Supreme Court of India
Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 19 September, 2024
Author: Sanjay Kumar
Bench: Sanjay Kumar
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REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 723
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2030/2024
SANTOSH @ RAJESH @ GOPAL ..... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ..... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G E M E N T
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
Five individuals, namely, Laadkunwar Bai, Jitendra Singh,
Nirbhay Singh @ Rajesh Mama, Meharban Singh and the appellant,
Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, were prosecuted for the murder of
Narayan Singh in the chargesheet arising out of First
Information Report No. 640/2011 dated 13.11.2011, registered
with Police Station – Industrial Area, District Dewas, Madhya
Pradesh, for offence(s) punishable under Sections 302, 34 and
120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 25(1-B)(A) of
the Arms Act, 1959.
2. Three out of these five persons are related to the victim,
Narayan Singh. Laadkunwar Bai and Jitendra Singh are the wife
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
and son of the victim, Narayan Singh. Meharban Singh is the
babita pandey
Date: 2024.09.23
17:24:14 IST
Reason:
father-in-law of Jitendra Singh, the son of Narayan Singh. The
remaining two persons, namely, Nirbhay Singh and the
2appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, are allegedly hired
killers.
3. On 30.11.2017, the trial court acquitted Laadkunwar Bai and
Meharban Singh. However, Nirbhay Singh @ Rajesh Mama, Jitendra
Singh, and the appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, were
convicted.
4. Following this, Nirbhay Singh @ Rajesh Mama, Jitendra Singh,
and the appellant filed appeals before the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Indore. During the pendency of the appeal,
Nirbhay Singh @ Rajesh Mama passed away, resulting in the
dismissal of his appeal as abated.
5. By the impugned judgment dated 18.10.2022, Jitendra Singh has
been acquitted. His acquittal has not been challenged.
However, the conviction of the appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @
Gopal, was upheld, prompting him to file the present appeal.
6. The prosecution’s case, in brief, is that on 13.11.2011, at
9.30 p.m., Rachna Bai, the mother of the victim, Narayan
Singh, deposed as PW-2 that both she and Narayan Singh were
sleeping at their house in Village Binjana, District Dewas,
Madhya Pradesh. Someone called out Narayan Singh’s name from
outside, prompting him to open the door. At that moment,
Rachna Bai (PW-2) heard a gunshot. She ran towards Narayan
Singh, and shortly after, a second gunshot was fired, striking
Narayan Singh in the chest, and causing him to fall. When
Rachna Bai (PW-2) went outside, she saw her daughter-in-law,
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Laadkunwar Bai (Narayan Singh’s wife), and Jitendra Singh
(Narayan Singh’s son) standing on the opposite side of the
house. She also saw two individuals with their faces covered
fleeing the scene on a motorcycle.
7. The prosecution’s primary evidence against the appellant,
Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, also referenced in the impugned
judgment, is the recovery (Exhibit P-6) of a pistol and the
ballistic report (Exhibit P-57), which confirms that the
bullet (Exhibit B-1) recovered from the body of the victim,
Narayan Singh, was fired from the country-made pistol (Exhibit
A-1 and C-1). There is evidence to show that the pistol was
recovered (Exhibit P-6) from the appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @
Gopal, and we would accept the said version of the
prosecution.
8. There are no eyewitnesses to the crime, implicating the
appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal. The case against the
appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, rests entirely on
circumstantial evidence.
9. Where the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, a
finding of guilt is justified only if all the incriminating
facts and circumstances are incompatible with the accused’s
innocence. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence
so far complete, such that every hypothesis is excluded but
the one proposed to be proved and such circumstances must show
that the act has been done by the accused within all human
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probability.1
10. In Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharasthra,2 this
Court outlined five essential principles, often referred to as
the “golden rules”, which must be satisfied for circumstantial
evidence to conclusively establish the guilt of the accused:
“(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused.”
