Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Myakanna, vs Mudda Hanumappa, on 26 October, 2024
APHC010528492005
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
SATURDAY, THE TWENTY-SIXTH DAY OF OCTOBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 185/2005
Between:
Myakanna, ...APPELLANT
AND
Mudda Hanumappa and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P V RAGHU RAM
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. T P ACHARYA
The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
1. The Appellant/Respondent/Plaintiff filed this Second Appeal under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.') against
the Judgment and decree, dated 01.11.2004 passed in A.S.No.7 of 2002 on
the file of Senior Civil Judge, Hindupur (for short, 'the 1st Appellate Court')
reversing the Judgment and decree, dated 22.01.2002 passed in O.S.No.119
of 1981 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Madakasira (for short „the trial Court‟).
2. The Appellant/Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in
O.S.No.119 of 1981 for the declaration of Plaintiff's right and title to the
schedule property and for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants
2
and their men from interfering in any manner with the possession and
enjoyment of the schedule mentioned property by the Plaintiff.
3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit in
O.S.No.119 of 1981 is expedient to mitigate any potential confusion and better
comprehend the case.
4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the
contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
One Hanumanthappa, s/o Obulesappa, originally owned the suit
schedule property. He acquired it from Kariyappa, S/o Dema Naika,
through a registered sale deed dated 27.09.1945. Since that time,
Hanumanthappa and his sons were in possession and enjoyment of
the suit schedule property. On 02.03.1981, Hanumanthappa and his
sons Maranna and Hanumantharayappa conveyed the suit
schedule property to the Plaintiff under a registered sale deed,
accompanied by the delivery of possession. Since the date of
purchase, the Plaintiff has been in exclusive possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Defendants hold no rights
or interest over the suit schedule property.
Nevertheless, the Defendants have threatened to unlawfully
dispossess the Plaintiff from the suit schedule property. When the
Plaintiff confronted the Defendants, they openly challenged the
Plaintiff‟s rightful claim to the property. As a result, the Plaintiff finds
it necessary to file this suit to protect his interests and rights.
5. The Defendants filed the written statement, refuted the plaint averments
and contended that Hanumanthappa, the vendor of the suit schedule property,
acquired it from Kariyappa through Bheemanna, who used proceeds from the
sale of sheep, manure and wool to facilitate the purchase, thereby registering
the deed in Hanumanthappa‟s name. They claim that Hanumanthappa was
never in possession of the suit schedule property, as Bheemanna and
3
Defendants 1 and 2 have consistently occupied and enjoyed it, fulfilling their
obligation to pay land revenue to the Government. Hanumanthappa‟s elder
son absconded to Karnataka after receiving funds from Bheemanna.
Following Bheemanna‟s death, his share, which included a house, devolved
upon his wife, i.e., 3rd Defendant, who engaged in joint cultivation with
Defendants 2 and 3, continuing to pay land revenue. A Ryotwary passbook
was subsequently issued in favour of the 3rd Defendant by the Tahsildar of
Madakasira. After the sale to the Plaintiff, the Defendants filed an objection
petition before the Revenue Divisional Officer, citing fraud and requesting a
rectification of the registrant. The Jamabandi Officer rejected the transfer and
directed the Plaintiff not to interfere with the Defendants‟ possession. In light
of these claims, the Defendants assert their right and possession over the suit
schedule property, seeking the dismissal of the suit with costs.
6. Based on the above pleadings in O.S.No.119 of 1981, the trial Court
framed the following issues:
1) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the right and title of the schedule
mentioned property?
2) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction?
3) To what relief Plaintiff is entitled?
7. During the trial, PWs.1 to 4 were examined on behalf of the Plaintiff
and marked Exs.A.1 to A.6. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, DWs.1
to 3 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.47.
8. After the trial concluded and both sides presented their arguments, the
learned trial Court, in its Judgment dated 22.01.2002, decreed the suit with
costs, declaring the right and title of the Plaintiff over the suit schedule
property and restraining the Defendants and their men from interfering with
the Plaintiff‟s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
property.
9. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and decree in O.S.No.119 of 1981, the
Defendants preferred an appeal in A.S.No.7 of 2002 on the file of the 1st
4
Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court,
framed the following points for consideration:
1) Whether the Plaintiff established his title over the suit property?
2) Whether the Plaintiff established his exclusive possession over
the suit property?
3) Whether the lower Court framed the issues properly?
10. The 1st Appellate Court, on scrutiny of oral and documentary evidence
adduced on behalf of both sides, had allowed the Appeal with costs by its
Judgment, dt.01.11.2004. Aggrieved by the 1st Appellate Court's Judgment
passed in A.S.No.7 of 2002, the Appellant/Respondent/Plaintiff preferred the
present Second Appeal.
11. I heard Sri P.V. Raghu Ram, learned counsel representing the
Appellant/Respondent/Plaintiff, and Sri T.P.Acharya, learned counsel for the
Respondents/Appellants/Defendants.
12. Learned counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff argued that the 1st Appellate
Court erroneously reversed the trial Court‟s decree and Judgment on mere
conjectures, presumptions and assumptions discarding the cardinal principles
of law. The 1st Appellate Court erred in holding that the Plaintiff has failed to
prove that the suit property is the self-acquired property of Hanumanthappa in
light of Ex.B.44 notice and that Ex.A.5 sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff is
nominal and that the Ex.A.5 is hit by Act 9 of 1977. The 1st Appellate Court
travelled beyond the pleadings and did not note the principles underlying the
Benami Transactions Prohibition Act of 1988, which prohibits the plea of
benami purchase.
13. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent/Defendant argued that
the 1st Appellate Court correctly appreciated the facts of the case and reached
a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the 1st Appellate Court do not
require any modifications.
5
14. Under the Order dated 31.08.2021, Respondents No.9 to 12 have been
impleaded as the Legal Representatives of the deceased 1st Respondent, vide
I.A. No.3 of 2009.
15. Based on the Appellant‟s contentions, the following substantial
questions of law are involved in this Second Appeal:
(i) Whether the 1st Appellate Court holding that the suit
property is the joint family property and there is a
division between the vendor of Ex.A.5 and his brother is
correct in law in light of Ex.A.1 standing in the name of
Hanumanthappa and any evidence contradicting the
same is prohibited by Evidence Act?
(ii) Whether the 1st Appellate Court is correct in holding that
the suit property is the joint family property of
Hanumanthappa and that Ex.A.5 is nominal?
(iii) Whether 1st Appellate Court is right in believing oral
evidence as against documentary evidence covered by
Exs.A.1 and A.5?
(iv) Whether 1st Appellate Court is correct in holding that
Ex.A.5 is hit by provisions of Prohibition of Alienation Act
9 of 1977?
(v) Whether 1st Appellate Court is correct in dismissing the
suit of Appellant/Plaintiff discarding overwhelming
documentary evidence?
(vi) Whether the 1st Appellate Court committed a grave error
in law in dismissing the suit of Plaintiff?
(vii) Whether 1st Appellate Court went wrong in placing
burden of proof on Plaintiff, when the Defendant
challenges the nature and character of suit property?
16. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the respective parties, I
have reviewed the Judgments, pleadings, and evidence on record.
17. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100
CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C.
18. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C. arise only when there is a
substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based
on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of
6
law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the
documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in 2nd
Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in nature in terms of
law.
19. In Mallanaguoda v. Ninganagouda1, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held
that:
10. The first Appellate Court is the final Court on facts. It has been
repeatedly held by this Court that the Judgment of the first Appellate Court
should not be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 100CPC unless there is a substantial question of
law. The High Court committed an error in setting aside the Judgment of the
first Appellate Court and finding fault with the final decree by taking a
different view on factual findings recorded by the first Appellate Court.......
20. In K.N. Nagarajappa v. H. Narasimha Reddy2, the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court held that:
14. Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction which a High Court derives under Section
100 is based upon its framing of a substantial question of law. As a matter of
law, it is axiomatic that the findings of the first Appellate Court are final.
However, the rule that sans a substantial question of law, the High Courts
cannot interfere with the findings of the lower Court or concurrent findings of
fact is subject to two important caveats. The first is that, if the findings of fact
are palpably perverse or outrage the conscience of the Court; in other words,
it flies on the face of logic that given the facts on the record, interference
would be justified. The other is where the findings of fact may call for
examination and be upset, in the limited circumstances spelt out in Section
103CPC.
15. Section 103CPC reads as follows:
"103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.--In any second
appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient,
determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the Appeal--
(a) which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or both by
the Court of first instance and the lower Appellate Court or
(b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or courts by reason of
a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100."
1
(2021) 16 SCC 367
2
(2021) 18 SCC 263
7
16. In the Judgment in Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab S.E.B.
[Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab S.E.B., (2010) 13 SCC 216 :
(2010) 4 S.C.C. (Civ) 861], this Court held as follows : (S.C.C. pp. 228-29,
paras 26-28)
"26. Thus, it is evident that Section 103CPC is not an exception to Section
100CPC, nor is it meant to supplant it; rather, it is to serve the same
purpose. Even while pressing Section 103CPC in service, the High Court
has to record a finding that it had to exercise such power because it found
that finding(s) of fact recorded by the Court (s) below stood vitiated because
of perversity. More so, such power can be exercised only in exceptional
circumstances and with circumspection, where the core question involved in
the case has not been decided by the Court (s) below.
27. There is no prohibition on entertaining a second appeal, even on a
question of fact, provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of fact
recorded by the courts below stood vitiated by non-consideration of relevant
evidence or by showing an erroneous approach to the matter, i.e. that the
findings of fact are found to be perverse. However, the High Court cannot
interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner
by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that of the lower courts.
(Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992)
1 SCC 647]; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-
Niswan [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan,
(1999) 6 SCC 343] and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali [Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf
Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740 : (2010) 4 S.C.C. (Civ) 738] .)
28. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material
or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring
the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of
the law. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence
which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from the vice of
procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable person
would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be
perverse. Further, if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on
conjecture and surmises, the Judgment suffers from the additional infirmity
of non-application of mind and, thus, stands vitiated. (Vide Bharatha Matha
v. R. Vijaya Renganathan [Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan,
(2010) 11 SCC 483 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 498] .)"
(emphasis supplied)
17. In a recent judgment of this Court, Narayan Sitaramji Badwaik v. Bisaram
[Narayan Sitaramji Badwaik v. Bisaram, (2021) 15 SCC 234], this Court
observed as follows, in the context of the High Courts' jurisdiction to
appreciate factual issues under Section 103IPC : (S.C.C. p. 238, para 11)
8
"11. A bare perusal of Section 103CPC clearly indicates that it provides for
the High Court to decide an issue of fact, provided there is sufficient
evidence on record before it, in two circumstances. First, when an issue
necessary for the disposal of the Appeal has not been determined by the
lower Appellate Court or by both the courts below. And second, when an
issue of fact has been wrongly determined by the Court (s) below by virtue of
the decision on the question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure."
