Punjab-Haryana High Court
Neeraj Saluja vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 20 January, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
239 CRM M-55991-2024
Date of Decision: 20.01.2025
Neeraj Saluja ... Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement ... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.S.SHEKHAWAT
Present : Mr. R.S. Rai, Senior Advocate and
Mr. Anand Chiber, Senior Advocate
Ms. Rubina Virmani, Advocate
Mr. Shikhar Sarin, Advocate
Mr. Arjun S. Rai, Advocate
Ms. Prachi Gupta, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Satya Pal Jain, Additional Solicitor General of India
(through VC) with Ms. Meghna Malik, Advocate
for the respondent.
N.S.SHEKHAWAT, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Section
483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 with a prayer to
grant a regular bail in ECIR/JLZO/36/2020 under Sections 3 and 4 of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, (hereinafter to be
referred as ‘the PML Act’) registered by Enforcement Directorate,
Jalandhar.
2. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner vehemently argues that the petitioner is a guarantor and
suspended director of a company known as SEL Textiles Limited
1 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -2-
(hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Company’). The said Company
was a leading manufacturer of textiles products in North India and in
the year 2009, the Central Bank of India and Allahabad Bank had
formed a consortium to extend the credit facilities to the companies
after observing the performance as well as financial returns of the
Company. Later on, various financial facilities were availed by the
Company from a consortium of 10 banks between the years 2009 to
2014. During this period, the Company also acquired various
spinning units, situated at different places to expand the business. He
further contends that in the meantime, the Company being severely
prejudiced by the actions of the bank and on recommendations of the
Central Bank of India, the Company underwent Corporate Debt
Restructuring in the year 2013-2014. Even, a Master Restructuring
Agreement was signed between the Company and all the ten lenders
on 30.09.2024 (including the complainant bank, i.e., the Central Bank
of India). The Board of Directors of each bank approved the financial
package submitted with the CDR Cell and the Master Restructuring
Agreement. The Company duly complied with the terms and
conditions stipulated by the CDR Cell and after the approval of the
CDR package in September 2014, the funds were required to be
released to the Company by the banks. However, the banks defaulted
in fulfilling their own commitments and did not disburse the funds.
He further contends that even the accounts of the Company were
under the extensive monitoring of the bank and there was no question
2 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -3-
of any kind of fraud by the Company. Later on, the bank accounts of
the Company were classified as NPAs in the year 2015 and the
complainant bank had also filed an application under Section 7 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code before the National Company Law
Tribunal, Chandigarh for initiating insolvency proceedings against the
petitioner. All the member banks of the consortium also filed
applications before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh against
the Company as well as its guarantors, which includes the petitioner.
3. Learned senior counsel further argues that in violation of
the Master Restructuring Agreement, the consortium banks exited
from the CDR and without providing any opportunity of hearing,
reported the accounts of the Company as ‘Fraud’ on different dates.
The complainant reported the accounts of the Company as well as
guarantors as ‘Fraud’ on 18.04.2018 and the same was followed by
other consortium members. On 29.07.2020, the complainant bank
lodged a formal complaint with the Superintendent of Police, Central
Bureau of Investigation, Anti Corruption-V, Branch, New Delhi which
was later on converted into a FIR bearing No. RC2232020A0004
dated 06.08.2020 registered at Police Station AC-V Delhi, under
Sections 403, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (Annexure P-5). The petitioner joined the
investigation and cooperated with CBI on multiple occasions,
however, the petitioner was arrested on 28.10.2022 and remained in
3 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -4-
custody till 03.05.2023, when he was ordered to be released on bail
by this Court, vide order dated 03.05.2023 (Annexure P-6) passed in
CRM M-4424-2023 titled as “Neeraj Saluja Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation”. The investigation was completed by the CBI and
challan (Annexure P-7) was filed against the petitioner only under
Sections 120-B read with Section 420, 477-A of the IPC and other
offences were deleted.
