Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shri Dhanprasad Patel vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 September, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 17th OF SEPTEMBER, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 22758 of 2024
SHRI DHANPRASAD PATEL
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Bramha Nand Pandey - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Vijayendra Singh Choudhary - Government Advocate for the
respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been
filed seeking following reliefs:
“7.1 That, this Hon’ble court may kindly be
pleased to issue the writ in the nature of
Mandamus and call the entire record
pertaining to the subject matter and after
kind perusal
perusal of it, direct to the respondents
to quash the action of the respondents to
construct the road in the land of the
petitioner.
7.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
issue writ in the nature of mandamus and
direct to the respondent to award the
compensation of Rs.1 Lakh to the petitioner
compensation
for their illegal works within a stipulated as
this court thinks fit, looking to the fact and
circumstances of the case, in the interest of
justice.
7.3 Any other relief this Hon’ble Court thinks
fit looking to the facts
facts and circumstances of
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the interest of justice.”
2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that petitioner is the
owner of Khasra No.51/1 area 0.40 hectares situated in circle Jaisi
Nagar, Tahsil and District
District Sagar. The petitioner had purchased the said
property from Jamna Pandey S/o Bhagirath and his name was also
mutated and it was also duly demarcated. It is the case of petitioner that
respondents No.4 to 6 are illegally constructing a road over the land
belonging
elonging to petitioner without acquiring the same under the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
and Acquisition
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short “Act 2013″)
2013”).
Accordingly, this Court by order dated 09.08.2024 had directed the
respondents to file their return and as an interim measure, it was directed
that respondents shall not carry out any construction work on the land
claimed by the petitioner.
3. The respondents have filed their return and in their return they
have admittedd that the land on which the road is being constructed
belongs to the petitioner. However, it is the claim of respondents that a
Kachcha road was already in existence for the last 40 years. It is further
mentioned in the return that the case of petitioner will be considered
under the provisions of the Act 2013 and appropriate compensation will
be paid in accordance with law.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
5. It is really shocking that the State Authorities are not trying to
protect the constitutional/human rights of the citizens of this country.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Devi Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh and Others reported in (2020) 5 SCC 569 has held
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that the State Authorities cannot claim the defence of adverse posse
possession
against its citizens. In spite of that the respondents have come up with a
case that since a Kachcha
Kac road was in existence for the last 40 years
therefore, the NIT was issued for construction of Pakka road.
7. This Court
ourt in the case of Bhaskar Dutt Dwivedi Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Other decided on 22nd May, 2024 in W.P.
No.13236/2024 had held under :
“18. Once, the ownership of the petitioner has not been
disputed by the respondents and once they have not
disputed that by encroaching upon the land belonging to
the petitioner they are constructing a road, then it is
suffice to mention here that admission is the best evidence
and under these circumstances, it cannot be said that any
disputed question of fact is involved in the present case.
19. Soo far as the submissions made by counsel for State
that Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer,
PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa has no legal knowledge and,
therefore, they may be granted sometime to file return is
concerned, the said submission is shocking
shocking even to the
conscience of the Court.
20. If the State is of the view that their officers have no
legal knowledge, then it is a high time for the State to
consider as to whether such officers are to be retained in
the service or not? How the State can promote the
violation of the constitutional rights of the citizens of the
country only on the ground that their officers have no
legal knowledge?
21. Accordingly, the State Counsel was directed to justify
the stand as to how the State can take a defence th that their
officers are innocent as they have no legal knowledge.
22. At this stage, it was submitted by counsel for State
that in fact her intention was not to submit that their
officers have no legal knowledge but it is submitted that
her intention was to submit that he might not have
understood the question formulated by this Court.
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23. The aforesaid explanation given by the State Counsel
cannot be accepted. At the beginning of the arguments, it
was submitted by the State Counsel that they have issued
instructions to the respondents and have communicated
about the interim order dated 21.05.2024 and the State
Counsel was sure that the officers must have complied
that order but once, Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa made a
statement in the open Court that the road is already in
existence
nce for last 40-50
40 50 years and merely a new road is
being constructed, then it is clear that in spite of the clear
communication by the A.G. Office to the Executive
Engineer regarding question which was formulated by this
Court, the Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division,
Rewa is still is of an adamant view that once the road is
situated over the land in dispute for the last 4040-50 years,
then State has acquired title and, therefore, they can
construct the road.
24. Accordingly, the explanation given by Smt. S Swati
Aseem George that the Executive Engineer had might
have failed to understand the question formulated by this
Court is nothing but a very weak attempt to save their
officers who according to the State itself are incompetent
having no knowledge of law.
25. Now the next question for consideration is as to
whether the State can claim adverse possession against the
private individuals or not?
