Jharkhand High Court
Prabha Devi vs The Union Of India on 21 October, 2024
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Navneet Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 5617 of 2024
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1. Prabha Devi, aged about 58 years, wife of Late- HariRaj Dubey,
resident of village- Bishrampur, P.O.- Hurka, P.S. – Indrapuri, District-
Rohtas, Bihar.
2. Sunita Dubey, aged about- 34 years, Daughter of – Late – HariRaj
Dubey, resident of village – Bishrampur, P.O. – Hurka, P.S. –
Indrapuri, District- Rohtas, Bihar. ....
Petitioners
Versus
1. The Union of India, through its Chariman Railway Board, Rail
Bhawan, 256- A, Raisina Road, Rajpath Area, Central Secretariat, P.O.
+ P.S. New Delhi, Pin – 110001.
2. The General Manager, East Central Railway, P.O. Hajipur, P.S. Sadar
Police Station, Distt.- Vaishali, Bihar, PIN – 844101.
3. The Divisional Railway Manager, East Central Railway, Mukunda,
Kasturba Nagar, P.O. + P.S. Dhanbad, Distt. Dhanbad, Jharkhand, Pin –
826001.
4. The Divisional Railway Manager (Personnel), East Central Railway,
Mukunda, Kasturba Nagar, P.O. + P.S. Dhanbad, Distt. Dhanbad,
Jharkhand, Pin – 826001.
5. Rahul Kumar Dubey, Son of Late – Hariraj Dubey, resident of –
Quarter No. 382/13 Diesel Set, Patratu, P.O. & P.S. – Patratu, District-
Ramgarh, Pin- 829119. …. Respondents
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR
——
For the Appellants : Mr. Sheyakur Rahman, Advocate
: Mr. Wazid Ali, Advocate
For the Resp.-UOI : Mr. Anil Kumar, A.S.G.I.
: Mr. Abhijeet Kumar, C.G.C.
For the Resp.-5 : Mr. B. Shastri, Advocate
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02/Dated: 21st October, 2024
1. Mr. Bishwambhar Shastri, learned counsel, at the outset, has sought
for leave of this Court to accept the Vakalatnama to represent the
Page 1 of 17
original applicant, who has been impleaded as respondent no. 5,
namely, Rahul Kumar Dubey.
2. The Vakalatnama has been accepted and the matter has been heard
on merit with the consent of the parties.
3. The instant writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 15.03.2024
passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Ranchi
Circuit Bench, in O.A. No. 051/00102/2024, whereby and
whereunder the respondents have been directed to consider the
case of the respondent no. 5(herein) for appointment on
compassionate ground on basis of no objection which according to
writ petitioners has obtained fraudulently from the petitioners and
without impleading the petitioners necessary party in the
proceeding. And further for the quashing of order dated 20.05.2024
passed by respondent no. 3 wherein respondent no. 5 have been
considered for the appointment ignoring the claim of the petitioners
despite objections being raised by them.
4. The factual aspect as is being reflected from the writ petition needs
to be referred herein which reads as under:
The husband of the petitioner no. 1 and father of petitioner
no. 2 namely Late HariRaj Dubey was a permanent employee of
East Central Railway and he died in harness on 30.05.2023, while
working as Sr. Technician (M) under Diesel Shed Patratu, under
East Central Railway.
After the death of her husband, the petitioner no. 1 has
informed the respondents about the death of her husband and
accordingly family pension amount has been started to be paid to
her by the respondent railway.
One Rahul Kumar Dubey purported to have submitted an
Page 2 of 17
application dated 05.10.2023 before the respondents railways
claiming himself to be the son of the deceased employee born out
of second wife Sanju Devi and thereby claimed for compassionate
appointment with no objection affidavit of the petitioner no. 1
without knowledge and consent of the petitioner no. 1.
Rahul Kumar Dubey (respondent no. 5 herein) taking
benefit of illiteracy got the LTI of petitioner no. 1 on some papers
by taking her into confidence that the LTI of the petitioner no. 1 is
required for processing the payment of DCRG of late Hari Raj
Dubey.
The petitioner no. 1 being a helpless widow had relied upon
the promises given by Rahul Kumar Dubey that she will get the
entire amount of DCRG and pension etc. and the paternal
properties of late Hari Raj Dubey. However, Rahul Kumar Dubey
has made his claim for compassionate appointment and in
respect of the landed property of Hari Raj Dubey as well as 50%
share of pensionary benefit etc.Thereafter, the petitioner no. 1 had appeared before the
respondent No. 3 and submitted application to the effect that
Rahul Kumar Dubey may not be provided compassionate
employment in railway department.