21. In Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy3, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
held that:
14. In the background of the legal position and on reasserting the position
that there is very limited scope for reappreciating the evidence or interfering
with the finding of fact rendered by the trial court and the first Appellate
Court in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, it
is necessary for us to take note as to whether in the instant facts, the High
Court has breached the said settled position........................
15. ................... When such divergent findings on fact were available
before the High Court in an appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure
Code, though reappreciation of the evidence was not permissible, except
when it is perverse, but it was certainly open for the High Court to take note
of the case pleaded, evidence tendered, as also the findings rendered by
the two courts which were at variance with each other and one of the views
taken by the courts below was required to be approved.
22. This Second Appeal has been heard on the aforesaid substantial
questions of law given the said finding of the learned 1st Appellate Court.
23. The Plaintiff, examined as PW.1, asserts his claim to the schedule
property, comprising an extent of Ac.5.72 in survey number 161-2, based on a
purchase from one Hanumanthappa. In substantiation of this assertion, the
Plaintiff relies on Ex.A.5, a registered sale deed dated March 2, 1981.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff contends that Hanumanthappa acquired the
schedule property from Kariyappa through a registered sale deed dated
September 27, 1945, as evidenced by Ex.A.1.
3
(2021) 12 SCC 529
9
24. Evidently, one Kalamma, the 3rd Defendant, wife of Bheemanna,
initiated a suit in O.S.No.141 of 1984 against the Plaintiff and others
concerning the schedule property. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff's vendor,
Hanumanthappa, and Bheemanna are siblings. The Defendants contend that
Bheemanna acquired the schedule property from Kariyappa using proceeds
derived from the sale of sheep, sheep manure, and wool, ultimately securing a
registered sale deed in Hanumanthappa's name. Notably, the Defendants do
not contest the Plaintiff‟s assertion that the property originally belonged to
Kariyappa.
25. The relationships among the Defendants are undisputed. Defendants 1
and 2 are brothers and the sons of Hanumanthappa, while the 3rd Defendant
is their junior paternal uncle's wife. The 3rd Defendant passed away during the
pendency of the suit, leading to the inclusion of the fourth Defendant, her
brother's son, as a legal representative in the proceedings. The fourth
Defendant asserts that Ex.B.46 is a will executed by the 3rd Defendant in his
favour. The 1st Appellate court noted that this assertion was not contested by
the Plaintiff, thereby permitting the inclusion of the fourth Defendant in the
proceedings following the death of the 3rd Defendant based on the provisions
of Ex.B.46. Notably, it appears that the will was executed during the pendency
of the suit. Thus, the 4th Defendant represented the estate of 3rd Defendant.
26. In support of the Defendants' stand, the 1st Defendant testified as DW.1.
His evidence elucidates that his father had four sons, namely Anjanappa,
Hanumanthappa, Hanumaiah (DW.1), and Marappa, as well as four
daughters. It is the DW.1's evidence that the joint family paid the sale
consideration to purchase the schedule property and obtained the sale deed
in the name of Hanumanthappa being, the elder member. The pleas taken in
the written statement are inconsistent with the evidence adduced on behalf of
Defendants. The evidence adduced falsifies the stand taken in the written
statement that Bheemanna purchased the property in the name of his elder
brother, Hanumanthappa.
10
27. The trial Court referred to DW.1's evidence in cross-examination that at
the time of execution of the sale deed by his father, Hanumanthappa, in favour
of PW.1, Kalamma (3rd Defendant) was alive. She knew the sale by his father
in favour of PW.1. Considering the said evidence; the trial Court concluded
that the execution of the registered sale deed by Hanumanthappa in favour of
PW.1 was within the knowledge of Kalamma (3rd Defendant).
28. On the other hand, the Plaintiff examined PW.2 (Chitteppa) and PW.4
(Chikkenna) who are the attestors of Ex.A.5. They supported the Plaintiff‟s
version by deposing that Hanumanthappaand others sold away the schedule
property to the Plaintiff under Ex.A.5. They attested it and Hanumanthappa
and others put their thumb impression in Ex.A.5 in their presence. PW.3
(Krishnappa) also testified that he scribed Ex.A.5 sale deed, and he also
deposed about the execution of the sale deed by Hanumanthappa. PWs.2 to 4
supported PW.1's evidence concerning the execution of the Ex.A.5 sale deed
by Hanumanthappa and his son Marenna and Hanumantharayappa S/o
Anjanappa. Plaintiff has also placed reliance on Exs.A.2 to A.4 cist receipts,
which stand in the name of Hanumanthappa. Ex.A.5 sale deed coupled with
PWs.1‟s evidence shows the delivery of possession of the schedule property.
It shows that the son and grandson of Hanumanthappa also executed the sale
deed along with him.
29. Though the DW.1‟s father sold the schedule property to the Plaintiff,
DW.1 supports the 3rd Defendant's stand by deposing that in a partition, his
father has got half share. His junior paternal uncle got a half share of the
scheduled property, and they further divided their father's share. And he got
an extent of Ac.0.95 cents, his elder brother got Ac.0.92 cents, and his other
brother got an extent of Ac.1.06 cents, and the property of the 3rd Defendant
was transferred in favour of the 4th Defendant by way of Will. The revenue
officials issued pattadar passbooks, and they have been in possession and
enjoyment of the schedule property. In support of the said stand, they placed
reliance on Exs.B.1 to B.6 documents.
