Delhi High Court
Ranjana Trehan vs Ramjas School Anand Parvat Senior Wing … on 12 November, 2024
Author: Jyoti Singh
Bench: Jyoti Singh
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 12th November, 2024
+ W.P.(C) 12136/2023
ARCHNA CHUGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rahul Singhal, Advocate
versus
RAMJAS SCHOOL, ANAND PARVAT, SENIOR
WING & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sacchin Puri, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Mohd. Amanullah, Mr. Soumya
Bhaumik, Mr. Misbah Bin Tariq, Ms. Shahin Alvi,
Mr. Fardeen Khan, Ms. Ashna and Mrs. Shabeena
Anjum, Advocates for R-1 and 2.
Mr. Shishir Singh, Advocate for R-3.
Mr. Gaurav Dhingra, Mr. Shashank Singh and
Ms. Tapasiya Tomar, Advocates for R-4.
+ W.P.(C) 12603/2023
RANJANA TREHAN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rahul Singhal, Advocate
versus
RAMJAS SCHOOL ANAND PARVAT SENIOR WING
THROUGH ITS V CHAIRMAN MR VINOD GUPTA & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sacchin Puri, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Mohd. Amanullah, Mr. Soumya
Bhaumik, Mr. Misbah Bin Tariq, Ms. Shahin Alvi,
Mr. Fardeen Khan, Ms. Ashna and Mrs. Shabeena
Anjum, Advocates for R-1 and 2.
Mr. Shishir Singh, Advocate for R-3.
Mr. Gaurav Dhingra, Mr. Shashank Singh and
Ms. Tapasiya Tomar, Advocates for R-4.
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CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH
JUDGEMENT
JYOTI SINGH, J.
1. Both these writ petitions have been filed by the Petitioners laying a
challenge to their respective suspension orders, issued by Respondents No.1
and 2/Ramjas School, Anand Parvat (‘School’). Direction is sought to the
School to pay full salary for the suspension periods along with all other
consequential benefits. Since both petitions concern teachers of the same
School and common questions of law are raised, with the consent of the
parties they were heard together and are being decided by this common
judgment.
W.P.(C) 12136/2023
2. Petitioner was employed with the School in July, 1991 as PGT
(Biology) and her services were confirmed in 1993. Petitioner claims to be
serving the School for the last 33 years prior to suspension without any
complaint and with an unblemished record of service. Petitioner was
appointed on various additional portfolios such as HOS, HOD (Science),
Academic/Educational Co-ordinator and Administrative In-charge,
reflecting her extraordinary work performance.
3. Pursuant to an e-mail and acknowledgement sent by the Petitioner
herself, referring to a missing Court case file in the case of one Ritu Phore, a
memorandum was issued to the Petitioner on 21.02.2023, calling upon her to
give a written explanation with respect to the alleged gross misconduct in
her capacity as a temporary HOS. Petitioner responded to the memorandum
and rendered her explanation pointing out that she was not at fault for
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the reasons mentioned therein. This memorandum was followed by
memorandums dated 03.03.2023 and 10.03.2023 on the same issue and
finally the impugned suspension order dated 05.04.2023 was issued by the
Chairman of the School, placing the Petitioner under suspension with
immediate effect and it is this order which is the subject matter of challenge
in the present writ petition.
W.P.(C) 12603/2023
4. Petitioner was employed as TGT in Science and Maths with the
School in July, 1993 and her services were confirmed in the year 1995.
Petitioner asserts that she worked with the School for 31 long years without
any complaint and has an unblemished record of service till the passing of
the impugned suspension order dated 17.04.2023. It is averred that Petitioner
was appointed on several additional portfolios such as Educational
Co-ordinator, Administrative In-charge, Transport In-charge, SMC Teacher
Representative of the School, Disciplinary Committee Member in an inquiry
proceeding against another suspended employee of the School. Petitioner
lays a siege to the suspension order in the present writ petition.
COMMON CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS
5. The suspension orders were passed in violation of Section 8(4) of
Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 (‘DSEAR’) read with Rule 115
of DSEAR as no approval was taken from the Directorate of Education
(‘DoE’) by the School, prior to passing of the said orders. Under the first
Proviso to Section 8(4), it is open to the school management to suspend an
employee without prior approval of the Director, if there is an imminent
necessity due to reason of gross misconduct, but in that event, suspension
shall remain in force only for a period of 15 days and unless it is approved
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by the Director before the expiry of the said period, the order shall lapse. In
the instant case, there was no approval from the Director within 15 days
from the dates of the suspension orders and thus the impugned orders lapsed
on expiry of the prescribed period and cannot be enforced in law. To support
this plea, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in Ruchi Malhotra v. Guru Nanak Public School & Ors., being
W.P. (C) 3567/2019 decided on 09.12.2019, which was upheld by the
Division Bench in Guru Nanak Public School and Another v. Ruchi
Malhotra and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 383 as well as on the
judgment of this Court in Nisha Tyagi v. Seema Model School, 1997 SCC
OnLine Del 224; Delhi Public School & Anr. v. Director of Education &
Ors., 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1086; and S.S. Tyagi v. Ravindra Public
School and Another, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2084.
6. The sole ground on which the School, which is a private unaided
school, contests these writ petitions is that the Supreme Court in TMA PAI
Foundation and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2002) 8 SCC
481, held that there ought to be minimal regulatory control over the unaided
private schools and maximum autonomy must be given to them in
administration and disciplinary matters etc. and thus there is no reason why
Managements of private unaided educational institutions should seek the
consent or approval of any Governmental authority before taking any action
pursuant to disciplinary inquiry initiated on account of a misconduct of the
school employee, cannot aid the School as this very contention was raised
by the school before the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Director of
Education and Others, (2016) 6 SCC 541 and rejected albeit in the context
of prior approval required under Section 8(2) of DSEAR, dealing with
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penalties of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. After considering
these very observations of the Supreme Court in TMA PAI Foundation
(supra), the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar (supra) observed that Section
8(2) of DSEAR was a procedural safeguard in favour of an employee to
ensure that an order of termination or dismissal is not passed without the
prior approval of DoE and this is to avoid arbitrary or unreasonable
termination or dismissal of an employee of a recognised private school.
7. Reliance of the School on the judgment of this Court in Kathuria
Public School v. Director of Education & Anr., 2005 SCC OnLine Del
778, is wholly misplaced in view of the observations of the Supreme Court
in Raj Kumar (supra), that the Division Bench of the High Court while
striking down Section 8(2) of DSEAR in Kathuria Public School (supra)
has not correctly appreciated the law laid down in Katra Education Society
v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 61, wherein a
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, dealing with a provision similar
to Section 8(2), held that regulation of the service condition of the
employees of private recognised schools is required to be controlled by
educational authorities and State Legislature is empowered to legislate such
provisions in DSEAR. The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar (supra) held that
the decision of the High Court striking down Section 8(2), was bad in law.
COMMON CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SCHOOL
8. There can be no quarrel that Section 8(4) of DSEAR provides that
where the school Management intends to suspend an employee, approval of
the Director is required, however, Section 8(4) per se is inapplicable to
unaided private schools, in view of the judgement of the eleven-Judge
Bench in TMA PAI Foundation (supra), wherein the Supreme Court
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observed that there is no reason why the private unaided educational
institutions should seek consent or approval of any Governmental Authority
before taking any action in disciplinary matters. In paragraphs 61 and 64 of
the said judgment, the Supreme Court has underscored that maximum
autonomy must be given to unaided private schools in matters relating to
administration, appointments, disciplinary actions, admission and fees
pertaining to students etc. and thus in the instant case, being a private
unaided school, the Management Committee was not required to seek
approval of the Director for passing the suspension orders, either prior
thereto or even within the prescribed period of 15 days, post the dates of the
impugned orders.
9. Petitioners cannot place reliance on the judgment in Raj Kumar
(supra), since the judgment in TMA PAI Foundation (supra) was delivered
by eleven-Judge Bench and moreover, in Raj Kumar (supra) the Supreme
Court erred in appreciating the true import of observation in TMA PAI
Foundation (supra). In Brahmo Samaj Education Society and Others v.
State of W.B. and Others, (2004) 6 SCC 224, while discussing the effect of
pronouncement in TMA PAI Foundation (supra), the Supreme Court
observed that when a larger Bench of eleven Judges in TMA PAI
Foundation (supra) has declared the law, it cannot be diluted by analysing
various settlements made or by indulging in any dissection of the principles
underlying therein. In a subsequent decision in P.A. Inamdar and Others v.
State of Maharashtra and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 537, the Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in the context of the same controversy
observed that even if they were inclined to disagree with any of the findings
amounting to declaration of law by the majority in TMA PAI Foundation
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(supra), they cannot, that being a judgment of eleven-Judge Bench. In Raj
Kumar (supra), by holding that the High Court in Kathuria Public School
(supra), wrongly quashed Section 8(2), the Supreme Court has in effect
disagreed with TMA PAI Foundation (supra), which was impermissible
and this Court being bound by the judgment in TMA PAI Foundation
(supra), ought to dismiss the writ petitions, as no regulatory regime can be
imposed on the present School, being an unaided private school, including
the mandate to take prior or post approval of the Director under Section
8(4), pertaining to suspension of its employees.
