Supreme Court of India
Shoor Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand on 20 September, 2024
2024 INSC 713
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.249/2013
SHOOR SINGH & ANR. … Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND …Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
MANOJ MISRA, J.
1. This appeal is against the judgment and order of the High
Court1 dated 26.04.2012, whereby, while affirming the
conviction of the appellants under Sections 304-B and 498-
A IPC2, the appeal3 of the appellants was partly allowed
thereby reducing the sentence awarded by the Trial Court4
from 10 years to 7 years R.I. under Section 304-B IPC and
Signature Not Verified
1
The High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
2 2024.09.20
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Date:
19:01:15 IST
3
Reason:
Criminal Appeal No.87 of 2010
4
Sessions Judge, Pauri Gharwal
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 1 of 20
maintaining the sentence of 1 year R.I. under Section 498-AIPC.
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The appellants are father-in-law and mother-in-law,
respectively, of the deceased (Neelam), who was daughter of
Shanker Singh (PW-1) and Sarojini Devi (PW-2). The
deceased was married to appellants’ son Jitendra Singh (co-
accused) on 1.03.2006. On 30.12.2006, deceased gave birth
to a male child. Naming ceremony of the child was performed
on 11.01.2007. On 17.01.2007, deceased died at her
matrimonial home due to extensive burn injuries. Upon
being informed of her death, PW-1 lodged a first information
report5 (Ex. Ka-1) on the same day, inter alia, alleging that,-
when he along with PW-2 had visited deceased’s matrimonial
home on 4.1.2007, deceased’s father-in-law, mother-in-law,
brother-in-law (i.e., husband’s elder brother – not tried) and
sister-in-law (husband’s elder brother’s wife – not tried) had
told PW-1 and PW-2 that on the day of naming ceremony of
5
FIR
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 2 of 20
the child they would have to give a motor-cycle and cash of
Rs.50,000/-. Besides that, it was alleged that when PW-1
and PW-2 visited deceased’s matrimonial home on
11.01.2007, the deceased inquired from PW-1 and PW-2
whether they had brought motorcycle and cash. However,
when PW-1 expressed his inability to meet the demand, the
deceased told PW-1 that lot of pressure was being put on her
and if the demand is not met, she would be killed. With these
allegations, and by stating that accused had killed his
daughter on account of the demand being not met, PW-1
lodged the FIR, which was registered as case crime No.1 of
2007 at P.S. Langur Walla-2, district Pauri Garhwal, under
Sections 304-B, 498-A IPC and Sections 3/ 4 Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961, against three accused, namely,
Jitendra Singh (husband of the deceased) and the
appellants, who were all tried together by the Court of
Session, Pauri Garhwal in Sessions Trial No.25 of 2007.
3. During trial, prosecution examined 7 witnesses. PW-1 (the
first informant – father of the deceased); PW-2 (mother of the
deceased); and PW-3 (uncle of the deceased) were family
members of the deceased who proved the date of marriage
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 3 of 20
and alleged that the deceased was depressed on account of
the demand. PW-4 was the doctor who conducted autopsy
of the cadaver. He proved that the deceased had suffered
extensive ante-mortem burn injuries which resulted in her
death. PW-5 is cousin of the deceased who had arrived at
the spot along with PW-1 on receipt of information regarding
her death. He is also the inquest witness. PW-6 is the
Patwari who made GD entry of the FIR and took initial steps
of investigation such as preparation of inquest report and
dispatch of the cadaver for autopsy. PW-7 completed the
investigation and submitted charge-sheet. PW-7, inter alia,
stated that at the time of inquest the body of the deceased
was lying in the courtyard.
4. In their statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC6 the
accused admitted:
(a) the factum of marriage;
(b) the date of marriage;
(c) the date of childbirth;
6
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 4 of 20
(d) that parents of the deceased visited her matrimonial
home on 04.01.2007 to see their daughter and the
child; and
(e) that on 11.01.2007 child naming ceremony was
done.
The accused, however, denied demand of dowry/
motorcycle/ cash of Rs.50,000/- as well as harassment of
the deceased. Jitendra Singh (i.e., husband of the deceased)
stated that the deceased committed suicide due to
depression on account of staying separate from him as no
quarter was allotted to him, and also because a photograph
of her with a male stranger was found. He had also stated
that at the time of the incident he had gone to collect wood.
