Punjab-Haryana High Court
Pp Singh vs Financial Commissioner (Coop) Punjab … on 5 November, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:137687
CWP Nos.7967 and 7968 of 1998 (O&M)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
Reserved on: 21.10.2024
Pronounced on: 05.11.2024
1. CWP No.7967 of 1998
P.P. Singh
....Petitioner
Versus
The Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab, Chandigarh and
others
....Respondents
2. CWP No.7968 of 1998
B.M. Sharma
....Petitioner
Versus
The Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab, Chandigarh and
others
....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present: Mr. D.V. Sharma, Sr. Advocate,
with Ms. Shivani Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Rajesh Sehgal, Addl. A.G., Punjab.
Mr. Vikas Singh, Advocate
and Ms. Anamika Sheoran, Advocate
for respondents No.4 to 7.
NAMIT KUMAR J. (Oral)
1. This judgment shall dispose of CWP Nos.7967 and 7968 of
1998, as common questions of law and facts are involved therein for
adjudication. For the sake of convenience, facts are taken from CWP
No.7967 of 1998, titled as “P.P. Singh vs The Financial Commissioner,
Cooperation, Punjab, Chandigarh and others”.
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2. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this
Court by filing the instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari, quashing the order
dated 26.04.1996 (Annexure P-15), whereby the petitioner has been
dismissed from service; order dated 19.03.1998 (Annexure P-20) passed
by the Revisional Authority – respondent No.1 and the order dated
16.05.1998 (Annexure P-21), relieving the petitioner from duty.
3. The brief facts, as have been pleaded in the petition, are
that the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Chief Engineer in Punjab
State Federation of Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Sugarfed’) on 11.12.1987 and was posted in Tarn Taran
Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited. Thereafter, he was promoted as Chief
Engineer and was posted in Nakodar Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited
on 03.06.1992. During the tenure of his service in Nakodar Mill, the
petitioner was issued charge-sheet dated 13.02.1995 by Sugarfed and
the statement of charges levelled against the petitioner is reproduced as
under:-
“Statement of charges against Shri P.P. Singh, Ex-
Chief Engineer, Nakodar CSM.
While working as Chief Engineer of the Nakodar
Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd., Nakodar for the period 3.6.92 to
27.1.94, Shri P.P. Singh committed certain acts of omission
and commission which are as under:
1. He is guilty of making unwarranted purchases of
machinery spare parts amounting to Rs.19,97,471.33
without any requirement ignoring the inventory position2 of 28
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-3-and consumption for the period 3.6.1992 to 27.1.1994 with
malafide intention for personal gain.
2. Effecting purchases of ball bearings at higher rates
without obtaining comparative rates in connivance with
other officers/officials and suppliers thereby causing
financial loss of Rs.1,12,634/-.
3. Purchasing at higher rate duplicate ball bearings no.
NU 2215 ECP Brass Cage (SKF) from unauthorised source
ignoring authorised dealer thereby causing financial loss
of Rs.18,720/-.
4. He purchased Kirloskar make motor 75 HP at higher
rates i.e. Rs.6621/- ignoring actual manufacturer i.e. M/s
Kirloskar Electrical Company with malafide intention and
personal gain without the approval of BOD of the mills.
5. Causing financial loss of Rs.38,800/- by purchasing
spurious defective sulphur burner bottom and its malter
from unauthorised source by verifying its quality which
actually could not be put to use in the mills.
6. He issued purchase orders for purchases of spare parts
at personal level without any financial powers exceeding
his authority with malafide intention and for personal gain
to the tune of Rs.1,31,803/-.
7. In connivance with other officers, unjustified purchases
of 900 Air Heater Tubes were made without seeking
approval of the Board though 110 Air Heater Tubes were
lying in stock. In order to justify the purchase, 809 tubes
were thrown in scrap to show consumption with malafide
intention for personal gain and ulterior motive thereby
causing financial loss of Rs.3,41,110/- to the mills.
8. Irregularity in the purchase of NSK Japan make
Bearings from unauthorised source by tempering the
record and manipulation quotations.
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9. Getting repaired Jyoti Make 3 speed motor on the basis
of single quotation and without the approval of Board with
malafide intention incurring an expenditure of Rs.54,000/-.
10. Getting sugar lifted at lesser rate i.e. Rs.20/- per bag
by associating with an unauthorised committee thereby
causing a financial loss of Rs.1,05,660/- to the mills.
