Supreme Court of India
Shento Varghese vs Julfikar Husen on 13 May, 2024
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
2024 INSC 407 Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2531-2532 OF 2024
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) NOS.10504-10505 OF 2023)
SHENTO VARGHESE …APPELLANT
VERSUS
JULFIKAR HUSEN & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
JUDGEMENT
Aravind Kumar J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred at the instance of the first
informant in Crime No.318 of 2022. By the impugned order dated
09.08.2023, passed in Crl. O.P. Nos.14029 & 14031 of 2023 and Crl. M.P.
Nos.8658 of 2023, the High Court of Madras has allowed the claim of the
Respondents-accused for de-freezing of their bank accounts. The High
Court has ordered for de-freezing on the specific ground that there was delay
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Indu Marwah
Date: 2024.05.13
on part of the police in reporting the seizure to the jurisdictional Magistrate.
14:49:14 IST
Reason:
1
The facts in the instant case, which we shall advert to later below, have given
rise to following question of law:
What is the implication of non-reporting of the seizure
forthwith to the jurisdictional Magistrate as provided
under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C.?
more specifically;
Does delayed reporting of the seizure to the Magistrate
vitiate the seizure order altogether?
That is the question which needs to be answered in these appeals.
3. Our research indicates that there is no authoritative pronouncement
of this Court on this issue. If we turn to the pronouncements of the High
Courts, there are decisions1 which have directly confronted this question.
Having reviewed these decisions, we find that, broadly, there are two
prevailing strands of thought: one set of cases holding that delayed reporting
to the Magistrate would, ipso facto, vitiate the seizure order; and the other
view being that delayed reporting would constitute a mere irregularity and
would not vitiate the seizure order.
4. The former view has been justified on the grounds that:
(a) the obligation [u/S 102(3) Cr.P.C.] to report the seizure
forthwith to the Magistrate is mandatory and non-negotiable,
breach of which would qualify as an illegality in following
the prescribed statutory procedure2;
(b) the employment of the word ‘shall’ in Section 102(3) makes
it clear that non-compliance of the mandatory requirement to
report forthwith to the Magistrate goes to the root of the
matter3;
1
See Table at Annexure A for a compilation of the 36 decisions on this issue.
2
Tmt. T .Subbulakshmi vs The Commissioner of Police 2013(4) MLJ (Crl) 41
3
The Meridian Educational Society Vs. The State of Telangana, 2022 1 ALT(Cri) 229
2
(c) the power to seize has been subjected to procedural
requirements prescribed under Section 102(3) – and
breach of complying with follow-up procedures would
render the exercise of the main power to be without
authority and jurisdiction – in that sense, the
requirement to report is in the nature of a condition
subsequent clause.4
5. The latter view has been sustained on the reasoning that:
a) The statutory provision provides no express consequence(s)
for non-compliance and therefore, the procedural requirement is
merely directory and not mandatory5;
b) The power to seize property connected with a crime is
plenary and the obligation to intimate is a mere incidental exercise
of power – breach of the latter cannot affect the former6;
c) the object of reporting is to facilitate disposal of property
seized – prejudice caused by delayed reporting, if any, can always
be demonstrated at the trial7;
d) Neither is there any obligation to seek prior leave before
exercising the power to seize nor is there any statutorily provided
consequence for non-compliance of the reporting obligation8;
e) No prejudice would be caused to the owner of a property by
non-reporting of seizure to the concerned Magistrate during the
investigation phase.
Therefore, it cannot be a case of illegality but such an omission
may only be an irregularity.9
4
Dr Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2008 CRL.L.J. 148
5
Ruqaya Akhter Vs Ut Through Crime Branch, CRM(M) No.223/2022, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh
High Court.
6
Operation Mobilization India Vs. State of Telangana 2021 SCC OnLine TS 1529
7
Bharath Overseas Bank Vs. Minu Publication [1988] MLJ (Crl.) 309
8
Supra, 7
9
Supra, 5
3
6. In light of conflicting precedents operating across various High
Courts, we find it expedient and necessary to settle the conflict and bring in
uniformity in adjudication.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Criminal Relevant Provision
Procedure
Codes
188210 Section 523- Procedure by police upon seizure of property taken
under Section 51 or stolen
The seizure by any Police-officer of property taken under Section 51, or
alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or found under circumstances
which create suspicion of the commission of any offence, shall be
forthwith reported to a magistrate, who shall make such order as he thinks
fit respecting the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the
possession thereof, or, if such person cannot be ascertained, respecting
the custody and production of such property.
