Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ranjit Kumar Alias Ghukka vs State Of Punjab And Others on 25 October, 2024
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:140937
CRM-M-43211-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-43211-2024 (O&M)
Reserved on: 19.10.2024
Date of Pronouncement: 25.10.2024
Ranjit Kumar @ Ghukka
... Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others
...Respondent (s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present:- Mr. Puneet Singla,Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Akshay Kumar, A.A.G, Punjab
Mr. Vinay Puri, Advocate
for respondents no.2 and 3.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
FIR Dated Police Station Sections No. 48 02.05.2013 Goraya, District Jalandhar 307, 326, 324, 148 and 149 IPC
The petitioner, arraigned as accused in the above captioned FIR, has come up before this
Court under Section 482 Cr.PC for quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings
based on the compromise with the aggrieved persons.
2. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved
persons have compromised the matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as
Annexure P-6.
3. After that, the petitioner(s) came up before this Court to quash the FIR, impleading
the aggrieved persons as respondent no. 2 and 3.
4. Pursuant to order of this Court dated 26.09.2024, the aggrieved persons -Lakhbir
Singh and Balwinder Pal (Respondents no.2 and 3), appeared before the Additional Sessions
Judge, Jalandhar and stated that there would be no objection if the Court quashes this FIR
and consequent proceedings. The relevant extract of the report of the concerned Court
reads as follows:
Name of the reporting Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar
Court
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before trial Court
1. Names of the complainant/ victims(s)/ Lakhbir Singh and Balwinder Pal
aggrieved persons(s)
2. Dates on which the statement(s) of the 05.10.2024
complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved
persons(s) were recorded
3. Has the identity of the complainant/ Yes
victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) been
verified?
4. Whether all the victims/ all the Yes
aggrieved persons have compromised
the matter?
5. Is there pressure, threat, or coercion No
upon the victim(s)/aggrieved
person(s)/complainant?
6. Names of the accused person(s) Ranjit Kumar @ Ghukka
7. Dates on which the statement(s) of the Exempted
accused persons(s) recorded
8. Whether all the accused have No. Only accused Ranjit Kumar alias
compromised the matter? If no, then Ghukka has compromised the matter.
the names of the accused who have
compromised.
9. Whether proclamation proceedings No
are pending against any accused?
10. Has the police report been filed or Yes
not?
11. Notice of accusation /Charges have Yes
been framed or not?
12. Sections of statutes invoked in the 307, 324, 326, 323, 148, 149 IPC
matter
13. Whether the court is satisfied with the Yes
genuineness of the compromise?
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
5. Despite the severe opposition of the State’s counsel to this compromise, the
following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: –
a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably settled the matter
between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before
the concerned Court;
b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the settlement has not been secured
through coercion, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings;
d) There is no objection from the private respondent in case present FIR and
consequent proceedings are quashed;
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e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity,
moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters
concerning public policy;
f) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial
affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an
unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work
to bring peace to family, community, and society;
i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequential
proceedings is justified to secure the ends of justice.
6. In the present case, the offences under sections 307, 324, 326,148, 149 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860, (IPC) are not compoundable under Section 320 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)/359 BNSS. However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this
case, the prosecution qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the
FIR and consequent proceedings.
7. No doubt offence under Section 307 IPC falls in the category of heinous and serious
offence and therefore, is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against
the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision.
It would be open to the High Court to examine whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. Given the fact that a
compromise has arrived at between the parties, which will affect the prosecution’s case, it
would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea of compounding of offence
based on settlement between the parties. Admittedly, the petitioner and the alleged victim
are in the age group between 30-40 years, and heat of the moment must have crossed their
limits to commit the alleged crime, but since better sense has prevailed and they have
compromised the matter, this Court is of the opinion that they deserve a chance to course
correct. The petitioner has also not been named in the FIR and no specific role has been
assigned to him. Since the parties have buried their hatchets, the continuation of criminal
proceedings will not advance the reformative purposes of jurisprudence just for the sake of
deterrence. Thus, the continuation of criminal proceedings will not advance the reformative
purposes of jurisprudence just for the sake of deterrence. This Court is satisfied that it is fit
case for acceptance of compromise in offence under Section 307 IPC.
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JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON QUASHING UNDER SECTION 307 IPC:
8. In Ram Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 2 SCC 149, Supreme Court holds,
The appellants, who are the accused and the complainant, Shri Ram,
who was the person injured as a result of firing, have appeared
before us and stated that they wish to compound the offence. The
offence for which both the appellants have been convicted is one
under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
but having regard to the nature of the injury sustained by Shri Ram,
we think that the proper offence for which the appellants should
have been convicted was under Section 324 read with Section 34.