11. Removing pages from Sugar Sale Proceeding Book to
conceal sales effected at higher rate.
MANAGING DIRECTOR”
The petitioner submitted reply dated 06.04.1995 to the
charge-sheet and finding the same to be unsatisfactory, Sh. A.S. Pannu,
PCS, Additional Managing Director, Sugarfed, Punjab, who was
appointed as an Enquiry Officer, submitted the enquiry report dated
28.02.1996, proving charges No.2 and 7, which was forwarded to the
petitioner along with show cause notice dated 26.03.1996, seeking his
reply to the show cause notice. The petitioner submitted reply dated
15.04.1996 and having found unsatisfactory, thereafter, vide order dated
26.04.1996, the petitioner was dismissed from service and ordered
recovery of proportionate share of Rs.73,560/- and Rs.40,284/- on
account of causing loss to Nakodar Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited
towards purchase of ball bearings 2215 (10 numbers) and 900 Air
Heater Tubes at higher rates. Aggrieved by, the petitioner filed an appeal
before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab, Chandigarh, under
Rule 4(a) of Annexure VI of the Punjab State Cooperative Sugar Mills
Service (Common Cadre) Rules, 1981, as amended in 1995, against the
punishment order dated 26.04.1996. The said appeal was accepted by
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-5-the Appellate Authority vide order dated 18.09.1996 on the ground that
the orders of punishment is not warranted by the evidence on record and
ordered reinstatement of the petitioner(s) in service. However, the
period for which the petitioner(s) remained out of service was treated as
leave of kind due and further it was ordered that if the management
deems necessary, it can proceed again into the matter after following
proper procedure under Rules.
The order dated 18.09.1996, passed by the Appellate
Authority was challenged by Sugarfed by filing a revision petition under
Section 69 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 before the
Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Punjab,
Cooperation Department, Chandigarh. The said revision petition has
been accepted by the Financial Commissioner, Cooperation Department,
Punjab, Chandigarh vide order dated 19.03.1998 and the order dated
18.09.1996, passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. Registrar,
Cooperative Societies, Punjab, has been set-aside and the dismissal
orders of the petitioner(s) have been upheld as passed by the Additional
Managing Director. The said revisional order has also been impugned in
the present writ petition.
4. On issuance of notice of motion, written statement on
behalf of respondents No.4, 5, 6 and 7 (Sugarfed), has been filed
wherein it has been stated that the enquiry officer has conducted the
enquiry in accordance with the procedure established by law. The order
dated 18.09.1996, passed by the appellate authority was not sustainable
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-6-as the charges No.2 and 7 were proved against the petitioner and the
impugned revisional order is perfectly legal and valid and does not call
for any interference by this Court in the writ jurisdiction.
5. The matter was heard on 03.10.2013, and the following
order was passed:-
“Present: Mr. D.V. Sharma, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Amanpreet Kaur, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Vikas Singh, Advocate
for respondents No.4, 5 and 7.
The petitioner has raised several questions
about his innocence and the plea that the charges against
him were not proved on account of the fact that he was not
instrumental in the decision making authority and that in
one of the charges i.e. Charge No.7 the proceedings for
purchase of 900 Air Heater Tubes had been initiated much
prior to his joining the assignment. However, a perusal of
the material on record would falsify the stand taken by the
petitioner largely. It indicates that the petitioner was
instrumental in taking the decision and placing orders for
components at a much inflated price causing loss to the
Corporation as per the extent indicated in the Equiry
Officer’s report. However, another aspect has been agitated
towards the fag end of the day i.e. to say that the revision
was heard by an officer who became a judge in his own
cause, inasmuch as the Financial Commissioner’ who
heard the revision, was also the supervisory officers of the
Sugarfed and this has seriously prejudiced the case of the
petitioner.
Learned counsel for the private respondents
contends that the petitioner himself has filed a revision
petition and, therefore, had acquiesced to the jurisdiction
of the said officer and in fact if he had any doubt, he ought
to have expressed the same at the first instance. Having not
done so and having filed a revision would indicate that the6 of 28
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-7-petitioner had confidence in the authority and therefore no
loss has been caused.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, however,
denies filing of any such revision petition and states that
even if it has been done, it would have been done to the
Government and not to a particular officer.
The respondents have taken up this plea of
filing a revision petition specifically in their reply which
has not been controverted by the petitioner by filing any
counter-affidavit. However, just to keep the record straight,
learned counsel for the respondents is directed to produce
the relevant record pertaining to the revision filed by the
petitioner.