189811 Section 550- Powers to police to seize property suspected to be stolen:
Any police-office may seize any property which may be alleged or
suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under
circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence.
Such police-officer, if subordinate to the office in charge of a police
station, shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer.
197312 102. Power of police officer to seize certain property.—(1) Any police
officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have
been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create
suspicion of the commission of any offence.
(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police
station, shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer
(3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report
the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property
seized is such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the Court, [or
where there is difficulty in securing proper accommodation for the
custody of such property, or where the continued retention of the property
in police custody may not be considered necessary for the purpose of
investigation,] he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing
a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when
required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the
disposal of the same:
10
Hereinafter referred to as “1882 Code”.
11
Hereinafter referred to as “1898 Code”.
12
Hereinafter referred to as “1973 Code”.
4
[Provided that where the property seized under sub-section (1) is subject
to speedy and natural decay and if the person entitled to the possession
of such property is unknown or absent and the value of such property is
less than five hundred rupees, it may forthwith be sold by auction under
the orders of the Superintendent of Police and the provisions of Sections
457 and 458 shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the net
proceeds of such sale.]
202313 106. (1) Any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged
or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under
circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence.
(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police
station, shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer.
(3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report
the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property
seized is such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the Court, or
where there is difficulty in securing proper accommodation for the
custody of such property, or where the continued retention of the property
in police custody may not be considered necessary for the purpose of
investigation, he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing
a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when
required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the
disposal of the same: Provided that where the property seized under sub-
section (1) is subject to speedy and natural decay and if the person
entitled to the possession of such property is unknown or absent and the
value of such property is less than five hundred rupees, it may forthwith
be sold by auction under the orders of the Superintendent of Police and
the provisions of Sections 505 and 506 shall, as nearly as may be
practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale.
7. The responsibility of the police officer to promptly inform the
Magistrate about the seizure can be historically traced to the 1882 Code.
Oddly enough, this provision was absent in the 1898 Code. In the 1898
Code, however, it was provided that if the seizing officer was below the rank
of an officer-in charge of a police station, then such officer was under a duty
to give information to his superior regarding the seized property. It appears
that the provision as it existed in the 1898 Code was retained as is in the
13
Hereinafter referred to as the “2023 Code”.
5
1973 Code. Sub-section (3) to Section 102 was inserted by way of an
amendment only in the year 1978. This amendment reintroduced the
reporting obligations of police officer to the Magistrate, as it originally
existed in the 1882 Code. It also empowered the seizing officer to give
custody of the seized property to any person, on such person executing a
bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when
required. There was no provision in the 1973 Code nor the 1898 Code till
the insertion of sub-section (3) by an amendment in 1978, empowering the
police to take a bond from a person undertaking to produce the property
entrusted to him by the police later on before the Court. The law as it existed
then was that the bond could be entered before the Court but not in favour
of the police. While setting aside the order of forfeiture in regard to the bond
in favour of the police, this Court in Anwar Ahmad v State of UP14, pointed
out the lacuna in the 1973 Code and suggested the insertion of a suitable
provision. That is why this sub-section (3) empowering the police to execute
the bond under certain conditionalities came to be inserted by way of the
1978 Amendment. For the sake of completeness, it may be observed that
Section 102 Cr.P.C. in its present form has been retained as is in the 2023
Code, which is scheduled to come into force on 1st July 2024 and replace the
1973 Code.
14
AIR 1976 SC 680
6
8. The Notes on Clauses appended to the 1978 Bill had set out the
following reasons for inserting sub section (3) to Section 102 Cr.P.C.:
“Clause 10- Section 102 is being amended (1) to provide that the
police officer shall forthwith report the seizure of any property
under sub-section (1) to the Magistrate, as there is a lacuna in the
Law and (2) to give effect to the observations of the Supreme Court
made in Anwar Ahmad vs. the State of U.P. (AIR 1976 SC 680) that
the police should be given the power to get a bond from the person
to whom the property seized is entrusted, particularly in cases
where a bulky property like elephant or car, is seized and the
Magistrate is living at a great distance and it is difficult to produce
the property seized before the Magistrate.”
