Himachal Pradesh High Court
Rekha vs Gold Link Finance on 17 September, 2024
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No. 462 of 2023
Reserved on: 05.08.2024
.
Date of Decision: 17.09.2024
Rekha ....Petitioner
Versus
Gold Link Finance ....Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No
For the Petitioner : Mr. C.M. Tanwar, Advocate.
For the Respondent
r : Ms. Seema K. Guleria, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment dated
23.06.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Shimla
(learned Appellate Court) in Criminal Appeal N0. 18-S/10 of 2023 vide
which the judgment dated 09.12.2022 and order dated 19.12.2022
passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla (learned Trial
Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision
are that the complainant filed a complaint against the accused for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the
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Negotiable Instruments Act (In short ‘NI Act’). It was asserted that the
complainant is a Private Limited Company having its head office at
Dhalli. It is carrying on the business of non-banking financial
.
institutions. The accused issued a cheque of ₹ 4,10,000/- in favour of
the complainant drawn on UCO Bank, Shimla in discharge of the part
payment of the existing debt advanced in her favour. The complainant
presented the cheque but it was dishonoured with an endorsement of
‘insufficient funds’. The complainant issued a notice asking the
accused to pay the amount but the accused failed to do so. Hence, the
complaint was filed for taking action against the accused.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon
the accused. When the accused appeared, the notice of accusation was
put to her for the commission of an offence punishable under Section
138 of the NI Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried.
4. The complainant examined Dheeraj Kumar (CW1) to prove
its case.
5. The accused in her statement recorded under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. admitted that she had taken a loan of ₹2,00,000/- which was
payable on demand. She stated that she had issued a blank cheque to
the Company, which was signed by her. She had not received any legal
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notice. The complainant was demanding extra interest on the amount
which was already paid by her. She had already made the payment of
the loan amount and a false complaint was filed against her and her
.
sister. She examined herself (DW1).
6. Learned Trial Court held that the issuance of the cheque
and taking of the loan were not disputed. The cheque carries a
presumption that it was issued in discharge of the legal liability. The
accused claimed that she had paid the money to the Company but she
admitted that she had also taken other loans from the Company and
the receipts were towards the other loans taken by the accused from
the Company. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement of
‘insufficient funds’. The notice was sent to the correct address and the
acknowledgement showed that it was delivered to the accused. All the
ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section
138 of the NI Act were satisfied; hence, the learned Trial Court
convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced her to undergo simple
imprisonment for six months and pay a compensation of ₹6,00,000/-.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned
Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge. Learned First Appellate Court
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that
the accused had not disputed the issuance of the cheque and a cheque
carried with it a presumption of consideration, which was not rebutted
.
by the accused. The statement of account showed that only one
instalment was paid. The other receipts produced by her are related to
the other loans taken by the accused. The plea that the cheque was
issued as a security will not help the accused as the dishonour of the
security cheque can attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act.
The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement of ‘insufficient
funds’ and the accused failed to pay the amount within 15 days from
the date of the receipt of the notice or within 15 days of appearance in
the Court. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced
the accused. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved from the judgments and order passed by
the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision
asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the
evidence. The Company had failed to prove any legally enforceable
liability against the accused. They erred in drawing presumptions
under Section 118 and Section 139 of the NI Act. The sentence is
disproportionate. The liability of the accused was less than the amount
shown in the cheque on the date of its presentation. The accused had
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
returned ₹27,800/-. The complainant had not deducted this amount.
The amount of ₹4,10,000/- was not recoverable on the date of the
presentation of the cheque. The complainant had stated in his cross-
.
examination that one other loan was taken by the accused but it was
suggested to the defence witness that two other loans were taken.
Thus, an adverse inference should have been drawn against the
complainant. The receipts (Ext. D1/DW1 and Ext. D3/DW1) remained
un-rebutted. The amount shown in the receipt was not deducted and if
the amount is deducted, the liability of the accused was ₹ 3,95,000/-
and not ₹ 4,10,000/-. The version of the accused that the cheque was
issued as a security was duly established and learned Courts below
erred in rejecting the same. The statement of the account shows that
the complainant had charged ₹ 4,500/- as interest from the accused,
which is impermissible. The instalment was deposited within one
month and no interest was due; therefore, it was prayed that the
present appeal be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the
learned Trial Court be set aside.
