Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sandeep@Baru vs State Of Haryana on 5 September, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:116459
216
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-35672-2024
Date of Decision:05.09.2024
Sandeep @ Baru ...Petitioner
vs.
State of Haryana ...Respondent
Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat
Present : Mr. Arpinder Singh Sidhu, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Ms. Sheenu Sura, Deputy Advocate General, Haryana.
***
N.S.Shekhawat J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has filed the second petition under Section 439 of
Cr.P.C with a prayer to grant regular bail to him in case FIR No. 344 dated
28.07.2021, registered under Section 346 of IPC and Section 302,201,506 of
IPC added later on Police Station City Tohana, District Fatehabad
(Annexure P-1).
2. A status report by way of an affidavit of Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Tohana, Fatehabad has been filed on behalf of respondent-State and the
same is taken on record.
3. The FIR in the present case was registered on the basis of the
complaint filed by Jagga Singh son of Amrit Kaur, since deceased. As per the
complainant, his father Mithu Singh had died about 01 year ago and his mother
Amrit Kaur was handicapped from her both legs. About 06/07 months ago,
Sandeep @ Baru, petitioner started residing with his mother in a live-in-
relationship and the petitioner used to suspect the character of his
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mother and used to beat her up. At about 01/02:00 P.M on 27.07.2021, the
complainant and his sister were at home and the petitioner had taken away his
mother on motorcycle for withdrawing the money. When his mother did not
reach home, he searched for her and ultimately, on his application, the FIR
under Section 346 IPC was registered. Later on, on 05.08.2021, the complainant
came to know that the police of Police Station Sadar Dabwali had cremated one
dead body, after getting the post mortem examination conducted from the
doctor. The complainant along with other family members reached the police
station and identified the photograph of his mother, Amrit Kaur.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has
been involved in the present case only on the basis of suspicion and there is no
evidence against him. He further contends that on 06.08.2021, the statement of
Jagga Singh and Sukhchain Singh were recorded and in their supplementary
statements they had stated that on 06.08.2021, the petitioner had met them and
had allegedly discussed that he had killed Amrit Kaur by pushing her in a canal
on 27.07.2021. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the
petitioner had no reason to confess his crime before the complainant and his
uncle and except the statement made before them, there is no evidence against
the petitioner. He further contends that even as per the medical evidence, there
were no injuries on the person of Amrit Kaur and the petitioner has been falsely
involved in the present case. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner
was arrested in the present case on 06.08.2021 and is in custody for the last 03
years and 01 month. He further contends that only 02 witnesses out of total 24
witnesses have been examined so far and the conclusion of the trial may take
quite a long time.
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5. On the other hand, learned State counsel has vehemently opposed
the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the
petitioner is the only principal accused, who had pushed his wife Amrit Kaur in
a canal and killed her. Thus, the present petition deserves to be dismissed by
this Court.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record carefully.
7. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
“Ranjan Dwivedi Vs. CBI, through the Director General, 2012(8) SCC 495;
2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 880” as follows:-
“14. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (supra), another
Constitution Bench considered the right to speedy trial and opined
that the delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case,
because reasons for delay will vary. This Court held :
“84. The right to a speedy trial is a derivation from a
provision of Magna Carta. This principle has also been
incorporated into the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776
and from there into the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution of United States of America which reads, “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial…”. It may be pointed out, in this
connection, that there is a Federal Act of 1974 called
‘Speedy Trial Act’ establishing a set of time-limits for
carrying out the major events, e.g., information, indictment,
arraignment, in the prosecution of criminal cases. [See
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. page 1400].
85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to
minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation
and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an3 of 9
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accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest
in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in
the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In
fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing
of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay
stating that the invocation of this right even need not await
formal indictment or charge.
86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right
to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by
arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may
result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time
of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a
finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that
the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly
reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary,
AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1360, State of Bihar while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed
thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick
trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would
fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
The question which would, however, arise is as to what
would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence
is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his
liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in4 of 9
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violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would
he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the
charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him
after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after
such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (I), (2)
Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar,
(3) Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar, Patna, (4) Hussainara Khatoon (VI) v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, (5) Kadra
Pahadia v. State of Bihar (II), (6) T.V. Vatheeswaran v.
State of T.N., and (7) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.