9. The reason cited for inserting the amendment was to overcome a
‘lacuna’ in the law. What could have been the lacuna in the law that impelled
the insertion of this amendment?
10. In our view, the answer to this question can be derived by referring
to the provisions in Chapter XXXIV of the 1973 Code which is titled as
‘Disposal of Property’. Section 457 Cr.P.C. sets out the procedure to be
followed by police upon seizure of the property. Sub section (1) begin with
the words: ‘Whenever the seizure of property by any police officer is
reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this Code, and such
property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or
trial…..”. Similarly, we may refer to Section 459 Cr.P.C. which empowers
the Magistrate with the power to auction/sell seized property in certain
situations. It begins with the words: ‘If the person entitled to the possession
7
of such property is unknown or absent and the property is subject to speedy
and natural decay, or if the Magistrate to whom its seizure is reported is of
opinion that……”.
11. Both, Section 457 Cr.P.C. and Section 459 Cr.P.C. contemplates the
act of seizure by police to be reported to the Magistrate so that necessary
steps could be taken for its custody and disposal. However, the provision
[Section 102(1) Cr.P.C.] which conferred substantive power on the police to
seize property linked to a crime, did not impose on such officers a
consequent duty to report the seizures made to the Magistrate. Section 523
in the 1882 Code had coupled the power to seize property linked to the crime
and the duty to report forthwith the seizure to the Magistrate in the same
provision. Since the relevant provisions in the 1898 Code and the 1973 Code
provided only for the substantive power to seize and did not impose any duty
on such seizing officer to report to the Magistrate, there arose a need for
amendment. That appears to us to be the lacuna in the law which was sought
to be overcome. In fact, there are several decisions which indicate that the
purpose of reporting to the Magistrate is to ensure an order of the disposal
of the seized property either on superdari, or otherwise, during the pendency
of the case/investigations under Section 457 Cr.P.C. This further reinforces
our view regarding the lacuna which was sought to be fixed. Therefore, the
8
main object underlying the amendment appears to be a mere gap-filling
exercise and an attempt to fix a basic omission in legislative drafting.
12. It is in this background that we must consider whether ‘seizure
orders’ can be set at naught for non-compliance with the procedural
formality of reporting such seizure forthwith to the Magistrate.
13. This requires us to consider whether validity of the seizure order is
contingent on compliance with the reporting obligation? In our view, the
validity of the power exercised under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. is not
dependent on the compliance with the duty prescribed on the police officer
under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C. The validity of the exercise of power under
Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. can be questioned either on jurisdictional grounds or
on the merits of the matter. That is to say, the order of seizure can be
challenged on the ground that the seizing officer lacked jurisdiction 15 to act
under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. or that the seized item does not satisfy the
definition of ‘property’16 or on the ground that the property which was seized
could not have given rise to suspicion concerning the commission of a crime,
in order for the authorities to justify the seizure.17 The pre-requisite for
exercising powers under Section 102(1) is the existence of a direct link
between the tainted property and the alleged offence. It is essential that the
15
Nevada Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2019) 20 SCC 119
16
Ms Swaran Sabharwal Vs. Commissioner of Police, 1990 (68) Comp Cas 652 Delhi (DB)
17
State of Maharashtra Vs. Tapas D. Neogy, 1999/INSC/417
9
properties sought to be seized under Section 102(1) of the Cr.P.C. must have
a direct or close link with the commission of offence in question.18
14. As stated hereinbefore, the obligation to report the seizure to the
Magistrate is neither a jurisdictional pre-requisite for exercising the power
to seize nor is the exercise of such power made subject to compliance with
the reporting obligation. Contrast this with Section 105E Cr.P.C., 1973
which provides for similar power of seizure and attachment of property.
While Section 105E(1) confers the substantive power to make seizure under
circumstances provided in that section, sub-section (2) of Section 105E
declares that the order passed under Section 105E(1) ‘shall have no effect
unless the said order is confirmed by an order of the said Court, within a
period of thirty days of its being made’. In that sense, the order of seizure,
for it to take effect and have legal force, is subjected to a further statutory
requirement of the seizure order being confirmed by an order of Court. It is
only upon passing of the confirmation order within the stipulated period
does the order of seizure take effect. Until then, it remains an order in form
but without having any legal force.
15. We find that there are certain other provisions19 in the 1973 Code
which place similar obligation(s) on the police officer to report their actions
18
Supra, 17.
