Supreme Court of India
Salam Samarjeet Singh vs The High Court Of Manipur At Imphal on 22 August, 2024
Author: Hrishikesh Roy
Bench: Sudhanshu Dhulia, Hrishikesh Roy
2024 INSC 647 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.294/2015
SALAM SAMARJEET SINGH Petitioner
VERSUS
THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL & ANR Respondent
JUDGMENT
1. Heard Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner. The respondents – High Court
of Manipur and the Registrar General are represented by Mr.
Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel.
2. While deciding this writ petition filed under Article 32
of the Constitution of India, there was a difference of
Signature Not Verified opinion and having regard to the conflicting judgments
Digitally signed by
Deepak Joshi
rendered by the two learned Judges on 7.10.2016, the
Date: 2024.08.31
15:01:21 IST
Reason:
matter was directed to be placed before a three-judge Bench.
Page 1 of 26
Thereafter, when a similar question of law was found
pending before the Constitution Bench i.e., in Tej Prakash
Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others1 (for
short “Tej Prakash Pathak”), this case was tagged with the
said case. On 12.07.2023, however submission was made
before the Constitution Bench by the learned counsel for the
parties that reference to the Constitution Bench along the
lines in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) is unnecessary and
therefore the difference of opinion between the two Judges
in the present case should be resolved by a three-Judge
Bench.
3. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the
parties, this case can be segregated and the Court should,
inter alia, consider the following aspects :-
“I. Can executive instructions in the form of a
resolution of the Full Court override statutory rules
made under Article 234/309?
II. Can the criteria of cut-off marks be introduced by a
Full-Court Resolution without amending the rules after
the written test is over without informing the
candidate?
1 Tej Prakash Pathak And Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court And Ors. C.A. No.
2634/2013 & batch
Page 2 of 26
III. Whether such a course of action amounts to
procedural fairness/unfairness?”
4. Thereafter, an order was passed by the Constitution
Bench on 12.07.2023 to place the present matter for
hearing before a three-Judge Bench and that is how we are
posted with this case.
RELEVANT FACTS
5. The petitioner, who was an aspirant for the post of
District Judge (Entry Level) in the Manipur Judicial Service
Grade-I, responded to the advertisement dated 15.05.2013.
The petitioner belonged to the Scheduled Caste category and
he appeared in the written examination conducted in July
2013 for all the applicants. The High Court of Manipur
then issued a Notification on 17.10.2013 declaring that
none of the candidates had secured the minimum qualifying
marks in the written examination. A grievance was then
raised by the petitioner and eventually a corrigendum came
to be issued on 07.02.2014 declaring the petitioner to have
been successful in the written examination having scored
52.8% marks which satisfied the required benchmark of
50% for the Scheduled Caste category.
Page 3 of 26
6. Just before the interview test, the Full Court of the
Manipur High Court on 12.01.2015 decided to fix 40% as
the cut-off for the viva-voce examination and the petitioner’s
case is that this decision was never intimated to him. The
Full Court Resolution reflected that the 40% minimum
qualifying marks for passing the interview was fixed by
resorting to sub-Rule (3) of Schedule ‘B’ of the Manipur
Judicial Service Rules, 2005 (for short “MJS Rules,2005”),
which reads as under:-
“All necessary steps not provided for in these rules for
recruitment under these rules shall be decided by the
recruiting authority.”
7. The petitioner who had secured 18.8 marks out of the
total 50 marks in the interview segment, was held to be
unsuccessful for not having the secured minimum
prescribed benchmark of 40%. At this stage, it may be noted
that the total marks allocated for the written examination
for the three papers were 300 and for the interview segment,
a total of 50 marks were prescribed. In his written
examination, the petitioner had secured 158.50 marks and
Page 4 of 26
18.8 marks in the interview, his total aggregate score in the
written examination plus viva-voce was 177.3 marks, out of
the total possible 350 marks. Thus, the percentage of
marks scored by the petitioner cumulatively stands at 50.6
percent. It is also pertinent to note that the Manipur High
Court subsequently on 9.3.2016 amended Schedule-B, Sub-
rule(3) to prescribe 40% minimum cut-off for the viva voce.
