Supreme Court of India
Ramji Lal Bairwa vs The State Of Rajasthan on 7 November, 2024
Author: C.T. Ravikumar
Bench: C.T. Ravikumar, Sanjay Karol
2024 INSC 846
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 3403 of 2023
(@ SLP (Crl.) No. 12912 of 2022)
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. …Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Rajasthan & Ors. …Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. The renowned American poet H. W. Longfellow
penned to the effect that a torn jacket might soon be
mended, but a bruised heart of a child would be beyond
reviviscence. Certainly, it contains the gospel truth as
relates a child subjected to sexual assault, be it
aggravated or penetrative; or any kind of sexual abuse
or exploitation. It is more so, in the case of a female child
as it may hound her and hack her family life.
On pedagogy Marcus Tullins Cicero (106-43 BC) in
‘De Officiis’ (on duties) said: “What nobler employment,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VARSHA MENDIRATTA
Date: 2024.11.07
15:47:52 IST
Reason:
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 1 of 40
or more valuable to the State, than that of the man who
instructs the rising generation?”
2. May be a jinx on pedagogy unfortunate,
unconscionable and unpardonable things happen,
though not often-times. The following factual narration
will unravel the raison d’etre for the above prelude: –
FIR No.6/2022 dated 08.01.2022 was registered at
Sardar Gangapur City Police Station, District Sawai
Madhopur, Rajasthan at the instance of the 4th
respondent, the father of the victim involved in the case,
against the 3rd respondent herein under Sections 354A,
342, 509 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short, ‘the IPC’) and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘the
POCSO Act’) and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2)
(vii) of the Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘the SC/ST
Act’). The allegations thereunder are to the effect that on
06.01.2022 when the victim child, then a student of Class
XI in Higher Secondary School was alone in the
classroom, the 3rd respondent, who is a teacher, came
there. After gazing through the window to ensure that
nobody is there near to the classroom, he reachedCriminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 2 of 40
behind her and started patting her cheeks and soon put
his hand inside bodice and rubbed her breast. In
anguish and anger, she got up and ran away. The
accused followed to stop her and hurled abuses with
ugly words like ‘dedh Chamar’ etc. Thereupon, she sat
down near the gate and beseeched the teachers for help,
but it was of no avail. They persuaded her to be tight-
lipped about the incident. Though, the Principal came to
know about it, he only took her signature on a blank
paper. Meanwhile, one teacher came to the residence of
the 4th respondent and took his wife to the school telling
that her daughter was not feeling well. On reaching there
his wife found the daughter in a deadly terrified and
numbed state and she could say nothing to the mother.
But, on reaching home, she divulged the incident, to the
mother viz., the wife of the 4th respondent and she, in
turn, informed him on his mobile phone as he was away
in another village for employment purpose. On the next
day, the 4th respondent came back home and the victim
narrated the whole incident to him and then, he lodged
the aforesaid FIR.
3. Obviously, the subject FIR was filed on 08.01.2022.
The third respondent herein compromised the matter
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 3 of 40
with the fourth respondent, who is the father of the victim,
on 31.01.2022 and thereupon, moved S.B (Crl.) Misc.
Petition No.1348/2022 before the High Court of Rajasthan
at Jaipur under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’), seeking
quashment of the said FIR and all further proceedings
thereon. As per the impugned order dated 04.02.2022
the High Court, despite the opposition by the learned
public prosecutor, allowed the said petition and quashed
the subject FIR and all further proceedings in pursuance
thereof. The impugned order would reveal that based
on the fact that the 3rd respondent has settled the dispute
amicably with the 4th respondent and relying on the
decision of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab1,
the High Court quashed the FIR and all further
proceedings therefrom. The High Court held thus:-
“…The offence alleged in this matter is non
compoundable, however Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(2012)
10 SCC 303] has propounded that if it is convinced
that offences are entirely personal in nature and do
not affect the public peace or tranquillity and where
it feels that quashing of such proceedings on
account of compromise would bring about peace
and would secure ends of justice, the High Court1
(2012) 10 SCC 303Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 4 of 40
should not hesitate to quash the same by exercising
the inherent powers vested in it. It is observed that
in such cases, the prosecution becomes the lame
prosecution and pursuing such a lame prosecution
would be a waste of time and energy. That will also
unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of
peace. This court is aptly guided by the principles
propounded by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and
feels that whether dispute is essentially inter se
between the parties, either they are relatives,
neighbours or having business relationship and
which does not affect the society at large, then in
such cases, with a view to maintain harmonious
relationships between the two sides & for restitution
of relationship. and with a view to end-up the
dispute in between them permanently, the High
Court should exercise its inherent power to quash
the FIR and all other subsequent proceedings
initiated thereto.”