10. Respondent No.3/Ramjas Foundation Managing Committee has filed
short affidavits in both the petitions, stating that in replies to the legal
notices dated 26.07.2023 sent by Petitioners to Respondent No.3, it
disassociated itself from the suspension orders and replied that it did not
agree with the suspension orders and therefore, broadly understood,
Respondent No.3 supports the Petitioners.
COMMON CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF DOE
11. DoE supported the cause of the Petitioners and urged that the School,
which is an unaided private school recognised by DoE under provisions of
DSEAR, is bound by the provisions of the enactment. The intent of the
Legislature while enacting DSEAR, in addition to providing for better
organisation and development of educational institutions in Delhi, was also
to provide security of tenure to the employees of the schools and regulate
their terms and conditions of employment. Under Rule 59 of DSEAR, the
Managing Committee, entrusted with the management of any recognised
private school, is bound to follow the statutory provisions of DSEAR while
managing the affairs of the school. It is therefore incumbent on the
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Management to comply with all provisions including the mandate of Section
8(4) of DSEAR.
12. Chapter IV of DSEAR concerns the terms and conditions of service of
employees of recognised private schools and includes Section 8(4) and (5)
and none of these provisions carve out any distinction between unaided and
aided recognised private schools, since these are in the nature of
safeguarding provisions meant to protect employees from harassment at the
hands of the school authorities. If the recognised private schools are left
totally unregulated, it would be to the detriment of the employees of the
school and will ultimately impact the education system. In the present case,
the impugned suspension orders were passed without prior approval of the
DoE and no approval was given by the Director, even after passing of the
suspension orders within the prescribed statutory period and thus the
suspension orders cannot be sustained in law. It was emphasised that even in
respect of unaided private minority schools, the Supreme Court in Frank
Anthony Public School Employees’ Association v. Union of India and
Others, (1986) 4 SCC 707, held that Section 8(4) does not encroach upon
the rights of the minorities to administer their educational institutions and in
Raj Kumar (supra), after considering the observations in TMA PAI
Foundation (supra), heavily relied upon by the school, the Supreme Court
held that Section 8(2) of DSEAR being a procedural safeguard in favour of
an employee, dismissal order cannot be passed without the approval of DoE.
In Gajanand Sharma v. Adarsh Siksha Parisad Samiti and Others, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 54, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High
Court with a serious observation that despite the judgment in Raj Kumar
(supra), a contrary view was taken by the Division Bench of the High Court
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that before terminating the services of an employee, approval of DoE was
not required. It was further observed that in Raj Kumar (supra), the
Supreme Court referred to and discussed the decision in TMA PAI
Foundation (supra) and therefore, the observation of the High Court that in
case of Raj Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court had not considered the
decision in TMA PAI Foundation (supra), was factually incorrect.
13. Heard learned counsels for the Petitioners and DoE and learned
Senior Counsel for the School and examined their submissions.
14. The neat legal nodus that arises for consideration before this Court is
the applicability of sub-Section (4) of Section 8 of DSEAR to the School,
which is an unaided recognised private school. Section 8(4) is extracted
hereunder, for ready reference:-
“8. Terms and conditions of service of employees of recognised private
schools.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Where the managing committee of a recognised private school intends
to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to
the Director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior
approval of the Director:
Provided that the managing committee may suspend an employee with
immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is
satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the
gross misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed
under section 9 of the employee:
Provided further that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force
for more than a period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless
it has been communicated to the Director and approved by him before the
expiry of the said period.”
15. Section 8(4) of DSEAR in no uncertain terms provides that if the
Managing Committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend its
employee, then the said intention has to be communicated to the Director
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and no employee can be suspended except with the prior approval of the
Director. First Proviso to sub-Section (4), empowers the Managing
Committee to suspend an employee with immediate effect and without prior
approval of the Director, if it is satisfied that immediate suspension is
necessitated by reason of gross misconduct of the employee within the
meaning of Code of Conduct prescribed under Section 9 of DSEAR, but the
validity of the suspension is subject to the second Proviso, which stipulates
that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force for more than a
period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless it has been
communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry of the
said period.
16. The legal issue raised by the Petitioners with respect to the validity of
the suspension orders, passed without approval of the Director under Section
8(4), is no longer res integra and in this context, I may first refer to one of
the earlier judgments of this Court in Anand Dev Tyagi v. Lt. Governor of
Delhi, 1996 SCC Online Del 537. In the said case, the employee had been
placed under suspension in an emergency and without prior approval.
Though the suspension was communicated to the Director but there was no
approval before the expiry of period of 15 days. The Division Bench
analyzing the provisions of Section 8(4) and (5) of DSEA&R observed that
there is nothing in the DSEA&R that in the event of the Director not
according his approval, the same shall be deemed to have been accorded. It
was observed that communication of the fact of suspension to the DOE and
grant of approval to the act of placing an employee under suspension, before
expiry of period of 15 days, is a sine qua non for the period of suspension to
remain in force beyond 15 days. On approval not being granted the
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suspension shall cease to be operative. The Division Bench after taking into
consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court emphasized on the
statutory mandate of an approval by the DOE and held that in the absence of
approval by DOE, order of immediate suspension of an employee shall lapse
on the 15th day and cease to have any legal force from the 16th day onwards.
Relevant paragraphs are as under:
“12. A combined reading of sub-sections (4) & (5) of Section 8 of the
Act and Rule 115(2) and (5) of the Rules would suggest that in ordinary
circumstances the Managing Committee of a recognised private school, if
it intends to suspend an employee has first to communicate to the Director
and such suspension will become operative only on prior approval being
accorded by the Director. Only in an emergent situation the Managing
Committee is empowered to forthwith place an employee under
suspension, which suspension firstly will remain in force for a period of
15 days. Its extension beyond that period is dependant upon the approval
of the Director, to be accorded by him, before the expiry of the said
period of 15 days. In the case of prior approval being accorded by the
Director permitting the Managing Committee to place its employee under
suspension or in the event of the Director having approved the action of
the Managing Committee in suspending its employee in emergent
situation that such suspension will continue to remain in operation till it
is revoked or modified, either by the Managing Committee or by the
Director, but in all eventualities suspension will continue to remain in
operation for a maximum period of six months unless Managing
Committee, for reasons to be recorded takes a decision to continue the
suspension beyond the period of six months.
13. In the instant case respondent No. 4 placed the petitioner under
suspension forthwith on 10.7.1994 and it is contended that the order was
communicated to the Director and his approval was sought. The record
reveals that respondent No. 4 merely forwarded a copy of memorandum
Annexure PX to the Director saying this is being intimated to Director to
Education as well”. Copy was also sent to District Education Officer. The
communication, which thereafter was sent by respondent No. 4 to the
Director of Education is Annexure R-4/24 dated 26.7.1994 with a copy to
Education Officer. The petitioner was placed under suspension on
10.7.1994. In case the petitioner had been put under suspension on
10.7.1994 by the Managing Committee, in exercise of its power to put an
employee under suspension with immediate effect on its satisfaction that
immediate suspension was necessary by reason of gross misconduct, the
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date of suspension. Suspension thereafter could remain operative only on
the Director’s according his approval before the expiry of the period of 15
days. No doubt the suspension was communicated by respondent No. 4 to
the Director but no approval was granted by the Director before the
expiry of period of 15 days. Director was required to take a decision
within the ambit of Sub-section (5) of Section 8 on his satisfaction that
there were adequate and reasonable grounds for suspension. There is
nothing in the Act or in the Rules that in the event of Director not
according his approval, the same will be deemed to have been accorded.
In other words, there is no deeming provision. Communication of the fact
of suspension to the Director of Education and according of his approval
to this act of placing an employee under suspension before the expiry of
period of fifteen days is a sine qua non for the period of suspension before
the expiry of period of fifteen days. On approval not being granted the
suspension will cease to be operative. Power lies with the Director either
to approve or not to approve. It is only on approval being granted that
period of suspension will extend beyond fifteen days. Not taking decision
by the Director within fifteen days will also amount to approval not being
accorded. No doubt the management in an emergent situation, as is
referred to in the second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section has a right
to forthwith place the employee under suspension, but this act of placing
suspension requires approval. Approval has to be accorded by the
Director on his satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for such
suspension. It requires positive decision to be taken. Approval may be
either accorded or withheld or may not be accorded at all There is no
question deemed approval as is contended on behalf of respondent No. 4.
Reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court
in HPMC v. Shri Suman Behari Sharma, 1996 (5) SCC 40.