Adjourned to 24.10.2013.”
6. In pursuance to the aforesaid order, a copy of the cross
revision petition dated 01.02.1998 filed by the petitioner before
respondent No.1, has been placed on record as Annexure R-1, whereby
the petitioner had sought modification of the order dated 18.09.1996
passed by Registrar, Cooperative Societies (Appellate Authority)
respondent No.3 whereby after holding the petitioner(s) not guilty of the
charges, liberty was given to Sugarfed to proceed again into the matter,
after following proper procedure under the Rules. During the course of
hearing, it has been stated by learned counsel for respondents No.4, 5, 6
and 7 – Sugarfed that although the said revision petition was filed by the
petitioner(s), however, no orders have been passed on the said revision
petition(s).
7. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
firstly, the revision petition filed by the respondent – Sugarfed under
Section 69 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, was not
maintainable before the Financial Commissioner and Secretary to
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Government of Punjab, Cooperation Department, Chandigarh as the
same was not filed by a party to a reference as required under Sections
55/56 of the Act. In support of the said contention, he has placed
reliance upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in “Jasbir Singh
and others vs Commissioner (Appeals), Jalandhar Division and
others”, 2011(4) RCR (Civil) 1. He has further argued that the said
revision petition was heard by an officer, who became a Judge in his
own cause as the Revisional Authority, who has heard the revision
petition was also the supervisory officer of Sugarfed at one point of time
which has seriously prejudiced the case of the petitioner. He has further
submitted that the enquiry officer has wrongly proved charge Nos.2 and
7 against the petitioner as the petitioner was not instrumental in the
decision making with respect to purchase of ball bearings as the said
purchase was approved by the Purchase Advisory Committee and the
petitioner is not a member of the said Committee and the quotations
were called on 08.07.1992 and the petitioner has no role in calling the
quotations and before joining the petitioner in the Sugar Mill, decision
had already been taken by the Managing Director for the purchase of
900 Air Heater Tubes. The Purchase Advisory Committee decided on
22.07.1992, to call the firms for negotiation and out of total four parties,
only one party i.e. M/s. Shiv Raman Enterprises, Jalandhar was present.
After negotiations, the Purchase Advisory Committee decided to place
order for 900 Air Heater Tubes @ Rs.415.40 paisa per tube and the
petitioner not being a member of the Purchase Advisory Committee
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cannot be held liable. He has further contended that the enquiry officer
Sh. A.S. Pannu, the then Additional Managing Director, Sugarfed, was
biased against the petitioner. He further submitted that no misconduct
has been committed by the petitioner. He also submitted that Nakodar
Sugar Mill and Sugarfed are separate legal entity and Managing
Director of the Sugarfed has no control over it and not competent to
issue charge-sheet to the petitioner.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents No.4 to 7, has
submitted that the petitioner has not raised an issue regarding
maintainability of the revision petition under Section 69 of the Punjab
Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, before the said authority when the
same was pending before the concerned authority and even in the writ
petition also, there is no plea to this effect and the said plea has only
been raised during the course of final hearing of the present petition. He
has further submitted that the plea of the petitioner that the Financial
Commissioner, Cooperation Department, Punjab, Chandigarh, was the
supervisory officer and therefore, being interested person, could not
have heard the revision petition is totally misconceived as no such
objection was ever raised by the petitioner when the matter was heard
by the Financial Commissioner, Cooperation Department, Punjab,
Chandigarh. He has further submitted that the petitioner himself has
even filed a cross revision petition dated 01.02.1998, before the said
authority. He has further submitted that the petitioner has been
dismissed from service on account of charges No.2 and 7, having been
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proved in the enquiry proceedings and this Court would not go into the
merits of the charges or the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence
led before the enquiry officer. He has also submitted that the petitioner
being the technical head should have ensured that components are not
purchased at inflated price. But he failed to perform his duty.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record with their able assistance.
10. Admittedly, the disciplinary proceedings have been
initiated against the petitioner on issuance of charge-sheet dated
13.02.1995 and charge Nos.2 and 7 reads as under:-
“xx xx xx xx
2. Effecting purchases of ball bearings at higher rates
without obtaining comparative rates in connivance with
other officers/officials and suppliers thereby causing
financial loss of Rs.1,12,634/-.
xx xx xx xx
7. In connivance with other officers, unjustified purchases
of 900 Air Heater Tubes were made without seeking
approval of the Board though 110 Air Heater tubes were
lying in stock. In order to justify the purchase, 809 tubes
were thrown in scrap to show consumption with malafile
intention for personal gain and ulterior motive thereby
causing financial loss of Rs.3,41,110/- to the mills.”