4. Learned senior counsel further argues that during the
interregnum period, on the basis of the FIR (Annexure P-5) registered
by the CBI, the Enforcement Directorate registered
ECIR/JLZO/36/2020 against the Company and its directors including
the present petitioner. The petitioner was summoned by the ED on
17.02.2021 and on different dates and the petitioner had fully
cooperated with the investigation in all respects. However, after more
than 3½ years of ECIR and after more than 1½ years of last
summoning, the ED conducted search at the residence of the
petitioner on 12.01.2024 and the petitioner was directed to appear
before the ED on 18.01.2024. On 18.01.2024, the petitioner appeared
before the ED and by alleging that the petitioner was not cooperated
with the investigation, the ED had arrested the petitioner on the same
day, i.e., 18.01.2024. He further argues that on 19.01.2024, the ED
filed an application for remand and pleadings in the remand
application by the CBI and the ED were exactly the same and there
were no reasons or satisfaction of the Arresting Officer, which is
4 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -5-
apparent from both the remand applications filed by the CBI as well
as ED (Annexures P-10 and P-11).
5. Learned senior counsel further argues that the petitioner
had challenged the declaration of ‘Fraud’ of the accounts of the
Company on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice.
Vide order dated 09.02.2024 (Annexure P-13), a Division Bench of
this Court had stayed all further proceedings including the registration
of FIR No. RC2232020A0004 dated 06.08.2020 at Police Station
AC-V Delhi, under Sections 403, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 1391)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Annexure P-5); investigation and
arrest in relation to complaints/FIRs already registered on the
complaint made by the respondent/bank. He further contends that the
FIR registered by the CBI (Annexure P-5) in the present case had
been stayed by this Court on the same very ground, the continuation
of proceedings by the ED have to be stopped and the petitioner filed a
CWP 15438 of 2024 before this Court, challenging the ECIR.
Ultimately, vide order dated 08.07.2024 (Annexure P-15), a Division
Bench of this Court held that the order passed on 09.02.2024 in
respect of CBI (ECIR No. ECIR/JLZO/36/2020 dated 08.10.2020)
shall also apply to the ED report as both arise from a common cause
of action as also relate to the common facts. Thus, the proceedings
arising out of ECIR have already been stayed by this Court.
5 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -6-
6. Learned senior counsel further argues that the respondent
has already completed its investigation and filed a complaint under
the PML Act on 15.03.2024. Learned senior counsel submits that the
petitioner was arrested in the present case by the respondent on
18.01.2024 and is in custody for the last more than 01 year. Even
otherwise, the petitioner had already suffered 06 months of
incarceration in the FIR and was granted the concession of bail and in
the present case, the petitioner has again suffered an incarceration of
more 02 months, i.e., he has undergone more than 01 year and 06
months of custody, on the same set of allegations, in both the
proceedings. He further contends that in fact the ECIR in the present
case has been challenged and further proceedings have been stayed,
the twin conditions as mentioned under Section 45 of the PML Act
would not come into effect and the present bail application have to be
dealt like normal bail petition. As per learned counsel, the petitioner
had cooperated with the respondent on each occasion, still, he was
wrongly arrested by the respondent without any justification.
7. Learned senior counsel has relied upon the law laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ramkripal Meena
Vs. Enforcement Directorate, 2024, SCC Online SC 2276, wherein,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
“7.Adverting to the prayer for grant of bail in the instant
case, it is pointed out by learned counsel for ED that the
complaint case is at the stage of framing of charges and
24 witnesses are proposed to be examined. The6 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356CRM M-55991-2024 -7-
conclusion of proceedings, thus, will take some
reasonable time. The petitioner has already been in
custody for more than a year. Taking into consideration
the period spent in custody and there being no likelihood
of conclusion of trial within a short span, coupled with
the fact that the petitioner is already on bail in the
predicate offence, and keeping in view the peculiar facts
and circumstances of this case, it seems to us that the
rigours of Section 45 of the Act can be suitably relaxed to
afford conditional liberty to the petitioner. Ordered
accordingly.”
8. Still further, the learned senior counsel has relied upon
the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Manish Sisodia Vs. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC Online SC
1920 as follows:-
“37. Insofar as the contention of the learned ASG that
since the conditions as provided under Section 45 of the
PMLA are not satisfied, the appellant is not entitled to
grant of bail is concerned, it will be apposite to refer to
the first order of this Court. No doubt that this Court in
its first order in paragraph 25, after recapitulating in
paragraph 24 as to what was stated in the charge-sheet
filed by the CBI against the appellant, observed that, in
view of the aforesaid discussion, the Court was not
inclined to accept the prayer for grant of bail at that
stage. However, certain paragraphs of the said order
cannot be read in isolation from the other paragraphs.