9. I have heard Mr. C.M. Tanwar, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused and Ms. Seema K. Guleria, learned counsel for the
respondent.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
10. Mr C.M. Tanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused
submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and
sentencing the accused and the learned First Appellate Court erred in
.
affirming the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court. The
accused had proved the receipts, which showed that the amount was
repaid by her. The amount of ₹4,10,000/- was not legally recoverable
from the accused and the complainant is bound to endorse the receipt
of the amount on the cheque in the absence of which, the accused
cannot be held liable for the whole of the amount. He relied upon the
judgments of Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel vs. Hitesh Mahendrabhai
Patel and anr, 2022 Live Law (SC) 830, Kamala vs. Vidyadharan M.J, 2007
(5) SCC 264, Rev. Mother Marykutty vs. Reni C. Kottaram and anr, 2013 (1)
SCC 327, Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors, 2010 (2) SCC 114,
Joseph Sartho vs. G. Gopanathan and anr, 2009 (2) Crimes 463, Sami Labs
Limited vs. M/s M.B. Joseph Criminal Appeal No. 855 of 2010 decided on
31.01.2019, R. Hanumantharaya vs. A.P. Krishnakumar, 2021 (3) Crimes
597, and Subhash Kumar vs. Ram Kumar in CRM No. 15784 of 2018
decided on 11.04.2023 in support of his submission.
11. Ms. Seema K. Guleria, learned counsel for the
respondent/complainant supported the judgments and order passed by
learned Courts below and submitted that no interference is required
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with them. She further submitted that the accused had admitted taking
other loans from the complainant; hence, learned Courts below had
rightly held that the payments were made towards the other loans. The
.
amount shown in the receipt could not have been deducted from the
present loan account, therefore, it was prayed that the present revision
be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submission made
13. to
at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet
Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri)
348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an
appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of
jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207:-
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the
outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of
conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciationof the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court
in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to
exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and the scope
of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction
for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined
on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at
length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those
findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh
.
Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 wherein it was observed:
“13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with the power to call
for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes
of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any
proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provisionis to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or
the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be
apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where the scope ofSection 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as
under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power
to call for and examine the records of an inferior court forthe purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The
object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an
error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-foundederror and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bear a token
of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with
the law. If one looks into the various judgments of thisCourt, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be
invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly
erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of
law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material
evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes
but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex-facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed properly.
and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be
reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the
categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.”
15. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
16. The accused did not dispute the issuance of a cheque in her
statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. She stated in her
statement while appearing as DW1 that she had taken a loan of
₹2,00,000/-. She had paid the whole amount and her cheque was
misused by the Company. She stated in her cross-examination that she
had issued the blank cheques at the time of the taking of the loan. It
was laid down by this Court in Naresh Verma vs. Narinder Chauhan
2020(1) Shim. L.C. 398 that where the accused had not disputed his
signatures on the cheque, the Court has to presume that it was issued
in discharge of legal liability and the burden would shift upon the
accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed: –
“8. Once signatures on the cheque are not disputed, the plea
with regard to the cheque having not been issued towards
discharge of lawful liability, rightly came to be rejected by
learned Courts below. Reliance is placed upon Hiten P. Dalal v.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )held as under:
“The words ‘unless the contrary is proved’ which occur in
this provision make it clear that the presumption has to
be rebutted by ‘proof’ and not by a bare explanation.
which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when
its existence is directly established or when upon the
material before it the Court finds its existence to be so
probable that a reasonable man would act on thesupposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the
explanation is supported by proof, the presumption
created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted……”
9. S.139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed
unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque
received the cheque of nature referred to in section 138
for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability.
17. Similar is the judgment in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa
2019 (5) SCC 418 wherein it was held:
24. Applying the proposition of law as noted above, in the facts
of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque
having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised underSection 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or
liability.
18. This position was reiterated in M/S Kalamani Tex and
another Versus P. Balasubramanian 2021 (5) SCC 283 wherein it was
held:
“14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of
its judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the
provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption
drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The Statute
mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the
cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these
‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative. In such a situation, the
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )imposed upon him. This point of law has been crystallized by
this Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat (2019) 18
SCC 106, 18 in the following words:
“In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the
.