After following the due procedure, the said charges
(charges No.2 and 7) have been proved in the enquiry proceedings in
the following manner:-
"XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
Charge No.2
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The Presenting Officer pointed towards annexure-II
of the charge-sheet (CP/45) thereby highlighting the
difference of rates of purchase of bearing and ball bearings
in consumption with the previous purchases. He also
produced the list of rates of ball-bearings purchased
subsequently i.e. 1993-94 and 1994-95(CP/67) and the
comparative chart of rates at CP/73-81 duly certified by
the Storekeeper. Shri P.P. Singh in his defence stated that it
was the duty of the Chief Accounts Officer to compare the
rates and he also mentioned that the Patiala mill
purchased bearing No.2215 at the rate of Rs.11,960/- and
Rs.11,900/- from M/s/ H.M. Dayal and Co., Delhi and
Ganesh Enterprises, Delhi, respectively (CP/171). The
scrutiny of purchase order of bearing NU 2215 EM/C3
SKF made in Germany/Australia/Sweden, whereas no such
strict specifications were given in this case as is revealed in
the purchase order placed at CP/173. Therefore, this plea
needs to be ignored.
The scrutiny of documents reveals that the purchase
of N-315 (4 nos) at Rs.5210/- on 1.9.1992 from M/s.
Mohindra and Co. as compared to the prevailing rates on
9.12.1991 at Rs.4250/- per piece, is 28% higher than the
previous year rates. Though this decision was taken by the
purchase Committee, it was the duty of the Chief Engineer
to apprise the committee regarding the high rates.
However, is it difficult to say at this stage as to whether the
escalation of 28% in price in comparison to previous year,
is justified or not.
The decision to purchase NU-2215 bearing (10 nos.)
and not 8 numbers (as given at annexure-II of the charge-
sheet at the rate of Rs.11856/- per piece (and not
Rs.11,909.10P as wrongly given in the charge-sheet), was
taken vide CP/73 (comparative chart) which was duly
recommended by the Chief Engineer, Shri P.P. Singh along
with the Chief Accounts Officer, Shri B.M.Sharma and duly
approved by the Managing Director of the mills.
The comparison of rates of this item with previous
years’ rates as per annexure-II (CP/45) of the charge-sheet
and subsequent year rates as per CP/67, shows that his
purchase was made at very high rates. This item was
purchased previously on 5.8.1991 and 30.8.1991 @
Rs.3052.87 and subsequent to this purchase (i.e. @
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Rs.11856/-), it was purchased at Rs.4500/- per piece in
1993-94. Therefore, this purchase of NU-2215 bearings
(numbering 10) is extremely high in comparison to
subsequent years’ purchase also. Thus, extra price for the
purchase of 10 nos. of Nu 2215 bearing @ Rs.11,856/-,
when compared with purchases made in the subsequent
year at Rs.4500/- per piece, shows that total extra price
paid for purchase of 10 nos. NU-2215 bearing, was
Rs.73,560-.
As regards purchase of 22224 CK (3 nos.) bearings,
the comparison of purchase on 1.9.1992 has been done
with purchase effected on 8.10.1988, which is four years
old as annexure-II of the charge-sheet. Therefore, this
comparison is not valid.
Thus, Shri P.P.Singh is responsible alongwith Shri
B.M. Sharma, Chief Accounts Officer for recommending
the purchase of NU-2215 ball bearings (10 nos.), which
was approved by the Managing Director of the mill,
thereby by effecting purchase at a higher rate to the tune of
Rs.73,560/-.”
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
Charge No.7
As stated by Shri P.P. Singh at CP/195-197 and as
per his joining report at CP-199, he joined at Nakodar mill
on 3.6.1992 and the purchase of air-heater tubes was
initiated on 5.3.1991 prior to his joining. It was during his
tenure that fresh tenders were finalised CP/99. Though
fresh tenders were obtained from three parties, out the rate
of M/s Shivaraman Enterprises (who did not participate in
this tender) which was previously sent during
correspondence dated 26.8.1991 @ Rs.367.20 (CP/103)
was taken into consideration in the comparative chart
(CP/105) being the lowest thereby ignoring the other three
parties. Then another letter was received from M/s.