The order will have to be read in its entirety. In
paragraph 28 of the said order, this Court observed that
the right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with7 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356CRM M-55991-2024 -8-
incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature
of the allegations, should be read into Section 439
Cr.P.C., 1973 and Section 45 of the PMLA. The Court
held that the constitutional mandate is the higher law,
and it is the basic right of the person charged of an
offence and not convicted that he be ensured and given a
speedy trial. It further observed that when the trial is not
proceeding for reasons not attributable to the accused,
the court, unless there are good reasons, would be
guided to exercise the power to grant bail. The Court
specifically observed that this would be true where the
trial would take years. It could thus clearly be seen that
this Court, in the first round of litigation between the
parties, has specifically observed that in case of delay
coupled with incarceration for a long period and
depending on the nature of the allegations, the right to
bail will have to be read into Section 45 of PMLA.
***
39. In the light of the specific observations of this Court
in paragraph 28 of the first order, we are not inclined to
accept the submission of the learned ASG that the
provisions of Section 45 of the PMLA would come in the
way of consideration of the application of the appellant
for grant of bail.
***
43. A perusal of the material placed on record would
clearly reveal that far from the trial being concluded
within a period of 6-8 months, it is even yet to
commence. Though in the first order of this Court, liberty
was reserved to move afresh for bail if the trial
proceeded at a snail’s pace within a period of three8 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356CRM M-55991-2024 -9-
months from the date of the said order, the
commencement of the trial is yet to see the light of the
day. In these circumstances, in view of the first order of
this Court, the appellant was entitled to renew his
request. When the appellant renewed his request, the
learned Special Judge (trial court) as well as the High
Court was required to consider the said applications in
the light of the observations made by this Court in
paragraphs 28 and 29 of the first order. In paragraph 29
of the first order, this Court specifically observed that
though the observations on the aspect of merit were not
binding, the observations of right to speedy trial were
required to be taken into consideration.
44. The learned Special Judge and the learned Single
Judge of the High Court have considered the
applications on merits as well as on the grounds of delay
and denial of right to speedy trial. We see no error in the
judgments and orders of the learned Special Judge as
well as the High Court in considering the merits of the
matter. In view of the observations made by this Court in
the first order, they were entitled to consider the same.
However, the question that arises is as to whether the
trial court and the High Court have correctly considered
the observations made by this Court with regard to right
to speedy trial and prolonged period of incarceration.
The courts below have rejected the claim of the appellant
applying the triple test as contemplated under Section 45
of the PMLA. In our view, this is in ignorance of the
observations made by this Court in paragraph 28 of the
first order wherein this Court specifically observed that
right to bail in cases of delay coupled with incarceration
9 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -10-
for a long period should be read into Section 439
Cr.P.C., 1973 and Section 45 of the PMLA.
****
49. We find that, on account of a long period of
incarceration running for around 17 months and the trial
even not having been commenced, the appellant has been
deprived of his right to speedy trial.
50. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy trial
and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights. On denial
of these rights, the trial court as well as the High Court
ought to have given due weightage to this factor.
51. Recently, this Court had an occasion to consider an
application for bail in the case of Javed Gulam Nabi
Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and Another 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1693 wherein the accused was prosecuted
under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court surveyed the entire
law right from the judgment of this Court in the cases of
Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Others v. Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1977
INSC 232, Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v.
State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 INSC 68,
Hussainara Khatoon and Others (I) v. Home Secretary,
State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1979 INSC 34, Union
of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 : 2021 INSC
50 and Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of
Investigation and Another (2022) 10 SCC 51 : 2022
INSC 690. The Court observed thus:
“19. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the
court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or
protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a10 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356CRM M-55991-2024 -11-
speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting
agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground
that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the
Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the
crime.”
52. The Court also reproduced the observations made in
Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), which read thus:
“10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial
courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed
by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, High Court reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240.
We quote:
“What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants
reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial
custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal. Lord
Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]:
“I observe that in this case bail was refused for the
prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the,
magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld
as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are
merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.”
