Supreme Court of India
Rajneesh Kumar vs Ved Prakash on 21 November, 2024
1
2024 INSC 891 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
RAJNEESH KUMAR & ANR. …PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
VED PRAKASH …RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 935 of 2021 arises from
the order passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated
09.12.2019 in the Civil Revision Application No. 96 of 2019 by
which the High Court allowed the Civil Revision Application
filed by the original defendant/counter claimant and thereby
quashed and set aside the order passed by the District Judge,
Signature Not Verified Shimla condoning the delay of more than 534 days in filing the
Digitally signed by
CHANDRESH
Date: 2024.11.22
appeal by the petitioners herein (original plaintiffs).
20:02:41 IST
Reason:
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
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2. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 936 of 2021 arises from
the order passed by the High Court in Review Petition No. 5 of
2020 dated 10.07.2020 by which the High Court rejected the
review application.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the
petitioners herein (original plaintiffs) filed a civil suit against
the respondent (defendant). The respondent herein had filed
counter claim in the said suit. The civil suit came to be
dismissed for default and the application for restoration moved
by the petitioners herein was also ordered to be dismissed for
default. The counter claim of the respondent was allowed vide
the judgment and decree dated 17.01.2015 passed in the very
same suit.
4. The petitioners herein being dissatisfied with the ex parte
order passed in the counter claim challenged the same before
the first appellate court by way of an appeal. However, the
appeal was time barred by 534 days.
5. The first appellate court condoned the delay of 534 days
in preferring the appeal essentially on the ground that the
litigant should not suffer on account of negligence on the part
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
3of the advocate and the court should adopt a liberal approach
in condoning the delay.
6. The respondent herein being dissatisfied by the order
passed by the first appellate court condoning the delay
challenged the same before the High Court. The High Court
allowed the civil revision application by which the order passed
by the appellate court condoning the delay of 534 days came to
be quashed and set aside.
7. In such circumstances, the petitioners are here before
this Court with the present petitions.
8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
9. The High Court in its impugned order observed as
under:-
“14. Thus, it is evidently clear that the respondents
were not only fully aware of the pendency of the
counter-claim on 22.3.2012, yet this fact has been
deliberately and willfully concealed and not stated
in the application for restoration. In fact the entire
blame has been put on the earlier counsel that had
been representing them.
x x x x
22. Since the respondents had not approached the
Court with clean hands and have rather suppressed.
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
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the material facts, that too, deliberately and
intentionally regarding knowledge of pendency of
the
counter-claim at least on 22.03.2012 and thereby
tried to gain an unfair advantage from the Court,
that too, by casting serious allegations on the
previous counsel(s), no indulgence much less
discretion could have been exercised in favour of the
respondents/plaintiffs, that too, for condoning the
delay of more than 534 days.”
10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the
head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in
the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a
tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of
negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings
before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the
concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself,
cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the
litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is
expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings
pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant,
therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on
the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time
and seek relief.
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
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11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this
Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd.
reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court observed as
under:-
“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts
and statements, made within the limits of authority
given to him, are the acts and statements of the
principal i.e. the party who engage him. It is true that
in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of
justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte
decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or
misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the
client was an innocent litigant but there is no such
absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at
any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity
can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make
the working of the system extremely difficult. The
observations made in Rafiq [AIR 1981 SC 1400] must
not be understood as an absolute proposition. As we
have mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going
suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven
years of its institution. It was not a second appeal
filed by a villager residing away from the city, where
the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic
ignorant villager but a private limited company with its
head office at Calcutta itself and managed by
educated businessmen who know where their interest
lies. It is evident that when their applications were not
deposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing
they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court.
May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged
by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear they
chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted
such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no
right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame
upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if theyS.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
6were totally unaware of the nature or significance of
the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted
and ought not to have been accepted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the
decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v.
The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC
860, wherein this Court held as under:-
“The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to
ensure that actions are commenced within a particular
period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence
documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant
to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect
to the principle that law does not assist a person who
is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them
when challenged or disputed to remain dormant
without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle
which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the
maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura sub-
veniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful
and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the
statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise
his right of action within a reasonable time as also to
discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent
claims.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. In view of the aforesaid, we find no error not to speak of
any error of law in the impugned judgment of the High Court
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
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warranting interference in exercise of our jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
14. In the result, these petitions fail and are dismissed.
15. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
…………………………………J.
( J.B. Pardiwala)
………………………………..J.
(R. Mahadevan)
New Delhi;
21st November, 2024
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
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ITEM NO.25 COURT NO.15 SECTION XIV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.935-936/2021
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 09-12-2019
in CR No. 96/2019 10-07-2020 in RP No. 5/2020 passed by the High
Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla]
RAJNEESH KUMAR & ANR. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
VED PRAKASH Respondent(s)
(IA No. 132566/2020 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT
IA No. 132561/2020 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT)
Date : 21-11-2024 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R. MAHADEVAN
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Aditya Dhawan, Adv.
Mrs. Kiran Dhawan, Adv.
Mr. Chander Shekhar Ashri, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Rajesh Gupta, Adv.
Mrs. Harpreet Singh, Adv.
Mr. Sumit R. Sharma, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed in terms of the
Signed Order.
2. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
(CHANDRESH) (POOJA SHARMA)
COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed order is placed on the file)
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021