Shivaraman Enterprises dated 21.7.1992 (CP/107), in
which rate was quoted at Rs.417.49 per tube, which was
finally settled at Rs.415.40 P after negotiations by the
purchase committee comprising of Chairman Avtar Singh,
Director, Swaran Singh, Chief Chemist Gurjit Singh, Chief
Accounts Officer B.M. Sharma and the then Managing
Director Shri A.S. Sidhu, on the reverse side of CP/107, i.e.
CP/108. The comparative chart shows that three parties
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gave tenders between Rs.370.64 to Rs.384.68, but the order
was placed with M/s. Shivaraman Enterprises at Rs.415.40
P. even when the party had not participated in the tender.
By purchasing 900 Air Heater tubes, a loss of Rs.40,284/-
was caused to the mill. Shri P.P. Singh, being the Chief
Engineer of the mills who recommended this purchase, is
responsible alongwith Shri Gurjit Singh, Chief Chemist;
Shri V.B.M. Sharma, Chief Accounts Officer and the then
Managing Director A.S. Sidhu (retired), alongwith the
members of the BODs of the mills.
As stated by Shri P.P. Singh (CP/197) that unused
air-heater tubes were kept between the two columns of
boiler house squarely stacked and covered with polythene
sheets out of which 600 tubes were loaned to the Patiala
CSM. He also admitted in cross-examination (CP/285) that
he asked the staff to get it issued from the store because as
per the instructions of the then MD they were directly
dumped that when they were first got to mills and the
storekeeper insisting on issuing slips. These 809 air heater
tubes were accounted for by the committee in its report
dated 30.5.1994 (CP/117). Further, 1010 Air-heater tubes
were got issued between 27.8.92 to 3.12.92 (CP/109-115),
out of these, 809 were located by the Committee on 30.5.94
in the boiler house after such a long gap.
Thus, we find that 900 Air-heater tubes were
unnecessarily purchased, without requirement and these
were thrown in the Boiler House after getting them issued
from the Store with malafide intention and a loss of
Rs.40,284/- was incurred due to purchasing these tubes at
a higher rate.
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX”
11. The contention raised by the learned Senior counsel for the
petitioner that the petitioner is innocent and no misconduct has been
committed by him as neither the petitioner recommended or initiated the
purchase of SKF bearings nor the purchase of 900 Air Heater Tubes for
which decision was taken by the Nakodar Sugar Mill before the
petitioner had joined at Nakodar, and he is having no role in the said
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purchases, was dealt with and rejected by this Court vide order dated
03.10.2013 as reproduced above.
12. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra
Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court
1723 has held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal which
examines the merits of the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry
and the power of judicial review is confined to; whether the inquiry was
held by a competent authority; according to the procedure prescribed
and whether rules of natural justice have been followed.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and
another v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015(1) SCT 5 while considering the scope
of interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has
held as under: –
“13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-
appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.
The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of
its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether :
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
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c. there is violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed
to admit the admissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the
finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been conducted
in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence
on which findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience.
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14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra
Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963
Supreme Court 1723, many of the above principles have
been discussed and it has been concluded thus :
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold
the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court in a petition for a writ
under Article 226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.
The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings
against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
where the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case
or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on
the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar
grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the
enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of
facts and if there be some legal evidence on which
their findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can
be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court
in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”
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15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra
Venkata Rao, (1975)2 SCC 557, the principles have been
further discussed at paragraph-21 to 24, which read as
follows :
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this
Court. Two propositions were laid down by this
Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First,
there is no warrant for the view that in considering
whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct
charged against him, the rule followed in criminal
trials that an offence is not established unless proved
by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule
be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the
High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not competent to declare the order of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal
under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. The Court is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. Second,
where there is some evidence which the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to
the evidence and the merits of the case or by17 of 28
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considerations or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that
no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the
enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of
facts and if there is some legal evidence on which
their findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can
be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court
in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board,
representing the Union of India, New Delhi v.
Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not
interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary
authority unless the finding is not supported by any
evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person
could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan
Singh case this Court held that the High Court
exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings
of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the
respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut-
down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on
May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry
Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that
the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled
them to close down their compressor could not be
accepted at its face value. The General Manager did
not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point.