14. In view of the above there being no approval accorded by the
Director before the expiry of period of 15 days from 10.7.1994 the
suspension of petitioner automatically came to an end on 25.7.1994. On
and from 25.7.1994, it cannot be said that the petitioner has remained
under suspension. Petitioner thereafter was neither placed under
suspension afresh separately nor a request was made by respondent No. 4
to the Director for placing the petitioner again under suspension. It is not
shown that Education Officer or Deputy Education Officer concerned
were delegated with the powers of the Director. It is the Director of
Education alone who can exercise the power to grant prior or post
approval of suspension under Section 8(5) of the Act. Education Officer
or Deputy Education Officer could not have taken any decision at their
own end.”
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17. Relying upon the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Frank
Anthony (supra), a Full Bench of this Court in Delhi Public School (supra)
held as under:
“21. In view of the afore-mentioned pronouncement of the Apex Court,
there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that on the expiry of 15 days from
the date of communication of the order of suspension, an order of
suspension lapses, in the event no order of the Director of Education
approving the same is received within the said period.
xxx xxx xxx
23. We, with respect, agree with the said findings. The petitioners
herein had not questioned the vires of the afore-mentioned provisions nor
having regard to the Frank Anthony’s case (supra), the same could be
done.
xxx xxx xxx
28. The decision in Prem Sehgal’s case (supra), therefore, cannot be
said to be an authority on the proposition as to whether on the expiry of 15
days from the date of order of suspension, in the event, no approval is
granted, the order of suspension lapsed or not. Apart from the fact that the
Director of School Education in terms of the provisions of the Act is bound
to accord his approval only when he comes to the requisite conclusion as
is required. We may notice that in terms of the provisions of the Act, the
Director is bound to accord his approval only if there are adequate and
reasonable grounds for such suspension. In terms of sub-section (4) of
Section 8, an order of suspension has to be passed only upon obtaining
prior approval of the Director. Proviso appended to sub-section (4) of
Section 8 is an exception to the main provision. An order of suspension can
be passed only when the Managing Committee is satisfied that such
immediate suspension is necessary by reason of a gross misconduct. The
second proviso appended thereto, in no uncertain terms, fixes the period
during which the said order of suspension shall remain in force. Such a
provision has been made for the benefit of the teachers against whom an
interim order of suspension has been passed whereas departmental
proceedings are pending or are contemplated; and having regard to the
clear provisions of the statute, he cannot continue to remain under
suspension although no approval therefor is granted within the period of
15 days.
29. An interim order of suspension, it will bear a repetition to state,
must be passed by the managing committee of the institution in an
exceptional situation.
30. In fairness to Mr. V.P. Singh, we may state that the main ground on
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which he wanted reading down of the provisions of Section 8 of the Act
was his apprehension to the effect that even in a case where the alleged
misconduct committed by an employee of the school is serious warranting
immediate suspension and further even when the circumstances of the case
justify the approval by the Director of Education, the Director of
Education and/or his subordinate functionaries may defeat the objective by
intentionally delaying the matter and thereby ensuring that no decision is
taken within 15 days from the date of communication of the order of
suspension. We have already stated that the petitioner has not challenged
the vires of Section 8 of the Act. That apart, in such a situation the
Managing Committee of the school would not be remediless. Illegal and/or
arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction by the Director of Education in a given
case can always be subject-matter of judicial review and in such a case it
would always be open to the Managing Committee of the school to
challenge the inaction and/or wrong decision of the Director of Education.
We may observe here that it is the statutory duty cast upon the Director to
take appropriate decision within 15 days as to whether approval is to be
given or not. He cannot, by delaying the matter beyond 15 days, make it a
fait accompli. No doubt, if no decision is taken within 15 days from the
days of communication of the order of suspension, the necessary
consequence thereof is that the suspension order lapses. However, that
does not mean that if no decision is taken at all or the matter is
unnecessarily delayed, it would not be permissible for the Managing
Committee of the school to insist the Director of Education to take a
decision even after 15 days of the communication of the order of
suspension. If such a decision is taken, though belatedly, the fresh order of
suspension can always be passed. Further, if the Director of Education
takes a decision and refuses to accord his approval to the order of
suspension and if the Managing Committee in such a case feels aggrieved
by that decision, it is always open for the Managing Committee to
challenge the decision of the Director of Education by appropriate
proceedings on well-established grounds of judicial review that would be
available to the Managing Committee in a given case.
31. What we are called upon to decide in this case is the effect on the
suspension order passed by the Managing Committee under first proviso to
subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act and the effect of non-grant of
approval in such a case within a period of 15 days from the date of
suspension as contemplated in the second proviso thereof. To that, our
answer is that such an order of suspension lapses after a period of 15 days
as is clearly contemplated by the second proviso.
32. It is for the Director of School Education, therefore, to consider as
to whether such immediacy was required in the facts and circumstances of
the case.
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33. The matter may also be considered from another angle.
34. An employer has an inherent right of suspension in the sense that it
may not take any work from its employees. But in such a situation, he has
to pay the entire salary to the employee. Thus, where in terms of an order
of suspension passed under a statute, the employee would be entitled only
to the subsistence allowance, as provided for in the rules, he would, in the
event the inherent power of suspension of the employer is taken recourse
to, be entitled to full salary.
35. In that view of the matter too, despite non-grant of approval by the
Director of School Education, the Managing Committee, in the event it is
found that it is expedient not to take work from the employee concerned,
may take recourse thereto but as noticed hereinbefore, in such a situation,
it will have to pay the entire salary and not the subsistence allowance
alone.
36. We, therefore, are of the opinion that upon expiry of 15 days from the
date of order of suspension, the order of suspension lapsed and the
employee shall be entitled to all consequential benefits.”
18. In Nisha Tyagi (supra), the Division Bench of this Court in the
context of Section 8(4) of DSEAR observed as follows:-
“54. The language of the section is clear that no suspension shall be
made except with the prior approval of the Director. Admittedly, in this
case, there has been no prior approval of the Director and in accordance
with the Section 8(4), the Managing Committee may suspend the
employees with immediate effect if it is satisfied that immediate suspension
is necessary within the meaning of the Code of Conduct. In exceptional
cases, it may be possible to suspend an employee without. taking prior
permission of the Director but no such suspension shall remain in force for
more than 15 days from the date of suspension unless it has been
communicated and approved by the Director before the expiry of that
period. In this case, till this date, the Director of Education has not
approved the suspension of petitioner No. 1. The suspension is clearly in
violation of Section 8(4) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973.
Consequently she would deem to be in regular service of respondent
No. 1.”
19. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court also, in the case of Ganesh Ram
Bhatt v. Director of Education & Anr., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3572,
following the judgement of the Full Bench in Delhi Public School (supra)
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and echoing the observation that suspension order automatically lapses and
ceases to operate on the expiry of the 15th day from its coming into effect, in
the absence of approval from the Director, held as follows :
“8. It is apparent from a perusal of the aforesaid provision that if the
Managing Committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend
any of its employees, then the said intention has to be communicated to the
Director of Education and no suspension shall be made except with his
prior approval. However, the first proviso of sub-section(4) of Section 8
empowers the Managing Committee to suspend an employee with
immediate effect, without obtaining the prior approval of the Director of
Education if it is satisfied that such an immediate suspension is
necessitated by reason of the gross misconduct of the employee, as
provided for under the code of conduct prescribed under Section 9 of that
Act. The second proviso attached to sub-section (4) of Section 8 prescribes
that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force beyond a period
of fifteen days from the date of the actual suspension unless and until the
same has been communicated to the Director of Education and he grants
and his approval before the expiry of the said period.
xxx xxx xxx
11. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench in the case of
Delhi Public School (supra), there cannot be any doubt that upon expiry
of fifteen days from the date of the order of suspension coming into effect,
the said order automatically lapses and thereafter, an employee is entitled
to all the consequential benefits. The contention of the learned counsel for
the School that the letter dated 13.1.2012 issued by the respondent No.
1/DOE during the pendency of the present petition, according approval to
the suspension of the petitioner with retrospective effect shall meet the
requirements of sub-section(4) of Section 8 of the Act, is found to be
devoid of merits. Quite clearly, the Act and Rules do not provide for an
eventuality where if the respondent No. 1/DOE fails to accord his
approval to the suspension, then the same would be deemed to be
accorded, there being no deeming provision to the said effect in the Act. In
other words, if a positive approval of the suspension of an employee made
by the Managing Committee of the School is not granted by the respondent
No. 1/DOE within the period prescribed under the Statute, then the said
suspension would automatically cease to operate at the end of the fifteenth
day, reckoned from the date of his suspension. Only in the event of
approval being granted by the Director of Education and that too within
the prescribed period of fifteen days, would such a suspension be valid for
the extended period. Any other interpretation would render the second
proviso of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act, nugatory.