19
See, Section 168 Cr.P.C.
10
to the jurisdictional Magistrate. For example, Section 157 Cr.P.C. provides
that ‘if, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a
police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence……he
shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate’. As in the case of
Section 102(3) Cr.P.C., Section 157 Cr.P.C. does not provide for any
consequence in the event there is failure to promptly comply with the
reporting obligation. It would be helpful to understand how this Court has
elucidated on the effect of such non-compliance in the context of Section
157 Cr.P.C. since the provision is nearly pari materia with Section 102(3).
16. It is now too well settled that delay in registration of FIR is no
ground for quashing of the FIR itself.20 It follows as a corollary that if delay
in registration of FIR is no ground to quash the FIR, then delay in forwarding
such FIR to the Magistrate can also afford no ground for nullification of the
FIR. In fact, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that unless serious
prejudice is demonstrated to have been suffered as against the accused, mere
delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate by itself will not have any
deteriorating effect on the case of the prosecution.21 If prejudice is
demonstrated and the prosecution fails to explain the delay, then, at best, the
effect of such delay would only be to render the date and time of lodging the
20
Ravinder Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, (2001) 7 SCC 690
21
Supra, 20.
11
FIR suspect and nothing more.22 Drawing from this analogy, the delay in
reporting the seizure to the Magistrate may, subject to proof of prejudice, at
best, dent the veracity of the prosecution case vis-à-vis the date, time and
occasion for seizure of the property. Since the proof of prejudice on part of
the accused and the explanation for delay on part of the prosecution can only
be demonstrated at trial, the effect of non-compliance becomes an issue to
be adjudicated at the time of appreciation of evidence. Moreover, this Court
has consistently held that even illegalities in the investigation (including
illegality in search and seizures) is no ground for setting aside the
investigation in toto23.
17. In the background of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, the line of
precedents which have taken the position that ‘seizure orders’ are vitiated
for delay in compliance with the reporting obligation are declared to be
manifestly erroneous and are accordingly, overruled. The relevant question
to be determined was not whether the duty of the police to report the seizure
to the Magistrate is mandatory or directory. Instead, what ought to have been
inquired into was whether the exercise of the seizure power was subjected
to compliance of reporting obligation, as illustrated in Section 105E Cr.P.C.
22
Bhajan Singh and Ors. vs. State of Haryana, 2011/INSC/422
23
HN Rishbud v. State of Delhi (1954) 2 SCC 934
12
18. Merely because we have held that non reporting of the seizure
forthwith by the police officer to the jurisdictional court would not vitiate
the seizure order, it would not mean that there would be no consequence
whatsoever as regards the police officer, upon whom the law has enjoined a
duty to act in a certain way. Since there is an obligation cast on the officer
to report the seizure forthwith, it becomes necessary to understand the
meaning of the expression forthwith as used in Section 102(3) CrPC. For,
without a clear understanding of the said expression, the Magistrate would
not be in a position to determine whether the obligation cast on the police
officer has been properly complied with. In this background, the expression
‘shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate’ occurring in sub-
section (3) of the Section 102 requires to be examined.
19. The meaning of the word ‘forthwith’ as used in Section 102(3) has
not received judicial construction by this Court. However, this Court has
examined the scope and contours of this expression as it was used under the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971; Preventive Detention Act, 1950;
Section 157(1) of the Cr.P.C.; and Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social
Activities Act, 1985 in the case of Sk. Salim v. State of West Bengal24, Alla
24
(1975) 1 SCC 653 (para 10 and 11)
13
China Apparao and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh25 and Navalshankar
Ishwarlal Dave v. State of Gujarat26.
20. This Court, in Rao Mahmood Ahmad Khan v. Ranbir Singh27, has
held that the word ‘forthwith’ is synonymous with the word immediately,
which means with all reasonable quickness. When a statute requires
something to be done ‘forthwith’ or ‘immediately’ or even ‘instantly’, it
should probably be understood as allowing a reasonable time for doing it28.