11
30. Ex.B.1 is Ryot pass book issued by M.R.O, dated 22.07.1980 in favour
of Kalamma, Ex.B.2 certified copy of orders dated 22.03.1989 showing a
change of sub-divisions in survey No.161-2, Ex.B.3 is the certified copy of
pattadar passbook issued by M.R.O, in favour of Nagendrappa, 4th Defendant,
Ex.B.5 is the certified copy of pattadar passbook issued by M.R.O, in favour of
Hanumappa, 1st Defendant to the extent of Ac.0.92 cents, Ex.B6 is the
certified copy of pattadar passbook issued by M.R.O, in favour of Ramappa, to
the extent of AC.1.01 cents in Sl. No.161-02. By relying on those pattadar
passbooks, the Defendants claim that the schedule property belongs to
Hanumanthappa and Bheemanna and the division of the said properties as
contended by the Defendants.
31. The trial court scrutinized the pattadar passbook stand in the name of
Kalamma, noting that it indicates the property as her self-acquisition in column
No. 3. However, in her written statement, Kalamma asserts that the schedule
properties are part of joint family assets, which cast doubt on the accuracy of
the entry, given the admitted case that the property is not indeed self-
acquired. In its analysis, the trial court referenced Ex.B.2, a certified copy of
the order from the Mandal Revenue Officer (M.R.O.) dated March 22, 1989,
which delineated the suit survey number into subdivisions: 161-2A, 161-2B,
161-2C, and 161-2D, encompassing areas of Ac.2.79, Ac.0.92, Ac.0.95, and
Ac.1.06, respectively. The trial Court highlighted that these subdivisions
occurred after filing the suit and expressed concern over the absence of clarity
in Ex.B.2 regarding the basis behind the M.R.O., of Gudibanda's decision to
subdivide the survey number. Furthermore, it observed that Exs.B.3 to B.6,
the pattadar passbooks, fail to specify the dates on which they were issued by
the Mandal Revenue Officer, leaving critical gaps in the evidence adduced.
The trial Court aptly noted that the documents presented fail to clarify the
rationale behind the Mandal Revenue Officer's subdivision of the survey
number and the subsequent issuance of pattadar passbooks in favour of
Nagendrappa, Hanumappa, Muddha Hanumappa, and Ramakka.
12
32. Ex.B.47 true copy of the order of R.D.O., Penukonda in
D.Dis.No.1911/97/J, dated 19.05.1998, shows the parties of the suit filed
Appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer.Ex.B.44 is the notice given by
Hanumanthappa, the vendor under Ex.A.5 to the Plaintiff and his father, dated
18.01.1985. In Ex.B.44, Hanumanthappa stated that his sons neglected him.
Therefore, he approached the Plaintiff's father, an elderly person, and advised
him to teach his sons a lesson and execute a nominal sale deed regarding the
suit property in his favour. Accordingly, he executed Ex.A.5, a nominal
document.
33. The 1st Appellate court ascribed excessive weight to the contents of
Ex.B.44, a notice issued four years after the initiation of the suit by the
Plaintiff's vendor. By relying on Ex.B.44, the Appellate court concluded that
Ex.A.5 is a nominal document, asserting that no title to the disputed property
had been conferred upon the Plaintiff. Moreover, Ex.B.45, which is the reply
notice from the Plaintiff and his father to Hanumanthappa, vehemently denies
the allegations contained in the previous notice. Before reaching such
conclusions, the Appellate court ought to have acknowledged that Ex.B.44
was issued during the pendency of the litigation. The assertions made in
Ex.B.44 are questionable, particularly since one of Hanumanthappa's sons
and grandsons participated as executants in the transaction. The record
indicates that the 3rd Defendant was also conscious of the sale transaction,
raising further questions about the necessity for Hanumanthappa, the
Plaintiff's vendor, to wait four years before issuing such a notice. The 1st
Appellate court should not have accepted the Defendants' claims solely on
this basis without providing adequate justification for its findings.
34. It is indeed perplexing that the 1st Appellate Court attributed significance
to the contents of the notice while disregarding the essential recitals contained
in the registered sale deed. The registered sale deed ought to be the
paramount document in establishing rightful ownership and the parties'
intentions rather than a legal notice issued four years after the suit was filed.
13
By sidelining this pivotal document in favour of a mere notice, the 1st Appellate
court ignored well settled principles of property law.
35. In light of the preceding considerations, this Court unequivocally holds
that the 1st Appellate court has egregiously faltered in arriving at a sound
conclusion, owing to a misconception of the evidence and documents relied
on, thereby warranting reappreciation.
36. The learned counsel for the Respondents argues that since the sale
deed, Ex.A.5, was executed without the payment of the sale price, the
transaction is rendered void. To support this assertion, he has cited the
following decision in Kewal Krishan V. Rajesh Kumar and Others4, wherein
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that:
15. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short "the TP Act")
reads thus:
"54. "Sale" defined.--"Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a
price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.
Sale how made.--Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property
of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a
reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered
instrument.
In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred
rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by
delivery of the property.
Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places
the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.
Contract for sale.--A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a
contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled
between the parties.
It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property."
Hence, a sale of an immovable property has to be for a price. The price may
be payable in future. It may be partly paid, and the remaining part can be
made payable in future. The payment of price is an essential part of a sale
covered by section 54 of the TP Act. If a sale deed in respect of an
immovable property is executed without payment of the price and if it does
4
2021 SCC OnLine SC 1097
14
not provide for the payment of the price at a future date, it is not a sale at all
in the eyes of the law. It is of no legal effect. Therefore, such a sale will be
void. It will not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
37. The learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the
Respondents/Defendants have not repudiated the payment of the sale
consideration by PW.1 to Hanumanthappa. In the absence of any counter-
suggestion in the cross-examination disputing the transfer of consideration, it
follows that Ex.A.5 should not be deemed unsupported by consideration.