8. In the split judgment, Justice Banumathi upheld the
rejection of the petitioner for failing to secure minimum 40%
in the viva voce. It was observed that the fixation of 40%
minimum cut off for viva voce is in consonance with the
MJS Rules, 2005 as per Clause 1(3) of the General
Instructions provided in Schedule-B. Under the Mode of
Evaluation table, securing less than 40% marks has been
graded as ‘F’, which carries a grade value of ‘0’. In Justice
Banumathi’s opinion, it was therefore implicit that for a
‘pass’ in exam, a minimum of 40% marks must be obtained.
It was also noted that after participating in the viva voce,
the petitioner cannot turn around and challenge the
selection process.
Page 5 of 26
9. On the other hand, Justice Shiva Kirti Singh, held that
the rejection in viva voce test is wrongful as it violated the
statutory mandate which provided for selection based on the
cumulative grade value obtained in the written exam and
viva voce. It was noted that Grade ‘F’ for marks below 40%
as provided in the evaluation table, corresponds to securing
‘0’ marks and nothing beyond that. Grade ‘F’ is not an
indicator of failure in the examination.
ARGUMENTS
10. Before this Court, Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior
Counsel for the writ petitioner would argue that when no
minimum marks were prescribed in the viva-voce segment
at the time when the recruitment commenced through the
advertisement dated 15.05.2013, the Full Court could not
have fixed minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce since
the unamended MJS Rules, 2005 never envisaged minimum
marks in the viva-voce segment. According to the counsel,
this is a case of midway change of rules of the game and
therefore it is argued that the opinion expressed by Justice
Shiva Kirti Singh should be accepted by this larger Bench. It
Page 6 of 26
was contended that the present case is covered by the
decision of the five-judge Constitution Bench of this Court
in Sivanandan C.T. & Ors vs High Court of Kerala & Ors2 (for
short “Sivanandan CT”).
11.1 On the other hand, Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior
Counsel would refer to the General Instructions contained
in Schedule ‘B’ to the MJS Rules, 2005 to say that the
petitioner was required to obtain 50% marks in the written
examination to be eligible for the viva-voce segment which
he did. The counsel however contends that those scoring
below 40% in the interview, as per the mode of evaluation,
should be considered in the ‘Fail’ category and here since
the petitioner had secured less than 40% in the viva-voce
segment, he was rightly held to be unsuccessful.
11.2 According to the counsel, the decision in Sivanandan
C.T.(supra) , can have no application in the present facts as
in that case, the Rules were amended after the interview
was over but in the present case, the requirement of
minimum 40% in the interview segment was decided before
the interview commenced.
2 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 994
Page 7 of 26
11.3. Mr. Hansaria also drew our attention to the
subsequent decisions of this Court in Kavita Kamboj v. High
Court of P&H3 (for short “Kavita Khamboj”) and Abhimeet
Sinha v High Court of Patna4(for short “Abhimeet Sinha”) to
buttress his submission that the minimum marks for
interview can be prescribed by the High Court and is not
violative of the recommendations of the Shetty Commission
and the decision of this Court in All India Judges Assn. v
Union of India5 (for short “All India Judges(2002))”.
12. Going by the above submissions, the following issues
arise for our consideration:
A. Can the executive instructions in form of a resolution of
the Full Court by prescribing minimum marks for interview,
override statutory rules made under Article 234/309?
B. Whether the High Court’s decision frustrates the
legitimate expectation of the petitioner?
Issue A
13. To answer the issue, a reference to the unamended
Schedule ‘B’ of MJS Rules 2005 is necessary:
“Schedule B to the MJS Rules of 2005
3 (2024) 7 SCC 103
4 (2024) 7 SCC 262
5 (2002) 4 SCC 247
Page 8 of 26
Clause 1:
Competitive Examination/Limited Departmental
Examination
(i) Written examination of 3 papers for 100 marks each
(ii) Interview :Viva-voce of 50 marks
Clause 3:
General Instructions:
(i) All candidates who obtained 60% or more marks or
corresponding grade in the written examination shall be
eligible for viva-voce examination, provided that SC/ST
candidates who obtained 50% or more marks or
corresponding grade in the written examination shall be
eligible for viva-voce examination.
(ii) Selection of candidate shall be made on the basis of
cumulative grade value obtained in the written and viva-
voce examination.
(iii) All necessary steps not provided for in these rules for
recruitment under these rules shall be decided by the
recruiting authority.