53. The Court further observed that, over a period of
time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten
a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment. From our experience, we can
say that it appears that the trial courts and the High
Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail.
The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an
exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of
non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and shut
11 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -12-
cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail
petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high
time that the trial courts and the High Courts should
recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is
exception”.
54. In the present case, in the ED matter as well as the
CBI matter, 493 witnesses have been named. The case
involves thousands of pages of documents and over a
lakh pages of digitized documents. It is thus clear that
there is not even the remotest possibility of the trial being
concluded in the near future. In our view, keeping the
appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time
in the hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive
his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution. As observed time and again, the prolonged
incarceration before being pronounced guilty of an
offence should not be permitted to become punishment
without trial.
55. As observed by this Court in the case of Gudikanti
Narasimhulu (supra), the objective to keep a person in
judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal is
to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial”.
9. Learned senior counsel has further relied upon the law
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Prem
Prakash Vs. Union of India, 2024 SCC Online SC 2270, wherein,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the fundamental right under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a higher constitutional right
and the statutory provisions will have to align themselves to the
higher constitutional edict and held as follows:-
12 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356CRM M-55991-2024 -13-
“11. Considering that the present is a bail application
for the offence under Section 45 of PMLA, the twin
conditions mentioned thereof become relevant. Section
45(1) of PMLA reads as under:-
“45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person
accused of an offence [under this Act] shall be released
on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity
to oppose the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application,
the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that
he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen
years, or is a woman or is sick or infirm or is accused
either on his own or along with other co-accused of
money-laundering a sum of less than one crore rupees,
may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs:
Provided further that the Special Court shall not take
cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 4
except upon a complaint in writing made by-
(i) the Director; or
(ii) any officer of the Central Government or a State
Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the
Central Government by a general or special order made
in this behalf by that Government”.
In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. v. Union of India
and Ors. reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929, this
13 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -14-
Court categorically held that while Section 45 of PMLA
restricts the right of the accused to grant of bail, it could
not be said that the conditions provided under Section 45
impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. Para 131
is extracted hereinbelow:-
“131. It is important to note that the twin conditions
provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act, though
restrict the right of the accused to grant of bail, but it
cannot be said that the conditions provided under
Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail.
The discretion vests in the court, which is not arbitrary
or irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law
as provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act. …”
These observations are significant and if read in the
context of the recent pronouncement of this Court dated
09.08.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 3295 of 2024
[Manish Sisodia (II) v. Directorate of Enforcement], it
will be amply clear that even under PMLA the governing
principle is that “Bail is the Rule and Jail is the
Exception”. In para 53 of [Manish Sisodia (II), this
Court observed as under:-
“53…..From our experience, we can say that it appears
that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play
safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail is
a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in
breach. On account of non-grant of bail even in straight
forward open and shut cases, this Court is flooded with
huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge
pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the
High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is
rule and jail is exception.”
14 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -15-
All that Section 45 of PMLA mentions is that certain
conditions are to be satisfied. The principle that, “bail is
the rule and jail is the exception” is only a paraphrasing
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which states
that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to the procedure established by
law. Liberty of the individual is always a Rule and
deprivation is the exception. Deprivation can only be by
the procedure established by law, which has to be a valid
and reasonable procedure. Section 45 of PMLA by
imposing twin conditions does not re-write this principle
to mean that deprivation is the norm and liberty is the
exception. As set out earlier, all that is required is that in
cases where bail is subject to the satisfaction of twin
conditions, those conditions must be satisfied.
12. Independently and as has been emphatically
reiterated in Manish Sisodia (II) (supra) relying on
Ramkripal Meena v. Directorate of Enforcement (SLP
(Crl.) No. 3205 of 2024 dated 30.07.2024) and Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and Another,
2024 SCC online 1693, where the accused has already
been in custody for a considerable number of months and
there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a
short span, the rigours of Section 45 of PMLA can be
suitably relaxed to afford conditional liberty. Further,
Manish Sisodia (II) (supra) reiterated the holding in
Javed Gulam Nabi Sheikh (Supra), that keeping persons
behind the bars for unlimited periods of time in the hope
of speedy completion of trial would deprive the
fundamental right of persons under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and that prolonged incarceration
before being pronounced guilty ought not to be permitted
15 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -16-
to become the punishment without trial. In fact, Manish
Sisodia (II) (Supra) reiterated the holding in Manish
Sisodia (I) v. Directorate of Enforcement (judgment
dated 30.10.2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 3352 of 2023)
where it was held as under:-
“28. Detention or jail before being pronounced guilty of
an offence should not become punishment without trial.