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12. As a result, the act of the School in issuing the memorandum dated
26.7.2011 informing the petitioner that the Managing Committee had
decided to continue his suspension till further orders, was illegal, the
same having been issued without obtaining the approval of the respondent
No. 1/DOE. As was observed by the Full Bench in the case of Delhi Public
School (supra), in the event the respondent No. 1/DOE did not take a
decision on the earlier decision of suspension taken by the School and
referred to him within the period of fifteen days from the date of
communication of the said order, an option was still available with the
Managing Committee of the School to issue a fresh order suspending the
petitioner. However, in the present case, the Managing Committee of the
School did not take any steps to pass a fresh order of suspension against
the petitioner. Instead, after a lapse of almost three months from the date
of issuance of the first suspension order, the school decided to continue
the said suspension order which was impermissible and is contrary to the
very purport and intent of the Act.
13. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this court is of
the opinion that failure on the part of the respondent No. 1/DOE to take a
decision on the recommendation made by the Managing Committee of the
School with regard to the petitioner’s suspension within a period of fifteen
days, would result in the period of suspension having elapsed at the end of
the fifteenth day. Failure on the part of the respondent No. 1/DOE to
communicate a decision within the stipulated period, cannot be
interpreted to mean that the petitioner would automatically remain under
suspension till further orders. Neither can the subsequent approval
granted by the respondent No. 1/DOE on 13.1.2012 be treated as having a
retrospective effect. There being no deeming provision in the statute, the
impugned suspension order dated 28.4.2011 passed in respect of the
petitioner died a natural death at the end of the fifteenth day, reckoned
from 30.4.2011.”
20. Against the said judgment, an appeal was filed by the School, titled
Sharda Devi Sanskrit Vidyapeeth v. Director of Education & Anr., 2016
SCC OnLine Del 3950, wherein the Division Bench, while examining the
judgement of the learned Single Judge, observed that the object behind
Section 8(4) is to protect the employees from suspension without approval
of the DOE. In an emergent situation, an employee can be suspended, but if
the approval is not granted by the Director within 15 days of suspension, the
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suspension shall lapse at the end of the fifteenth day. Significantly, in the
said case the Director had granted approval to the order of suspension, but
belatedly, after nearly seven months. Court observed that the approval will
not have a retrospective effect, but would be effective from the date it was
granted. In the circumstances, the Court upheld the order passed by the
learned Single Judge, declaring the suspension to have lapsed after expiry of
15 days, while upholding the suspension order from the date of approval.
Respondent was held entitled to full salary and allowances for the relevant
period. Relevant paragraphs of the judgement are as under:-
“15. In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra. (2001)
4 SCC 534, it was observed that the cardinal principle of interpretation of
statutes is that words of a statute must be understood in the natural,
ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical
meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there
is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the
contrary. Efforts must be made to give meaning to each and every word
used by the legislature and the words and language used in the statute
should not be brushed aside if they have proper application in
circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. The
object behind sub-section 4 to Section 8 is to protect the employees, who
should not be suspended without approval from the Director of Education.
In emergent situations an employee can be suspended but the suspension
is unenforceable where approval is not granted by the Director within 15
days. In the present case, the Director of Education had granted
consent/approval to the order of suspension belatedly on 13th January,
2012, but not within 15 days. The provision does not bar or prohibit the
Director of Education from passing an order granting approval. The
provision does not state that the request for approval would be deemed as
rejected, if not accepted or decided within 15 days. The approval may not
have retrospective effect, but would be effective from the date it is granted.
Thus with effect from 13th January, 2012, Ganesh Ram Bhatt’s suspension
had approval of the Director. In such circumstances, the condition of
approval of the Director postulated under sub-section (4) to Section 8
would be satisfied.
16. It could be urged that sub-section 4 to section 8 refers to prior
approval before an order of suspension is passed, and in the present case
Ganesh Ram Bhatt had throughout remained under suspension post
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30th April, 2011 and a formal order of suspension after the approval of the
Director dated 13th January, 2012, was never passed. We would not like to
read Section 8(4) of the Act in a narrow and technical manner and would
rather refer and rely on the intent behind the provision. Issuing a new or
confirmatory letter of suspension on or after 13th January, 2012 would
have been a ministerial act and a redundant formality. It is not that
Ganesh Ram Bhatt was not suspended and had not remained under
suspension post 13th January, 2012. He had not worked. We are examining
whether the continued suspension of Ganesh Ram Bhatt would be legal
and valid. The appellant-school had always treated and considered
Ganesh Ram Bhatt as suspended. Once the approval was granted it can be
held that there was compliance with Section 8(4) of the Act and henceforth
the suspension was as per the law and valid. The suspension thereafter
would be as per the mandate and requirement of the section 8(4) for the
approval of the Director exists and is on record. When approval/sanction
is granted after more than 15 days, the approval/sanction is not non est
and a nullity. The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the Delhi Public
School (supra) had observed that the Managing Committee in the event of
non grant of approval by the Director may find it expedient not to take
work, but would have to pay the entire salary. Thus Ganesh Ram Bhatt
though under suspension, would be entitled to full salary and allowances
for the period when the suspension was unapproved. Post the approval,
Ganesh Ram Bhatt would be paid the suspension or subsistence
allowance.
17. Therefore, on or after 13th January, 2012 Ganesh Ram Bhatt would
be entitled to subsistence allowance and not full salary and allowances. To
this extent, we find that the impugned order dated 11th July, 2014 is not in
accordance with the mandate of Section 8(4) of the Act. The direction to
the appellant-school to pay salary and allowances on or after
13th January, 2012, therefore, is contrary to law and cannot be sustained.
18. However, we do not find any infirmity in the direction for payment
of salary and allowances for the period from 15th May, 2011 to
12th January, 2012. Learned counsel for the appellant-school has
submitted that the school was not at fault, for there was delay and lapse on
the part of the Director of Education in disposing of the request made by
the school vide their letter dated 28th April, 2011. Thus, the appellant
school should not be burdened and compelled to pay salary and
allowances. This aspect and question was examined by the Full Bench of
Delhi High Court in the case of Delhi Public School (supra) and it was
held as under:-
“30. In fairness to Mr. V.P. Singh, we may state that the main ground
on which he wanted reading down of the provisions of Section 8 of the
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alleged misconduct committed by an employee of the school is serious
warranting immediate suspension and further even when the
circumstances of the case justify the approval by the Director of
Education, the Director of Education and/or his subordinate
functionaries may defeat the objective by intentionally delaying the
matter and thereby ensuring that no decision is taken within 15 days
from the date of communication of the order of suspension. We have
already stated that the petitioner has not challenged the virus of
Section 8 of the Act. That apart, in such a situation the Managing
Committee of the School would not be remediless. Illegal and/or
arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction by the Director of Education in a
given case can always be subject matter of judicial review and in such
a case it would always be open to the Managing Committee of the
school to challenge the inaction and/or wrong decision of the Director
of Education. We may observe here that it is the statutory duty cast
upon the Director to take appropriate decision within 15 days as to
whether approval is to be given or not. He cannot, by delaying the
matter beyond 15 days, make it a fait accompli. No doubt, if no
decision is taken within 15 days from the date of communication of the
order of suspension, the necessary consequence thereof is that the
suspension order lapses. However, that does not mean that if no
decision is taken at all or the matter is unnecessarily delayed, it would
not be permissible for the Managing Committee of the school to insist
the Director of Education to take a decision even after 15 days of the
communication of the order of suspension. If such a decision is taken,
though belatedly, the fresh order of suspension can always be passed.
Further, if the Director of Education takes a decision and refuses to
accord his approval to the order of suspension and if the Managing
Committee in such a case feels aggrieved by the decision, it is always
open for the Managing Committee to challenge the decision of the
Director of Education by appropriate proceedings on well-established
grounds of judicial review that would be available to the Managing
Committee in a given case.
31. What we are called upon to decide in this case is the effect on the
suspension order passed by the Managing Committee under first
proviso to Subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act and the effect of non-
grant of approval in such a case within a period of 15 days from the
date of suspension as contemplated in the second proviso thereof. To
that, our answer is that such an order of suspension lapses after a
period of 15 days as is clearly contemplated by the second proviso.
32. It is for the Director of School Education, therefore, to consider as
to whether such immediacy was required in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
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19. The reasoning given in the aforesaid judgment would squarely
apply and negate the contention of the appellant-school. The appellant-
school did not take the required steps highlighted in the aforesaid
quotation after communicating their request for approval to the Director
of Education. The effect of sub-section (4) to Section 8 is clear and
categorical. After the prescribed period of 15 days, the suspension order
could not have been enforced and was illegal, till the approval was
granted.”
21. Another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ruchi Malhotra (supra),
relying on the judgement in Delhi Public School (supra), quashed the
suspension order on the ground that the same was issued without approval of
the DOE, within the prescribed period of 15 days, as mandated by Section
8(4) of DSEAR. Relevant paragraphs are as under:-
“Ld. counsel for the respondents on being specifically asked as to
whether the Director of Education has given any approval of suspension
of the petitioner, the response is in the negative. The suspension of the
petitioner is thus clearly violative of the statutory provisions of the Act,
1973. Consequently, in the given facts and circumstances and taking note
of the specific violation of the provisions of the special enactment i.e. the
Act, 1973, the respondent school cannot escape the liability to pay the full
back wages till the time of imposition of the penalty, which is under
challenge before the Delhi School Tribunal.