Accused Shoor Singh (appellant no.1 herein) added that he
had gone to Lansdowne at the time of incident. Similarly,
accused Gangotri Devi (appellant no.2 herein) stated that
she had gone out to wash clothes.
5. The defense had examined 4 witnesses (DW-1 to DW-4) and
produced color photographs (Ex Kha-1 to Kha-6). DW-1
stated that the deceased used to accompany her for
collecting grass and wood, but she never made any
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 5 of 20
complaint about her harassment on account of dowry
demand. Rather, the deceased used to say that if she is not
taken by her husband to his workplace she would die. DW-
2 stated that in the morning of 17.01.2007 (i.e., date of the
incident) she had seen Shoor Singh (appellant no.1 herein)
going towards Lansdowne. DW-3 stated that between 12.30
and 1.00 p.m. he saw smoke bellowing from the house of
Shoor Singh. When he reached there, he noticed that none
of the accused were there, and the body of the deceased was
lying outside the shutter in a burnt condition. Whereafter,
he went to inform Gangotri Devi who was washing clothes
near a water well. DW-4 stated that he was present at the
time of inquest when he saw an empty can of kerosene and
matchsticks lying near the body of the deceased; and smell
of kerosene was all over.
6. The trial court primarily relied on the testimonies of PW-1,
PW-2 and PW-3 to hold that the deceased was harassed soon
before her death in connection with demand for a motorcycle
and cash and, therefore, in view of the presumption under
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872, the accused were
liable to be convicted for dowry death, punishable under
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 6 of 20
Section 304-B IPC, and for cruelty, punishable under
Section 498-A IPC.
7. Aggrieved therewith, two separate criminal appeals were filed
before the High Court. One appeal was by the husband of
the deceased and the other was by the appellants herein.
Both appeals were decided by the impugned order. In so far
as the accused Jitendra Singh is concerned, he has served
out the sentence and has not filed any appeal. This appeal
is, therefore, by father-in-law and mother-in-law of the
deceased.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the record.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(S)
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted:
(i) The autopsy report indicated no mark of injury,
other than burn injuries, on the body of the
deceased. Body of the deceased was found in the
courtyard of the house. Further, the evidence
indicated death during daytime. The defense
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 7 of 20
evidence indicated that when smoke was noticed,the witness reached the spot to find a burnt body
of the deceased lying in the courtyard and, at that
time, none of the accused persons were present.
Even prosecution witnesses do not state that at
the time of incident the accused were present in
the house. All of this would suggest that it is a
case of suicide, which could be for multiple
reasons.
(ii) There is no direct evidence regarding demand of
dowry by the appellants. The testimonies of PW-1
and PW-2 do not support the FIR allegation that
on 4.1.2007 appellants had demanded a
motorcycle and cash from PW-1 and PW-2.
(iii) There is no evidence that motorcycle or cash was
demanded in connection with marriage. Hence, a
case of dowry death is not made out.
(iv) The courts below failed to test the merit of the
allegations against the weight of surrounding
circumstances and the deposition of prosecution
witnesses during cross-examination.
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 8 of 20
Interestingly, PW-1 and PW-2, who had been
visiting the matrimonial home of the deceased,
admitted during cross-examination that they did
not confront the accused in respect of the alleged
demand as reported to them by their daughter
(i.e., the deceased) because they thought it to be a
joke. If it was so, the question of subjecting the
deceased to cruelty does not arise.
(v) Admittedly, husband of the deceased in
connection with service was residing elsewhere.
Accused in their statement under Section 313
CrPC stated that the deceased was unhappy and
depressed because she was not able to live with
her husband as no residential quarter was allotted
to him. A suggestion to that effect was also given
to the prosecution witnesses. Hence, this was a
material circumstance explaining the drastic step
to commit suicide.
(vi) PW-1 tried to implicate even the elder brother of
the husband of the deceased even though he
resided in another town in connection with
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 9 of 20
service. This would suggest that there was a
malicious attempt to implicate the entire family
without any basis. In such circumstances, the
Court ought to have been circumspect. More so,
when no witness of the locality was produced in
support of the prosecution case.