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial
court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the
part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for
advancing loan to the accused and want of examination ofrelevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for
advancing it to the accused. This approach of the trial
court had been at variance with the principles of
presumption in law. After such presumption, the onusshifted to the accused and unless the accused had
discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and
circumstances as to show the preponderance of
probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on thecomplainant’s case could not have been raised for want of
evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan
to the appellant-accused…..”
15. Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the
cheque and the Deed, the trial Court ought to have presumed that
the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable
debt. The trial Court fell in error when it called upon the
Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under
which the appellants were liable to pay. Such an approach of the
trial Court was directly in the teeth of the established legal
position as discussed above and amounts to a patent error of law.
16. No doubt, and as correctly argued by senior counsel for the
appellants, the presumptions raised under Section 118 and
Section 139 are rebuttable in nature. As held in MS Narayana
Menon v. State of Kerela (2006) 6 SCC 39, 32, which was relied
upon in Basalingappa (supra), a probable defence needs to be
raised, which must meet the standard of “preponderance of
probability”, and not a mere possibility. These principles were
also affirmed in the case of Kumar Exports (supra), wherein it
was further held that bare denial of passing of consideration
would not aid the case of the accused.”
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19. Similar is the judgment in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v.
Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, wherein it was
observed: –
.
“7.2. What is emerging from the material on record is that the
issuance of a cheque by the accused and the signature of the
accused on the said cheque are not disputed by the accused. Theaccused has also not disputed that there were transactions
between the parties. Even as per the statement of the accused,
which was recorded at the time of the framing of the charge, he
has admitted that some amount was due and payable. However,it was the case on behalf of the accused that the cheque was
given by way of security and the same has been misused by the
complainant. However, nothing is on record that in the reply tothe statutory notice it was the case on behalf of the accused that
the cheque was given by way of security. Be that as it may,however, it is required to be noted that earlier the accused issued
cheques which came to be dishonoured on the ground of
“insufficient funds” and thereafter a fresh consolidated chequeof ₹9,55,574 was given which has been returned unpaid on the
ground of “STOP PAYMENT”. Therefore, the cheque in question
was issued for the second time. Therefore, once the accused hasadmitted the issuance of a cheque which bears his signature,
there is a presumption that there exists a legally enforceabledebt or liability under Section 139 of the NI Act. However, such a
presumption is rebuttable in nature and the accused is required
to lead the evidence to rebut such presumption. The accused wasrequired to lead evidence that the entire amount due and payable
to the complainant was paid.
9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering
the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the
cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in
question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques
were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some
amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under
Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable
debt or liability. Of course, such presumption is rebuttable in
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )required to lead the evidence that the full amount due and
payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case,
no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put
forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of
security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to.
rebut the presumption and more particularly the cheque in
question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques
were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have
materially erred in not properly appreciating and consideringthe presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists
legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI
Act. It appears that both, the learned trial court as well as the
High Court, have committed an error in shifting the burden uponthe complainant to prove the debt or liability, without
appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As
observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverseonus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has
been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has beenadmitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the
complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability
and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption byleading evidence.
20. It was submitted that the accused had paid the amount to
the complainant and receipts (Ext. D1/DW1 to Ext. D5/DW1) were
produced to show this fact. The accused admitted in her cross-
examination that the Demand Primissory Note (DPN) (Ext. CX1),
address letter (Ext. CX2) and copy of Loan Agreement (Ext. CX3) were
executed regarding taking of loan of ₹50,000/-. DPN (Ext. CX4),
address letter (Ext. CX5) and Agreement for a loan (Ext. CX6) were
prepared regarding the loan of ₹1,50,000/-. She admitted that the
receipt (Ext. D4/DW1) mentions the loan of ₹1,50,000/-. She
volunteered to say that she had taken only one loan. She admitted that
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(Ext.D6/DW1) mentions the loan amount of ₹50,000/-. She admitted
that (Ext. D5/DW1) mentions the amount of ₹50,000/-.