For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is disposed of with a
writ of mandamus issued to the respondent school – Guru Nanak Public
School to pay the arrears of salary and other perks if any, giving
adjustments for the subsistence allowance from the date of suspension till
the imposition of penalty vide reference no. GNPS/PPURA/1887 dated
16.08.2019, within eight weeks from today, failing which, the arrears
shall carry interest @ 8% per annum. The petition stands disposed off
accordingly.”
22. Coming to the present writ petitions, it is an undisputed fact that both
the Petitioners were suspended without prior approval of DoE. Assuming in
favour of the School, albeit that is not the case set up, that there was an
immediate necessity of suspending the Petitioners, the School was not
helpless and as observed by the Full Bench of this Court in Delhi Public
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School (supra), it was open to the Managing Committee to suspend the
Petitioners without prior approval and then seek approval from the Director
within the period specified in the first Proviso to Section 8(4) of DSEAR. In
the eventuality that the Director did not grant approval within the period
prescribed under the Statute, then the suspension would have automatically
lapsed at the end of 15th day reckoned from the date of suspension, but if the
approval was granted within 15 days, the suspension would have been valid.
Even where the Director did not take a decision, if approval was sought
within the prescribed period, an option was available to the Managing
Committee of the School to either insist that the decision be taken, though
belatedly and thereafter pass a fresh order of suspension or if the Director
took a decision and refused to accord approval, to challenge the said
decision on well-established grounds of judicial review, but it was certainly
not open to the School to charter a course different from any of the legally
permissible ones. Admittedly, suspension orders were passed without prior
approval of the Director and even post passing of the orders there is no
approval with the prescribed period of 15 days and hence it has to be held
that the suspension orders lapsed on the expiry of the 15 th day from the dates
of issuance of the said orders. Read simply, the object of Section 8(4) of
DSEAR is to protect and safeguard the employees and at the same time
counter balance the right of the School to suspend a delinquent employee
and it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that words of the
Statute must be understood in their natural and ordinary sense unless the
construction leads to an absurdity or runs contrary to the object of the
Statute.
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23. As noted above, learned Senior Counsel for the School candidly did
not dispute that provisions of Section 8(4) of DSEAR read along with the
judicial precedents on the subject, mandate an approval by DoE but
contested the applicability of the said provisions to the School on the ground
that it is an unaided private institution and to so contend, vehemently relied
on and took support from the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in TMA PAI Foundation (supra), with special emphasises
on paragraphs 61 and 64 thereof, where the Supreme Court held that in case
of unaided private schools, maximum autonomy has to be left with the
Management of the School and that there is no reason why Management of a
private unaided institution should seek the consent or approval of any
Governmental Authority before taking action in a disciplinary inquiry.
Learned Senior Counsel emphatically submitted that the Supreme Court in
Raj Kumar (supra), erroneously interpreted the judgment in TMA PAI
Foundation (supra) and this Court is bound by the latter decision, which
was delivered by eleven Judges of the Supreme Court.
24. Broadly understood, learned Senior Counsel for the School calls upon
this Court to hold that the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar (supra), erred in
appreciating the true import of TMA PAI Foundation (supra) and the
judgement is thus per incuriam. There cannot be an iota of doubt that this
Court cannot be called upon to hold that the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar
(supra), erroneously interpreted the observations in TMA PAI Foundation
(supra) and is bound by the interpretation of the Supreme Court in Raj
Kumar (supra), wherein while examining Section 8(2) which mandates
approval of DoE prior to imposing penalty of dismissal/removal/reduction in
rank, the Supreme Court dealt with the observations of the Constitution
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Bench in TMA PAI Foundation (supra) and held as under:-
“44. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent School
submits that not obtaining prior approval for the termination of the
services of the appellant is thus, justified.
45. We are unable to agree with the contention advanced by the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent School. Section 8(2)
of the DSE Act is a procedural safeguard in favour of an employee to
ensure that an order of termination or dismissal is not passed without the
prior approval of the Director of Education. This is to avoid arbitrary or
unreasonable termination or dismissal of an employee of a recognised
private school.
46. The State Legislature is empowered to enact such statutory
provisions in relation to educational institutions, from Schedule VII List II
Entry 11 of the Constitution of India, which reads as:
“11. Education including universities….”
(emphasis supplied)
47. A number of legislations across the country have been enacted
which deal with the regulation of educational institutions, which contain
provisions similar to the one provided for under Section 8(2) of the DSE
Act. One such provision came for consideration before a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Katra Education Society v. State of U.P. [Katra
Education Society v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307] The impugned
provisions therein were certain sections of the amended Intermediate
Education Act (U.P. Act 2 of 1921). Section 16-G of the Intermediate
Education (Amendment) Act, 1958 provided that the Committee of
Management could not remove or dismiss from service any Principal,
Headmaster or teacher of a college or school without prior approval in
writing of the Inspector. The Amendment Act also contained other
provisions providing for governmental control over certain other aspects
of the educational institutions. Adjudicating upon the competence of the
State Legislature to enact the amending Act, this Court held as under: (AIR
pp. 1310-11, paras 8 & 10)
“8. Power of the State Legislature to legislate under the head
‘education including universities’ in Schedule VII List II Entry
11 would prima facie include the power to impose restrictions on the
management of educational institutions in matters relating to
education. The pith and substance of the impugned legislation being
in regard to the field of education within the competence of the State
Legislature, authority to legislate in respect of the maintenance of
control over educational institutions imparting higher secondary
education and for that purpose to make provisions for proper
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administration of the educational institutions was not denied. But it
was said that the impugned Act is inoperative to the extent to which it
seeks to impose controls upon the management of an educational
institution registered under the Societies Registration Act and
managed through trustees, and thereby directly trenches upon
legislative power conferred by List I Entry 44 and List III Entries 10
and 28. This argument has no substance. This Court has in Ayurvedic
and Unani Tibia College v. State of Delhi [Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia
College v. State of Delhi, AIR 1962 SC 458] held that legislation
which deprives the Board of Management of a Society registered
under the Societies Registration Act of the power of management and
creates a new Board does not fall within List I Entry 44, but falls
under List II Entry 32, for by registration under the Societies
Registration Act the Society does not acquire a corporate status. It
cannot also be said that the pith and substance of the Act relates to
charities or charitable institutions, or to trusts or trustees. If the true
nature and character of the Act falls within the express legislative
power conferred by List II Entry 11, merely because it incidentally
trenches upon or affects a charitable institution, or the powers of
trustees of the institution, it will not on that account be beyond the
legislative authority of the State. The impact of the Act upon the rights
of the trustees or the management of a charitable institution is purely
incidental, the true object of the legislation being to provide for
control over educational institutions. The amending Act was therefore
within the competence of the State Legislature and the fact that it
incidentally affected the powers of the trustees or the management in
respect of educational institutions which may be regarded as
charitable, could not distract from the validity of the exercise of that
power.
* * *
10. … If the management fails to comply with the directions made by
the Director, that Officer may after considering the explanation or
representation, if any, given or made by the management, refer the
case to the Board for withdrawal of recognition or recommend to the
State Government to proceed against the institution under sub-section
(4) and the powers which the State Government may exercise after
being satisfied that the affairs of the institution are being mismanaged
or that the management has wilfully or persistently failed in the
performance of its duties, include the power to appoint an Authorised
Controller to manage the affairs of the institution for such period as
may be specified by the Government. The provision is disciplinary and
enacted for securing the best interests of the students. The State in a
democratic set up is vitally interested in securing a healthy system of
imparting education for its coming generation of citizens, and if the
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management is recalcitrant and declines to afford facilities for
enforcement of the provisions enacted in the interests of the students,
a provision authorising the State Government to enter upon the
management through its Authorised Controller cannot be regarded as
unreasonable.” (emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above judgment [Katra Education
Society v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307] of the Constitution Bench,
it becomes clear that the State Legislature is empowered in law to
enact provisions similar to Section 8(2) of the DSE Act.
48. At this stage, it would also be useful to refer to the Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the DSE Act, 1973. It reads as under:
“In recent years the unsatisfactory working and management of
privately managed educational institutions in the Union Territory of
Delhi has been subjected to a good deal of adverse criticism. In the
absence of any legal power, it has not been possible for the
Government to improve their working. An urgent need is, therefore,
felt for taking effective legislative measures providing for better
organisation and development of educational institutions in the Union
Territory of Delhi, for ensuring security of service of teachers,
regulating the terms and conditions of their employment. … The Bill
seeks to achieve these objectives.”
A perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the DSE Act would
clearly show that the intent of the legislature while enacting the same was
to provide security of tenure to the employees of the school and to regulate
the terms and conditions of their employment.