(iv) Mode of evaluating the performance of Grading in the
written and viva-voce examination shall as below:
Percentage of Grade Grade
marks Value
70% & above O 7
65% to 69% A+ 6
60% to 64% A 5
55% to 59% B+ 4
50% to 54% B 3
45% to 49% C+ 2
40% to 44% C 1
Below 40% F 0
Page 9 of 26
Numerical marks obtained for each question in written
examination are to be graded as per the above chart and
thereafter all the grade values are to be added up and
divided by total number of questions, thereby arriving at a
Cumulative Grade value Average (CGVA), which inturn is
to be again graded as per the above chart.
(v) The same vigorous and objective grade value exercise is
also recommended for the viva-voce examination as well.
(vi) Final selection list will be readied by combining the
cumulative grade value obtained in the written
examination and viva-voce examination.”
14. The unamended Schedule ‘B’ of MJS Rules 2005
prescribes the mode of evaluating and grading the
performance in the written and viva-voce examination.
Those who secured below 40% are classified in the ‘F’
category with zero grade value. However, Sub clause (iv)
clearly indicates that the “final selection list will be readied
by combining the cumulative grade value obtained in the
written examination and viva-voce examination.”
15. Interestingly, the MJS Rules 2005 came to be amended
on 09.03.2016, after conclusion of the present recruitment
process whereby, 40% minimum qualifying marks in the
viva-voce segment were prescribed. This would also indicate
Page 10 of 26
that the Rules as unamended, did not have the requirement
of minimum 40% in the viva-voce segment and such
qualifying marks came to be incorporated only vide
Resolution adopted by the Full Court on 12.01.2015.
16. If the evaluation and selection of the petitioner would
have been carried out on the basis of the unamended Rules,
the petitioner having cumulatively secured 50.65% by
combining both the written and the interview segment and
would have been awarded ‘B’ Grade as per the mode of
evaluation prescribed under sub-Clause (iv) of Clause 3
under Schedule ‘B’ of the MJS Rules 2005. With ‘B’ Grade,
the petitioner cannot logically be placed in the category of
failed candidates.
17. As was noticed earlier, the relevant advertisement for
filling up the vacancy in the entry-level post of District
Judge was initiated through the advertisement published on
15.05.2013 which reflected that the recruitment shall be
governed by the MJS Rules 2005. The duly filled application
was presented by the petitioner and he secured the
minimum benchmark of 50% marks as a Scheduled Caste
Page 11 of 26
category candidate, in the written examination. If the
unamended Rules were to be made the basis for evaluation
of the performance, the petitioner with his 18.8 marks in
the interview out of the maximum permissible 50 marks
would have qualified, as his cumulative score (written
158.50 and viva 18.8) would have been 177.3 out of total
350 marks. His percentage in aggregate will then be 50.6%
and this would have ensured his success as per the
unamended MJS Rules.
18. In application of the MJS Rules 2005, we are quite
certain that there was no cut-off marks or pass marks
prescribed for the viva-voce examination in the present
process when the recruitment advertisement was published.
The subsequent amendment to the Rules with effect from
09.03.2016, cannot be applied to the present recruitment
process where the petitioner participated. Moreover, the
unamended Rules explicitly provided that the cut-off in the
written test for SC/ST Candidates would be 50% and the
final list would be calculated by combining the cumulative
grade value in both written and viva voce.
Page 12 of 26
19. During the course of arguments, Mr. Hansaria,
Learned Senior Counsel for the High Court relied on the
decisions of this Court in Kavita Khamboj(supra) and
Abhimeet Sinha(supra) to emphasize the importance of
interview for selection in the higher judiciary. In this regard,
we must observe that it is well-settled that prescribing
minimum marks for interview is not violative of the Shetty
Commission report and the judgment of this Court in All
India Judges(2002)(supra). This Court in a recent judgment
in Abhimeet Sinha(supra) examined the following aspects:-
“34.1. ((i) Whether the prescription of minimum
marks for viva voce is in contravention of the law
laid down by this Court in All India Judges
(2002) [All India Judges Assn. (3) v. Union of
India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 508]
which accepted certain recommendations of the
Shetty Commission?
34.2. (ii) Whether the prescription of minimum
marks for viva voce is violative of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution of India?”