26. The question is no more res integra.. The Supreme
Court in the case of Vidya Devi Vs. State of Himachal
a Others, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 has
Pradesh and
held as under:-
under:
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly
expropriated of her property in 1967,
when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by
Article 31 in Part III of the
Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed
guaranteed the
[State of
right to private property [State
W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,, (1953) 2
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could not be deprived without due
process of law and upon just and fair
compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased
to be a fundamental
fundamental right by the
Constitution (Forty Fourth
(Forty-Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right
[
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC
MIDC,
(2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC
(Civ) 491] in a welfare State, and a
constitutional right under Article 300
300-
A of the Constitution.
Cons Article 300–A
provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot
dispossess a citizen of his property
except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The
obligation to pay compensation
compensation,
though not expressly included in
Article 300-A,
300 A, can be inferred in that
Article. [K.T.
[K.T. Plantation (P)
Ltd. v. State of Karnataka,, (2011) 9
SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414]
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a
person of his private property, without
following due
due process of law, would
be violative of a human right, as also
the constitutional right under Article
300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is
300-A
placed on the judgment in Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai [Hindustan
Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai
Chenai,
(2005) 7 SCC 627] , wherein this
Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6)
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“6.. … Having regard to the
provisions contained in Article
300-AA of the Constitution, the
State in exercise of its power of
“eminent domain” may
interfere with the right of
property of a person by
acquiring the same but the
same must be for a public
purpose and reasonable
compensation therefor must be
paid.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S.
Ramakrishna Reddy [N.
N.
Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy Reddy,
(2008) 15 SCC 517] , this Court held
(2008)
that: (SCC p. 526, para 21)
“21. If the right of property
is a human right as also a
constitutional right, the same
cannot be taken away except in
accordance with law.. Article
300-AA of the Constitution
protects such right.. The
provisions of the Act seeking
to divest such right, keeping in
view of the provisions of
Article 300-AA of the
Constitution of India, must be
strictly construed.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P)
Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Delhi Airtech tech
Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. U.P.,
(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC
(Civ) 673] , this Court recognised the
right to property as a basic human
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right in the following words: (SCC p.
379, para 30)
“30. It is accepted in every
jurisprudence and by different nt
political thinkers that some
amount of property right is an
indispensable safeguard
against tyranny and economic
oppression of the Government..
Jefferson was of the view that
liberty cannot long subsist
without the support of
property. “Property must be
secured, else liberty cannot
subsist” was the opinion of
John Adams. Indeed the view
that property itself is the seed-
bed which must be conserved if
other constitutional values are
to flourish, is the consensus
among political thinkers and
jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai
Khachar v. State of Gujarat [Jilubhai
Jilubhai
Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat
Gujarat,
1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] , this Court
held as follows: (SCC p. 627, para 48)
“48.. … In other words,
Article 300-A A only limits the
powers of the State that no
person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of
law. There has to be no
deprivation without any
sanction of law. Deprivation by
any other mode is not
acquisition or taking
possession under Article 300-
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A. In other words, if theree is no
law, there is no deprivation.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.7. In this case, the appellant
could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without
any legal sanction, and without
following due process of law, and
depriving her payment of just
compensation, being a fundamental
right on the date of forcible
dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State
that the appellant or her predecessors
had “orally” consented to the
acquisition is completely baseless. We
find complete lack of authority
authority and
legal sanction in compulsorily
divesting the appellant of her property
by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity
governed by the rule of law, the State
could not have deprived a citizen of
their property without the sanction of
law. Reliance is placedplaced on the
judgment of this Court in Tukaram
Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram
Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. MIDC,, (2013) 1 SCC 353 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it
was held that the State must comply
with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissib
permissible
statutory mode. The State being a
welfare State governed by the rule of
law cannot arrogate to itself a status
beyond what is provided by the
Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of
Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State State of
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Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10
SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769]
held that the right to property is now
considered to be not only a
constitutional or statutory right, but
also a human right. Human rights have
been considered in the realm of
individual rights such as right to
shelter, livelihood, health,
employment, etc. Human rights have
gained a multi-faceted
multi dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea
taken by the State before the High
Court, that since it has been in
continuous possession of the land for
over 42 years, it would tantamount to
“adverse” possession. The State being
a welfare State, cannot be permitted to
take the plea of adverse possession,
which allows a trespasser i.e. a person
guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to
gain legal title over such property for
over 12 years.
years. The State cannot be
permitted to perfect its title over the
land by invoking the doctrine of
adverse possession to grab the
property of its own citizens, as has
been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by
the State of delay and laches
laches of the
appellant in moving the Court is also
liable to be rejected. Delay and laches
cannot be raised in a case of a
continuing cause of action, or if the
circumstances shock the judicial
conscience of the Court. Condonation
of delay is a matter of judicial judicial
discretion, which must be exercised
judiciously and reasonably in the facts
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and circumstances of a case. It will
depend upon the breach of
fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay
arose. There is no period of limitatio
limitation
prescribed for the courts to exercise
their constitutional jurisdiction to do
substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand
for justice is so compelling, a
constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote
justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. P.S.
Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N.
T.N.,
(1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S)
22]
12.14. In Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram
Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. MIDC,, (2013) 1 SCC 353 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] , this Court
while dealing with a similar fact
situation, held as follows: (SCC p.
situation,
359, para 11)
“11.. There are authorities
which state that delay and
laches extinguish the right to
put forth a claim. Most of these
authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of
compensation for a wrong done
to them decades
des ago, recovery
of statutory dues, claim for
educational facilities and other
categories of similar cases, etc.
Though, it is true that there are
a few authorities that lay down
that delay and laches debar a
citizen from seeking remedy,
even if his fundamental
mental right
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has been violated, under
Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution, the case at hand
deals with a different scenario
altogether. The functionaries of
the State took over possession
of the land belonging to the
appellants without any
sanction of law.. The appellants
had asked repeatedly for grant
of the benefit of
compensation. The State must
either comply with the
procedure laid down for
acquisition, or requisition, or
any other permissible statutory
mode.”
27. Thus, it is clear that the State cann
cannot take the
defence of adverse possession against an individual.
Surprisingly, the Advocate General Office is well aware
of the law laid down by Supreme Court and in spite of
clear communication by the A.G. Office to the Officers
about the law as well as thethe question formulated by this
Court and the interim order granted by this Court, Shri
Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD,
Rewa Division, Rewa is adamant to say that since the
road is in existence for last 40-50
40 50 years, therefore, they
are rightt in constructing a new road by raising the height
of the road. This attitude is the height of the arbitrariness
and mala fide action on the part of Shri Manoj Kumar
Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division,
Rewa.
28. Thus, it is clear that the attitude of Shri Manoj
Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa
Division, Rewa is not indicative of lack of knowledge but
it is indicative of the hostile attitude towards the law
citizens of the state as well as the authority of the Court.
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29. The Chief
Chief Secretary State of Madhya Pradesh is
directed to take immediate action against Shri Manoj
Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa
Division, Rewa for having his hostile attitude in spite of
the clear instructions issued by the O/o Advocate Gene
General
and in spite of the interim order granted by this Court.
30. The Supreme Court in the case of Kolkata
Municipal Corporation & Anr. Vs. Bimal Kumar
Shah,, decided on 16.05.2024 in Civil Appeal No. 6466
of 2024 has held as under:-
under:
“30. Following are the seven
principles:
30.1. The Right to notice : (i) A
prior notice informing the bearer of the
right that the State intends to deprive
them of the right to property is a right
in itself; a linear extension of the right
to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a).
The Constitution does not contemplate
acquisition by ambush. The notice to
acquire must be clear, cogent and
meaningful. Some of the statutes
reflect this right.
(ii) Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition
sition of
Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Section 11 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and
Section 3A of the National Highways
Act, 1956 are examples of such
statutory incorporation
incorporation of the right to
notice before initiation of the land
acquisition proceedings.
(iii) In a large number of decisions,
our constitutional courts have
independently recognised the right to
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acquisition is commenced.
commence
30.2. The Right to be heard: (i)
Following the right to a meaningful
and effective prior notice of
acquisition, is the right of the property-
property-
bearer to communicate his objections
and concerns to the authority acquiring
the property. This right to be heard
against the proposed acquisition must
be meaningful and not a sham.
(ii) Section 5A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of
Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Section 15 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and
Section 3C of the National Highways
Act, 1956, are some statutory
embodiments of this right.
(iii) Judicial opinions recognizing
the importance of this right are far too
many to reproduce. Suffice
Suffice to say that
that the enquiry in which a land holder
would raise his objection is not a mere
formality
formality.
30.3. The Right to a reasoned
decision i) That the authorities have
decision:
heard and considered the objections is
evidenced only through a reasoned
order. It is incumbent upon the
order.
authority to take an informed decision
and communicate the same to the
objector.
(ii) Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(2) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of
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Section 19 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 and
Section 3D of the National Highways
Act, 1956, are the statutory
incorporations of this principle.
(iii) Highlighting the importance of
the declaration
declaration of the decision to
acquire, the Courts have held that the
declaration is mandatory, failing
which, the acquisition proceedings will
cease to have effect.
effect
30.4. The Duty to acquire only for
public purpose: (i) That the
acquisition must be for a public public
purpose is inherent and an important
fetter on the discretion of the
authorities to acquire. This
requirement, which conditions the
purpose of acquisition must stand to
reason with the larger constitutional
goals of a welfare state and
distributive justice.
j
(ii) Sections 4 and 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894,
Sections 3(1) and 7(1) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of
Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Sections 2(1), 11(1), 15 (1)
(b) and 19(1) of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 and
Section 3A(1) of the National
Highways Act, 1956 depict the
statutory incorporation of the public
purpose requirement of compulsory
acquisition.