49. In Principal v. Presiding Officer [Principal v. Presiding Officer,
(1978) 1 SCC 498:1978 SCC (L&S) 70] , a Division Bench of this Court
held as under: (SCC p. 503, para 7)
“7. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act ordains that subject to any
rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised
private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor
shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior
approval of the Director of Education. From this, it clearly follows
that the prior approval of the Director of Education is required only if
the service of an employee of a recognised private school is to be
terminated.”
50. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, thus, erred in striking
down Section 8(2) of the DSE Act in Kathuria Public School [Kathuria
Public School v. Director of Education, 2005 SCC OnLine Del 778 : ILR
(2005) 2 Del 312 : (2005) 123 DLT 89 : (2005) 83 DRJ 541] by placing
reliance on the decision of this Court in T.M.A. Pai [T.M.A. Pai
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Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1] , as the
subject-matter in controversy therein was not the security of tenure of the
employees of a school, rather, the question was the right of educational
institutions to function unfettered. While the functioning of both aided and
unaided educational institutions must be free from unnecessary
governmental interference, the same needs to be reconciled with the
conditions of employment of the employees of these institutions and
provision of adequate precautions to safeguard their interests. Section 8(2)
of the DSE Act is one such precautionary safeguard which needs to be
followed to ensure that employees of educational institutions do not suffer
unfair treatment at the hands of the management.
51. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, while striking down
Section 8(2) of the DSE Act in Kathuria Public School [Kathuria Public
School v. Director of Education, 2005 SCC OnLine Del 778 : ILR (2005) 2
Del 312 : (2005) 123 DLT 89 : (2005) 83 DRJ 541] has not correctly
applied the law laid down in Katra Education Society [Katra Education
Society v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307] , wherein a Constitution Bench
of this Court, with reference to provision similar to Section 8(2) of the DSE
Act and keeping in view the object of regulation of an aided or unaided
recognised school, has held that the regulation of the service conditions of
the employees of private recognised schools is required to be controlled by
educational authorities and the State Legislature is empowered to legislate
such provision in the DSE Act. The Division Bench wrongly relied upon at
part of the judgment in Katra Education Society [Katra Education
Society v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307] which dealt with Article 14 of
the Constitution and aided and unaided educational institutions, which had
no bearing on the fact situation therein. Further, the reliance placed upon
the decision of this Court in Frank Anthony Public School Employees’
Assn. v. Union of India [Frank Anthony Public School Employees’
Assn. v. Union of India, (1986) 4 SCC 707 : (1987) 2 ATC 35] is also
misplaced as the institution under consideration in that case was a
religious minority institution.
52. The reliance placed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondents on T.M.A. Pai [T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of
Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1] is also misplaced as the same
has no bearing on the facts of the instant case, for the reasons discussed
supra. The reliance placed upon the decision of the Delhi High Court
in Kathuria Public School [Kathuria Public School v. Director of
Education, 2005 SCC OnLine Del 778 : ILR (2005) 2 Del 312 : (2005) 123
DLT 89 : (2005) 83 DRJ 541] is also misplaced as the same has been
passed without appreciating the true purport of the Constitution Bench
decision in Katra Education Society [Katra Education Society v. State of
U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307]. Therefore, the decision in Kathuria Public
School [Kathuria Public School v. Director of Education, 2005 SCC
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OnLine Del 778 : ILR (2005) 2 Del 312 : (2005) 123 DLT 89 : (2005) 83
DRJ 541], striking down Section 8(2) of the DSE Act, is bad in law.”
25. Reading of the judgement makes it luminously clear that the Supreme
Court in Raj Kumar (supra), negatived the contention that unaided private
schools were not bound to take approval of DoE as mandated under Section
8(2) of DSEAR and observed that the said provision was a procedural
safeguard in favour of an employee to ensure that an order of termination or
dismissal or reduction in rank is not passed without prior approval of DoE
and this is to avoid an arbitrary or unreasonable action against an employee
of a recognised private school. The Supreme Court also referred to the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of DSEAR, which was to provide for
better organisation and development of educational institutions in Delhi for
ensuring security of service of teachers. Be it noted that the Supreme Court
considered the observations in TMA PAI Foundation (supra), before
arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and it is not open to this Court to give a
different interpretation and take a contrary view.
26. It may be emphasised here that in Raj Kumar (supra), the Supreme
Court also held that the decision of the High Court in Kathuria Public
School (supra) striking down Section 8(2) was bad in law. It was observed
that the Delhi High Court erred in striking down Section 8(2) by placing
reliance on the decision in TMA PAI Foundation (supra), as the subject
matter in controversy therein was not the security of tenure of the employees
of a school but the question was right of educational institutions to function
unfettered. It was observed that while the functioning of both aided and
unaided educational institutions must be free from unnecessary
Governmental interference, the same needs to be reconciled with the
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conditions of employment of the employees of these institutions and
provision of adequate precautions to safeguard their interests. The Supreme
Court held that Section 8(2) is one such precautionary safeguard which
needs to be followed to ensure that employees of educational institutions do
not suffer unfair treatment at the hands of the Management. It may be
flagged that the Supreme Court also observed that the High Court had not
correctly appreciated the law laid down in Katra Education Society
(supra), wherein the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court with
reference to a provision similar to Section 8(2) and keeping in view the
objection of regulation of an aided or unaided recognised school, held that
regulation of service conditions of employees of private recognised school is
required to be controlled by educational authorities and the State Legislature
is empowered to legislate such provisions in the DSEAR. Relevant
paragraphs from Raj Kumar (supra), in this context have been extracted in
the earlier part of this judgement.
27. In fact, at this stage, I may allude to a judgment of the Supreme Court
in Gajanand Sharma (supra), where the Supreme Court was examining a
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court allowing an appeal
preferred by the school Management against the order of the learned Single
Judge confirming an order of the School Tribunal setting aside the
termination order on the ground that prior approval of DoE was not taken.
Notably, the judgment in Raj Kumar (supra) was brought to the notice of
the Division Bench of the High Court but the same was not followed
observing that in Raj Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court had not considered
the decision in TMA PAI Foundation (supra). Setting aside the judgment of
the Division Bench, the Supreme Court in Gajanand Sharma (supra), made
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the following observations:-
“15. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court,
it appears that before the High Court the decision of this Court in the case
of Raj Kumar (supra) taking a contrary view and taking the view that
before terminating the services of an employee of a recognized institution
prior approval of the Director of Education is required was pressed into
service. However, though impermissible the Division Bench of the High
Court has not followed the said binding decision by observing that in the
case of Raj Kumar (supra), this Court had not considered the decision of
this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). Apart from the
fact that the same is wholly impermissible for the High Court even the said
observations are factually incorrect. If the decision in the case of Raj
Kumar (supra) is seen in more than 8-9 paragraphs, this Court had
referred to and as such dealt with the decision of this Court in the case
of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). Even the decision in the case of T.M.A.
Pai Foundation (supra) was explained and considered by this Court in the
case of Raj Kumar (supra). Therefore, the Division Bench of the High
Court is factually incorrect in observing that while deciding the decision
in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court had not considered the
decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). Before
commenting upon the decision of this Court in the case of Raj
Kumar (supra) the Division Bench of the High Court ought to have
thoroughly read and/or considered the decision in the case of Raj
Kumar (supra). Even after making the incorrect observations that in the
case of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court had not considered the decision of
this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) the Division
Bench of the High Court has considered few decisions of judicial
discipline which were not applicable at all. Judicial discipline also
requires that the judgment/decision of this Court should be considered and
read thoroughly. As observed hereinabove, the decision of this Court in
the case of Raj Kumar (supra) was binding upon the High Court.
Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court has seriously erred in not
following the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra).
16. Now so far as the decision of this Court in the case of Raj
Kumar (supra) is concerned, this Court was considering pari
materia provisions under the DSE Act. This Court was considering
Section 8 of the DSE Act, which reads as under:–
“8.(2) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no
employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed
or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated
except with the prior approval of the Director.”
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17. Similar is the provision so far as Section 18 of the Act, 1989 is
concerned which reads as under:–
“18. Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees.- Subject
to any rules that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a
recognised institution shall be removed, dismissed or reduced in rank
unless he has been given by the management a reasonable opportunity
of being heard against the action proposed to be taken;
Provided that no final order in this regard shall be passed unless
prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer authorised
by him in this behalf has been obtained.”
18. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra) while dealing with the pari
materia provision under the DSE Act and after considering the decision of
this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), it is specifically
observed and held by this Court that in case of a recognized institution,
before terminating the services of an employee, prior approval of the
Director of Education is required. Therefore, a contrary view taken by the
Larger Bench of the High Court relied upon by the Division Bench of the
High Court is not a good law. It is required to be noted that the decision of
this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) has been considered by this
Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) and also by the
Delhi High Court in the case of Mangal Sain Jain (supra). In the case
of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) this Court considered the decision in
the case of Raj Kumar (supra) and object and purpose of Section 8 of DSE
Act in paragraphs 13 and 14 as under:–
“13. In Raj Kumar v. Director of Education [Raj Kumar v. Director of
Education, (2016) 6 SCC 541 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 111] this Court
held that Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 is a
procedural safeguard in favour of employee to ensure that order of
termination or dismissal is not passed without prior approval of
Director of Education to avoid arbitrary or unreasonable
termination/dismissal of employee of even recognised private school.