88. Thus this Court by a line of judicial pronouncements has
emphasised and re-emphasised that speedy trial is one of the
facets of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined
in Article 21 and the law must ensure ‘reasonable, just and
fair’ procedure which has a creative connotation after the
decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi.”
The Court further observed :
“92. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass
scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon
the show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases.
On the other hand, the court has to adopt a balancing
approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and
disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable
delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal
proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy
trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by
the factors – (1) length of delay, (2) the justification for the
delay, (3) the accused’s assertion of his right to speedy trial,
and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay.
However, the fact of delay is dependent on the
circumstances of each case because reasons for delay will5 of 9
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vary, such as delay in investigation on account of the
widespread ramification of crimes and its designed network
either nationally or internationally, the deliberate absence of
witness or witnesses, crowded dockets on the file of the
court etc.”
8. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu and
others v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1978 SC 429 has held as under:-
“Bail or Jail”- at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage – largely
hinged on judicial discretion. The learned Judge held that
personal liberty was too precious a value of our constitutional
system recognised under Article 21 that the crucial power to
negate it was a great trust exercisable not casually but judicially,
with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the
community. It was further held that deprivation of personal
freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations
relevant to the welfare objectives of society specified in the
Constitution. The learned Judge quoted Lord Russel who had said
that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment and that the
requirements as to bail were merely to secure the attendance of the
prisoner at trial. According to V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., the principal
rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of
the applicant to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of
the Court punishing him with imprisonment. After holding that it
makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to
prepare and present his case than one remanded in custody the
learned Judge observed that if public justice is to be promoted
mechanical detention should be demoted.
9. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc Vs The State of Punjab, AIR
1980 SC 1632, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“Judges have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful of
the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions.
The Court has also observed that in which case bail should be
granted and in which case it should be refused is a matter of6 of 9
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discretion. The court found it interesting to note that as long back
as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra
Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1924 Calcutta 476, that the object of bail
was to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the
proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether
bail should be granted or refused was whether it was probable that
the party would appear to take his trial and that it was
indisputable that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment. The
Supreme Court also referred to the observation of the Allahabad
High Court in K.N. Joglekar Vs. Emperor, AIR 1931 Allahabad
504, that Section 498 of the Old Code which corresponds to
Section 439 of the New Code, conferred upon the Sessions Judge
or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not
handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which
corresponds to the present Section 437. The Allahabad High Court
had also observed that there was no hard and fast rule and no
inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion
conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously.
The Supreme Court referred also the decision of the Allahabad
High Court in Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson, AIR 1931
Allahabad 356, wherein it was held that the principle to be
deduced from the various sections in the Cr.P.C. was that grant of
bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, that as a presumably
innocent person, the accused person is entitled to freedom and
every opportunity to look after his own case and to establish his
innocence and that an accused person who enjoys freedom is in a
much better position to look after his case and to properly defend
himself than if he were in custody. The High Court had also held
that it would be very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any
particular rules which would bind the High Court, having regard
to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court
unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that
may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is7 of 9
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dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that
in particular classes bail may be granted but not in other classes.
The Supreme Court apparently approved the above views and
observations and held (vide paragraph 30) as follows :
“It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or
not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances,
the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial
verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of
universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or
refusal of bail.”
10. At this stage, it is observed that the object of the bail is to secure
the presence of the accused at the trial only. It is also observed that the object of
bail is neither punitive nor preventive and deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person
will stand his trial when called upon. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed
in catena of judgments that when a person is punished by denial of bail in
respect of any matter upon which he has not been convicted it would be
contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution except
in cases where there is reason to believe that he may influence the witnesses. It
is appropriate to say that pre-conviction detention should not be resorted to,
except in cases of necessity to secure attendance at the trial or upon material
that the accused will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty.
11. In the present case, the petitioner was arrested on 06.08.2021 and is
in custody for the last 03 years and 01 month. Further, the prosecution has been
able to examine only 02 witnesses out of total 24 witnesses and the trial is
progressing at snail’s pace. No doubt, the allegations levelled against the
petitioner are very serious, however, he cannot be incarcerated for an indefinite
period as an undertrial prisoner.
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12. Without commenting on the merits of the case, the present petition
is allowed. The petitioner is ordered to be released on bail pending trial on his
furnishing bail bonds and surety to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court/
Duty Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate.
(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
05.09.2024 JUDGE
hitesh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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