The General Manager accepted the evidence. This
Court said that it was open to the General Manager
to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion
reached by the committee. This Court held that the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority
should prevail and the High Court should not have
interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The
Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The
findings of fact reached by an inferior court or
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An error of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of
fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to
a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can
be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to
admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would
be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on
the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or
inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the
inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the
entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The
High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the
aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding
of fact on the ground that the evidence is not
sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present
case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot
be scanned by the High Court to justify the
conclusion that there is no evidence which would
justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent
did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons
for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High
Court to say that no reasonable person could have
arrived at these conclusions. The High Court
reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and
then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is
precisely what the High Court in exercising
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not
do.”
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These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the
living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in
State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2
SCC 491. To quote the unparalled and inimitable
expressions:
“4. …. in a domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian
Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are
logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence
provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is
true that departmental authorities and
Administrative Tribunals must be careful in
evaluating such material and should not glibly
swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under
the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is
not necessary to cite decisions nor text books,
although we have been taken through case-law and
other authorities by counsel on both sides. The
essence of a judicial approach is objectivity,
exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations
and observance of rules of natural justice. Of
course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or
arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of
judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such
finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot
be held good. …”
14. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force and others v.
Abrar Ali, 2017(1) SCT 682 wherein it has been held as under: –
“8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the
High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he
fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without
assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary
Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which
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delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a
local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into
the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of
evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence
is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in
2011(2) S.C.T. 782 : 2011(3) Recent Apex Judgments
(R.A.J.) 28 : (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held as follows:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act
as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led
in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground
that another view is possible on the material on
record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly
held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable
nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries,
except where such findings are based on no evidence
or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find
out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting
reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or
finding, on the material on record. The courts will
however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is
found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based
on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1996(1) S.C.T. 617 :
(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32
ATC 44, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, 1997(4)
S.C.T. 214 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S)
1806, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana,
1999(3) S.C.T. 669 : (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC
(L&S) 1036 and High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.”
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15. The said view has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and
others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(1) SCT 285 and in the said
judgment it has been held as under: –
“23. The power of judicial review in the matters of
disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the
departmental/appellate authorities discharged by
constitutional Courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or
Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by
limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors
leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case
on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier
examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V.
Venuaopalan, 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government
of T.N. and Another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216
and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this
Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others,
1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under:-
“13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not
relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel
[(1964) 4 SCR 718] this Court held at p. 728 that if
the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued.”
24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of
this Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board
Limited v. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017(1) SCC 768 and recently
by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v.
Union of India and Others, 2020(9) SCC 471.
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25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the
Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-
making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It
is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness
of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the
proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any
manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the
face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial
review cannot be extended to the examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as
a matter of fact.
26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the
alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is
to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was
held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of
natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings
or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority
has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or
conclusion.
27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not
the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of
enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree
with the findings recorded by the former, in case of
disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the
reasons for disagreement and after affording an
opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his
own findings if the evidence available on record be
sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the
enquiry officer for further enquiry.
28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable
to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only
requirement of law is that the allegation against the
delinquent must be established by such evidence acting
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upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and
with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the
gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is
true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the
finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry
proceedings.
29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its
jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article
136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry
proceedings except in a case of malafides or perversity,
i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or
where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and
with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so
long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion
arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to
be sustained.”
16. The plea raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that the Nakodar Sugar Mill is a separate legal entity and
Sugarfed is a separate legal entity and Managing Director of the
Sugarfed has no control over it and not competent to issue charge-sheet
to the petitioner cannot be countenanced with as the petitioner was
common cadre employee under Punjab State Cooperative Sugar Mills
Service (Common Cadre) Rules, 1981, which were amended in
November, 1995. Rule 5 of the Annexure ‘B’ provides that the authority
competent to impose penalty upon the Chief Engineer is the Managing
Director of Sugarfed, who has awarded punishment to the petitioner.
Therefore, proceedings have rightly been initiated by the Managing
Director, Sugarfed. It is itself stated in para 6 of the petition that
punishing authority of the petitioner is Managing Director, Sugarfed.
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17. The contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel
regarding non-maintainability of the revision petition filed by the
Sugarfed under Section 69 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act,
1961, on the ground that it was not filed by a party to the reference
under Sections 55 and 56 of the Act is of no worth acceptance.