Moreover, this Court also considered the Objects and Reasons of
the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and came to the conclusion that
the termination of service of the driver of a private school without
obtaining prior approval of Director of Education was bad in law.
This Court observed : (SCC p. 560, para 45)
“45. We are unable to agree with the contention advanced by the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent school.
Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is a procedural safeguard in favour of
an employee to ensure that order of termination or dismissal is not
passed without the prior approval of the Director of Education.
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This is to avoid arbitrary or unreasonable termination or dismissal
of an employee of a recognised private school.”
14. This Court has laid down in Raj Kumar v. Director of
Education [Raj Kumar v. Director of Education, (2016) 6 SCC
541 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 111] that the intent of the legislature while
enacting the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (in short “the DSE
Act”) was to provide security of tenure to the employees of the school
and to regulate the terms and conditions of their employment. While
the functioning of both aided and unaided educational institutions
must be free from unnecessary governmental interference, the same
needs to the reconciled with the conditions of employment of the
employees of these institutions and provision of adequate precautions
to safeguard their interests. Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is one such
precautionary safeguard which needs to be followed to ensure that
employees of educational institutions do not suffer unfair treatment at
the hands of the management.”
19. Even on fair reading of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, we are of the
opinion that in case of termination of an employee of a recognized
institution prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer
authorised by him in this behalf has to be obtained. In Section 18, there is
no distinction between the termination, removal, or reduction in rank after
the disciplinary proceedings/enquiry or even without disciplinary
proceedings/enquiry. As per the settled position of law the provisions of
the statute are to be read as they are. Nothing to be added and or taken
away. The words used are “no employee of a recognized institution shall
be removed without holding any enquiry and it further provides that no
final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of the
Director of Education has been obtained.” The first part of Section 18 is to
be read along with first proviso. Under the circumstances, taking a
contrary view that in case of dismissal/removal of an employee of a
recognized institution which is after holding the departmental enquiry the
prior approval of the Director of Education is not required is
unsustainable and to that extent the judgment of the Larger Bench of the
Rajasthan High Court in the case of Central Academy Society (supra) is
not a good law.
20. Therefore, on true interpretation of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, it
is specifically observed and held that even in case of termination/removal
of an employee of a recognized institution after holding departmental
enquiry/proceedings prior approval of the Director of Education has to be
obtained as per first proviso to Section 18 of the Act, 1989.
21. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High
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Court restoring the order of termination which as such was without
obtaining the prior approval of the Director of Education deserves to be
quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. The order
of learned Tribunal setting aside the order of termination confirmed by the
learned Single Judge is hereby restored. Consequently, the appellant shall
have to be reinstated in service and considering the fact that the
respondent(s) is/are un-aided institution and the order of termination was
passed as far as back in the year 1998, we direct that the appellant shall
be entitled to 50% of the back wages, however, he shall be entitled to all
other benefits notionally including the seniority etc., if any.”
28. It is important to allude to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Frank Anthony (supra), albeit the case pertains to an unaided private
recognised non-minority school, wherein Section 8(4) of DSEAR, a
protective gear for the employees of the School, was held to be applicable
even to minority institutions and Section 12 of DSEAR, which made the
provisions of Chapter IV inapplicable to unaided minority institutions was
held to be discriminatory and void, save and except, to the extent it made
Section 8(2) of DSEAR inapplicable. The Supreme Court observed as
follows:-
“19. Section 8(4) would be inapplicable to minority institutions if it had
conferred blanket power on the Director to grant or withhold prior
approval in every case where a management proposed to suspend an
employee but we see that it is not so. The management has the right to
order immediate suspension of an employee in case of gross misconduct
but in order to prevent an abuse of power by the management a safeguard
is provided to the employee that approval should be obtained within 15
days. The Director is also bound to accord his approval if there are
adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension. The provision
appears to be eminently reasonable and sound and the answer to the
question in regard to this provision is directly covered by the decision
in All Saints High School [(1980) 2 SCC 478 : AIR 1980 SC 1042] where
Chandrachud, C.J. and Kailasam, J. upheld Section 3(3)(a) of the Act
impugned therein. We may also mention that in that case the right of
appeal conferred by Section 4 of the Act was also upheld. How necessary
it is to afford some measure of protection to employees, without interfering
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the action taken by the management in this very case against some of the
teachers. These teachers took part along with others in a “silent march”,
first on April 9, 1986 and again on April 10, 1986, despite warning by the
principal. The march was during the break when there were no
classes. There were no speeches, no chanting or shouting of slogans, no
violence and no disruption of studies. The behaviour of the teachers
appears to have been orderly and exemplary. One would have thought that
the teachers were, by their silent and dignified protest, setting an
example and the soundest of precedents to follow to all agitators
everywhere. But instead of sympathy and appreciation they were served
with orders of immediate suspension, something which would have never
happened if all the provisions of Section 8 were applicable to the
institution.
20. Thus, Sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(4) and 8(5) do not encroach upon any
right of minorities to administer their educational institutions. Section
8(2), however, must, in view of the authorities, be held to interfere with
such right and, therefore, inapplicable to minority institutions. Section 9 is
again innocuous since Section 14 which applies to unaided minority
schools is virtually on the same lines as Section 9. We have already
considered Section 11 while dealing with Section 8(3). We must, therefore,
hold that Section 12 which makes the provisions of Chapter IV
inapplicable to unaided minority schools is discriminatory not only
because it makes Section 10 inapplicable to minority institutions, but also
because it makes Sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(4), 8(5), 9 and 11 inapplicable to
unaided minority institutions. That the Parliament did not understand
Sections 8 to 11 as offending the fundamental right guaranteed to the
minorities under Article 30(1) is evident from the fact that Chapter IV
applies to aided minority institutions and it cannot for a moment be
suggested that surrender of the right under Article 30(1) is the price which
the aided minority institutions have to pay to obtain aid from the
Government.
21. The result of our discussion is that Section 12 of the Delhi School
Education Act which makes the provisions of Chapter IV inapplicable to
unaided minority institutions is discriminatory and void except to the
extent that it makes Section 8(2) inapplicable to unaided minority
institutions. We, therefore, grant a declaration to that effect and direct the
Union of India and the Delhi Administration and its officers, to enforce the
provisions of Chapter IV [except Section 8(2)] in the manner provided in
the chapter in the case of the Frank Anthony Public School. The
management of the school is directed not to give effect to the orders of
suspension passed against the members of the staff.”
29. It would also be useful to allude in this context to a judgment of the
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Division Bench of this Court in Guru Nanak Public School (supra), where
the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Ruchi Malhotra (supra) was
upheld. The issue in the said case was with regard to applicability of Section
8(4) of DSEAR in case of unaided private minority school and the
primordial contention of the school was that in view of the decision in TMA
PAI Foundation (supra), provisions of Section 8(4) of DSEAR will be
inapplicable. Negating this contention, the Division Bench dismissed the
appeal and the Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.
10055/2024 on 10.05.2024 and relevant passages are as follows:-
“6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submits
that while passing the impugned order, the learned Single Judge failed to
appreciate that the appellant, being an unaided minority private school,
has full autonomy in the matter of disciplinary proceedings against its
employees. He contends that Section 8(4) of the DSE Act is not applicable
to a minority institution like the appellant, for which purpose he seeks to
place reliance on the answer to question no. 5(c) as formulated by the
Constitution Bench in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka,
(2002) 8 SCC 481. He submits that the Constitution Bench has held that in
case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory
measure of control should be minimal with the only condition being that
the minority institution should evolve a rational procedure for selection of
teaching staff and for taking disciplinary actions against them. He,
therefore, prays that the impugned order, which is premised solely on the
provisions of section 8(4) DSE Act be set aside.
7. In response, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 supports the
impugned order and submits that the appellant’s plea that Section 8(4) of
the Act is not applicable to an unaided minority institution is wholly
misconceived. He submits that not only was this issue dealt with by the
Apex Court in Frank Anthony Public School Employees Assn. v. Union of
India, (1986) 4 SCC 707 but also thereafter in G. Vallikumari v. Andhra
Education Society, (2010) 2 SCC 497. By drawing our attention to
paragraphs nos. 12 & 17 of the decision in G. Vallikumari (supra), he
contends that the Apex Court has categorically held that provisions of
Section 8(4) of the Act are applicable to unaided minority educational
institutions as well. He, therefore, prays that the appeal be dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx
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9. In the light of this statutory provision, learned counsel for the
appellant does not deny that as per section 8(4), it is mandatory for a
recognized private school to seek prior approval of the Director of
Education before passing an order of suspension. His only plea, however,
is that in view of decision of the Constitution Bench in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation (supra), the provisions of Section 8(4) of the Act are not
applicable to unaided minority educational institutions. In order to
appreciate this plea of the appellant, we may now refer to the manner in
which question no. 5(c) has been answered by the Apex Court in the
decision of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). Relevant extract of the
decision reads as under-
Q. 5. (c) Whether the statutory provisions which regulate the facets of
administration like control over educational agencies, control over
governing bodies, conditions of affiliation including
recognition/withdrawal thereof, and appointment of staff, employees,
teachers and principals including their service conditions and
regulation of fees, etc. would interfere with the right of administration
of minorities?