4. The appellants state that they are ordinary men
residing in the very same Tehsil and District to which the
4th respondent belongs. They moved this Court
challenging the order quashing the subject FIR and all
further proceedings therefrom under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India contending that the FIR registered
against the 3rd respondent carried serious allegation of
commission of acts involving offence(s) under various
sections of the IPC, and POCSO Act; that they are not
purely private in nature; that they are offences against
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 5 of 40
the society, that the quashment of the subject FIR was
solely based on compromise between the third
respondent accused and the fourth respondent, the
father of the minor victim and that the first respondent
State did not choose to challenge the said order dated
04.02.2022 though it was so quashed ignoring the
opposition of the public prosecutor. They would further
contend that the offences alleged against the 3rd
respondent were serious offences having impact on the
society and letting off the third respondent untried might
result in recurrence of such instances besides it being
injustice to the victim and society as a whole. On
30.09.2022, this Court issued notice and taking note of
the involvement of important issues in the matter,
requested Mr. R. Basant, learned Sr. advocate to assist
the Court as amicus curiae, which request was graciously
accepted by the learned counsel. On 13.10.2022, Mr.
Aviral Saxena, learned advocate, agreed to assist the
learned Senior Counsel. On 02.12.2022, upon hearing
the learned counsel appearing for the parties and the
learned amicus curiae and taking note of difficulty to
continue the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India this Court converted the writ
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 6 of 40
petition into Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India and further ordered thus:-
“Let the parties address the Court on merits on the
next date of hearing. List on 20.01.2023”
5. The learned counsel appearing respectively for
the third and fourth respondents vehemently challenged
the locus standi of the appellants to challenge the order
dated 04.02.2022 passed thereon as they were not
parties to the abovementioned Crl. Misc. Petition.
Besides challenging the locus standi of the appellants
they would contend that the quashment of the subject FIR
and all further proceedings therefrom is legally
permissible in view of the law laid down by this Court in
Gian Singh’s case (supra) and the reason for such
interference and consequential quashment are
specifically mentioned in the impugned order.
According to the said respondents the appellants
besides being total strangers to the Misc. Petition and
are not at all affected by the impugned order.
Meanwhile Delhi Commission for Protection of Child
Rights (DCPCR) have filed an intervention application
seeking permission to assist the Court for proper
adjudication of the issues raised in the Special Leave
Petition. Considering the nature of the issues involved
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 7 of 40
and the fact that intervention is sought for by the
Commission for Protection for Child Rights we have
heard learned counsel for the intervenor, besides the
learned amicus curae Sri R. Basant, with the able
assistance of Mr. Avival Saxena and the learned counsel
for the parties.
6. Considering the conspectus of facts and taking
note of the rival contentions, the following twin questions
of relevance arise for consideration in this appeal: –
(I.) Whether a third party to a criminal
proceeding got locus standi to challenge the
order quashing the FIR concerned and all
further proceedings pursuant thereto based
on a compromise arrived at by the parties, in
a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India?
(II.) Whether the power to quash criminal
proceedings or complaint or FIR in regard to
heinous and serious offences having serious
impact on society, is exercisable merely
because the offender and victim or parent(s)
of the victim arrived at a compromise, relying
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 8 of 40
on the dictum laid down by this Court in Gian
Singh’s case (supra)?
7. Needless to say, that answers to the above
questions would decide the fate of this appeal. For
answering the first question, various factors have to be
looked into. Necessarily the questions as to whether the
offender is accused of commission of offence(s)
involving moral turpitude or against the society or
whether they are purely of private nature have to be
taken note of. As some of the offence(s) alleged fall
under special statute relating children, the very object
and purpose of the said enactment may also require
consideration in the above regard. The learned amicus
curiae relied on various decisions of this Court to drive
home the point that when criminal proceedings are
abruptly terminated based on compromise between the
offender and the victim or on behalf of the victim by the
parent(s), despite the alleged offence being one having
impact on the society and of heinous and serious in
nature and still, the State did not take up the matter
further in accordance with law, ignoring the fact that such
quashment of the proceedings was done disregarding
the opposition of the public prosecutor, a public spirited
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 9 of 40
person should be having the locus standi to challenge
such an order in the interest of justice. It is furthermore
submitted that in such circumstances if a public-spirited
person is non-suited on the ground of locus standi it
would only help the offender to escape even without
facing the trial. Such situations may result in recurrence
of commission of such offences detrimental to the
interests of the society. To buttress the point that a
spirited citizen has the locus standi to petition under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India to ensure that
justice is done, the learned amicus curiae relied on the
decisions of this Court in P.S.R. Sadhanantham
v. Arunachalam2, Sheonandan Paswan v. State of
Bihar and Ors.3, Amanullah and Anr. v. State of Bihar4
and V.S Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai5. The
learned counsel for the intervenor also endorsed the
said submissions and contentions made by the learned
amicus curiae on the question of locus standi.