However, the 1st Appellate Court noted that while PW.1 asserted the
consideration was paid at the Sub-Registrar's office to Hanumanthappa,
Ex.A.5 explicitly states that the consideration had already been paid. This
discrepancy led the 1st Appellate Court to doubt the credibility of the assertion
regarding the passing of consideration. The counsel further argues that Ex.A.5
distinctly delineates the particulars concerning the payment of consideration.
He posits that the 1st Appellate Court failed to adequately recognise these
pivotal recitals, choosing instead to fixate on perceived inconsistencies in
witness statements. Consequently, the 1st Appellate Court concluded that
Ex.A.5 is merely a nominal document, a stance the counsel fervently disputes
as fundamentally erroneous. The counsel further contends that the non-
payment of a portion of the sale price does not compromise the validity of the
transaction. Even if one were to entertain the notion that the outstanding
balance remains unpaid, such a circumstance should not serve as a basis for
invalidating the sale itself.
38. To bolster this contention, the Appellant has relied upon the following
judgments:
(i) In Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali 5 , the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held that:
29.8. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao [Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC
573], this Court held that the words "price paid or promised or part-paid and
part-promised" indicates that actual payment of the whole of the price at the
5
(2020) 7 SCC 366
15
time of the execution of the sale deed is not a sine qua non for completion
of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid, but the document is
executed, and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and the
title would pass on to the transferee under the transaction. The non-
payment of a part of the sale price would not affect the validity of the sale.
Once the title in the property has already passed, even if the balance sale
consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. In
order to constitute a "sale", the parties must intend to transfer the ownership
of the property on the agreement to pay the price either in praesenti or in
future. The intention is to be gathered from the recitals of the sale deed, the
conduct of the parties, and the evidence on record.
29.9. In view of the law laid down by this Court, even if the averments of the
Plaintiffs are taken to be true, that the entire sale consideration had not in
fact been paid, it could not be a ground for cancellation of the sale deed.
The Plaintiffs may have other remedies in law for recovery of the balance
consideration but could not be granted the relief of cancellation of the
registered sale deed. ........................
(ii) In Damodhar Narayan Sawale (D) through LRs. Versus Tejrao
Bajirao Mhaske6, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that:
17. The term 'transfer' is a word in a broader sense, and the word 'sale' is a
specific word. Sale, going by the definition under the T.P. Act, presupposes
the transfer from one person to another of the right in property and in other
words, in the sale, the ownership of the property is transferred. A conjoint
reading of Section 54 of the TP Act and Section 17 of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908, mandates that the transfer of ownership of any land
worth more than Rs. 100/- shall be effected by a registered deed.
Therefore, the transfer of land worth more than Rs. 100/- by a registered
deed implies the transmutation of all rights the vendor possessed in the
property concerned. .............
37. In the context of the contentions of the second Defendant/the first
respondent herein against Ext.128, taking note of its registration and the
admission of its execution, it is only proper to refer to Sections 91 and 92 of
the Evidence Act. Certainly, parol evidence is admissible to show that a
contract embodied in a document was never intended to be acted upon but
was made for some collateral purpose. xxxxx We do not think it proper or
necessary to enter into the extrinsic evidence relating sale transaction
covered by sale deed dated 04.07.1978. It is to be noted that here, by virtue
of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 of the
Registration Act and since the immovable property was worth more than
Rs. 100/- Ext.128 was reduced in writing and registered. The intention of
6
2023 SCC OnLine SC 566
16
the parties are also reflected specifically in Ext.128 and at the same,
nothing reflecting a contra-intention not to pass the title and ownership in
present even impliedly therein. In other words, the need to take into
consideration the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of parties in
deciding the passing of the title would arise only if the recitals in the
document are indecisive and ambiguous. The oral evidence of the second
Defendant could not override the registered Ext. 128 sale deed, as held by
the First Appellate Court in the facts, circumstances and evidence on record
in this case.
(iii) In Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal 7 , wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court held that:
17. It is now well settled that payment of the entire price is not a condition
precedent for completion of the sale by passing of title, as Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("the Act", for short) defines "sale" as "a
transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid
and part-promised". If the intention of the parties was that the title should
pass on execution and registration, the title would pass to the purchaser
even if the sale price or part thereof is not paid. In the event of non-payment
of price (or balance price as the case may be) thereafter, the remedy of the
vendor is only to sue for the balance price. He cannot avoid the sale. He is,
however, entitled to a charge upon the property for the unpaid part of the
sale price where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer
before payment of the entire price under Section 55(4)(b) of the Act.
39. Upon thorough examination of the evidence adduced, this Court finds
no valid basis for the 1st Appellate Court's conclusion that the Plaintiff failed to
establish that consideration was duly paid under Ex.A.5. The document
explicitly articulates a clear recital confirming the passing of consideration.
The 1st Appellate Court has placed undue significance on the discrepancies in
the testimony of PWs.1 to 4 concerning the passage of consideration under
Ex.A.5, the sale deed. However, it has overlooked a critical fact that none of
the executants of the document contested the accuracy of the recitals in
Ex.A.5 regarding the passing of consideration to them. This absence of
counter-evidence significantly weakens the Defendants' position and calls into
question the validity of the Appellate court's conclusions, as it failed to fully
consider the implications of this omission in its appreciation of the evidence.
7
(2009) 4 SCC 193
17
However, the Appellate court has conspicuously failed to furnish any rationale
for the non-consideration of its recital, and the 1st Appellate Court has
overlooked significant evidence and well-settled principles, as referred to
above.
40. The evidence on record unequivocally demonstrates that the Plaintiff
has taken possession of the property by virtue of the registered sale deed,
Ex.A.5, and has appropriately relied on the accompanying cist receipts.