Thereafter, the respondent authorities called upon the
petitioner no. 1 to appear before the Senior Divisional Personnel
Officer, East Central Railway, Dhanbad, and the petitioner no. 1
along with petitioner no. 2 appeared before the respondent no. 3
on 03.12.2023 for personal hearing and the petitioner no.1 has
made her claim for compassionate appointment of her daughter
and the petitioner no. 2 has also submitted an application for her
compassionate appointment.
When the matter was kept pending before the respondent-
Page 3 of 17
Railways, Rahul Kumar Dubey (respondent no. 5 herein) has
preferred OA No. 051/00102/2024 praying for compassionate
appointment for himself without knowledge and information to
the petitioners and also without impleading them as a necessary
party/respondent in the OA.
Thereafter, the Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit
Bench, Ranchi, has passed order dated 15.03.2024, in OA No.
051/00102/2024, directing the respondent railways to consider
the case of Rahul Kumar Dubey for compassionate appointment
and to pass an order within four months in view of railway
circular RBE No. 218 of 2019.
The Railways circular RBE No. 218 of 2019 specifically
mentioned that the children born out of second wife may be
considered provided the first wife and her children given no
objection but here in this case the petitioners have not giving no
objection though the respondent no. 5 has fraudulently produced
no objection papers obtained from the petitioners.
The railway notification RBE No. 218 of 2019 specifically
bars the compassionate appointment to the children born out of
second wife where the first (legally wedded wife) opts for such
compassionate appointment either for herself or one of her own
children, such claim will have priority over any competing claim
made by the second wife for any of her children.
It is the case of the petitioner that the learned Tribunal,
while passing the impugned order dated 15.03.2024, has failed to
consider the mandate fixed by the Indian Railway authority in
RBE No. 218 of 2019 by not considering the same to the letter
and spirit of the circular.
The petitioner no. 1 had appeared before the respondent
authorities and submitted referring her earlier application onPage 4 of 17
03.12.2023, and 25.04.2024 praying for compassionate
appointment of her daughter Sunita Kumari, i.e., petitioner no. 2
and thereby requested the respondents not to provide
employment to Rahul Kumar Dubey since he refuse to maintain
her.
The petitioners had appeared before the respondents for
personal hearing on 25.04.2024 where the petitioner no. 1 has
again requested the respondents not to provide compassionate
appointment to Rahul Kumar Dubey.
The respondent no. 3 after hearing the parties has passed a
reasoned and speaking order dated 20.05.2024.
In Paragraph-8 of the speaking order, the amount of retiral
dues has been assessed wherein column 4 speaks about the
Gratuity/DCRG amount payable to the dependants of the
deceased employee amounting to Rs. 20 Lakhs but the said
amount has been illegally decided to be paid in 3 equal share i.e.
(1) Prabha Devi, the first wife of Late HariRaj Dubey, (2) Rahul
Kumar Dubey, the unmarried son of second wife and (3) Miss
Anjali Kumari, the unmarried daughter of the DCRG appears to be
wholly illegal and against the mandate of law. Hence the
respondents have grossly erred the passing the reasoned and
speaking order dated 20.05.2024, and the forwarded the letter
issued by respondent no. 3 to the petitioner No. 1 dated
24.07.2024.
The respondent no. 5- Rahul Kumar Dubey, in order to get
an order for compassionate appointment in his favour, has
submitted some documents fraudulently and as such the
respondent railway authorities have erred in deciding the matter
and passing the reasoned order, aggrieved by which the
petitioners had filed the instant writ petition.
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5. It is evident from the factual aspects that the respondent no. 5, after
the death of his father, namely, HariRaj Dubey, has made an
application, who happens to be the son of the second wife. The claim
for appointment on compassionate ground has been made by
bringing the case under the fold of circular issued by the respondent
when the provision has been made that the son of the second wife
can be provided appointment on compassionate ground subject to
no objection has been issued by first wife or the son/daughter taken
birth from the wedlock of first wife of the deceased employee.
6. The petitioners have made serious objection that the said no
objection has fraudulently be obtained. The emphasis of argument is
that the writ petitioner has not been impleaded as party to the
proceeding before the Tribunal as would be evident from the cause
title as available in the impugned order.
Submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Petitioners:
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted whatever may
be the delay, he being the necessary party to the proceeding ought to
have been impleaded as a party to the proceeding so as to get an
opportunity of hearing. But the applicants have not impleaded the
writ petitioner as party and hence the said order cannot be said to
be sustainable in the eye of law which has been passed without
providing an opportunity of hearing.
Submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the Respondents:
8. While on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent no. 5 has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the
petitioner to take the ground that NOC has been obtained
fraudulently, according to his argument, the same NOC has been
furnished by both the petitioners in front of one Executive
Page 6 of 17
Magistrate which was brought on record.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 in view of the above has
submitted that the learned Tribunal has taken into consideration the
aforesaid aspect of the matter and as such it is incorrect on the part
of the writ petitioner to take the ground that any prejudice has been
caused to him.
Analysis:
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across
the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order
as also the pleading made in the writ petition.
11. The primary issue which has been raised on behalf of the
petitioners is that the order passed by the Tribunal is without
providing an opportunity of hearing as they have not impleaded as
party since as per the case of the respondent No. 5, the NOC has been
said to be furnished by both the petitioners which is the prerequisite
for consideration for appointment on compassionate ground to be
given in favour of the children taken birth from the wedlock of the
second wife of the deceased employee.
12. While on the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.
5 has submitted that there is no need to implead the petitioner as
party to the proceeding, since the NOC had been furnished by both
the petitioner in front of the Executive Magistrate.
13. This Court on consideration of the rival submissions made on behalf
of the parties, and considering the admitted position that the basis
for consideration for appointment on compassionate ground in fact
made in favour of the children taken birth from the wedlock of the
deceased employee and the second wife. The NOC to be furnished by
the wife or the children taken birth from the wedlock of the first wife
and the deceased employee.
Page 7 of 17
14. The said NOC was furnished on behalf of the respondent no. 5
claiming his case to be squarely covered under the fold of the
scheme applicable during the relevant time. But the concerned party
interested who are the petitioners herein from whom the NOC is
being sought to be obtained before the Executive Magistrate had not
been impleaded as party.
15. This Court is in the view that whatever may be the contention, it is
the prime duty of the Court of Law that before adjudicating the issue,
if any averment regarding the interest of any other party or any
document on the basis of which the reliance is being placed said to
be issued by a party are required to be impleaded as a party to the
proceeding so as to ascertain the fact whatever be stated making the
ground to get the relief from the Court of Law is being ascertained.
16. This Court further is of the view that for ascertaining the aforesaid
fact, the party concerned who is being said to be a party in creating
the document will be necessary party and it is a fundamental
principle of law that in absence of necessary party if any order is
being passed, the same cannot be said to be sustainable in the eye of
law.
17. The principle regarding “necessary party” has been dealt with by
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Moreshar Yadaorao Mahajan V.
Vyankatesh Sitaram Bhedi (D) thr. LRs. and Others reported in
2022 SCC Online SC 1307 wherein in at Paragraphs-17, 18 and 20
the consideration has been given with respect to the
interpretation/meaning of necessary party. For ready reference, the
relevant paragraphs are being referred herein which reads as under:
“17. This Court, in the case of Mumbai International
Airport Private Limited (supra), has observed thus: “15. A
“necessary party” is a person who ought to have been
joined as a party and in whose absence no effective
decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessaryPage 8 of 17
party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be
dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a
necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable
the court to completely, effectively and adequately
adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though
he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the
decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a
proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to
implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact
that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit
property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff,
will not make such person a necessary party or a proper
party to the suit for specific performance.”
18. It could thus be seen that a “necessary party” is a
person who ought to have been joined as a party and in
whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all
by the court. It has been held that if a “necessary party” is
not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed.
20. It can thus be seen that what has been held by this
Court is that for being a necessary party, the twin test
has to be satisfied. The first one is that there must be a
right to some relief against such party in respect of the
controversies involved in the proceedings. The second one
is that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of
such a party.”
18. This Court, considering the aforesaid proposition and adverting to
the factual aspect of the present case, is of the view that non-
impleadement of the party to the proceeding, according to our
considered view is the error which has been committed by the
learned Tribunal.
19. We are conscious with the law that the order passed by the Tribunal
Page 9 of 17
is to be looked into under the power of judicial review in view of the
judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of L Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India & Others reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261
wherein at Paragraph-99 it has been held that the order passed by
the learned Tribunal i.e., the Court of first instance is to be looked
into by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
in exercise of power of judicial review.
“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that
clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article
323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the
High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional.
Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction”
clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of
Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be
unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the
High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a
part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution.
While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and
Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in
discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227
and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under
Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are
possessed of the competence to test the constitutional
validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of
these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny
before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose
jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals
will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first
instance in respect of the areas of law for which they
have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for
litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in
cases where they question the vires of statutory
legislations (except where the legislation which creates
Page 10 of 17
the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the
Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in
the manner we have indicated.” [emphasis supplied]
20. Further, the power of judicial review has been interpreted by the
Hon’ble Apex Court wherein it has been held that if any error is
apparent on the face of the record, will be said to be an error
apparent.
