Supreme Court of India
Shoyeb Raja vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 September, 2024
Author: Sanjay Karol
Bench: Sanjay Karol, C.T. Ravikumar
2024 INSC 731 NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3327 OF 2024
SHOYEB RAJA … APPELLANT(S)
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. Assailed before us, at the insistence of the complainant, is a judgment and
order dated 23rd November, 2023 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Principal
Bench at Jabalpur), passed in Criminal Revision No.3125 of 2021, whereby the
judgment/order dated 11th November, 2021 in Sessions Trial No.52/2019 of the
Signature Not Verified
learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Seoni, acquitting the accused-
Digitally signed by
VARSHA MENDIRATTA
Date: 2024.09.25
15:56:16 IST
Reason:
1|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
Respondents (Nos.2 to 9) of the charges under Sections 294, 323, 506, 353, 352
read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code1 was confirmed.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2. The complainant-appellant was appointed as the Chairman of the District
Waqf Board, Seoni, thereby being charged with the supervision of Masjid
Committees. As a result of the dispute between the newly appointed committee
of which he was the Chairman and the previous committee, the claimant was
abused and beaten to the point of unconsciousness.
3. He was taken to the district hospital wherefrom he was referred to the Asian
Hospital, Nagpur and upon discharge therefrom, FIR No.133 of 2018 dated 9th
March, 2018 under Sections 294, 323, 506 read with 34 IPC came to be lodged.
4. Vide order dated 18th March, 2019 of learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Seoni, the case was committed to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge,
Seoni. In this order, it was noted that the accused were on bail, but they were
taken into custody under Section 307 IPC on that date itself.
5. The Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni, framed charges under Sections 294,
332/34 and 307/34 IPC. Such framing of charge by order dated 17th September,
2019 was challenged before the High Court in Criminal Revision No.4805 of
1 For short, ‘IPC’
2|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
2019, whereby vide order dated 21st January, 2020 the same was set aside on the
ground that the documents made part of the record were not supplied to the
accused. The matter was remanded for framing of charge afresh.
6. It is in this backdrop, that the order impugned before the High Court came
to be passed. Regarding Section 307, the order records:-
“In this way in the said medical report, based on the
circumstances arising as a result of future aspects, keeping in view, the
possibilities, it has been mentioned that if pressure was applied on the
scratch marks present in the mouth, nose and throat it could have caused
obstruction of the respiratory tract. The said possibility is dependent on
that if the accused had committed further acts of the above type, there
was a possibility that the windpipe could have been blocked. It has not
been said in the report that the injury caused by the accused or the act
done by them was likely to result in the death of the complainant. In
the above situation, prima facie there is no basis for offence under
Section 307 IPC against the accused.”In respect of the other allegations and alleged crimes, it was observed :-
“As far as the allegations of other crimes against the accused are
concerned, the First Information Report has been filed by the
complainant to the effect that he was the Chairman of the Waqf
Committee in District Seoni, then during his official duty he went to the
Mosque to settle the dispute. There, the accused abused and beat him
and pressed his mouth, nose and neck. In the above situation, prima
facie there are grounds for crime under Sections 294 and 334 read with
34 of the Indian Penal Code against all the accused……”
7. Aggrieved by the said order, the complainant-appellant preferred the
instant criminal revision. The impugned order records that the medical officer of
the District Hospital, Seoni, gave his opinion about the nature of the injury
sustained by the complainant, also observing that the throttling could have
3|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
resulted in respiratory arrest. There are observations with respect to bruises and
abrasions, however, details as to their size and location were missing. Such
assessment was termed as general and superficial.
8. As such, it was held that no case under Section 307 IPC was made out and
the Criminal Revision was, thus, dismissed.
CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT
9. By way of the special leave petition, it is submitted primarily that :
a) The nature of the injury suffered by the complainant-appellant
does not rule out Section 307 IPC at the stage of framing of charge;
b) Given that throttling was suspected, reliance on the medical
document to reject the charge was unjustified, since the author of such
document could not be examined;
c) The statements of the witnesses under Section 161 Code of
Criminal Procedure disclose the respondents’ acts of “pressing of mouth,
nose and throat” and their intention to kill;
d) Reference stands made to the judgment in State of Delhi v.