8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
third respondent, who is the accused on whose instance
2
(1980) 3 SCC 141
3
(1987) 1 SCC 288
4
(2016) 6 SCC 699
5
(2011) 3 SCC 317
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 10 of 40
the subject FIR was quashed, contended that it is
impermissible for a third party/strangers to interfere in
criminal proceedings. In support of the said contention,
he relied on various decisions such as Rajiv Ranjan
Singh ‘Lalan’ v. Union of India6, Simranjit Singh Mann
v. Union of India7 and Bar Council of Maharashtra v.
M.V. Dabholkar8.
9. It is disheartening to note that with tooth and nail,
the learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent,
the father of the victim, challenged the appellants’ locus
standi to maintain the Special Leave Petition against the
impugned order whereunder the FIR registered against
the third respondent, the accused was quashed based on
the compromise between third and the fourth
respondents. It is contended that since none of the
fundamental rights under part III of the appellants are
infringed, they could not maintain a petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India and merely
because the petition filed by them under Article 32 was
converted to one under Article 136, of the Constitution of
India, the appellants would not acquire locus standi to
6
(2006) 6 SCC 613
7
(1992) 4 SCC 653
8
(1975) 2 SCC 702
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 11 of 40
challenge the order dated 04.02.2022 passed by the
High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482,
Cr. P.C. The learned counsel relied on the decision of
this Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India9 in support his
contentions.
10. Before dealing with the contentions on behalf of the
respondents and also the submissions of the learned
amicus curiae and the counsel for the intervenor, we
think it only appropriate to refer to certain relevant
aspects of the POCSO Act. As introduction to the POCSO
Act, what actually actuated the Parliament to enact
‘POCSO Act’ has been stated thus:-
“Sexual offences against children are not
adequately addressed by the existing laws. A large
number of such offences are neither specifically
provided with nor are they adequately penalised.
Such offences against children need to be defined
explicitly and countered through adequate
penalties as an effective deterrence. This Act
provides for protection of children from offences of
sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography
with due regard for safeguarding the interest and
well-being of children.”9
1981 Supp. SCC 87Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 12 of 40
11. Contextually, it is worthy to refer to the statement
of objects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO
Act. It reads as follows: –
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, confers
upon the State powers to make special provision for
children. Further, article 39, inter alia, provides that
the State shall in particular direct its policy towards
securing that the tender age of children are not
abused and their childhood and youth are protected
against exploitation and they are given facilities to
develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of
freedom and dignity.
2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Children, ratified by India on 11th December, 1992,
requires the State Parties to undertake all
appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral
measures to prevent (a) the inducement or coercion
of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;
(b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or
other unlawful sexual practices; and (c) the
exploitative use of children in pornographic
performances and materials.
3. The data collected by the National Crime Records
Bureau shows that there has been increase in cases
of sexual offences against children. This is
corroborated by the ‘Study on Child Abuse: India
2007’ conducted by the Ministry of Women and
Child Development. Moreover, sexual offences
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 13 of 40
against children are not adequately addressed by
the existing laws. A large number of such offences
are neither specifically provided for nor are they
adequately penalised. The interests of the child,
both as a victim as well as a witness, need to be
protected. It is felt that offences against children
need to be defined explicitly and countered through
commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence.
4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained
comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for
protection of children from the offences of sexual
assault, sexual harassment and pornography with
due regard for safeguarding the interest and well
being of the child at every stage of the judicial
process, incorporating child-friendly procedures
for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation
and trial of offences and provision for establishment
of Special Courts for speedy trial of such offences.
5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the
right of all children to safety, security and protection
from sexual abuse and exploitation.
6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various
provisions contained in the Bill.
7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.”
12. The objects and reasons for the enactment of the
POCSO Act, as extracted above, would undoubtedly
show that quashment of proceeding initiated under
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 14 of 40
POCSO Act abruptly by invoking the power under
Section 482, Cr. PC without permitting it to mature into a
trial, except on extremely compelling reasons ex facie
malafidely initiated or initiated solely to settle the score
etc., would go against the very intention of the
legislature behind the enactment. As noted earlier, it is
the inadequacy of the existing laws to address certain
issues relating sexual offences against the children that
made the legislature to come up with the aforesaid
legislation with a view to protect and respect the privacy
and confidentiality of children and to ensure their
physical, emotional, intellectual and social
development. The POCSO Act also addressed the lack
of provisions defining various offences against the
children and also adequate penal provisions therefor. A
careful scanning of the various provisions under the
POCSO Act would reveal that with a view to achieve the
aforesaid objects and purposes various offences against
the children are specifically defined and provisions for
adequate penalisation are also inserted in the Act.