However, in a misstep marked by the recording of erroneous justifications, the
1st Appellate Court has unjustly disregarded these receipts. This Court views
that had the Plaintiff not been in possession of assets as indicated by Ex.A.5;
he would have been compelled to file a suit for a possession; thus, the
absence of such a suit indicates that he is, indeed, in possession.
41. The Respondents contend that the schedule land is the D.C land; thus,
the sale transaction dated 02.03.1991 is hit by Act 9 of 1977. As noted in the
judgment of the 1st Appellate Court, it was observed that the suit land is
designated as D.C. land, assigned by the Government, and thus cannot be
purchased by the Plaintiff. The certificate, Ex.B.43, issued by the M.R.O. of
Gudibanda, confirms that the suit land has been allocated to the Depression
Class. The 1st Appellate Court further remarked that under Act 9 of 1977, any
alienation of assigned land is explicitly prohibited, thereby rendering the
Plaintiff ineligible to purchase the suit land vide Ex.A.5.
42. This Court thinks that the 1st Appellate Court has overlooked a critical
fact: the Plaintiff's vendor, Hanumanthappa, acquired the schedule property
from Kariyappa via a registered sale deed dated September 27, 1945, as
substantiated by Ex.A.1. The 1st Appellate Court should have articulated its
reasoning for why the same analogy applied to the Plaintiff should not extend
to the Plaintiff‟s vendor. Such oversight warrants reconsideration, as it directly
impacts the validity of the Plaintiff‟s claim regarding the property in question.
18
43. The learned counsel for the Appellant argues that the
Respondents/Defendants have failed to present any documentation
demonstrating that, when assigning land to the Plaintiff's vendor's
predecessor, any clause was included that prohibited the alienation of the
assigned land. He highlights that the first instance of such a prohibition
emerged only with the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.1142, dated June 18, 1954.
Notably, by the time this directive was issued, Kariyappa had already
transferred the property to the Plaintiff‟s vendor under Ex.A.1 on September
27, 1945. Consequently, the Appellant contends that the arguments put forth
by the Respondents lack merit. To support this position, the Appellant‟s
counsel has referenced the following precedents:
(i) In Kommineni Mohan Naidu and another Versus The State of
Andhra Pradesh8, wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held
that:
It is an undisputed position that prior to the issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 1142,
dated 18-6-1954 (in the affidavit, the petitioners have wrongly mentioned
the date as 18-4-1954), the assigned lands did not contain any clause
prohibiting their alienation. For the first time, by the said G.O., a clause
prohibiting alienations of the assigned lands was introduced in the
assignment conditions in Andhra and Rayalaseema regions. It is the
pleaded case of the petitioners that the lands in question were assigned
somewhere between the years 1932 and 1948.
In support of this plea, the petitioners have filed a copy of proceedings in
Roc.A/627/2001, dated 20-4-2012, of respondent No. 3, addressed to the
Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupathi, wherein he has traced the history of
the lands in survey numbers such as Sy. No. 2196/3 and other survey
numbers over which the petitioners claim right. He has categorically
mentioned in his report that all the sub-divided survey numbers as
mentioned in his report relate to the lands assigned between 1932 and
1948 and that during the said period, there was no condition in the D.K.T.
pattas prohibiting the sale or purchase of such lands. Respondent No. 3
also mentioned that this Court had declared that the lands' assignees
before 1954 had saleable rights.
8
2012 SCC OnLine AP 400
19
The above-discussed material would clinchingly establish that the
petitioners have purchased the lands on which assignments were made
prior to the issue of G.O.Ms. No. 1142, dated 18-6-1954. Admittedly, there
was no prohibition of alienation of the assigned lands during that period.
Being well aware of this position, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have been
preventing the petitioners from registering the mortgage deed. This attitude
on the part of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is wholly reprehensible. They
cannot claim to be so nave as not to realize that there is a clear cut
demarcation between the two categories of assigned lands, namely, lands
assigned prior to the issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 1142 and that assigned post
G.O.Ms. No. 1142. Despite this clear distinction, respondent Nos. 2 and 3
have harassed the petitioners and forced them to approach this Court again
and again.
(ii) In Boya Ramappa and Another Versus Joint Collector,
Anantapur District and Others 9 , wherein the composite High Court of
Andhra Pradesh held that:
8.............. As per G.O. Ms. No. 1142, dated 18.06.1954, non-alienation of
assigned lands was introduced only in 1954 and the same is also not
disputed by the learned AGP for revenue. By virtue of the said G.O., the
Government has introduced the condition of non-alienation of assigned
lands. When once the assignment was made in the year 1951 and when
once it is claimed that the 4th Respondent sold the same to the petitioners
by registered sale deeds and they were issued pattadar pass books and
title deeds, their names were also referred to in revenue records, initiation
of proceedings under the Act of 1977 is without jurisdiction, as the
provisions of the Act have no application in respect of lands assigned prior
to 1954. ..................
44. Learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance on the
G.O.Ms.No.575, dated 16.11.2018, the Government of Andhra Pradesh
ordered for deletion of Government lands assigned prior to 18.06.1954 from
the purview of section 22-A of Registration Act, 1908 here under:
4. The Spl. C.S. & Chief Commissioner of Land Administration has
suggested that all assignments made prior to 18.06.1954 may be
considered for deletion from the purview of section 22-A of the Registration
Act, 1908, as there was no condition of non-alienation. The condition of
non-alienation to non-British subjects may be ignored as it is irrelevant at
present. The clear statement about the assigned lands before 18.06.1954
9
2016 SCC OnLine Hyd 457
20
will settle a number of land matters and court cases faced by the Revenue
Department.