Gyan Devi & Ors.2 to state that at the time of framing of charge, the Court
is not to undertake a detailed assessment of the material placed on record.
e) The predecessor in office of the Additional Sessions Judge
took a contrary view on the same set of facts and circumstances and had
framed the charge under the said section.
2
(2000) 8 SSCC 239
4|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
10. Section 307 IPC is the charge that the Courts below have concurrently,
refused to frame. It reads as under:-
“307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention
or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act
caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person
by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life,
or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.Attempts by life
convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under
sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished
with death.”
11. Let us at this stage, consider the law as laid down by this Court in respect
of this section, as also that of Section 34 IPC, given that there are a total of eight
respondents (accused) before the court.
11.1 In State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao3, the Court identified the essential
ingredients for the applicability of the section. The relevant extract is as
below:
“The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an
offence under Section 307 are:
(i) that the death of a human being was attempted;
(ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of
the act of the accused; and
(iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that
it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as : (a) the
accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted
to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently
dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse
for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.”3
(2003) 10 SCC 4345|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
11.2 This Court in Om Prakash v. State of Punjab4, as far back as 1961,observed the constituents of the Section, having referred to various
judgments of the Privy Council, as under:
“a person commits an offence under Section 307 when he has an
intention to commit murder and, in pursuance of that intention, does an
act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is
the penultimate act or not. It is to be clearly understood, however, that
the intention to commit the offence of murder means that the person
concerned has the intention to do certain act with the necessary
intention or knowledge mentioned in Section 300. The intention to
commit an offence is different from the intention or knowledge
requisite for constituting the act as that offence. The expression
“whoever attempts to commit an offence” in Section 511, can only
mean “whoever : intends to do a certain act with the intent or knowledge
necessary for the commission of that offence”. The same is meant by
the expression “whoever does an act with such intention or knowledge
and under such circumstances that if he, by that act, caused death, he
would be guilty of murder” in Section 307. This simply means that the
act must be done with the intent or knowledge requisite for the
commission of the offence of murder. The expression “by that act” does
not mean that the immediate effect of the act committed must be death.
Such a result must be the result of that act whether immediately or after
a lapse of time.”
(Emphasis supplied)11.3 Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand5 holds that the nature
or extent of injury suffered, are irrelevant factors for the conviction under
this section, so long as the injury is inflicted with animus. It has been held:
“10. …To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that
bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted.
Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give
considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the
accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances,
and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at4
1961 SCC OnLine SC 72
5
(2004) 12 SCC 2206|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
all to actual wounds. …What the court has to see is whether the act,
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and
under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to
be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if
there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution
thereof.
11. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is
present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is
not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have
been inflicted. If the injury inflicted has been with the avowed object or
intention to cause death, the ritual nature, extent or character of the
injury or whether such injury is sufficient to actually causing death are
really factors which are wholly irrelevant for adjudging the culpability
under Section 307 IPC. The section makes a distinction between the act
of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the
act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge
and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not
correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely
because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple
hurt.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11.4 The principle governing the application of Section 34 has been
captured thus in Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P.6:
“24. Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which
case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner
as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders.