Obviously, rubbing the breast of a child would constitute
an offence of ‘sexual assault’ under Section 7 of POCSO
Act, punishable with imprisonment of either description
for a term which shall not be less than three years and
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 15 of 40
may extend to five years and also fine. They would
reveal that the commission of such offences against the
children should be viewed as heinous and serious.
Needless to say, that commission of such offences cannot
be taken lightly as offences of private nature and in fact,
such offences are bound to be taken as offences against
the society. In the decision in Attorney General for
India v. Satish and Anr.10 at paragraph 38, this Court
held thus:-
“The act of touching any sexual part of the body of a
child with sexual intent or any other act involving
physical contact with sexual intent, could not be
trivialised or held insignificant or peripheral so as to
exclude such act from the purview of “sexual
assault” under Section 7. As held by this Court in
Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, the law would
have to be interpreted having regard to the subject-
matter of the offence and to the object of the law it
seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law cannot be
to allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes of
law.”
13. This Court went on to hold that the legislature had
incorporated certain statutory presumptions having
regard to the seriousness of the offences under the
POCSO Act.
10
(2022) 5 SCC 545
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 16 of 40
14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid aspects we will
consider the submissions and contentions made relying
on the aforementioned decisions.
15. With respect to the decisions relied on by the
learned counsel for the third respondent, it can be seen
that they deal with the locus standi of a third party to
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. But
then, this Court has already passed an order on
02.12.2022 converting the petition filed under Article 32
of the Constitution of India as a Special Leave Petition
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and further
ordered to list the matter for hearing the parties on
merits. Hence, the fact is that the present matter has
already shed its character as a petition under Article 32
of the Constitution of India pursuant to the order of this
Court on 02.12.2022. The power of this Court to pass
such an order cannot be disputed in view of the inherent
power in this Court or in view of the power under Article
142 of the Constitution of India. In this context, it is also
relevant to refer to Article 136 of Constitution of India and
the following decisions of this Court describing the
nature of power of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India.
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 17 of 40
“Article 136 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this
Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment,
decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or
tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any
judgment, determination, sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or
under any law relating to the Armed Forces.”
16. In the decision in Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State
of Kerala and Anr.11, this Court held:-
“.…Article 136 of the Constitution of India is a
special jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court
which is sweeping in its nature. It is a residuary
power in the sense that confers an appellate
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court subject to the
special leave being granted in such matters as may
not be covered by the preceding articles. It is an
overriding provision conferring a special
jurisdiction providing for invoking of the appellate
jurisdiction of Supreme Court not fettered by the
sweep of preceding articles. Article 136 opens with
a non obstante clause and conveys that even in the
field covered by the preceding articles, jurisdiction
conferred by Article 136 is available to be exercised
in an appropriate case. It is untrammelled reservoir
of power incapable of being confined to definitional
bounds; the discretion being subjected only to one11
(2000) 6 SCC 359Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 18 of 40
limitation i.e., wisdom and good sense of justice of
the judges. No right of appeal is conferred upon any
party; only a discretion is vested in the Supreme
Court to interfere by granting leave to an applicant
to enter in its appellate jurisdiction not open
otherwise and as of right.”
17. In the decision in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur
Raghuraj Singh and others12, this Court in paragraph 5
observed and held thus:-
“5. …… The powers given by Article 136 of the
Constitution however are in the nature of special or
residuary powers which are exercisable outside the
purview of ordinary law, in cases where the needs
of justice demand interference by the Supreme
Court of the land. The article itself is worded in the
widest terms possible. It vests in the Supreme Court
a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining
and hearing appeals, by granting of special leave,
against any kind of judgment or order made by a
court or tribunal in any cause or matter and the
powers could be exercised in spite of the specific
provisions for the best of reasons did not choose to
fetter or circumscribe the powers exercisable under
this article in any way. ……”
18. In the said circumstances, the question whether
there is any violation of fundamental right(s) under part
III of the Constitution of India of the appellants herein
12
(1954) 2 SCC 20
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 19 of 40
need no consideration as it pales into insignificance.
According to us, in the said circumstances, while
considering the locus standi of the appellants herein to
challenge the order dated 04.02.2022 in S.B. CR. M.P.