21. These admissions clearly show that the accused had also
.
taken loans of ₹1,50,000/- and ₹50,000/- in addition to the loan of
₹2,00,000/- taken by her. The receipts (Ext. D1/DW1, D2/DW1 and
D3/DW1) were issued on the same day i.e. on 02.07.2013. The Company
would not have issued three receipts on the same day if they pertained
to the same loan account. This shows that the amount was not paid
towards the single loan account but towards three different loan
accounts. The Company had considered the receipt (Ext. D2/DW1)
towards the present loan account. Hence, the submission that the
accused had made the part payment which is not accounted for and the
cheque was presented for the whole of the amount is not acceptable.
The judgments cited on her behalf pertain to the effect of payment of
loan and do not apply to the present case.
22. The ledger account (Ext. CW1/Q) mentions the interest of
₹4,500/- on 30.06.2013. It was submitted that this interest was
wrongly added as the first instalment was paid by the accused on
02.07.2013. This submission is not acceptable. The amount of
₹12,850/- was only paid on 02.07.2013. No amount was paid in June
and ₹4,500/- was payable towards the interest w.e.f. 10.06.2013 till
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
30.06.2013. The loan bore the interest @27% per annum as per the
Agreement (Ext. CW1/F). Hence, the Company cannot be faulted for
charging the interest of ₹4,500/- for June when no instalment was
.
paid in June. The agreement (Ext. CW1/F) does not mention anywhere
that no interest was to be charged for June and the plea that the
complainant erred in charging the interest for June cannot be accepted.
23. Learned Courts below had rightly held that there is a
presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act that the cheque was
issued in the discharge of the legal liability. This presumption was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Triyambak S. Hegde Versus
Sripad 2022 (1) SCC 742 as under:
“11. From the facts arising in this case and the nature of the rival
contentions, the record would disclose that the signature on the
documents at Exhibits P-6 and P-2 is not disputed. Exhibit P-2is the dishonoured cheque based on which the complaint was
filed. From the evidence tendered before the JMFC, it is clear thatthe respondent has not disputed the signature on the cheque. If
that be the position, as noted by the courts below a presumptionwould arise under Section 139 in favour of the appellant who was
the holder of the cheque. Section 139 of the N.I. Act reads as
hereunder:-
“139. Presumption in favour of holder- It shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder
of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to
in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt or other liability.”
12 Insofar as the payment of the amount by the appellant in the
context of the cheque having been signed by the respondent, the
presumption for the passing of the consideration would arise as
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provided under Section 118(a) of N.I. Act which reads as
hereunder: –
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments –
Until the contrary is proved, the following
.
presumptions shall be made: -
(a) of consideration – that every negotiable
instrument was made or drawn forconsideration, and that every such
instrument, when it has been accepted,
indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred
for consideration.”
13. The above-noted provisions are explicit to the effect that
such presumption would remain until the contrary is proved.
The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard has relied on
the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan
Balan & Anr., 1999 (7) SCC 510 wherein it is held as hereunder:
“9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be
that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section
118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque wasmade or drawn for consideration on the date on which the
cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins the Court to
presume that the holder of the cheque received it for thedischarge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the
accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The Trial
Court was not persuaded to rely on the interested
testimony of DW-1 to rebut the presumption. The saidfinding was upheld by the High Court. It is not now open to
the accused to contend differently on that aspect.”
14. The learned counsel for the respondent has however referred
to the decision of this Court in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa,
2019 (5) SCC 418 wherein it is held as hereunder: –
“25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in
the above cases on Sections 118 (a) and 139, we now
summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in the
following manner:
25.1. Once the execution of the cheque is admitted
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that
the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or
other liability.
25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a
.
rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the
accused to raise the probable defence. The standard
of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of the
preponderance of probabilities.
25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the
accused to rely on evidence led by him or the
accused can also rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant in order to raise a probable defence.
Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be
drawn not only from the materials brought on
record by the parties but also by reference to the
circumstances upon which they rely.
25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come
in the witness box in support of his defence, Section
139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a
persuasive burden.
25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come into
the witness box to support his defence.
26. Applying the proposition of law as noted above,
in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the
signature on the cheque having been admitted, a
presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that
the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or
liability. The question to be looked into is as to
whether any probable defence was raised by the
accused. In cross-examination of PW1, when the
specific question was put that the cheque was issued
in relation to a loan of ₹25,000 taken by the accused,
PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his
evidence admitted that he retired in 1997 on which
date he received a monetary benefit of ₹8 lakhs,
which was encashed by the complainant. It was also
brought in the evidence in the evidence that in the
year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale
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agreement for which he paid an amount of
₹4,50,000 to Balana Gouda towards sale
consideration. Payment of ₹4,50,000 being
admitted in the year 2010 and a further payment of a
loan of ₹ 50,000 with regard to which Complaint
.