If the trial gets protracted despite assurances of the
prosecution, and it is clear that case will not be decided
within a foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be
meritorious. While the prosecution may pertain to an
economic offence, yet it may not be proper to equate
these cases with those punishable with death,
imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnaping for
ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where
100/1000s of depositors have been defrauded. The
allegations have to be established and proven. The right
to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a
long period, depending on the nature of the allegations,
should be read into Section 439 of the Code and Section
45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the constitutional
mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the
person charged of an offence and not convicted, that he
be ensured and given a speedy trial. When the trial is not
proceeding for reasons not attributable to the accused,
the court, unless there are good reasons, may well be
guided to exercise the power to grant bail. This would be
truer where the trial would take years.”
It is in this background that Section 45 of PMLA needs to
be understood and applied. Article 21 being a higher
16 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -17-
constitutional right, statutory provisions should align
themselves to the said higher constitutional edict”.
10. Learned senior counsel has further relied upon the law
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of V. Senthil
Balaji Vs. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC Online SC 2626,
wherein the Apex Court had laid down various principles of law,
which governed the grant of bail under the Provisions of the PML Act
and held as follows:-
“25. Considering the gravity of the offences in such
statutes, expeditious disposal of trials for the crimes
under these statutes is contemplated. Moreover, such
statutes contain provisions laying down higher threshold
for the grant of bail. The expeditious disposal of the trial
is also warranted considering the higher threshold set
for the grant of bail. Hence, the requirement of
expeditious disposal of cases must be read into these
statutes. Inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial
and the higher threshold for the grant of bail cannot go
together. It is a well-settled principle of our criminal
jurisprudence that “bail is the rule, and jail is the
exception.” These stringent provisions regarding the
grant of bail, such as Section 45(1)(iii) of the PMLA,
cannot become a tool which can be used to incarcerate
the accused without trial for an unreasonably long time.
26. There are a series of decisions of this Court starting
from the decision in the case of K.A. Najeeb2, which hold
that such stringent provisions for the grant of bail do not
take away the power of Constitutional Courts to grant
bail on the grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution of India. We have already referred to17 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356CRM M-55991-2024 -18-
paragraph 17 of the said decision, which lays down that
the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there
is no likelihood of trial being completed in a reasonable
time and the period of incarceration already undergone
has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed
sentence. One of the reasons is that if, because of such
provisions, incarceration of an undertrial accused is
continued for an unreasonably long time, the provisions
may be exposed to the vice of being violative of Article
21 of the Constitution of India.
27. Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum sentence
is three years, and the maximum is seven years. The
minimum sentence is higher when the scheduled offence
is under the NDPS Act. When the trial of the complaint
under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond reasonable
limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to consider
exercising their powers to grant bail. The reason is that
Section 45(1)(ii) does not confer power on the State to
detain an accused for an unreasonably long time,
especially when there is no possibility of trial concluding
within a reasonable time. What a reasonable time is will
depend on the provisions under which the accused is
being tried and other factors. One of the most relevant
factor is the duration of the minimum and maximum
sentence for the offence. Another important
consideration is the higher threshold or stringent
conditions which a statute provides for the grant of bail.
Even an outer limit provided by the relevant law for the
completion of the trial, if any, is also a factor to be
considered. The extraordinary powers, as held in the
case of K.A. Najeeb2, can only be exercised by the
Constitutional Courts. The Judges of the Constitutional18 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356CRM M-55991-2024 -19-
Courts have vast experience. Based on the facts on
record, if the Judges conclude that there is no possibility
of a trial concluding in a reasonable time, the power of
granting bail can always be exercised by the
Constitutional Courts on the grounds of violation of Part
III of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the
statutory provisions. The Constitutional Courts can
always exercise its jurisdiction under Article 32 or
Article 226, as the case may be. The Constitutional
Courts have to bear in mind while dealing with the cases
under the PMLA that, except in a few exceptional cases,
the maximum sentence can be of seven years. The
Constitutional Courts cannot allow provisions like
Section 45(1)(ii) to become instruments in the hands of
the ED to continue incarceration for a long time when
there is no possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence
and the PMLA offence concluding within a reasonable
time. If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise their
jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of the undertrials
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India will be
defeated. In a given case, if an undue delay in the
disposal of the trial of scheduled offences or disposal of
trial under the PMLA can be substantially attributed to
the accused, the Constitutional Courts can always
decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs.