No.1348/2022, what is to be looked into is whether the
parameters laid down in P.S.R. Sadhanantham’s case
(supra) and such other relevant decisions are satisfied or
not.
19. Now, we will refer to the decisions referred to by
the learned amicus curiae, in regard to the locus standi of
the appellants to challenge the order dated 04.02.2022.
We have already noted that this Court converted the
petition filed under Article 32 by the appellants herein as
Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India and specifically listed to hear the
parties on merits. In the aforesaid circumstances, the
decision in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors.13
assumes relevance. That was a case where the acquittal
of the convicts, who originally stood convicted by the
Trial Court, in an appeal by the High Court was
challenged before this Court by a third party to the
criminal proceedings (father of the deceased) in a
13
(2003) 12 SCC 395
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 20 of 40
Special Leave Petition. Leave was granted, though he
was not a party to the original criminal proceedings
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India overruling
the objection that a third party to a criminal proceeding
could not invoke the power of this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution of India to appeal against an
acquittal. This Court considered the power available to
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
and held that such a Special Leave Petition is
maintainable. It was held that Article 136 of the
Constitution of India neither confers on anyone the right
to invoke jurisdiction of the Supreme Court nor inhibits
anyone from invoking its jurisdiction and that the said
power is actually vested in the Supreme Court. It was
also held that the exercise of the power under Article 136
by the Supreme Court is circumscribed by any limitation
as to ‘who may invoke it’. Paragraph 12 of the decision
in Ramakant Rai’s case is relevant in the contextual
situation and it read thus:-
“12. A doubt has been raised about the competence
of a private party as distinguished from the State, to
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution of India (in short “the
Constitution”) against a judgment of acquittal by the
High Court. We do not see any substance in the
doubt. The appellate power vested in this CourtCriminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 21 of 40
under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be
confused with the ordinary appellate power
exercised by appellate courts and Appellate
Tribunals under specific statutes. It is a plenary
power, “exercisable outside the purview of ordinary
law” to meet the pressing demands of justice
(See Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh [AIR
1954 SC 520]). Article 136 of the Constitution neither
confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the
Court’s jurisdiction. The power is vested in this
Court but the right to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction
is vested in no one. The exercise of the power of this
Court is not circumscribed by any limitation as to
who may invoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal
by the High Court has led to a serious miscarriage
of justice, this Court cannot refrain from doing its
duty and abstain from interfering on the ground that
a private party and not the State has invoked the
Court’s jurisdiction. We do not have slightest doubt
that we can entertain appeals against judgments of
acquittal by the High Court at the instance of
interested private parties also. The circumstance
that the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short
“the Code”) does not provide for an appeal to the
High Court against an order of acquittal by a
subordinate court, at the instance of a private party,
has no relevance to the question of the power of this
Court under Article 136. We may mention that
in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh [(1978) 3 SCC 279 this
Court interfered with a judgment of acquittal by the
High Court at the instance of a private party. An
apprehension was expressed that if appeals againstCriminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 22 of 40
judgments of acquittal at the instance of private
parties are permitted there may be a flood of
appeals. We do not share the apprehension.
Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution are
entertained by special leave granted by this Court,
whether it is the State or a private party that invokes
the jurisdiction of this Court, and special leave is not
granted as a matter of course but only for good and
sufficient reasons, on well-established practice of
this Court.
(Underline supplied)
20. The view expressed in paragraph 13 was virtually
the view expressed by this Court in Arunachalam v.
P.S.R. Sadhanantham14, as held in Ramakant Rai’s case
itself. In Arunachalam’s case (supra), the acquittal of
P.S.R. Sadhanantham and four others by the High Court
upon reversing the judgment of their conviction was
challenged by the brother of the deceased viz.,
Arunachalam by filing a Special Leave Petition.
Virtually, leave was granted only against the first
accused P.S.R. Sadhanantham. Though the locus standi of
the private party in the sense, one who was not a party to
the original criminal proceedings to maintain a Special
Leave Petition under Article 136 was raised, this Court,
14
(1979) 2 SCC 297
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 23 of 40
relying on the decision in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh15, held
that this Court could entertain appeal against a judgment
of acquittal at the instance of private parties also.