20. It was opined in the above judgment that the
prescription of minimum marks for the viva voce is not
violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Page 13 of 26
Discussing the recommendations of Shetty Commission and
the precedents of this Court, it was held that All India
Judges (2002) is sub-silentio on the aspect of minimum
marks for interview and cannot be said to have
authoritatively pronounced on doing away with minimum
marks for interview.
21. However, in our view, even though prescribing minimum
marks for interview may not be manifestly arbitrary, the
present case is on the failure to make the selection, in
accordance with the unamended MJS Rules, based on
aggregate marks secured by the petitioner in the written
examination and the viva-voce test. This aspect was also
discussed in Abhimeet Sinha (supra):
“68. The implications of the split judgment in Salam
Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur [Salam
Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur, (2016) 10 SCC
484 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 147] will next bear
consideration. Banumathi, J. in her judgment noticed
that All India Judges (2002) [All India Judges Assn.
(3) v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 : 2002 SCC (L&S)
508] is sub silentio on the aspect of minimum cut-off
marks for the viva voce test. In his dissenting judgment,
Shiva Kirti Singh, J. had not expressed anyPage 14 of 26
disagreement on the said sub silentio observation but
left it open for determination in a future case. There
again, the dissent of Singh, J. was based on the fact
that minimum cut-off was not prescribed in the
recruitment rules and were brought in midway through
the recruitment process, just prior to the stage of
interview, by resolution of the Court. Here however the
prescription of minimum cut-off in the recruitment
process was notified for information of the candidates
well before the commencement of the selection process
under the Patna High Court and also under the Gujarat
High Court and this distinguishing feature will have to
be borne in mind.”
22. The judgment in Abhimeet Sinha (supra) reiterated the
following position in case of inconsistency between the
recommendations of Shetty Commission and the rules
framed by the High Court as per the proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution of India:
“(i) In case of inconsistency between the
recommendations and the Rules, primacy should be
given to the existing statutory rules.
(ii) In the absence of existing Rules, the High Court
should follow the directions of this Court.
60. For the sake of completeness, we may however
clarify that even though the statutory rules can be
supplemented to fill in gaps as held in Kavita
Kamboj v. High Court of P&H [Kavita Kamboj v. High
Court of P&H, (2024) 7 SCC 103] , the High Court
cannot act contrary to the Rules [Sivanandan
Page 15 of 26
C.T. v. High Court of Kerala, (2024) 3 SCC 799 :
(2024) 1 SCC (L&S) 67].”
[emphasis supplied]
23. Applying the above legal proposition, it is seen that in this
matter, the mode of evaluation was provided for in the Rules.
This is not a case where the Rules were silent. Mr. Hansaria,
placed considerable reliance on the decision of this Court in
Kavita Khamboj(supra), where a three-judge bench of this
Court while upholding the prescription of minimum 50%
marks in interview for promotion as District Judges, observed
that the rules can be supplemented to fill in the gaps.
However, it particularly distinguishes the instances where the
Rules specifically provide for the mode of evaluation. In this
regard, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court speaking
through DY Chandrachud CJI, itself notes that the matter
would have been entirely different if the Rules specifically
provided that the final merit list would be on the basis of
aggregate marks:
“52. Moreover, the Rules in the present case are
entirely silent in regard to the prescription of a
minimum eligibility for clearing a competitive test,
on the one hand, and the viva voce, on the other
hand. If the Rules were to specifically provide in aPage 16 of 26
given case that the criterion for eligibility would be
on the combined marks of both the written test and
the viva voce, the matter would have been entirely
different. [P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India,
(1984) 2 SCC 141, para 44 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214]
Rule 6(1)(a) and Rule 8 being silent as regards the
manner in which merit and suitability would be
determined, administrative instructions can
supplement the Rules in that regard. This is not a
case where the Rules have made a specific provision
in which event the administrative instructions
cannot transgress a rule which is being made in
pursuance of the power conferred under Article 309
of the Constitution. For instance, if the Rules were
to provide that there would be a minimum eligibility
requirement only in the written test, conceivably, it
may not be open to prescribe a minimum eligibility
requirement in the viva voce by an administrative
instruction. Similarly, if the Rules were to
provide that the eligibility cut-off would be
taken on the basis of the overall marks which
are obtained in both the written test and
the viva voce, conceivably, it would not be open
to the administrative instructions to modify the
terms.”[emphasis supplied]
24. In the present case, the Resolution (12.1.2015)
prescribing qualifying marks for viva voce is not a case of
Page 17 of 26
supplementing the rules but appears to us as a case wherethe Rules pertaining to the final selection of candidates,
have been substituted. Therefore, the decision in Kavita
Khamboj(supra) is clearly distinguishable.