11. The ballistic report (Exhibit P-57) connects the pistol
recovered (Exhibit P-6) from the appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @
Gopal, with the bullet (Exhibit B-1) recovered from the body
of the victim, Narayan Singh. This is an inculpatory fact.
However, it is also the prosecution’s case that the said
1 Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 2 SCC 71.
2 (1984) 4 SCC 116.
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discovery and recovery is attributable to the disclosure
statement (Exhibit P-35) provided by the co-accused, Nirbhay
Singh (since deceased). Such discovery and recovery at the
instance of an accused are governed by Sections 83 and 274 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 18725.
12. This Court, in Perumal Raja v. State, Represented By Inspector
of Police,6 has referred to Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of
Maharashtra,7 which elucidated the conditions required to be
satisfied under Section 27:
“Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception
to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. It
makes that part of the statement which distinctly
leads to discovery of a fact in consequence of
the information received from a person accused of
an offence, to the extent it distinctly relates
to the fact thereby discovered, admissible in
evidence against the accused. The fact which is
discovered as a consequence of the information
given is admissible in evidence. Further, the
fact discovered must lead to recovery of a3 Section 8 of the Evidence Act reads:
“8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct.— Any fact is relevant
which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or
relevant fact. The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any
suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to
any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an
offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such
conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and
whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.”4 Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads:
“27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.— Provided that,
when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much
of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”5 For short, “Evidence Act”.
6 [2024] 1 SCR 87.
7 (1976) 1 SCC 828.
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physical object and only that information which
distinctly relates to that discovery can be
proved.”
The word, “distinctly”, used in Section 27 relates to the
discovered fact. Only that much which relates to the discovery
of a physical object is admissible. The rest of the testimony
is to be excluded. The facts proved by the prosecution,
particularly the admissible portion of the statement of the
accused, would give rise to two alternative hypotheses,
namely, (i) that the accused had himself deposited the
physical items that were recovered; or (ii) only the accused
knew that the physical items were lying at that place. The
second hypothesis is wholly compatible with the innocence of
the accused, whereas the first would be a factor to show the
involvement of the accused in the offence. The court has to
analyse which of the hypotheses should be accepted in a
particular case. Further, a fact already known to the police
is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
13. As the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-35) has led to the
arrest of the appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, the
prosecution may take the benefit of Section 8 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. However, even assuming this to be the
case, the absence of any corroborative evidence directly
linking the appellant to the crime introduces a significant
gap in facts as alleged in the chain of circumstances. In our
view, this fails to establish a hypothesis of guilt that
conclusively excludes all other reasonable possibilities.
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14. This Court, in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh,8 observed that
when any incriminating material is discovered based on a
disclosure statement, three hypotheses emerge: –
“26. We too countenance three possibilities when
an accused points out the place where a dead body
or an incriminating material was concealed
without stating that it was concealed by himself.
One is that he himself would have concealed it.
Second is that he would have seen somebody else
concealing it. And the third is that he would
have been told by another person that it was
concealed there…”
15. In the present context, it is the prosecution’s case that the
location of the pistol was disclosed by the co-accused,
Nirbhay Singh (since deceased). However, to establish that the
appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, participated in the
murder, the prosecution must present further material and
evidence linking the appellant to the actual crime. While the
appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, may be guilty of an
offence under Section 201 of the IPC, the evidence provided by
the prosecution is insufficient to secure a conviction for the
murder of the victim, Narayan Singh, on 13.11.2011.
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to prove that the
appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, is guilty of murder,
either individually or with shared common intention or in
conspiracy with the co-accused, Nirbhay Singh @ Rajesh Mama
(now deceased).
8 (2000) 1 SCC 471.
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16. We, therefore, allow the present appeal and set aside the
conviction of the appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal. The
appellant, Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, was granted bail by this
Court on suspension of sentence, vide order dated 08.04.2024.
The bail bonds and sureties furnished by the appellant,
Santosh @ Rajesh @ Gopal, shall be treated as cancelled.
17. The impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
……………J.
(SANJAY KUMAR)
……………J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 19, 2024.