Shri Ram received only one injury on the shoulder and that was also
in the nature of simple hurt. We would, therefore, convert the
conviction of the appellants to one under Section 324 read with
Section 34. Since the parties belong to the same village and desire
to compound the offence, we think, in the larger interest of peace
and harmony between the parties and having regard to the nature
of the injury, that it would be proper to allow the parties to
compound the offence.
9. In Mahesh Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1990 SCC 781, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds
as under:
[2]. The accused were acquitted by the trial court, but they were
convicted by the High Court for the offence under section 307
Indian Penal Code This offence is not compoundable under law. The
parties, however. want to treat it a special case, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of the case. It is said and indeed not disputed
that one of the accused is a lawyer practising in the lower court.
There was a counter case arising out of the same transaction. It is
said that this case has already been compromised. The decision of
this Court in Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987(2) JT
361, has been also referred to in support of the plea for permission
to compound the offence.
10. In Dimpey Gujraj v Union Territory, (2013) 11 SCC 497, Supreme Court holds,
[5]. In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh v.
State of Punjab and another, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4)
Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : 2012(5) CTC 526 (SC) we feel
that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings
would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged
offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor
are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature
and burying them would bring about peace and amity between the
two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated
26/10/2006 registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452
and 506 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector 3,
Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom
including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code
and charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed.
11. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014:INSC:217, [Para 24-25, 31], 2014 (6) SCC
466, a two-member bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
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[24]. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has
approved the quashing of proceedings under section 307, IPC
whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of
serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each
of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified
on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as
to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The
law declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes
binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts,
to follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare Decisis
is the fundamental principle of judicial decision making which
requires `certainty’ too in law so that in a given set of facts the
course of action which law shall take is discernable and predictable.
Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its
significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is
to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual
Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch
as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be
given identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore,
support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of
precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn,
by “that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that
all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances”.
[25]. As there is a close relation between the equality and justice, it
should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under
Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given
different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are
proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason we
deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and clear
guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to take a
view as to under what circumstances it should accept the
settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and
under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make
it clear that though there would be a general discussion in this
behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of offences
under Section 307 IPC.
[31]. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down
the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in
giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties
and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while
accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing
to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings :
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to
be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court
to compound the offences under Section 320 of the
Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not
compoundable, where the parties have settled the
matter between themselves. However, this power is to
be exercised sparingly and with caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and
on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure :
(i) ends of justice, or
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(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While
exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by Public Servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore
is to be generally treated as crime against the society
and not against the individual alone. However, the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because there is
a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the
High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section
307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High
Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the
body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in
respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally
be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie
analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether
there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances
of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it
can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would
be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete settlement
between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be
swayed by the fact that the settlement between the
parties is going to result in harmony between them
which may improve their future relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement
play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is
arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of
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offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to
quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation
is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but
the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at
infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in
exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie
assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned
above. On the other hand, where the prosecution
evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of
the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,
normally the High Court should refrain from exercising
its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such
cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the
case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to
whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed
or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is
already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at
the appellate stage before the High Court, mere
compromise between the parties would not be a ground
to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender
who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here
charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is
already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore,
there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of
such a crime.
12. In State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149, Hon’ble Supreme Court
holds,
[14] We notice that the gravity of the injuries was taken note of by
the Sessions Court and it had awarded the sentence of 10 years
rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section
307 IPC, but not by the High Court. The High Court has completely
overlooked the various principles laid down by this Court in Gian
Singh , and has committed a mistake in taking the view that, the
injuries were caused on the body of Abdul Rashid in a fight occurred
at the spur and the heat of the moment. It has been categorically
held by this Court in Gian Singh that the Court, while exercising the
power under Section 482, must have “due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime” and “the societal impact”. Both these aspects
were completely overlooked by the High Court. The High Court in a
cursory manner, without application of mind, blindly accepted the
statement of the parties that they had settled their disputes and
differences and took the view that it was a crime against “an
individual”, rather than against “the society at large”.
[15] We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged to have been
committed by the accused persons was a crime against an
individual, on the other hand it was a crime against the society at
large. Criminal law is designed as a mechanism for achieving social
control and its purpose is the regulation of conduct and activities
within the society. Why Section 307 IPC is held to be non-
compoundable, because the Code has identified which conduct
should be brought within the ambit of non-compoundable offences.