21. The expression ‘forthwith’ has been defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary, 10th Edition as under:
“forthwith, adv. (14c) 1. Immediately; without delay. 2. Directly;
promptly; within a reasonable time under the circumstances; with
all convenient dispatch”Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 17th Edition describes ‘forthwith’ as extracted:
Forthwith, When a defendant is ordered to plead forthwith, he
must plead within twenty four hours. When a statute or rule of
Court requires an act to be done ‘forthwith’, it means that the act
is to be done within a reasonable time having regard to the object
of the provision and the circumstances of the case [Ex parte
Lamb, (1881) 19 Ch D 169; 2 Chit. Arch. Prac., 14th Edition]
22. From the discussion made above, it would emerge that the expression
‘forthwith’ means ‘as soon as may be’, ‘with reasonable speed and
25
(2002) 8 SCC 440 (para 9)
26
1993 Supp (3) SCC 754 (para 9)
27
1995 Supp (4) SCC 275
28
Bidya Deb Barma v. District Magistrate, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 82.
14
expedition’, ‘with a sense of urgency’, and ‘without any unnecessary delay’.
In other words, it would mean as soon as possible, judged in the context of
the object sought to be achieved or accomplished.
23. We are of the considered view that the said expression must receive
a reasonable construction and in giving such construction, regard must be
had to the nature of the act or thing to be performed and the prevailing
circumstances of the case. When it is not the mandate of the law that the act
should be done within a fixed time, it would mean that the act must be done
within a reasonable time. It all depends upon the circumstances that may
unfold in a given case and there cannot be a straight-jacket formula
prescribed in this regard. In that sense, the interpretation of the word
‘forthwith’ would depend upon the terrain in which it travels and would take
its colour depending upon the prevailing circumstances which can be
variable.
24. Therefore, in deciding whether the police officer has properly
discharged his obligation under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate would
have to, firstly, examine whether the seizure was reported forthwith. In doing
so, it ought to have regard to the interpretation of the expression, ‘forthwith’
as discussed above. If it finds that the report was not sent forthwith, then it
must examine whether there is any explanation offered in support of the delay.
15
If the Magistrate finds that the delay has been properly explained, it would
leave the matter at that. However, if it finds that there is no reasonable
explanation for the delay or that the official has acted with deliberate
disregard/ wanton negligence, then it may direct for appropriate departmental
action to be initiated against such erring official. We once again reiterate that
the act of seizure would not get vitiated by virtue of such delay, as discussed
in detail herein above.
25. Having clarified the applicable legal position above, we now
proceed to consider the facts in instant case.
26. The Respondents-accused is said to have placed an order for
purchase of forty-seven Kerala Model Gold Chains from the Appellant-first
informant, who worked as a deliveryman in a company called ‘PR Gold’. In
consideration for the supply of gold chains, the Respondents had agreed to
provide gold bars of equivalent value. The allegations in the complaint
suggest that the exchange took place on 20.12.2022. Shortly thereafter, the
Appellant learns that gold bars handed over to him were fake. On this basis,
the Appellant approached the police and lodged the first information report.
On registration of the first information report, the police initiated
investigation and during such investigation, it was noticed that certain
monies to the tune of Rs.19,83,036/- were deposited in the bank accounts of
Accused 1 and 3. On 09.01.2023, the investigating officer wrote to the bank
16
and ordered for freezing of their bank accounts. The order of freezing was
reported to the Magistrate on 27.01.2023. The Respondents had
unsuccessfully approached29 the jurisdictional Magistrate for taking custody
of the seized bank accounts. The Respondents then approached the High
Court by filing an original petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and sought for
de-freezing of the bank accounts. The High Court vide the impugned order
has allowed the application of the Respondents-accused for de-freezing of
the bank accounts, and therefore set at naught the seizure order on the sole
ground that the order of seizure was not forthwith reported to the Magistrate.
27. The reasoning adopted by the High Court cannot be sustained in the
light of aforestated discussion. This takes us to the consequential question,
namely, whether at this distance of time, we ought to direct freezing of the
bank accounts afresh? The answer has to be in the negative, since
undisputedly by virtue of the impugned order, the bank accounts of the
respondents has been defreezed and resultantly, the Respondents would have
operated the accounts and amount of Rs.19,83,036/- which had been frozen
would have been withdrawn. The ends of justice would be met and the interest
of prosecution would be served if the Respondents are called upon, forthwith,
to execute a bond undertaking to deposit the amount (which has been thus far
withdrawn from the seized bank accounts) before the jurisdictional Court in
29
Application under Section 457 – Cr. M.C 2032 of 2023 was filed.
17
the event the Court were to return a finding of guilt against the accused
persons. The Respondents would have to undertake to deposit the amount
within four weeks from the date on which the Court passes an order of
conviction. It is needless to say that the bond executed would stand discharged
if the accused persons are acquitted at the end of trial.