No.119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy of
which complaint was also filed as Ext. D-2, there
was a burden on the complainant to prove his
financial capacity. In the years 2010-2011, as per the
own case of the complainant, he made a payment of
₹18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when the
financial capacity to pay ₹ 6 lakhs to the accused
was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply
given by the complainant. The evidence on record,
thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused,
which shifted the burden on the complainant to
prove his financial capacity and other facts.”
15. In that light, it is contended that the very materials produced
by the appellant and the answers relating to lack of knowledge of
property details by PW-1 in his cross-examination would
indicate that the transaction is doubtful and no evidence is
tendered to indicate that the amount was paid. In such an event,
it was not necessary for the respondent to tender rebuttal
evidence but the case put forth would be sufficient to indicate
that the respondent has successfully rebutted the presumption.
16. On the position of law, the provisions referred to in Sections
118 and 139 of N.I. Act as also the enunciation of law as made by
this Court needs no reiteration as there is no ambiguity
whatsoever. In, Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa (supra) relied on
by the learned counsel for the respondent, though on facts the
ultimate conclusion therein was against raising presumption,
the facts and circumstances are entirely different as the
transaction between the parties as claimed in the said case is
peculiar to the facts of that case where the consideration claimed
to have been paid did not find favour with the Court keeping in
view the various transactions and extent of the amount involved.
However, the legal position relating to presumption arising
under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I. Act on a signature being
admitted has been reiterated. Hence, whether there is a rebuttal
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case.”
24. This position was reiterated in Tedhi Singh vs. Narayan Dass
Mahant 2022 (6) SCC 735 wherein it was held:
.
7. It is true that this is a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Section 139 of the N.I. Act provides that theCourt shall presume that the holder of a cheque received the
cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge,
in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. This
presumption, however, is expressly made subject to the positionbeing proved to the contrary. In other words, it is open to the
accused to establish that there is no consideration received. It is
in the context of this provision that the theory of ‘probable
defence’ has grown. In an earlier judgment, in fact, which hasalso been adverted to in Basalingappa (supra), this Court notes
that Section 139 of the N.I. Act is an example of reverse onus [see
(2010) 11 SCC 441). It is also true that this Court has found that
the accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high standard
of proof. It is accordingly that the principle has developed thatall which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As
to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to
be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus ofevidence and circumstances that exist.
25. Similar is the judgment in P. Rasiya v. Abdul Nazer, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1131 wherein it was observed:
“As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed, unless
the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the
cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in
whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Therefore, once
the initial burden is discharged by the Complainant that the
cheque was issued by the accused and the signature and the
issuance of the cheque are not disputed by the accused, in that
case, the onus will shift upon the accused to prove the contrary
that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The
presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
20
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque
is issued in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is
in favour of the Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case,
it is for the accused to prove the contrary.”
.
26. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh,
(2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275 wherein it was observed at
page 161:
33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and
Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall bepresumed until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable
instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of
the Act stipulates that “unless the contrary is proved, it shall be
presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, forthe discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability”. It will be
seen that the “presumed fact” directly relates to one of the crucial
ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138.
[The rules discussed hereinbelow are common to both the
presumptions under Section 139 and Section 118 and are hence,
not repeated–reference to one can be taken as reference to
another]
34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a “shall
presume” clause is illustrative of a presumption of law. Because
Section 139 requires that the Court “shall presume” the fact
stated therein, it is obligatory for the Court to raise this
presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising
of the presumption has been established. But this does not
preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn
from rebutting it and proving the contrary as is clear from the
use of the phrase “unless the contrary is proved”.
35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been
issued towards the discharge of a legally enforceable
debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of
the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque
and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves that the
cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The
circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
the activation of the presumptive clause. [Bharat Barrel & Drum
Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal [Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg.
Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35] ]
36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that
.
presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused
contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and
handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 309 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] ]. Therefore, the mere admission
of the drawer’s signature, without admitting the execution of the
entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the
presumption.