(vii) Presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence
Act arises only when the necessary ingredients of
a dowry death are proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Here there was no direct and reliable
evidence that the deceased was subjected to
cruelty in connection with demand of dowry soon
before her death. Hence, there was no occasion to
raise a presumption in respect of a dowry death.
(viii) There were sufficient reasons for the deceased to
commit suicide, such as:
(a) She was depressed for not being able to
reside with her husband who had to be
away from home in connection with his
service.
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 10 of 20
(b) She was shamed by discovery of a
photograph (Ex. Kha-1) wherein she was
noticed alone with a male stranger in front
of a waterbody.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF STATE
10. On behalf of the prosecution (i.e., the State of Uttarakhand),
it was submitted:
(i) PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 have all been consistent
about the deceased reporting to them that
accused persons were demanding a motorcycle
and cash of Rs.50,000/- and threatening her that
if their demand is not met by the date of child
naming ceremony, she would be killed. Naming
ceremony was held on 11.01.2007 and soon
thereafter the deceased died on 17.01.2007.
Thus, deceased’s statement was in respect of
circumstances of the transaction which resulted
in her death and, therefore, admissible in evidence
under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act.
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 11 of 20
(ii) The courts below justifiably raised a presumption
of the offence of dowry death; and that
presumption was not dispelled by the accused-
appellants. Moreover, the appellants being father-
in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased,
residing in the same house where the deceased
died an unnatural death, were liable to be
convicted.
(iii) The photograph (Ex. Kha-1) was not admissible in
evidence as neither the person who took the
photograph nor its negative was produced in
evidence. Otherwise also, it did not reveal any
such compromising position of which the
deceased will be ashamed of.
(iv) The appeal is concluded by concurrent findings
of fact, therefore no case for interference is made
out.
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 12 of 20
ANALYSIS/ DISCUSSION
11. Before we proceed to test the merit of the rival submissions,
it would be useful to cull out certain facts as regards which
there is no serious dispute. These are:
(a) the deceased was married to the son of the
appellants within seven years of her death;
(b) the deceased died an unnatural death on account of
ante-mortem burn injuries;
(c) place of death of the deceased was her matrimonial
home;
(d) just 18 days before her death, the deceased had
given birth to a male child;
(e) prior to her death there was no police complaint or
FIR in respect of harassment of the deceased for any
reason whatsoever;
(f) there is no evidence that any of the accused
demanded dowry, or a motorcycle, or cash from the
family members of the deceased either before the
marriage or at the time of marriage; and
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 13 of 20
(g) there is no evidence that the deceased was physically
assaulted by any of the accused in connection with
demand for dowry or motorcycle or cash.
12. To constitute a ‘dowry death’, punishable under Section 304-
B7 IPC, following ingredients must be satisfied:
i. death of a woman must have been caused by any
burns or bodily injury or it must have occurred
otherwise than under normal circumstances;
ii. such death must have occurred within seven years
of her marriage;
iii. soon before such death, she must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or any relative of her husband; and
iv. such cruelty or harassment must be in connection
with any demand for dowry.
7
Section 304-B. Dowry Death. – (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death.
Explanation. — For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [28 of 1961].
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for lifeCriminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 14 of 20
The phrase ‘otherwise than under normal circumstances’ iswide enough to encompass a suicidal death.
13. When all the above ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved,
the presumption under Section 113-B8 of the Evidence Act
is to be raised against the accused that he has committed
the offence of ‘dowry death’. What is important is that the
presumption under Section 113-B is not in respect of
commission of an act of cruelty, or harassment, in
connection with any demand for dowry, which is one of the
essential ingredients of the offence of ‘dowry death’. The
presumption, however, is in respect of commission of the
offence of ‘dowry death’ by the accused when all the essential
ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved beyond reasonable
doubt by ordinary rule of evidence, which means that to
prove the essential ingredients of an offence of ‘dowry death’
the burden is on the prosecution.
14. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the deceased died
otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
8
Section 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty
or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused
the dowry death.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, dowry death shall have the same meaning as in section 304 capital B of
the Indian Penal Code [45 of 1860]
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 15 of 20
years of her marriage. However, the issue between the
parties is about her being subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or his relative, soon before her death, in
connection with any demand for dowry.
15. The testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 do not indicate that
any demand for dowry was made by the accused-appellants
either before or at the time of marriage of the deceased with
their son. Further, there is no evidence that the accused
appellants directly demanded a motorcycle or cash from any
of the above witnesses. In fact, evidence is to the effect that
the deceased had informed PW-1 and PW-2 on 4.1.2007 and
11.1.2007 about the demand for a motorcycle and cash.
Further, from the deposition of PW-1 and PW-2, it appears
that the aforesaid demand was not in connection with
marriage but as a mark of celebration on birth of a male
child.
16. No doubt testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 would not be hit by
the rule against hearsay evidence because it related to one
of the circumstances of the transaction resulting in their
daughter’s unnatural death. However, a distinction must be
drawn between admissibility and acceptability/reliability of
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 16 of 20
a piece of evidence. Merely because a piece of evidence is
admissible does not mean that it must be accepted. Before
accepting the evidence to hold that the fact in issue stands
proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court must evaluate
the same against the weight of surrounding circumstances
and other facts proven on record.
17. In the instant case, the witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 were
asked whether they took up the issue of motorcycle /cash
demand with the accused. Their reply was that they did not,
because they took it as a joke. We fail to understand how
parents could treat their daughter’s multiple reporting of
apprehension to her life, on account of demand being not
met, as a joke. This creates a serious doubt about the
truthfulness of the allegation more so when there is no
allegation that any such demand was ever raised either
before or at the time of marriage. This doubt gets fortified by
change in stance of PW-1 from what was taken in the FIR.
Notably, in the FIR it was alleged that the accused-
appellants including their elder son, and his wife, had
directly raised demand for a motorcycle and cash. This
allegation was not supported by the deposition of both PW-1
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 17 of 20
and PW-2 while admitting that appellant’s elder son was a
doctor serving in another district. Thus, there appears to be
a knee-jerk reaction to the unnatural death of their daughter
to make out a case of dowry death. Besides that, no
independent witness of the vicinity was examined. In our
considered view, therefore, one of the essential ingredients of
dowry death, namely, any demand for dowry, was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
18. Indisputably, the accused have not been convicted for
murder, and rightly so, because there was no worthwhile
evidence to show that except for the burn injuries, which
could be self- inflicted, the accused suffered any other ante-
mortem injury. Moreover, the presence of the accused in the
house at the time of occurrence is not proved. In such
circumstances, the death was most probably suicidal though
this would not make a difference for commission of an
offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC if all the other
ingredients of dowry death stand proved. But, as noted
above, here harassment/ cruelty at the instance of the
appellants in connection with any demand for dowry has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. As regards the
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 18 of 20
reason to commit suicide, though it is not necessary for us
to dwell upon, suffice it to say that husband of the deceased
was in service and stayed away from the deceased.
Suggestion was given to the prosecution witnesses, and
statement was also made under Section 313 CrPC, that the
deceased used to remain depressed for being unable to join
her husband at the place of his posting due to lack of
residential quarter. That apart, a photograph of the deceased
(Ex. Kha 1), regarding which no dispute was raised by the
prosecution witnesses, showing her alone with a male
stranger had surfaced. In the statement under Section 313
CrPC a stand was taken that this photograph had shamed
her. Be that as it may, once all the necessary ingredients of
dowry death have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
would not be available to the prosecution. Hence, in our
considered view, the appellants are entitled to be acquitted
of the charge of offences punishable under Section 304-B
and 498-A IPC.
19. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order convicting and
sentencing the appellants under Section 304-B and 498-A
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 19 of 20
IPC is set aside. The appellants are on bail. They need not
surrender. Their bail bond(s) stand discharged.
20. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
……………………………………….J.
(J.B. Pardiwala)
……………………………………….J.
(Manoj Misra)
New Delhi;
September 20, 2024
Criminal Appeal No. 249/2013 Page 20 of 20