An exception will also be in a case where, considering
the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility
of the accused becoming a real threat to society if
enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative
writs is always discretionary.
28. Some day, the courts, especially the Constitutional
Courts, will have to take a call on a peculiar situation19 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356CRM M-55991-2024 -20-
that arises in our justice delivery system. There are cases
where clean acquittal is granted by the criminal courts to
the accused after very long incarceration as an
undertrial. When we say clean acquittal, we are
excluding the cases where the witnesses have turned
hostile or there is a bona fide defective investigation. In
such cases of clean acquittal, crucial years in the life of
the accused are lost. In a given case, it may amount to
violation of rights of the accused under Article 21 of the
Constitution which may give rise to a claim for
compensation.
29. As stated earlier, the appellant has been incarcerated
for 15 months or more for the offence punishable under
the PMLA. In the facts of the case, the trial of the
scheduled offences and, consequently, the PMLA offence
is not likely to be completed in three to four years or
even more. If the appellant’s detention is continued, it
will amount to an infringement of his fundamental right
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India of speedy
trial.”
11. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents submits that the present petition was not
maintainable before this Court as the petitioner was not entitled to
seeking discretionary relief of bail without fulfilling the twin
conditions as laid down under Section 45 of the PML Act. He further
further contends that the mandate of twin conditions under Sections
45 of the PML Act had been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the matter of Vijay Modanlal Choudhary and others Vs. UOI and
others 2022 SCC Online SC 929. He further argues that the law is
20 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -21-
well settled that the economic offences constitute a different class and
need to be visited with a different approach, while considering the
concession of bail to such an accused. These offences affect the
economic fiber of the country and pose serious threat to the financial
health of the nation. Even, the money laundering offence is a serious
threat to the national interest and the offence was committed with
proper conspiracy and is a deliberate attempt to loot the money of the
banks. He further contends that on the basis of the FIR registered by
the CBI, the ECIR/JLZO/36/2020 dated 08.10.2020 was recorded and
the investigation under the provisions of the PML Act was initiated.
During investigation, it was found that the consortium of banks led by
the Central Bank of India had disbursed the loan amount to the
Company for the purpose of setting up manufacturing plants and
working capital. However, the petitioner in connivance with other
accused had illegally diverted part of loan amount to the tune of
Rs. 81.03 crores to two companies, i.e., M/s Silverline Corporation
Limited and M/s Rhythm Textiles and Apparels Park Limited, which
were not owned/controlled by him. Thus, an amount of Rs. 81.03
crores was diverted illegally, without explicit permission from the
consortium of banks and in clear violation of terms and conditions of
the loan. Apart from that, an amount of Rs. 191 crores approximately
was diverted by the petitioner and other accused in the guise of
export, causing a wrongful loss to the banks. Still further, the account
of the Company was declared NPA by the consortium of banks led by
21 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -22-
the complainant bank on 28.02.2016 and the account was further
declared as ‘Fraud’ by the banks on 18.04.2018. Still further, it was
also revealed that an amount of Rs. 35.19 crores was also diverted
from the Company to M/s 3-A Exports in the guise of advance
payments for procurement of goods and services. During
investigation, the assets worth Rs. 828.90 crores in the form of
movable and immovable properties had been provisionally attached
under Section 5 of the PML Act, 2002, vide attachment order dated
17.02.2023.
12. While referring to the specific role of the petitioner,
learned senior counsel submits that the Company was a family owned
concern, which was controlled by the petitioner and his brother Dhiraj
Saluja after the death of their father late Ram Saran Saluja. The
petitioner is one of the directors of the Company and was responsible
for managing/controlling the day to day affairs of the Company. The
credit facilities availed by the Company have been illegally diverted
and siphoned off, thus, causing wrongful loss to the banks and
causing wrongful gains to themselves. The petitioner was actively
involved in the decision making of the Company and was also an
authorized signatory to the various bank transactions, including taking
of bank loan proceeds. He had full control over the board meetings,
where the decision regarding investment in subsidiaries was taken and
was at the helm of the affairs.