25. On the other hand, the decision in Sivanandan C.T.
(supra), is squarely applicable to the facts of the present
case. In that case, the Court held that the Kerala High
Court erred in fixing the minimum cut-off contrary to Rule
2(c)(iii) of Kerala State Higher Judicial Service Special
Rules,1961 which provided that the aggregate of the
written test and the viva voce would be taken into
consideration for appointment. There also, the Rules were
subsequently amended in 2017 to prescribe minimum cut-
off of 35% in the viva voce. It is essential to note that while
the intention for introducing a minimum cut-off through
the High Court Resolution may be bona fide, in the present
case, it is not grounded in legality as it cannot override the
statutory rules. The minimum marks for interview was
prescribed through a High Court Resolution without
amending the rules.
Page 18 of 26
26. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the
executive instructions cannot override statutory Rules
where the method of final selection by combining the
cumulative grade value obtained in the written and the
viva voce examinations is specified categorically. Issue A is
answered accordingly.
Issue B
27. The second issue that falls for our consideration is
whether the High Court’s decision frustrates the substantive
legitimate expectation of the petitioner. In Sivanandan CT
(supra), a constitution bench of five judges of this Court
speaking through Chandrachud DYC J. succinctly
explained the principle as under:
“40. The principle of fairness in action requires that
public authorities be held accountable for their
representations, since the State has a profound impact
on the lives of citizens. Good administration requires
public authorities to act in a predicable manner and
honour the promises made or practices established
unless there is a good reason not to do so.
In Nadarajah [R. (Nadarajah) v. Secy. of State for the
Home Deptt., 2005 EWCA Civ 1363] , Laws, L.J. held
that the public authority should objectively justify thatPage 19 of 26
there is an overriding public interest in denying a
legitimate expectation. We are of the opinion that for a
public authority to frustrate a claim of legitimate
expectation, it must objectively demonstrate by placing
relevant material before the court that its decision was
in the public interest. This standard is consistent with
the principles of good administration which require
that State actions must be held to scrupulous
standards to prevent misuse of public power and
ensure fairness to citizens.
“45. The underlying basis for the application of the
doctrine of legitimate expectation has expanded and
evolved to include the principles of good
administration. Since citizens repose their trust in the
State, the actions and policies of the State give rise to
legitimate expectations that the State will adhere to its
assurance or past practice by acting in a consistent,
transparent, and predictable manner. The principles of
good administration require that the decisions of public
authorities must withstand the test of consistency,
transparency, and predictability to avoid being regarded
as arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14.”
28. The Court therein observed that an individual who
claims a benefit or entitlement based on the doctrine of
legitimate expectation has to establish : (i) the legitimacy
of the expectation; and (ii) that the denial of the legitimate
expectation led to a violation of Article 14.
Page 20 of 26
29. Let us now apply the above principle to the present
case. The unamended MJS Rules, 2005 generated a
legitimate expectation in the candidate that the merit list
would be drawn based on the aggregate of the total marks
secured both in the written examination and the viva voce
examination. Moreover, the petitioner had no notice about
the minimum cut-off for the viva-voce segment which was
introduced just on the eve of the viva-voce test, well after
the conclusion of written examination. If the candidate had
been informed in advance, he could have prepared
accordingly, ensuring a fair and predictable process.
30. The petitioner in this case, is on a similar footing as the
petitioners in Sivandandan CT (supra) where it was noted
as under:
“13. In the above backdrop, it is evident that when the
process of selection commenced, all the candidates
were put on a notice of the fact that : (i) the merit list
would be drawn up on the basis of the aggregate
marks obtained in the written examination and viva
voce; (ii) candidates whose marks were at least at the
prescribed minimum in the written examination
would qualify for the viva voce; and (iii) there was no
cut-off applicable in respect of the marks to bePage 21 of 26
obtained in the viva voce while drawing up the merit
list in the aggregate.”