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Such provisions are not meant, just to protect the individual, but the
society as a whole. High Court was not right in thinking that it was
only an injury to the person and since the accused persons had
received the monetary compensation and settled the matter, the
crime as against them was wiped off. Criminal justice system has a
larger objective to achieve, that is safety and protection of the
people at large and it would be a lesson not only to the offender,
but to the individuals at large so that such crimes would not be
committed by any one and money would not be a substitute for the
crime committed against the society. Taking a lenient view on a
serious offence like the present, will leave a wrong impression about
the criminal justice system and will encourage further criminal acts,
which will endanger the peaceful co-existence and welfare of the
society at large.
[16] We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside
the judgment of the High Court. The High Court was carried away by
the settlement and has not examined the matter on merits, hence,
we are inclined to direct the High Court to take back the appeal to
its file and decide the appeal on merits.
13. In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 2014:INSC:496, [Para 4], 2, 1.7.2014,
Supreme Court holds,
[4]. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can
compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC
which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that offences which
are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts
draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the
Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v.
State of Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex
Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given
case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of
its power under section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact
that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim
has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable.
In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash
the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each
case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like
rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings
because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences
cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If
such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society.
However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are
entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public
peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such
proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace
and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash
them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution.
Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and
energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct
restoration of peace.
14. In Kailash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 2018(4) R.C.R (Criminal) 292, Hon’ble Supreme
Court holds,
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[7]. Upon perusal of the record, it appears that the incident has
occurred almost 30 years ago. Since the complainant/s and the
appellant-accused belong to the same family and are living in the
same house, they have buried their animosity and settled their
disputes amicably in writing under an agreement letter dated
28.07.2017, copy of which is already placed on the file. The injured
victims are brother and sister-in-law of the appellant. It is also
stated in the aforesaid application for compromise/compounding of
offence that there is no untoward incident has ever taken place
after the date of incident.
[8]. Though the offences under sections 307 and 326 of the IPC are
non-compoundable, having regard to the fact that the incident in
the present case did not have an impact on the society in general,
and having regard to the fact that the dispute between the parties
has been settled amicably and there is no likelihood of the
repetition of such incident, we allow the application for
compromise/compounding of offence and set aside the orders of
conviction and sentence passed by the courts below against the
appellant by exercising our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India. The appellant is ordered to be acquitted of the
charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is confined in jail,
he is ordered to be released from custody forthwith if not required
in any other case.
15. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dhruv Gurjar, 2019:INSC:254 [Para 16.1], (2019) 5 SCC
570, the FIR was registered under S 307, 294 and 34 IPC based on the allegations that Dhruv
Gurjar (accused) armed with a 12-bore gun, and his gang, visited the house of the
complainant with a view to take revenge with his nephew. When the complainant told them
that his nephew was not present at home, on this Dhruv Gurjar fired, and the pellets struck
on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear. Disagreeing with the order of High Court
quashing the FIR, Hon’ble Supreme Court held,
[16.1] However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact
that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per
Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and
orders, it appears that the High Court has not at all considered the
relevant facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the
seriousness of the offences and its social impact. From the
impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court, it
appears that the High Court has mechanically quashed the
respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
The High Court has not at all considered the distinction between a
personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social impact.
As observed by this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs.
Vikram Anantrai Doshi, 2014 15 SCC 29, the Court’s principal duty,
while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the
criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out
the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As
observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and
the said experience should be used with care, caution,
circumspection and courageous prudence.
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16. In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not
compoundable under Section 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself no
reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under
Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in our opinion
be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a
conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is
destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction
between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial
Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the
High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Criminal
Procedure Code on the other. While a Court trying an accused or
hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to
permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at
between the parties in cases where the offences are not
compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the
prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the
accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent
powers of the High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure
Code are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Criminal
Procedure Code Having said so, we must hasten to add that the
plenitude of the power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code
by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same
with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the
power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases
where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear
view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an
abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us
to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under
Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the
exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only
in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the
abuse of the process of law. The High court may be justified in
declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for
it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a
petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject
to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and
circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in
which the inherent powers may be invoked.
17. In State of M.P. v. Rajveer Singh, 2016:INSC:337, 2016(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 176, Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[7]. Considering allegations and counter-allegations, it was not such
a case which could have been compromised by the complainant and
the accused and FIR could not have been quashed in such a serious
case as that would be against public policy and administration of
criminal justice system. The FIR discloses commission of cognisable
offence under Section 307/34 IPC. Considering the nature of
allegation, it is necessary to investigate further in the facts and
circumstances of the instant case.
18. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003, [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC 641, a
three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing
of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: –
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CRM-M-43211-2024[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject, may be summarized in the following propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court
to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the
ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that
a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the
victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the
purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an
offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of
section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to
quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice
or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information
Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and
victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court
must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence.
Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences
such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed
though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the
dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but
have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with
the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far
as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,
the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the
financial and economic well-being of the state have implications
which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private
disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash
where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or
economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
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complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in
the balance.
19. In The state of Madhya Pradesh v. Kalyan Singh, 2019:INSC:8 [Para 3.1], 2019 (4) SCC
268, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[3.1] It is required to be noted that the original Accused was facing
the criminal proceedings under Sections 307, 294 read with Section
34 of the IPC. It is not in dispute that as per Section 20 of the Cr.PC
offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC are
non-compoundable. It is also required to be noted that the
allegations in the complaint for the offences under Sections 307,
294 read with Section 34 of the IPC are, as such, very serious. It is
alleged that the accused fired twice on the complainant by a
country-made pistol. From the material on record, it appears that
one of the accused persons was reported to be a hardcore criminal
having criminal antecedents. Be that as it may, the fact remains that
the accused was facing the criminal proceedings for the offences
under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC and that the
offences under these sections are not non-compoundable offences
and, looking to the serious allegations against the accused, we are
of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in
quashing the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections
307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC solely on the ground that
the original Complainant and the accused have settled the dispute.
At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Gulab Das and
Ors. V. State of M. P., 2011 12 Scale 625 is required to be referred
to. In the said decision, this Court has specifically observed and held
that, despite any settlement between the Complainant on the one
hand and the accused on the other, the criminal proceedings for the
offences under Section 307 of the IPC cannot be quashed, as the
offence under Section 307 is a non-compoundable offence. Under
the circumstance, the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the original
Accused for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section
34 of the IPC cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be
quashed and set aside.
[4] In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 6075 of
2013 is hereby quashed and set aside.
20. In The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & others, 2019:INSC:307, [Para 13-
14], 2019 (5) SCC 688, a two-member bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[13] Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this
Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held
as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash
the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under
Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly
and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out
of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved
the entire dispute amongst themselves;
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ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall
in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to
be treated as crime against the society and not against the
individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the
offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have
a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of
powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the
parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for
the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section
307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go
by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on
the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc.
However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible
only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the
charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such
exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6
and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh
(supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and
in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable
offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious
impart on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with
the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.
[14] Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has
quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections
307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the investigation was
under progress. Somehow, the accused managed to enter into a
compromise with the complainant and sought quashing of the FIR
on the basis of a settlement. The allegations are serious in nature.
He used the fire arm also in commission of the offence. Therefore,
the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused is not at
all considered by the High Court and solely on the basis of a
settlement between the accused and the complainant, the High
Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under
Section 482 of the Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
The High Court has also failed to note the antecedents of the
accused.
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21. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on
29.09.2021, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[11]. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannot
be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its
powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court
would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section
320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no
patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C.,
which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences
in the docket of ‘compoundable’ offences which have been
consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the
limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework
of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent
powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The
High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of
a case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the
ends of justice.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the
offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute
and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-
compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the
consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an
individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure
that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or
paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice
system.
[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-
heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a
private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has
already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against
conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of
delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always
subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases
where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High Court ought
to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the
circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the
compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature
and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused,
before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the
extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure
the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line constricting
the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive
construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead
to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and
circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the
other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved
against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as
cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State
of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5
SCC 688, 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which
involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and
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moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public
policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only,
for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large.
Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not
only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an
undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders,
who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social
boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no
guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.”
22. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously when parties,
who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
23. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of
compromise, placement of parties, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of
the compromise deed and its objectives point towards its acceptance.
24. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh,
2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon’ble, Supreme Court holds
“[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants
came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason
that matter was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave
Petitions against the order of the High Court rejecting their petition for quashing of
the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ petition has also
been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of
cognizance would automatically stands vitiated.”
25. Considering the entire facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-mentioned
judicial precedents, I believe that continuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruitful
purpose whatsoever.
26. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent
jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC/528 BNSS, 2023 and quashes the FIR and all subsequent
proceedings qua the petitioner Ranjit Kumar @ Ghukka only. The bail bonds of the
petitioner are accordingly discharged.
Petition allowed in the terms mentioned above. All pending application(s), if any, stand
closed.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
October 25, 2024
AK
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : No
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