45. The learned counsel for the Respondents asserts that G.O.Ms.No.575
bears no relevance to the present case, arguing that it pertains solely to the
deletion of government land assignments made prior to 18.06.1954 from the
purview of Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908. However, it is
imperative to note that the G.O., as mentioned above, explicitly indicates that
assignments prior to 18.06.1954 may be deemed valid, given the absence of
any alienation conditions. Notably, the sale transaction favouring the Plaintiff's
vendor occurred as early as 1945, well before the specified date. Furthermore,
the Respondent's contentions, raised during the hearing questioning the
Appellant's status as a landless poor, cannot be entertained at the Second
Appeal stage. Such matters are fundamentally questions of fact that should
have been articulated in the initial pleadings and resolved by both the trial
Court and the 1st Appellate Court. Such contentions cannot be introduced or
considered for the first time in the Second Appeal.
46. Upon reviewing the submissions presented and examining the cited
precedents, this Court concludes that the observations made by the 1st
Appellate Court that the alienation of the suit land is prohibited under Act 9 of
1977 and that the Plaintiff is not entitled to purchase the land under Ex.A.5 are
not sustainable. The failure to adequately consider the relevant documentation
and the lack of prohibitory clauses at the time of the initial transaction
undermines the basis of the 1st Appellate Court's judgment. Consequently, the
Plaintiff's right to acquire the property warrants reconsideration in light of
these findings.
47. The learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the 1st Appellate
Court erred in holding that Ex.A.5 sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff is a
nominal and it has not taken note of the principles underlying Benami
Transactions Prohibition Act, 1988, which prohibits the plea of benami
purchase and thus, committed grave error in its judgment.
21
48. For better appreciation, it is relevant to refer to the definition of benami
transaction as per the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988,
as follows:
(9) "benami transaction" means,--
(A) a transaction or an arrangement--
(a) where a property is transferred to or is held by a person, and the
consideration for such property has been provided, or paid by,
another person; and
(b) the property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or
indirect, of the person who has provided the consideration, except
when the property is held by--
(i) a Karta, or a member of a Hindu undivided family, as the case may
be, and the property is held for his benefit or benefit of other members
in the family, and the consideration for such property has been
provided or paid out of the known sources of the Hindu undivided
family;
X
49. To appreciate the said submission, I have carefully gone through the
Defendants' stand in the suit. They contend that Bheemanna purchased the
property in the name of Hanumanthappa, being an elder member nominally,
as Sri Hanumanthappa did not have any income. However, it is the contention
of the Appellants that it is the self-acquired property of Hanumanthappa. This
Court finds that if the Respondents/Defendants can adequately establish their
case as projected, then the transaction in question would not fall under the
definition of the Benami Prohibition Act.
50. By keeping the principles in the decision reported in Bathula Anasuya
And Anr. vs Bathula Rayudu And Ors. 10 , by composite High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, this Court views that generally benami transactions are
cases where property is purchased by a person in the name of another after
10
AIR1989AP290
22
paying consideration by himself. In the case of nominal transactions, no title is
passed, and the title is never intended to be passed. The Court is always free
to examine the attendant circumstances and find whether the title was
intended to be passed under the transaction in question.
51. Furthermore, the properties owned by the Hindu undivided family could
not be treated as benami transactions. As long as the transactions conducted
by the Karta are for the benefit of the Hindu undivided family and not for
personal gain, they cannot be classified as benami. The karta acts on behalf
of the family and does not personally benefit from the assets, reinforcing that
the Hindu undivided family members are the true beneficiaries.
52. Sections 3 and 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988
have to be read and understood together. They are not disjunctive provisions
in a comprehensive legislation intended to prohibit benami transactions.
Sections 3 and 4 complement each other to achieve the same object. While
Section 3 prohibits the creation of any "benami transaction", Section 4
prevents any suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any
property "held benami". It is only when any right in respect of a property "held
benami" is sought to be enforced in any suit or claim that Section 4 is
attracted.
53. After carefully examining the material on record, this Court concludes
that the burden of proof rests with the Respondents/Defendants to establish
the nominality of the document. The evidence presented is insufficient to meet
this burden. Furthermore, the available material does not substantiate the
Respondents' claim that Ex.A.5 was executed nominally in favour of
Hanumanthappa or that it was not intended to be acted upon. Consequently,
the assertions made by the Respondents lack the requisite support to
invalidate the transaction.
54. The learned counsel for the Respondents contends that they have
submitted numerous documents to demonstrate their possession of the
23
property. In light of this, I have examined Exs.B.1 to B.47. It is noteworthy that
many of these documents consist of cist receipts issued after the initiation of
the suit. Consequently, this Court is disinclined to place reliance on these
documents. Revenue authorities may have collected cist payments from
individuals without verifying their legal entitlement to the property in question.
It appears that the 1st Appellate Court attributed undue significance to the cist
receipts and adangals presented by the Defendants, which pertain to the
period subsequent to the initiation of the suit.
55. In Balwant Singh and Another V. Daulat Singh (dead) by L.Rs and
others11, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that "mutation entries do not convey or
extinguish any title and those entries are relevant only for the purpose of
collection of land revenue".
56. Given the observations from the preceding decision, this Court
concludes that the cist receipts issued after the suit hold limited weight in
assessing the parties' rights.