Furthermore, it was held that Article 136 of the
Constitution of India neither confers on anyone the right
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court nor
inhibits anyone from invoking the Court’s jurisdiction
and where a judgment of acquittal by the High Court led
to a miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court would not
refrain from doing its duty and abstain from interfering
on the ground that a private party and not the State has
invoked the Court’s jurisdiction. We may hasten to add
here that the said decisions were rendered prior to the
amendment brought to Section 372, Cr. P.C., conferring
the victim a right to prefer an appeal against an order
passed by a Court acquitting the accused and expanding
the scope of the expression “victim” under Section 2
(wa), Cr. P.C. by including his or her guardian or legal
heir, vide Act No.5 of 2009 with effect from 31.12.2009 to
prefer an appeal against acquittal in the Cr. P.C. That
apart, this Court in those decisions specifically held that
a private party could prefer an appeal against acquittal
15
(1978) 3 SCC 279
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 24 of 40
invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution if the judgment of acquittal led to
serious miscarriage of justice. According to us, such
right to a third party to prefer a petition under Article 136
of the Constitution is certainly to be recognised and
respected in a case where seemingly miscarriage of
justice had occurred and still, neither State nor the victim
or any relative falling under the term ‘victim’
approached this Court.
21. According to us, the case on hand stands on a much
firmer footing than those cases. When leave is sought to
challenge a judgment of acquittal would undoubtedly
reveal the fact that the acquitter was made to face the trial
before a Court and acquittal is the outcome of
appreciation of evidence by the trial Court concerned.
22. The case on hand is not one where the third party
sought leave to challenge a judgment of acquittal. In the
case on hand, the very FIR registered against the third
respondent for the serious offences, as mentioned
above, was quashed by the High Court invoking the
power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. solely based on the
fact that a compromise was arrived at between the third
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 25 of 40
and the fourth respondents, as mentioned above. It is a
fact that the compromise was acted upon despite the
opposition of the public prosecutor and even then, the
State has not chosen to file petition seeking leave to
challenge the order passed by the High Court. Though,
the fourth respondent is the father of the victim, who
suffered sexual assault and such other offences under the
POCSO Act and IPC offences in view of the fact that he
had compromised the offences with the third respondent
accused, and in view of the manner in which he supports
the impugned order, it is evident that he would not
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India. While considering the locus
standi of the appellants to challenge the order dated
04.02.2022 the aforesaid aspects are also to be borne in
mind. The appellants are ordinary men residing in the
very same village to which the fourth respondent
belong. There is absolutely no case for the third and
fourth respondents that they filed the Special Leave
Petition due to any private revenge or personal vendetta.
No ill motive has been attributed on them. We have
already taken note of the fact that the very object and
purpose of enactment of the POCSO Act and also taken
note of the offences alleged against the third respondent
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 26 of 40
which are heinous and serious in nature. The definition
to crimes by Blackstone was taken note of in P.S.R.
Sadhanantham’s case (supra) by this Court as “the
breach and violation of public rights and duties which
affect the whole community” to observe that in such
circumstances a crime is an act deemed by law to be
harmful to society in general, even though its immediate
victim is an individual. In view of the nature of the
offences alleged against the third respondent, one can
only say that if they are proved they could be treated
only as offences against the society and at any rate, it
cannot be said that prosecuting an offender against
whom such allegations are made is not in the interest of
the society. In fact, it would only be in the interest of the
society. In that view of the matter, when by quashing the
FIR by invoking the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C.,
the accused was relieved of the liability to face the trial
coupled with the aforesaid circumstances and the
position of law qua locus standi of third party to maintain
a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India,
as revealed from the decisions referred above, we have
no hesitation to hold that the challenge based on the
appellants’ locus standi got no merit at all. We do not
think it necessary to deal with the other decisions cited
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 27 of 40
before us on the aforesaid question. In short, we find no
ground or reason to revoke the grant of leave to the
appellants to assail the order dated 04.02.2024.
23. We will now, consider the second question as to
whether the power to quash criminal proceedings
invoking the power under Section 482, Cr. PC be
exercisable solely by relying on the fact that the parties
have arrived at a compromise and the decision of this
Court in Gian Singh’s case (supra).
24. The learned amicus curiae submitted that a
scanning of the decision of this Court in Gian Singh’s
case (supra) itself would reveal the legal position in
regard to the said question. The learned amicus curiae
drew our attention to paragraphs 48, 57, 58 and 61 of the
said decision. Paragraph 57 and the relevant portions of
paragraphs 48, 58 and 61 read thus: –
“48.……….While parting with this part, it appears
necessary to add that the settlement or compromise
must satisfy the conscience of the court. The
settlement must be just and fair besides being free
from the undue pressure, the court must examine
the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims with
necessary caution……”Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 28 of 40
57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on
the ground of settlement between an offender and
victim is not the same thing as compounding of
offence. They are different and not interchangeable.
Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of
offences given to a court under Section 320 is
materially different from the quashing of criminal
proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences,
power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the
provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is
guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the High
Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the
material on record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power although the
ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal
of indictment.