18. The Full Bench of this Court in Jasbir Singh’s case (supra),
has held as follows:-
“58. In view of the above discussion, we reach to the
following conclusion:-
(i) The State Government or the Registrar under
Section 69 of the Punjab Act and the State
Government under Section 115 of the Haryana Act
can exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction on
the application made by an aggrieved person,
whether he is or not a party to the reference.
(ii) The remedy of revision is barred only in case
where appeal against the impugned order lies under
Section 68 of the Punjab Act or under Section 114 of
the Haryana Act.
(iii) The remedy of revision is not barred in those
cases where aggrieved person has a right of appeal
under the Statutory Service Rules or Common Cadre
Rules. An aggrieved party can challenge the order of
Registrar or Deputy Registrar passed as an
Appellate Authority under the Statutory Rules or
Common Cadre Rules by filing a revision under
Section 69 of the Punjab Act or under Section 115 of
the Haryana Act as no remedy of appeal has been
provided under Section 68 of the Punjab Act or
under Section 114 of the Haryana Act against such
order. But, if the appellate order is passed by the
official of the Society and not by the Registrar or
Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Society, no25 of 28
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revision is maintainable only against the order
passed by the authority under the Act or a
proceeding arising out of the Act and the Rules
framed thereunder.
(iv) The remedy of revision either suo motu or
otherwise cannot be invoked against an order passed
by the Society. The said power can be exercised
against the decision or order passed by the authority
under the Act or a proceeding arising out of the Act
or the Rules framed there-under.
(v) The suo motu power of revision cannot be
exercised by the State Government or the Registrar,
as the case may be, where a revision under
Section 69 of the Punjab Act or under Section 115 of
the Haryana Act itself is not maintainable either on
the ground that against the impugned order an
appeal has been provided under Section 68 of the
Punjab Act or under Section 114 of the Haryana Act
or on any other ground. In case the Government or
the Registrar, as the case may be, exercise suo motu
power of revision on the application of an aggrieved
party or otherwise, it must be specifically so stated
in the order itself.”
The present case would fall under Clause (iii) above where
it has been held that where the Registrar passes an order as an Appellate
Authority under the Service Rules then the revision petition under
Section 69 of the Act would be maintainable. In the present case, the
Registrar, Cooperative Societies has passed an order dated 26.04.1996
in appeal filed under Section 4(a) of Annexure VI of the Punjab State
Cooperative Sugar Mills Service (Common Cadre) Rules, 1981 as
amended in 1995, and not in exercise of powers under Section 68 of the
Act. Therefore, the revision petition filed under Section 69 of the Act is
maintainable. Further no objection was taken before the Revisional
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authority regarding maintainability of revision petition when the same
was pending before the said authority and no pleading to this effect has
been made in the petition.
19. So far as the plea raised by the petitioner that the Financial
Commissioner, Cooperation Department, Punjab, Chandigarh, was the
supervisory officer of Sugarfed and managing the affairs of Sugarfed,
and being an interested person, could not have heard the revision
petition, it may be observed here that firstly no such objection was
raised by the petitioner at that point of time when the matter was heard
by him. Further the petitioner himself has filed the cross revision
petition dated 01.02.1998. The petitioner having himself submitted
before the jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner, Cooperation
Department, Punjab, Chandigarh, cannot now raise a plea that the said
authority could not have heard the revision petition. Since no said
objection has been raised by the petitioner before the said authority,
therefore, there is no finding to that effect given by the said authority in
the impugned revisional order dated 19.03.1998 (Annexure P-20) and
the same is, accordingly, not acceptable.
20. So far as the issue raised by the petitioner with regard to
the fact that enquiry officer was biased against the petitioner, it may be
observed that the enquiry officer had exonerated the petitioner in
relation to nine allegations and the petitioner was held guilty of only
two charges i.e. charges No.2 and 7 after the same was found proved on
the basis of evidence so adduced. Further the said plea has never been
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taken by the petitioner in the reply to the show cause notice before the
punishing authority or before the appellate authority or the revisional
authority. Even in the cross revision petition filed by the petitioner, no
such plea was ever raised by the petitioner. Further, the decision to
impose punishment was taken by the competent authority i.e. Managing
Director, Sugarfed.
21. In view of the foregoing discussions, I do not find any
merit in the present petition(s) and the same are, accordingly, dismissed.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
05.11.2024 JUDGE
yakub
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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