This section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender
committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders
liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous
consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to
bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed
at the spot as held in Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar [Lallan Rai v. State of
Bihar, (2003) 1 SCC 268 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 301] . There must be a
common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute
common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each
one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused.”6
(2020) 4 SCC 1267|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
11.5 Sanjiv Khanna J., writing for the Court in Krishnamurthy v. Stateof Karnataka, encapsulated, succinctly its field of operation as under:
“26. Section 34IPC makes a co-perpetrator, who had participated in the
offence, equally liable on the principle of joint liability. For Section 34
to apply there should be common intention between the co-perpetrators,
which means that there should be community of purpose and common
design or prearranged plan. However, this does not mean that co-
perpetrators should have engaged in any discussion, agreement or
valuation. For Section 34 to apply, it is not necessary that the plan
should be prearranged or hatched for a considerable time before the
criminal act is performed. Common intention can be formed just a
minute before the actual act happens. Common intention is necessarily
a psychological fact as it requires prior meeting of minds. In such cases,
direct evidence normally will not be available and in most cases,
whether or not there exists a common intention has to be determined by
drawing inference from the facts proved. This requires an inquiry into
the antecedents, conduct of the co-participants or perpetrators at the
time and after the occurrence. The manner in which the accused arrived,
mounted the attack, nature and type of injuries inflicted, the weapon
used, conduct or acts of the co-assailants/perpetrators, object and
purpose behind the occurrence or the attack, etc. are all relevant facts
from which inference has to be drawn to arrive at a conclusion whether
or not the ingredients of Section 34IPC are satisfied. We must
remember that Section 34IPC comes into operation against the co-
perpetrators because they have not committed the principal or main act,
which is undertaken/performed or is attributed to the main culprit or
perpetrator…”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In the light of the decisions considered supra, let us now turn our attention
to the facts of the present case. The statement of the doctor, relied upon by the
Trial Court to observe that there are minor injuries is placed as Annexure P-5. It
is extracted as under:
“To,
The Town Inspector,
P.S Kotwali, Seoni8|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
Sub:- Explanation regarding your letter No. 133B/18 dated 13.03.2018Dear Sir,
Pt. Soyeb Raja was brought to the Hospital around 10 p.m. on
07.03.2018. The injurids are mentioned in the PMLC report.
Though, other injuries were simple but Death of patient might be
possible if throttling had been done (as suspected by the bruise marks
over upper lip, nose and throat ) which may result in respiratory arrest.
14.03.2018
–sd—
Dr. Praveen Thakur
MBBS
Reg No. MP 10316
Medical Officer
District Hospital Seoni”
13. It is well recognized that intention may not always be proved by hard
evidence and instead may be required to be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of the case. If the doctor who conducted the examination posits
the possibility of throttling, then under what circumstances, without rigorous
cross-examination, could it be concluded that the injuries sustained were simple?
That apart, even if the injuries were taken as simple, the extent of the injuries, as
observed supra in Hari Mohan Mondal, are not relevant, if the intent is present.
We are not in agreement with the learned Courts below that intent was absent, as
the Doctor’s report itself records throttling to be reasonably suspected.
14. The third criterion as in Kashirao (supra) could also arguably be met.
Whether or not it is met, is a matter of determination at trial. The question of
intention to kill or the knowledge of death in terms of Section 307, IPC is a
question of fact and not one of law.
9|SLP(CRL.16333/2023
15. This Court’s scope of interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India is well established. Reference made be made to Mathura Prashad v. State
of M.P.7. It was held as below:
“9. This Court in Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 219, 227 :
1974 SCC (Cri) 837] held that the powers of the Supreme Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution are wide but in criminal appeals, this
Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in
exceptional circumstances. The scope of interference by this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in a case of concurrent
findings of fact arose in Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhananthan [(1979)
2 SCC 297 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 454] wherein this Court has held that:
“Article 136 of the Constitution of India invests the Supreme
Court with a plentitude of plenary appellate power over all
Courts and Tribunals in India. The power is plenary in the
sense that there are no words under Article 136 itself
qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power has
led the Court to set limits to itself within which to exercise
such power…”In recognition of these self-imposed, long-standing, and justified limitations,
interference is to be made, more so, when a Court, in arriving at its findings has
acted perversely or otherwise improperly. [See: State of Madras v. A.
Vaidyanatha Iyer]8. This has been the consistently adopted position till date.
[See: Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra]9
16. In view of the above discussion, given that the minor nature of injuries is
not sufficient reason to not frame a charge under Section 307 IPC, as per the law
laid down by this Court, the judgment impugned, passed in Criminal Revision
7
1992 Supp (1) SCC 406
8
AIR 1958 SC 61
9
2022 SCC OnLine SC 883
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No. 3125 of 2021 dated 23rd November, 2023, is set aside. Accordingly, the
appeal is allowed. The concerned Trial Court is directed to have the Respondents
stand trial for all the offences for which charges have been framed, as also Section
307. The trial shall proceed on its own merits, as per law, uninfluenced by the
observations hereinabove which were for the limited purpose of testing the
propriety of the impugned order. The same shall be expedited.
17. Registry to transmit a copy of this judgment to the Registrar General, High
Court of Madhya Pradesh (Principal Bench at Jabalpur) who will then transmit it
to the Concerned Court.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………….J.
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
………………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
New Delhi;
September 25, 2024.
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