28. With these observations, appeals are allowed in part.
ANNEXURE ‘A’
CASES WHERE COURTS HAVE HELD THAT
BREACH OF REPORTING CONDITIONS IS ILLEGAL
S.No CASE CITATION COURT
1. Manish Khandelwal And Ors vs 2019 SCC OnLine Bom Bombay
The State of Maharashtra And Ors 1412 High Court
2. V Plus Technology Pvt Ltd vs The 2022/DHC/001595 Delhi HC
State (Nct Of Delhi) & Anr
3. Muktaben M. Mashru vs State Of 2019 SCC OnLine Del Delhi HC
Nct Of Delhi & Anr 11509
4. Tmt.T.Subbulakshmi vs The 2013(4)MLJ(Crl)41 Madras High
Commissioner of Police Court
5. Ms Swaran Sabharwal Versus 1990 (68) Comp Cas 652 Delhi High
Commissioner of Police Delhi (DB) Court
6. Uma Maheshwari Vs. The State 2013 SCC OnLine Mad Madras HC
Rep. By Inspector of Police, 3829
Central Crime Branch, Egmore,
Channai; Criminal O.P. No.15467
of 2013
7. The Meridian Educational Society 2022 1 ALT(Cri) 229 Telangana
Vs. The State of Telangana; Writ HC
Petition No.21106 of 2021
8. Padmini vs. Inspector of Police, 2008(3) Crimes 716 Madras HC
Tirunelveli (Mad.)
18
9. R. Chandrasekar vs. Inspector of 2003 Criminal Law Madras HC
Police, Salem Journal 294
10. Lathifa Vs. State of Karnataka 2012 Cri. L.J. 3487 Karnataka
High Court
11. B. Ranganathan Vs. State and Ors 2003 Crl.L.J 2779 Madras HC
12. Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. The State II(2007)BC337 Bombay HC
of Maharashtra
13. Karthika Agencies Export House vs W.P.No.17953 of 2021 Madras High
The Commissioner of Police Court
14. S. Ganapathi Vs. State and Ors. Crl.O.P.No.800 of 2014 Madras HC
15. R. Sivaraj Vs. State of Tamil Nadu Criminal O.P.Nos.576 Madras HC
and 577 of 2013
16. Shri. Vilas S/o. Prabhakar Dange Criminal Writ Petition Bombay HC
Vs. State of Maharashtra No. 1033/2017
17. Purbanchal Road Service, Gauhati 1991CRILJ2798 Gauhati High
VS State Court
18. S. T. Cleopatra VS Commissioner W.P.No.17953 of 2021 Madras HC
of Police, Chennai City, Vepery,
Chennai
19. Kiruthika Vs. State rep. by Crl.O.P.No.14733 of Madras HC
Inspector of Police and another 2021
20. Dr.Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. State 2008 CRL.L.J. 148 Bombay HC
Of Maharashtra
21. Ali Trading and Anr v The State of WA 296/2019 Gauhati HC
Assam
22. 2B. Kavitha v. Inspector of Police & Crl.OP. NO. 14824/2019 Madras HC
4ors
.
CASES WHERE THE COURT HAS HELD THE REPORTING
CONDITIONS ARE DIRECTORY AND NOT ILLEGAL
23. Dattasai (Kisan Seva Kendra) VS 2022 6 ALD 702 Telangana
State of Telangana HC
24. M/S SJS Gold Pvt. Ltd. Thru. Criminal Misc. Writ Allahabad
Director Sunil Jaihind Salunkhe & Petition No. – 3511 Of High Court
Anr V. State of UP 2022
25. Amit Singh vs State of U.P. And Criminal Misc. Writ Allahabad
Anr. Petition No. – 11201 Of High Court
202
26. Ruqaya Akhter Vs Ut Through CRM(M) No.223/2022 The Jammu
Crime Branch & Kashmir
19
and Ladakh
High Court
27. Narottam Singh Dhillon and Criminal Misc. No.43768 Punjab-
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blication
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36. Operation Mobilization India v. 2021 SCC OnLine TS Telangana
State of Telangana 1529: (2021) 1 HLT 81 HC
….…………………………….J.
(Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha)
…….………………………….J.
(Aravind Kumar)
New Delhi,
May 13, 2024
20