31. In the present case, no notice was given to the petitioner
regarding the imposition of minimum 40% marks for
interview. Prescribing minimum marks for viva voce
segment may be justified for the holistic assessment of a
candidate, but in the present case such a requirement was
introduced only after commencement of the recruitment
process and in violation of the statutory rules. The decision
of the Full Court to depart from the expected exercise of
preparing the merit list as per the unamended Rules is
clearly violative of the substantive legitimate expectation of
the petitioners. It also fails the tests of fairness,
consistency, and predictability and hence is violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
32. Before we conclude, we may also advert to the contention
that after participating in the recruitment process, the
unsuccessful candidates cannot turn around and challenge
the recruitment process6. We are of the view that it is equally
6 Madan Lal v. State of J&K (1995) 3 SCC 486; Dhananjay Malik v. State of
Uttaranchal (2008) 4 SCC 171; Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi (2013)
11 SCC 309 ; Anupal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC 173
Page 22 of 26
well-settled that the principle of estoppel cannot override the
law7. Such legal principle was reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Dr.(Major) Meeta Sahai Vs. Union of India8 where it
was observed as under:
“17. However, we must differentiate from this principle
insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the
selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure
and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a
candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and
discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the
same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate
has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is
sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is
impermissible. In fact, a candidate may not have locus to
assail the incurable illegality or derogation of the
provisions of the Constitution, unless he/she
participates in the selection process.”
33. In light of the above discussion, the opinion of Justice
Shiva Kirti Singh is upheld. This Court is not in agreement
with the opinion rendered by Justice Banumathi.
34. The petitioner, is therefore, entitled to be declared
successful in the recruitment test. It is also noteworthy that
despite getting more than 50% marks in the written exam,
7 Krishna Rai v Banaras Hindu University (2022) 8 SCC 713
8 (2019) 20 SCC 17
Page 23 of 26
he was only called for the interview round after he filed aRight to Information (RTI) Application to know his marks. A
corrigendum was later issued by the High Court in this
regard.
35. It would be unjustified to deny the sole SC candidate,
who successfully qualified both the written exam and the
interview, in accordance with the then existing rules.
36. Following the above conclusion and to avoid disturbing
the seniority of those who are already serving in the same
cadre vis-à-vis the petitioner who is found entitled to
recruitment, the following order is passed:
I. The High Court should declare the petitioner to be
successful by virtue of his scoring 50.6% in aggregate
marks in the recruitment tests. He be issued
appointment order. However, the appointed petitioner will
be entitled to seniority only from the date of his
appointment. The petitioner shall not be entitled to any
actual monetary benefits for any period prior to his
appointment.
Page 24 of 26
II. The appointee should be given notional seniority from
the year 2015 when the interview was conducted. It is
however made clear that this notional seniority is only for
the purpose of superannuation benefits.
III. The above directions be implemented within four
weeks from today.
37. The matter stands disposed of and answered on the
above terms. Parties to bear their own cost.
………………..……….………….. J.
[HRISHIKESH ROY ]
..…………………………………… J.
[ SUDHANSHU DHULIA ]
………………….…………………. J.
[ S.V.N. BHATTI ]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 22, 2024
Page 25 of 26
ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.5 SECTION X
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s).294/2015
SALAM SAMARJEET SINGH Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR AT IMPHAL & ANR. Respondent(s)
([ TO GO BEFORE THREE HON'BLE JUDGES ]
IA No. 4/2017 – APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS
IA No. 3/2016 – DIRECTION
IA No. 1/2015 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDL. DOCUMENT)
Date : 22-08-2024 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.V.N. BHATTIFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Adv.
Mr. Ahanthem Romen Singh, Adv.
Ms. Oindriala Sen, Adv.
Mr. Mohan Singh, Adv
Mr. Aniket Rajput, Adv.
Ms. Khoisnam Nirmala Devi, Adv.
Mr. Rajiv Mehta, AOR
For Respondent(s)
Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Maibam Nabaghanashyam Singh, AOR
Ms. Kavya Jhawar, Adv.
Ms. Nandini Rai, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E RThe Writ Petition is disposed of in terms of the
reportable judgment.
Pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
(DEEPAK JOSHI) (KAMLESH RAWAT) ASST. REGISTRAR-cum-PS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the File)
Page 26 of 26