57. The learned counsel for the Appellant asserts that the Respondents
have not demonstrated any nucleus of income that would support the
purchase of the property under Ex.A.5. Therefore, the argument that the
schedule property was acquired with funds from the joint family nucleus in the
name of Hanumanthappa is unsubstantiated. This Court finds merit in the
Appellant's contention, as the mere establishment of a joint Hindu family does
not automatically imply the existence of joint family property. Without clear
evidence of a financial basis for the acquisition, the Respondents' claims
cannot be upheld. At this juncture, referring to the decision reported in D.S.
Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam is relevant. 12 , wherein the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held that:
11
197 (4) ALT page 17
12
(2003) 10 SCC 310
24
17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the respondents having failed to
discharge the initial burden of establishing that there was any nucleus in the
form of any income whatsoever from Item 2 property and no other nucleus
was claimed, the burden remained on the respondents to establish that Item
1 property was joint family property. In this view, the fact that the first
appellant has not led any evidence to establish his separate income is of no
consequence insofar as the claim of the respondents is concerned. Under
these circumstances, for failure to lead evidence, the respondents' claim of
Item 1 to be joint family property would fail, as rightly held by the first
Appellate court.
18. The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of property
being joint family property only on account of the existence of a joint Hindu
family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family
property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was a
nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would
be a presumption of the property being joint, and the onus would shift on
the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he
purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family
nucleus that was available.
******
58. In Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh V. Ram Chandra Ravagowda
Sankh13, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
Of course, there is no presumption that merely because the family is joint
so, the property is also joint. So, the person alleging the property to be joint
family property must prove it. In that case, this Court further held that the
burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property is,
therefore, in the first instance, upon the person who claims it to be
coparcenary property. But if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family
property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of
the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. The Court carved out
an exception and observed that “this is, however, subject to the limitation
that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in
question could have been acquired. It is only after the possession of an
adequate nucleus is shown that the onus shifts to the person who claims
the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property
was acquired without any aid from the family estate.
59. In Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh (cited supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court heavily relied upon the ratio of the Privy Council judgment in Randhi
13
(1969) 1 SCC 386
25
Appalaswami v. Randhi Suryanarayanamurti 14 , wherein the legal position of
Hindu Law has been beautifully articulated by Sir John Beaumont. The relevant
portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: (Randhi Appalaswami case [ILR
1948 Mad 440 (PC)], ILR pp. 447-48)
“… Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the
presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and
the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property is joint to
establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed
some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have
formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been
acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish
affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint
family property;”
60. At this juncture, addressing the submissions articulated by the
Respondents’ counsel in their written arguments is essential. They assert that
Sri Hanumanthappa, who is a landless poor, acquired the property through the
registered sale deed marked as Ex.A.5. It is not contended that Bheemanna
had any properties in his name. Even if it is assumed that both lived together,
no evidence has been provided to demonstrate the existence of a joint family
nucleus that could have facilitated the purchase of the schedule property.
Furthermore, as previously noted, the sale deed is registered exclusively
under the name Hanumanthappa. In light of these observations, this Court
concludes that the Defendants have not successfully established any viable
source of joint family income that predates the acquisition of the property as
outlined in Ex.A.5. Consequently, the assertion that the schedule property was
acquired in the name of Hanumanthappa with joint family funds cannot be
upheld.
61. The record establishes that the schedule property is the self-acquired
assets of the Hanumanthappa. For the sake of argument, even assuming that
the schedule property is a joint family asset, given the assertion that
Hanumanthappa held the status of an elder family member, this Court posits
14
ILR 1948 Mad 440 (PC)
26
that the Respondents bear the onus of demonstrating how Hanumanthappa is
deemed incompetent to alienate the properties in question. Notably, the
Respondents have not contended that Hanumanthappa lacked the legal
necessity for such alienation. Furthermore, there are no allegations of any
habitual vices on Hanumanthappa‟s part from the Respondents.
62. In Sunil Kumar v. Ram Parkash15, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
6. …………… It is well settled that in a joint Hindu Mitakshara family, a son
acquires by birth an interest equal to that of the father in ancestral property.
The father, by reason of his paternal relation and his position as the head of
the family, is its Manager, and he is entitled to alienate joint family property
so as to bind the interests of both adult and minor coparceners in the
property, provided that the alienation is made for legal necessity or for the
benefit of the estate or for meeting an antecedent debt.
63. In the light of aforesaid discussions, this Court finds that the Ex.A.5 sale
transaction is valid and binding. For the above reasons, this Court discerns
perversity in the Judgment rendered by the learned 1st Appellate Court. The
findings and reasoning provided by the 1st Appellate Court are inconsistent
with established legal principles. Furthermore, the 1st Appellate Court failed to
consider the evidence on the record following the well-settled principles of
law.
64. Upon a thorough examination of the evidence on record, this Court
concludes that the trial Court has duly evaluated the evidence in its proper
context and rendered its findings with accuracy and in alignment with the
material on record. The conclusions reached by the trial Court are grounded in
a sound interpretation of the evidence and do not warrant any interference.
The Judgment and decree of the learned 1st Appellate Court are set aside.
Consequently, the substantial questions of law raised in this Second Appeal
are adjudicated in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents.
65. As a result, this Second Appeal is allowed without costs,
consequently, the judgment and decree dated 01.11.2004 passed by the
15
(1988) 2 SCC 77
27
learned Senior Civil Judge, Hindupur in A.S.No.7 of 2002, are hereby set
aside. The Judgment and decree, dated 22.01.2002 passed by the learned
Junior Civil Judge, Madakasira, in O.S.No.119 of 1981, are restored.
In this Second Appeal, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall
stand closed.
_____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 26.10.2024
SAK / MS
28
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO.185 OF 2005
Date: 26.10.2024
MS