37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove
that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for
discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of
the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of
the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential
burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not
received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until
this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the
presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting
the complainant to do anything further.
38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of
Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as
follows:
“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is
merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to
reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to thecontrary from the opponent but if the opponent does
offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the
Judge’s requirement of some evidence), the
presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is
in the Jury’s hands free from any rule’.”
39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is
not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the
prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The
accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the
presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
meet the standard of “preponderance of probabilities”, similar to
a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa v. Sri
Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : (2010) 4 SCC
(Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184 : AIR 2010 SC 1898] ]
.
27. Therefore, the Court has to start with the presumption that
the cheque was issued in discharge of legal liability and the burden is
upon the accused to prove the contrary.
28. The accused claimed that a blank cheque was issued as a
security. This plea was established. Even otherwise, it was laid down by
this Court in Hamid Mohammad Versus Jaimal Dass 2016 (1) HLJ 456,
that even if the cheque was issued towards the security, the accused
will be liable. It was observed:
“9. Submission of learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
revisionist that cheque in question was issued to the
complainant as security and on this ground, criminal revision
petition be accepted is rejected being devoid of any force for thereasons hereinafter mentioned. As per Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act 1881 if any cheque is issued on account of otherliability then provisions of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments
Act 1881 would be attracted. The court has perused the original
cheque Ext. C-1 dated 30.10.2008 placed on record. There is norecital in cheque Ext. C-1 that cheque was issued as a security
cheque. It is well-settled law that a cheque issued as security
would also come under the provision of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. See 2016 (3) SCC page 1 titled
Don Ayengia v. State of Assam & another. It is well-settled law that
where there is a conflict between former law and subsequent law
then subsequent law always prevails.”
29. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sampelly
Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency
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23
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 458: (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 149: (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 126: 2016
SCC OnLine SC 954 that issuing a cheque toward security will also
attract the liability for the commission of an offence punishable under
.
Section 138 of N.I. Act. It was observed: –
“9. We have given due consideration to the submission advanced
on behalf of the appellant as well as the observations of this
Court in Indus Airways [Indus Airways (P) Ltd. v. Magnum Aviation
(P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539: (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 138: (2014) 6 SCC
(Cri) 845] with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of theAct and the expression “for discharge of any debt or other
liability” occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view
that the question whether a post-dated cheque is for “dischargeof debt or liability” depends on the nature of the transaction. If
on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amounthas become legally recoverable, the section is attracted and not
otherwise.
10. Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows that
though the word “security” is used in Clause 3.1(iii) of the
agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being
towards repayment of instalments. The repayment becomes dueunder the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the
instalment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was dulydisbursed on 28-2-2002 which was prior to the date of the
cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and instalments have
fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement,dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the
Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding
liability.
11. The judgment in Indus Airways [Indus Airways (P)
Ltd. v. Magnum Aviation (P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539: (2014) 5 SCC
(Civ) 138 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 845] is clearly distinguishable. As
already noted, it was held therein that liability arising out of a
claim for breach of contract under Section 138, which arises on
account of dishonour of cheque issued was not by itself on a par
with criminal liability towards discharge of acknowledged and
admitted debt under a loan transaction. Dishonour of a cheque::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
24
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )issued for discharge of later liability is clearly covered by the
statute in question. Admittedly, on the date of the cheque there
was a debt/liability in praesenti in terms of the loan agreement,
as against Indus Airways [Indus Airways (P) Ltd. v. Magnum
Aviation (P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539: (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 138 : (2014).
6 SCC (Cri) 845] where the purchase order had been cancelled and
cheque issued towards advance payment for the purchase order
was dishonoured. In that case, it was found that the cheque had
not been issued for discharge of liability but as advance for the
purchase order which was cancelled. Keeping in mind this fine
but real distinction, the said judgment cannot be applied to a
case of the present nature where the cheque was for repayment
of loan instalment which had fallen due though such deposit of
cheques towards repayment of instalments was also described as
“security” in the loan agreement. In applying the judgment
in Indus Airways [Indus Airways (P) Ltd. v. Magnum Aviation (P)
Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 138 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri)
845], one cannot lose sight of the difference between a
transaction of purchase order which is cancelled and that of a
loan transaction where loan has actually been advanced and its
repayment is due on the date of the cheque.