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the fact that the
dispute between the offender and the victim has
been settled although the offences are not
compoundable, it does so as in its opinion,
continuation of criminal proceedings will be an
exercise in futility and justice in the case demands
that the dispute between the parties is put to an end
and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice
being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes
are acts which have harmful effect on the public and
consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and
threatens the well-being of the society and it is not
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 29 of 40
safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and
the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that
the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain
crimes have been made compoundable in law, with
or without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or
other offences of mental depravity under IPC or
offences of moral turpitude under special statutes,
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, the settlement between the offender and
the victim can have no legal sanction at all.
However, certain offences which overwhelmingly
and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen
out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to
dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong
is basically to the victim and the offender and the
victim have settled all disputes between them
amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences
have not been made compoundable, the High Court
may within the framework of its inherent power,
quash the criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of
such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the
offender being convicted and by not quashing the
criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and
ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast
category can be prescribed.
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 30 of 40
61. The position that emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised thus : the power of
the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or
FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power
given to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with
the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to
secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of any court. In what cases power to
quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR
may be exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such
power, the High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly
quashed even though the victim or victim’s family
and the offender have settled the dispute. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Similarly, any compromise
between the victim and the offender in relation to
the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 31 of 40
stand on a different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
or such like transactions or the offences arising out
of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved
their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the
High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in
its view, because of the compromise between the
offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal
case would put the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full
and complete settlement and compromise with the
victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest
of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding
or continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and
the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of
justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put
to an end and if the answer to the above question(s)
is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well
within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding.”
(Underline supplied)
25. Thus, in unambiguous terms this Court held that
before exercising the power under Section 482, Cr. PC
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 32 of 40
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime besides observing and holding that
heinous and serious offences could not be quashed even
though a victim or victim’s family and the offender had
settled the dispute. This Court held that such offences
are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the
society. Having understood the position of law on the
second question that it is the bounden duty of the court
concerned to consider whether the compromise is just
and fair besides being free from undue pressure we will
proceed to consider the matter further. A bare perusal of
the impugned order dated 04.02.2022 would reveal that
the High Court has erred in not bestowing proper
consideration the law laid down in Gian Singh’s case
(supra) while rendering the same. The impugned order
would reveal that the allegations contained in the subject
FIR was not at all even adverted to, before quashing the
same. We have referred to the allegations which are of
serious nature revealed from the FIR. The complaint in
this case is annexed to the FIR produced in this
proceeding as Annexure P-1. In the said complaint
which led to the registration of the FIR reads thus:-
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 33 of 40
“Hence my report may be lodged and action may
be taken against the offender Vimal Kumar Gupta as
he is making pressure on me not to lodge report.”(underline supplied)
26. In this context, it is to be noted that the complaint
which led to the registration of the FIR was filed on
08.01.2022 and the compromise was entered into
between the third and fourth respondents within a few
weeks thereafter viz., on 31.01.2022. A perusal of the
impugned order would reveal that without even
referring to the alleged offence and thereby without
looking into the nature and gravity of the offence, solely
relying upon the compromise, the High Court observed
thus: –
“This Court is aptly guided by the principles
propounded by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and
feels that whether dispute is essentially inter se
between the parties, either they are relatives,
neighbours or having business relationship and
which does not affect the society at large, then in
such cases, with a view to maintain harmonious
relationships between the two sides & for restitution
of relationship and with a view to end-up the dispute
in between them permanently, the High Court
should exercise its inherent power to quash the FIR
and all other subsequent proceedings initiated
thereto. Here in this case, though the offences are
not compoundable but the parties have settled theCriminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 34 of 40
dispute amicably and that is essentially in between
the parties which is not-affecting public peace and
tranquillity therefore with a view to maintain the
harmony and to resolve the dispute finally in
between the parties, it is deemed appropriate to
quash the FIR and all further proceedings
undertaken in pursuance thereof.”
(underline supplied)
27. It is also to be noted that after quashing the FIR and
further proceedings, the SHO of the Police Station
concerned was directed to file a closure report with the
concerned Judicial Magistrate within a period of one
month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.
28. A bare perusal of the impugned order and in the
light of the observations and binding conclusions in Gian
Singh’s case (supra), bearing in mind the allegations in
the subject FIR, it would reveal that the High Court has
misread and misapplied the law laid down in Gian
Singh’s case (supra) to quash the subject FIR and all
further proceedings based in pursuance thereof. We
are at a loss to understand how the High Court arrived at
the conclusion that in the case on hand a dispute to be
resolved exists between the parties and further that to
maintain harmony the FIR and all further proceedings
thereto should be quashed even without adverting to theCriminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 35 of 40
allegations raised against the 3rd respondent in the
subject FIR. It is also a fact that though in terms of the
decision in Gian Singh’s case (supra) an irrecusable
duty of the Court to consider whether the compromise
could be acted upon or not in the interest of justice, the
impugned order would reveal that the High Court has
failed to bestow proper consideration in that regard as
well.
29. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer
to a Three Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of
M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan16. This Court held that whether
an FIR is quashable or not would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case and while considering
that question, the Court has to apply its mind to (i)
whether the crime is one against the society or against
an individual alone, nature of the dispute, (ii)
seriousness and how the crime was committed (iii)
whether offence(s) is one under a special statute (iv)
stage of proceedings and how the accused manged to
compromise with the complainant.
16
(2019) 5 SCC 688
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 36 of 40
30. In this regard, it is relevant to note that in the case
on hand the victim was then a student of Class 11th in the
Higher Secondary aged 16 years. The statement
annexed to the FIR of the complainant viz., the 4th
respondent itself would reveal that on 08.01.2022 he
complained about the pressure from the 3rd respondent
to restrain him from lodging report. The compromise
was entered immediately thereafter on 31.01.2022.
Despite the said position, the Court has not chosen to
consider whether the compromise entered into between
the parents and the accused could be acted upon or not,
in the interest of justice, taking note of the serious
allegations levelled against the 3rd accused and in view
of the law laid down in Gian Singh’s case (supra). In that
context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of a learned
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sunil Raikwar v.
State and Another17. Paragraph 12 therein, to the extent
it is relevant reads thus:-
“12. The father of the victim cannot be permitted to
settle the dispute with the accused. He is not the
victim and the courts have to safeguard and protect
the interest of children against onslaught by bad
forces. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the
accused is being prosecuted for an offence that
shocks the value system of a society and this is not a17
2021 SCC OnLine Del 258Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 37 of 40
matter that can be permitted to be settled as a
compoundable minor offence. Deterrence to others
committing similar offence is a must and they cannot
get a signal that anything and everything can be
compromised……”
31. In view of the very object and purpose of enacting
the POCSO Act, we find no reason to disagree with the
conclusions in paragraph 12 extracted above in the
given case. It is more so, when the extracted portion
from the complaint that was annexed to the FIR and
extracted hereinbefore would reveal that the accused
was making pressure on him not to lodge any report.
Despite giving such statement in the complaint, within a
couple of weeks, the accused managed to compromise
the case with the 4th respondent and his wife.
32. In the decision relied on by the High Court to quash
the proceedings viz., Gian Singh’s case (supra) and the
decision in Laxmi Narayan’s case (supra) in
unambiguous terms this Court held that the power under
Section 482, Cr. P.C. could not be used to quash
proceedings based on compromise if it is in respect of
heinous offence which are not private in nature and have
a serious impact on the society. When an incident of the
aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred in a
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 38 of 40
higher secondary school, that too from a teacher, it
cannot be simply described as an offence which is
purely private in nature and have no serious impact on
the society.
33. In view of the reasons as aforesaid and in the light
of the decisions referred supra, the impugned order
dated 04.02.2022 of the High Court in S.B.C.R.M.P.
No.1348/2022, quashing the FIR No.6/2022 dated
08.01.2022 and all further proceedings pursuant thereto
solely on the ground that the accused and the
complainant had settled the matter, invites interference.
We have no hesitation to hold that in cases of this nature,
the fact that in view of compromise entered into between
the parties, the chance of a conviction is remote and
bleak also cannot be a ground to abruptly terminate the
investigation, by quashing FIR and all further
proceedings pursuant thereto, by invoking the power
under Section 482, Cr. P.C. In the said circumstances,
this appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated
04.02.2022 of the High Court in S.B.C.R.M.P.
No.1348/2022 is hereby quashed and set aside.
Consequently, the FIR No.6/2022, investigation and
criminal proceedings pursuant thereto subject to the
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 39 of 40
nature of the report to be filed under Section 173(2), Cr.
P.C., be proceeded with against the accused, in
accordance with law.
34. We make it clear that we shall not be understood to
have made any observations on the merits of the case.
35. Before parting with this case, we would render our
gratitude and appreciation for the invaluable assistance
provided to the Court by Mr. R. Basant, learned Senior
Counsel as amicus curiae, ably assisted by Mr. Aviral
Saxena, Advocate on Record.
……………………, J.
(C.T. Ravikumar)
……………………, J.
(Sanjay Kumar)
New Delhi;
November 07, 2024
Criminal Appeal No.3403 of 2023 Page 40 of 40