For ready reference, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.C.
Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa reported in (1955) 1 SCR 250, their
Lordship hold that the patent error in a decision can be corrected by
writ of certiorari, when it is manifested by the error apparent on the
face of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
judgment is quoted hereunder:-
“10. ……….. An error in the decision or determination
itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it
must be a manifest error apparent on the fact of the
proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or
disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a
patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not
a mere wrong decision. ………..”
Further, in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R.
1964 SC 477. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being
reproduced as under:
“The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High
Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has
been frequently considered by this Court and the true
legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ
of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals :
these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts
or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or asPage 11 of 17
a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can
similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction
conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or
improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without
giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected
by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing
with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural
justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction
and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an
appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that
findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal
as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be
reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of
law which is apparent on the face of the record can be
corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however
grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be
issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the
tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and
material evidence, or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned
finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no
evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law
which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing
with this category of cases, however, we must always
bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ
of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and
material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was
insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a
point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a
writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdictionPage 12 of 17
conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a
writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari
Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S)
AIR 1955 SC 233); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills
Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : (AIR 1958 SC 398) and
Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168.
In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955
Supreme Court 233, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in
paragraph no.21 as under:
With regard to the character and scope of the writ of
certiorari and the conditions under which it can be
issued, the following propositions may be taken as
established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or
Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or
fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be
issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the
exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides
without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard,
or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court
issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a
supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the Court will not review
findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal
even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a
Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has
jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when
the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of
appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its
purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the
case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in
certiorari.”
In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2
SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under
Page 13 of 17
Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of
certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as
hereunder:
“12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will
be useful to notice the general principles indicating the
limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can
be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of
certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction.
The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article
226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was
pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob’s case (supra)
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior
tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in
recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on
evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to
admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not
supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases
the error amounts to an error of law. The writ
jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are
passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their
jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise
jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or
improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing
grave miscarriage of justice.”
In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012)
5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph
nos. 66 and 67 as hereunder:
“66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of
judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature or executive or their agents as to
matters within the province of either, and that the court
does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its ownPage 14 of 17
review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this
Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to
finding out whether the findings of fact have a
reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings
are consistent with the laws of the land.
67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of
Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on
a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is
not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article
226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally
unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the
view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case
where this Court held that the High Court does not
generally determine questions which require an
elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right
to enforce for which the writ is claimed.”
In the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission &
Others Vs. Abdul Halim & Others reported in (2019) 18 SCC 39,
their Lordships have been laid down pleased to hold at paragraph
no. 30 that the power of the judicial review must be exercised by the
Court after determining that the impugned is vitiated by an error
apparent on the face of the record and not the same has been
established by a process of reasoning, Para-30 of the aforesaid
judgment reads as under:-
“30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is
to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an
apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a
decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the
record is whether the error is self-evident on the fact of
the record or whether the error requires examination or
argument to establish it. If an error has to be established
by a process of reasoning, on points where there may
reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be anPage 15 of 17
error on the fact of the record, as held by this Court in
Satyanarayan Vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC
137. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably
capable of two or more constructions and one
construction has been adopted, the decision would not be
open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an
obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory
provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision
founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law,
which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of
writ of Certiorari.”
21. The power of judicial review has been dealt by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the aforementioned judgments, wherein such power can be
exercised, if the order impugned challenged under the Article 226 of
Constitution of India, appears to be error on the face of record is
required to be there.
Conclusion:
22. This Court in view of the aforesaid proposition of law and taking into
consideration the fact that the petitioners and even though the
learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 are emphasizing upon the
NOC which is alleged to be said to be issued by the two petitioners
herein and since they have not been impleaded as party before the
Tribunal as such due to non-impleadment of them as party to the
proceeding, the order passed by the learned Tribunal, according to
our considered view, will be said to suffer from an error apparent on
the face of order.
23. This Court in view of the aforesaid settled principle of law and
particularly the judgment rendered by Constitutional Bench of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of L Chandra Kumar v. Union of
India & Others (supra) as referred hereinabove is of the view that
the impugned order needs to be interfered with.
Page 16 of 17
24. Accordingly, the order dated 15.03.2024 is quashed and set aside.
25. The matter is remitted to the learned Tribunal for fresh adjudication
of the issue.
26. Further, the learned Tribunal is requested to issue notice to the
petitioners and the petitioners are also at liberty to appear on its
own.
27. It needs to refer herein that we have not considered the case on
merit. Further, the fresh adjudication is to be made without being
prejudiced by this own.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Navneet Kumar, J.)
Samarth/ A.F.R.
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