22 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -23-
13. I have heard learned the rival submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.
14. In the present case, the FIR (Annexure P-5) was ordered
to be registered against the petitioner on 06.08.2020 under Sections
403, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 at Police Station AC-V Delhi. Thereafter, the petitioner
joined investigation and was arrested on 28.10.2022. However, after
06 months of custody, vide order dated 03.05.2023 passed in CRM
M-4424-2023 (Annexure P-6), the petitioner was ordered to be
released on bail. After concluding the investigation, the challan
(Annexure P-7) filed against the petitioner by the CBI, however, the
charge has not been framed against the petitioner so far. Later on,
with regard to the predicate offence, the respondent-ED also
registered ECIR/JLZO/36/2020 dated 08.10.2020 against the
Company and its directors including the petitioners. After 3 ½ years
of registration of ECIR and more than 1 ½ years of the summoning,
the petitioner was directed to appear before the ED on 18.01.2024 on
the ground that he was not cooperating with the investigation. In the
present case, the petitioner challenged the registration of the FIR by
CBI as well as the declaration of the accounts of the Company as
‘Fraud’ by the banks. Vide order dated 09.02.2024 (Annexure P-13), a
Division Bench of this Court had stayed further proceedings initiated
against the petitioner in pursuance of FIR No. RC2232020A0004
23 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -24-
dated 06.08.2020 passed in CWP-2771-2024 (O&M) titled as
“Neeraj Saluja Vs. Reserve Bank of India and another”.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed CWP 15438-2024 titled as “Neeraj
Saluja Vs. Union of India and another’, before this Court and vide
order dated 08.07.2024 (Annexure P-15), this Court further stayed the
proceedings arising out of the present ECIR No. ECIR/JLZO/36/2020
dated 08.10.2020 as the FIR as well as the ECIR arise from a
common cause of action as also relate to common facts. Thus, when
further proceedings in pursuance of FIR as well as ECIR have been
stayed by a Division Bench of this Court; the matter is still
sub-judice before this Court; no purpose will be served by keeping the
petitioner behind the bars.
15. Apart from that, the petitioner was arrested in the present
case on 18.01.2024 and continues to be in custody for the last more
than 01 year. Even though, it has been stated that the complaint has
been filed under the provisions of the PML Act, however, the further
proceedings have been stayed and there is no likelihood of trial being
completed within a reasonable time period. Apart from that, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in number of judgments that right to
speedy trial and right to liberty are sacrosanct rights and this Court
being a constitutional Court has to give due weightage to this factor.
Thus, on account of a long period of incarceration running for more
than 01 year and trial having not been commenced before the trial
Court, the petitioner has apparently been denied of his right to speedy
24 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:008356
CRM M-55991-2024 -25-
trial. Apart from that, to prevent the escape of the petitioner from the
country and to make him available before the trial Court during trial,
stringent conditions can be imposed to address the concern raised by
the learned State counsel. Thus, the present petition is allowed and the
petitioner is ordered to be released on bail till the disposal of the
matter before the concerned Special Court subject to the following
conditions:-
(i) The petitioner shall furnish bail bonds in the sum of
Rs. 10,00,000/- with three sureties in the like amount.
(ii) The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly attempt
to contact or communicate with the prosecution
witnesses.
(iii) The petitioner shall submit his passport before the
concerned Special Court, PML Act, if not already
surrendered in any proceedings/investigation and shall
not leave the country without prior permission of the
concerned Court.
(iv) The petitioner shall regularly appear before the
Court and shall also cooperate with the concerned Court
for early disposal of the case and shall not seek
adjournment on frivolous grounds and shall not create
hurdle in the disposal of the matter.
(v) The petitioner shall not dispose any of the assets as
mentioned in the ECIR, without seeking prior permission
of the Special Court.
20.01.2025 (N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
amit rana JUDGE
Whether reasoned/speaking : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
25 of 25
::: Downloaded on – 23-01-2025 00:18:50 :::