. Keeping in view the foregoing reasoning and findings, this Court is
of the view that both the driver/respondent no. 1 as well as the registered
owner/respondent no. 2 are jointly and severally liable to pay the
compensation amount to the claimant/appellant herein.
110. Accordingly, issue no. 2 stands decided in aforesaid terms.
CONCLUSION
111. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 is a beneficial legislation which was brought in force with an intent
to provide relief to the victims or their families, who were subjected to
motor vehicle accidents. Therefore, while granting compensation to the
victims of motor-vehicle accidents or their families, the Courts need to
consider the objective and intent behind the promulgation of the Act.
However, the said compensation cannot be awarded exorbitantly, rather,
in a just and reasonable manner.
112. Moreover, as per the settled principles of law, the person whose
name reflects in the records of the Registering Authority will be
considered as the registered owner of the vehicle. However, the extent of
liability is determined based on the possession and control over the
14
2023 SCC OnLine Del 5506.
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offending vehicle and also differs with the involvement of parties in the
accident.
113. Therefore, by way of filing the instant appeal, the appellant has
sought for enhancement of the compensation amount granted by the
learned Tribunal as the same is not adequate to the injuries sustained by
the appellant. Additionally, it also sought for making respondent no. 2
jointly and severally liable to pay the said compensation as the
respondent no. 2 is the registered owner as per the records of the
Registering Authority.
114. After due consideration and discussion, this Court is of the view
that the learned Tribunal erred in granting inadequate compensation to the
claimant under all the sub-heads, without taking into consideration the
gravity of injuries sustained by the claimant in the accident.
115. It is further held that the respondent no. 2 is a registered owner of
the offending vehicle as per Section 2(30) of the Act and as per the settled
position of law, the respondent no. 2 is liable to pay the compensation to
the claimant. With respect to the extent of liability, this Court has
observed that the possession and control of the offending vehicle, at the
time of the accident, is with the respondent no. 1, and therefore, both
respondent no. 1 and 2 are made jointly and severally liable.
116. Accordingly, the following directions are passed by this Court:
a. The learned Tribunal erred in granting adequate
compensation to the claimants and therefore, the same stands
enhanced from Rs. Rs. 2,72,922/- to Rs. 18,59,466/- along
with interest @ 9% per annum.
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KUMAR BABBAR
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b. It is further held that the respondent no. 2/owner along with
the respondent no. 1/driver are jointly and severally liable to
pay the compensation amount of Rs. 18,59,466/- to the
appellant/victim.
c. Accordingly, the respondent no. 1 and 2 i.e., the driver and
the registered owner of the offending vehicle, respectively,
are directed to pay the compensation amount of Rs.
18,59,466/- to the claimant/ appellant within the period of
four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of this order, after
deducting/adjusting the amount already paid/deposited.
117. In view of the aforesaid discussions on facts and law, the impugned
order dated 20th February, 2016 passed by the learned Presiding Officer,
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, South East District/Saket Court, New
Delhi in suit bearing no. 335/14 is modified in aforesaid terms.
118. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby allowed and stands
disposed of along with the pending application(s), if any.
119. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
(CHANDRA DHARI SINGH)
JUDGE
OCTOBER 8, 2024
rk/mk/ryp
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Digitally Signed By:PRAVEEN
KUMAR BABBAR
Signing Date:15.10.2024
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