12. The crucial question to determine the applicability of Section
138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents the discharge of
existing enforceable debt or liability or whether it represents
advance payment without there being subsisting debt or liability.
While approving the views of the different High Courts noted
earlier, this is the underlying principle as can be discerned from
discussion of the said cases in the judgment of this Court.”
30. This position was reiterated in Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand,
2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002: AIR 2021 SC 5732, and it was held that a
cheque issued as security is not a waste paper and complaint under
section 138 of the N.I. Act can be filed on its dishonour. It was observed:
“17. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state
of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
25
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make
certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the
transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and
the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified
timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such.
repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form
before the due date or if there is no other understanding or
agreement between the parties to defer the payment of the
amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature forpresentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to
present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138
and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
18. When a cheque is issued and is treated as ‘security’ towards
repayment of an amount with a time period being stipulated for
repayment, all that it ensures is that such cheque which is issuedas ‘security cannot be presented prior to the loan or the
instalment maturing for repayment towards which such cheque
is issued as security. Further, the borrower would have the
option of repaying the loan amount or such financial liability in
any other form and in that manner, if the amount of loan dueand payable has been discharged within the agreed period, the
cheque issued as security cannot thereafter be presented.
Therefore, the prior discharge of the loan or there being analtered situation due to which there would be an understanding
between the parties is a sine qua non to not present the chequewhich was issued as security. These are only the defences that
would be available to the drawer of the cheque in proceedings
initiated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, therecannot be a hard and fast rule that a cheque, which is issued as
security can never be presented by the drawee of the cheque. If
such is the understanding a cheque would also be reduced to an
‘on-demand promissory note’ and in all circumstances, it would
only be civil litigation to recover the amount, which is not the
intention of the statute. When a cheque is issued even though as
‘security’ the consequence flowing therefrom is also known to
the drawer of the cheque and in the circumstance stated above if
the cheque is presented and dishonoured, the holder of the
cheque/drawee would have the option of initiating the civil
proceedings for recovery or the criminal proceedings for::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
26
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )punishment in the fact situation, but in any event, it is not for
the drawer of the cheque to dictate terms with regard to the
nature of litigation.”
31. In the present case, the ledger (Ext. CW1/Q) shows that an
.
amount of ₹4,10,232/- was due on 17.08.2015; hence, the accused had a
subsisting liability on 02.01.2016, the date of the issuance of the
cheque and the submission that the cheque was issued as a security
will not help the accused.
32. The learned Trial Court has rightly held that once the
signatures were not disputed, the presumption under Section 139 of
N.I. Act would be attracted and the burden will shift upon the accused
to rebut the presumption. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat (2019) 18 SCC 106 that
once a presumption has been drawn the onus shifts to the accused. The
Court cannot raise any doubt on the complainant’s case in view of the
presumption. It was observed: –
“18. In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court
proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the
complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan
to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses
who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the
accused. This approach of the trial court had been at variance
with the principles of presumption in law. After such
presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the
accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such
facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of
probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
27
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )complainant’s case could not have been raised for want of
evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to
the appellant-accused. The aspect relevant for consideration
had been as to whether the appellant-accused has brought on
record such facts/material/circumstances which could be of a.
reasonably probable defence.”
33. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uttam
Ram Versus Devinder Singh Hudan and another (2019) 10 SCC 287 that
the complainant is not to prove the debt as in a civil court because of
the presumption but only to prove that the cheque was issued by the
accused. It was observed:-
r to
“20. The Trial Court and the High Court proceeded as if, the
appellant is to prove a debt before a civil court wherein, the
plaintiff is required to prove his claim on the basis of evidence to
be laid in support of his claim for the recovery of the amount
due. Dishonour of a cheque carries a statutory presumption of
consideration. The holder of the cheque in due course is required
to prove that the cheque was issued by the accused and that
when the same was presented, it was not honoured. Since there
is a statutory presumption of consideration, the burden is on the
accused to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued not
for any debt or other liability.”
34. It was laid down in P. Rasiya v. Abdul Nazer, 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 1131 that the complainant is not to state the nature of the
transaction or the source of funds. It was observed:-
“By the impugned common judgment and order, the High
Court has reversed the concurrent findings recorded by both
the courts below and has acquitted the accused on the ground
that, in the complaint, the Complainant has not specifically
stated the nature of transactions and the source of fund.