A. So far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of
administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority
educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be
minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the conditions
of affiliation to a university or board have to be complied with, but
in the matter of day-to-day management, like the appointment of
staff, teaching and non-teaching, and administrative control over
them, the management should have the freedom and there should
not be any external controlling agency. However, a rational
procedure for the selection of teaching staff and for taking
disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself.
For redressing the grievances of employees of aided and unaided
institutions who are subjected to punishment or termination from
service, a mechanism will have to be evolved, and in our opinion,
appropriate tribunals could be constituted, and till then, such
tribunals could be presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of
District Judge. The State or other controlling authorities, however,
can always prescribe the minimum qualification, experience and other
conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being appointed
as a teacher or a principal of any educational institution. Regulations
can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other
staff for whom aid is provided by the State, without interfering with
the overall administrative control of the management over the staff.
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Fees to be charged by unaided institutions cannot be regulated but no
institution should charge capitation fee.
(Emphasis Supplied)
10. From a perusal of the aforesaid, we are of the view that though the
Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) has held that there ought to
be minimal regulatory control over administration of unaided minority
educational institutions, this, however, in itself does not imply that Section
8(4) of the DSE Act would not be applicable to these unaided minority
educational institution. In our view, merely because the Constitution
Bench has observed that minority institutions must evolve a rational
procedure for selection of its teaching staff and for taking disciplinary
action, this does not imply that the statutory mandate under Section 8(4)
would not be applicable to them. We are unable to agree with the learned
counsel for the appellant that the manner in which the question 5(c) has
been answered by the Constitution Bench would imply that Section 8(4)
DSE Act would not be applicable to the appellant.
11. On the other hand, we have also considered the decision in Frank
Anthony Public School Employees Assn. (supra), and in G.
Vallikumari (supra) relied upon by the respondents and find that in these
decisions the Apex Court has specifically held that Section 8(4) of the DSE
Act which provides that no minority educational institutions will suspend
an employee without prior approval of the Director of Education, is valid.
It would therefore be useful to refer to the relevant extracts of the decision
in Frank Anthony Public School Employees Assn. (supra) which reads as
under:
“19. Section 8(4) would be inapplicable to minority institutions if it
had conferred blanket power on the Director to grant or withhold
prior approval in every case where a management proposed to
suspend an employee but we see that it is not so. The management
has the right to order immediate suspension of an employee in case
of gross misconduct but in order to present an abuse of power by the
management a safeguard is provided to the employee that approval
should be obtained within 15 days. The Director is also bound to
accord his approval if there are adequate and reasonable grounds
for such suspension. The provision appears to be eminently
reasonable and sound and the answer to the question in regard to this
provision is directly covered by the decision in All Saints High School,
where Chandrachud, C.J. and Kailasam, J. upheld Section 3(3)(a) of
the Act Impugned therein. We may also mention that in that case the
right of appeal conferred by Section 4 of the Act was also upheld.
How necessary it is to afford some measure of protection to
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disciplinary action, is illustrated by the action taken by the
management in this very case against some of the teachers. These
teachers took part along with others in a ‘silent march’, first on April
9, 1986 and again on April 10, 1936, despite warning by the principal.
The march was during the break when there were no classes. There
were no speeches, no chanting or shouting of slogans, no violence and
no disruption of studies. The behavior of the teachers appears to have
been orderly and exemplary. One would have thought that the
teachers were, by their silent and dignified protest, setting an example
and the soundest of precedents to follow to all agitators everywhere.
But instead of sympathy and appreciation they were served with
orders of immediate suspension, something which would have never
happened if all the provisions of Section 8 were applicable to the
institution.
20. Thus, Sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(4) and 8(5) do not encroach upon
any right of minorities to administer their educational institutions.
Section 8(2), however, must, in view of the authorities, be held to
interfere with such right and, therefore, inapplicable to minority
institutions. Section 9 is again innocuous since Section 14 which
applies to unaided minority schools is virtually on the same lines as
Section 9. We have already considered Section 1 1 while dealing with
Section 8(3). We must, therefore, hold that Section 12 which makes the
provisions of Chapter IV inapplicable to unaided minority schools is
discriminatory not only because it makes Section 10 inapplicable to
minority institutions, but also because it makes Sections 8(1), 8(3),
8(4), 8(5), 9 and 11 inapplicable to unaided minority institutions. That
the Parliament did not understand Sections 8 to 11 as offending the
fundamental right guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30(1) is
evident from the fact that Chapter IV applies to aided minority
institutions and it cannot for a moment be suggested that surrender of
the right under Article 30(1) is the price which the aided minority
institutions have to pay to obtain aid from the government.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
12. We may now also refer to the decision in G. Vallikumari (supra),
where the Apex Court after considering the decision in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation (supra) has while holding Section 8(2) as being violative of
rights of minority institutions, categorically held that the Section 8(4) of
the DSE Act was valid. It would, therefore, be apposite to note the relevant
findings of the Apex Court as contained in para 12 and 17 of the decision
in G. Vallikumari (supra), which read as under:
“12. Shri L.N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
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in view of the judgment in Frank Anthony Public School Employees’
Assn. case, Section 8(2) cannot be treated as applicable to aided
minority institutions and Section 8(3) cannot be read as providing an
effective remedy to the management of the school against an order
passed by the Director. He submitted that if Section 8(2) is not
applicable to unaided minority institutions then its applicability to
aided minority institutions would result in violation of Article 14. Shri.
Rao also relied upon the larger Bench judgment in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation case and submitted that the right of the private aided
minority institutions to regulate the discipline cannot be curtailed by a
provision like the one contained in Section 8(2) of the Acts.
17. The propositions which can be culled out from the above noted
two judgments are:
(i) Sections 8(1), (3), (4) and (5) of the Act do not violate the right
of the minorities to establish and administer their educational
institutions. However, Section 8(2) interferes with the said right
of the minorities and is, therefore, inapplicable to private
recognised aided/unaided minority educational institutions.
(ii) Section 12 of the Act, which makes the provisions of Chapter IV
of the Act inapplicable to unaided private, recognised minority
educational institutions is discriminatory except to the extent of
Section 8(2). In other words, Chapter IV of the Act except Section
8(2) is applicable to private recognised aided as well as unaided
minority educational institutions and the authorities concerned of
the Education Department are bound to enforce the same against
all such institutions.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
13. For the aforesaid reasons, we have no hesitation in rejecting the
appellant’s plea that Section 8(4) of the DSE Act is not applicable to
unaided minority educational institutions. This provision in our view is a
part of the limited supervisory powers, which the Director of Education
exercises over the functioning and administration of minority educational
institutions like the appellant. We, therefore, find no infirmity with the
order passed by the learned Single Judge. The appeal being meritless is,
accordingly, dismissed with all pending applications.”
30. In view of the wealth of judicial precedent referred to above, this
Court cannot accept the contention of the School that provisions of Section
8(4) of DSEAR are inapplicable to the School only because of its status as
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR W.P.(C) 12136/2023 and connected matter Page 39 of 40
Signing Date:18.11.2024
20:12:27
an unaided private school. School cannot be permitted to take a plea that it
was not bound by the procedural requirements of obtaining approval of
DoE. I may note that even the Legislature in its wisdom while enacting sub-
Sections (2) and (4) of Section 8 has envisaged no difference in their
applicability to unaided or aided schools. In light of this, the impugned order
of suspension dated 05.04.2023 in W.P.(C) 12136/2023 and suspension
order dated 17.04.2023 in W.P.(C) 12603/2023 are hereby quashed and set
aside. Petitioners shall be entitled to consequential benefits of full salary and
allowances as per law. The amounts shall be calculated by the School after
adjustment of any subsistence allowance that may have been paid to the
Petitioners during the suspension periods and the balance due and payable to
the Petitioners shall be released within four weeks from today.
31. Both writ petitions are allowed in the aforesaid terms with cost of
Rs.20,000/- each to the Petitioners payable by the School within six weeks
from today.
32. Writ petitions stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
JYOTI SINGH, J
NOVEMBER 12 , 2024/shivam
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR W.P.(C) 12136/2023 and connected matter Page 40 of 40
Signing Date:18.11.2024
20:12:27