However, the High Court has failed to note the presumption
under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. As per Section 139 of the N.I.::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
28
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the
holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to
in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
other liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged
by the Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused.
and the signature and the issuance of the cheque are not
disputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift upon
the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was not for
any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it
is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any
debt or other liability which is in favour of the
Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case, it is for theaccused to prove the contrary. The aforesaid has not been dealt
with and considered by the High Court.”
35. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the complainant is not required to prove the existence
of legally enforceable debt or liability as this is a matter of
presumption. Rather, the accused is required to disprove the existence
of legally enforceable debt or liability.
36. In the present case, the accused claimed that she had repaid
the whole of the amount. The receipts produced by her do not show
that the amount of ₹2,00,000/- was paid by her to the complainant.
She admitted that she had taken the other loans from the complainant
and the receipts do not show the discharge of the part of the loan
amount. Hence, the evidence of the accused was insufficient to rebut
the presumption.
37. The cheque returning memo (Ext. CW1/K) shows that the
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
cheque was dishonoured with the remarks ‘insufficient funds’. The
memo carries with it a presumption of correctness under Section 146
of the NI Act. No evidence was led to rebut this presumption; hence,
.
the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the requirement that the
cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds was duly proved.
38. The complainant stated that it had issued a notice (Ext.
CW1/L) to the accused. The postal receipts (Ext. CW1/M and CW1/N)
were placed on record. The acknowledgement (Ext. CW1/P) bearing the
signatures of some person has also been filed on record, therefore, the
learned Trial Court had rightly held that the notice was duly served
upon the accused. In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs.
Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555 that the person, who claims that he
had not received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days from
the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court and in case of
failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact that notice
was not received by him. It was observed:
“It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of
notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where
there is no stipulation of giving of a notice before filing a
complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice
sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the
court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make
payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had
made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a
copy of the complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
30
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within
15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy
of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously
contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under
Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under.
Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our
view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the
very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s case
(supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of theproviso was the same as the receipt of notice a trickster cheque
drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by
adopting different strategies and escape from legal
consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied)
39.
The accused has not paid any money to the complainant,
and it was duly proved that the accused had failed to pay the money
despite the receipt of the notice.
40. Thus, it was duly proved that the cheque was issued in
discharge of the legal liability, it was dishonoured due to insufficient
funds and the accused failed to make the payment despite the receipt
of a valid notice of demand; hence, the complainant had succeeded in
proving its case beyond the reasonable doubt.
41. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to
undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The legislature had
introduced the offence of dishonour of cheques to instil confidence in
the public about the transactions carried with the cheque. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar
2019 (4) SCC 197 that the penal provision of Section 138 is a deterrent in
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )
nature. It was observed:
“9. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable
instruments including cheques and to encourage and.
promote the use of negotiable instruments including
cheques in financial transactions. The penal provision of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intendedto be a deterrent to the callous issuance of negotiable
instruments such as cheques without serious intention to
honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”
42. In view of this consideration, the sentence of six months is
not excessive.
43. to
The learned Trial Court had directed the accused to pay the
compensation of ₹ 6,00,000/- The evidence shows that the liability of
₹ 4,10,000/- existed in the year 2016 and the complainant had to
pursue the litigation. The order was announced on 19.12.2022 and the
complainant was entitled to compensation for the loss of interest as
well as the expenses incurred in the litigation. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/S Kalamani Tex and another Versus P.
Balasubramanian JT 2021(2) SC 519 that the Courts should uniformly
levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at
the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed: –
“20. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of
the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that
the object of Chapter XVII of the NIA is not only punitive but
also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA
envision a single window for criminal liability for the::: Downloaded on – 17/09/2024 20:32:43 :::CIS
32
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8627 )dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation
of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to
be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation and
unless there exist special circumstances, the Courts should.
uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with
simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. [R. Vijian v. Baby,
(2012) 1 SCC 260, 20]”
44. Thus, the compensation of ₹6,00,000/- cannot be said to
be excessive.
45. No other point was urged.
46.
Therefore, the judgments and order passed by learned
Courts below are sustainable and no interference is required with
them.
47. In view of the above, the present revision fails and the same
is dismissed. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back
forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
17th September, 2024.
(saurav pathania)
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