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(iii) The decision of compulsory
acquisition of land is subject to
judicial review and the Court will
examine and determine whether the
acquisition is related to public
purpose. If the court arrives at a
conclusion that that there is no public
purpose involved in the acquisition,
the entire process can
c be set-aside.
aside.
This Court has time and again
reiterated the importance of the
underlying objective of acquisition of
land by the State to be for a public
purpose
purpose.
30.5. The Right of restitution or
fair compensation: (i) A person’s right
to hold and enjoy property is an
integral part to the constitutional right
under Article 300A. Deprivation or
extinguishment of that right is
permissible only upon restitution, be it
in the form of monetary compensation,
rehabilitation or other similar means.
Compensation has always been
considered to be an integral part of the
process of acquisition.
(ii) Section 11 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894,
Sections 8 and 9 of the Requisitioning
and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Section 23 of
the Right to Fair Compensation
ensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013, and Sections 3G and 3H of
the National Highways Act, 1956 are
the statutory incorporations of the right
to restitute a person whose land has
been compulsorily acquired.
acquire
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(iii) Our courts have not only
considered that compensation is
necessary, but have also held that a
fair and reasonable compensation is
the sine qua non for any acquisition
process
process.
30.6. The Right to an efficient and
expeditious process: (i) The
acquisition process is traumatic for
more than one reason. The
administrative delays in identifying the
land, conducting the enquiry and
evaluating the objections, leading to a
final declaration, consume time and
energy. Further, passing of the award,
payment of compensation and taking
payment
over the possession are equally time
consuming. It is necessary for the
administration to be efficient in
concluding the process and within a
reasonable time. This obligation must
necessarily form part of Article 300A.
(ii) Sections 5A (1), 6, 11A,
and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Sections 6 (1A) and 9 of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of
Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Sections 4(2), 7(4), 7(5), 11(5), 14,
15(1), 16
(1), 19(2), 25, 38(1), 60(4), 64 and 80
of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 and
Sections 3C(1), 3D(3) and 3E(1) of
the National Highways Act, 1956,
prescribe for statutory frameworks for
the completion of individual steps
steps in
the process of acquisition of land
within stipulated timelines.
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(iii) On multiple occasions, upon
failure to adhere to the timelines
specified in law, the courts have set
aside the acquisition proceedings.
proceedings
30.7. The Right of conclusion: (i)
Upon conclusion of process of
acquisition and payment of
compensation, the State
takes possession of the property in
normal circumstances. The
culmination of an acquisition process
is not in the payment of compensation,
but also in taking over the actual
physical possession of the land. If
physical
possession is not taken, acquisition is
not complete. With the taking over of
actual possession after the normal
procedures of acquisition, the private
holding is divested and the right, title
and interest in the property, along-with
alo with
possession is vested in the State.
Without final vesting, the State’s, or its
beneficiary’s right, title and interest in
the property is inconclusive and causes
lot of difficulties. The obligation to
conclude and complete the process of
acquisition is also part of Article
300A.
ii) Section 16 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894,
Sections 4 and 5 of the Requisitioning
and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952,
Sections 37 and 38 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition,
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and
Sections 3D and 3E of the National
Highways Act, 1956, statutorily
recognise this right of the acquirer.
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iii) This step of taking over of
possession has been a matter of great
judicial scrutiny and this Court
Court has
endeavoured to construe the relevant
provisions in a way which ensures
non arbitrariness in this action of the
non-arbitrariness
acquirer. For that matter, after taking
over possession, the process of land
acquisition concludes with the vesting
of the land with the concerned
authority. The culmination of an
acquisition process by vesting has
been a matter of great importance. On
this aspect, the courts have given a
large number of decisions as to the
time, method and manner by which
vesting takes place.”
place
31. Thus, the the action of the respondents in
constructing a road on the private land of the petitioner is
held to be unconstitutional, violative of constitutional
right of the petitioner as enshrined under Article 300
300-A of
Constitution of India as well as violative of hhis Human
Rights.”
8. In spite of that respondents are not ready to understand the things
that they cannot claim the defence of adverse possession against its
citizen and they are still living in a fool’s
fool s paradise by claiming that since
the road was inn existence since last 40 years, therefore, they are entitled
to construct a Pakka road without acquiring the land belonging to
petitioner. Furthermore, in the return a vague reply has been given that
respondents will consider the case of petitioner under the Act, 2013 and
appropriate compensation will be paid. It is really shocking that the
respondents are not aware of the fact that for initiating proceedings
under Act 2013, several steps are to be taken starting from issuance of
draft notification till the
the final notification under Section 19 and the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:47003
2024:MPHC
19 W.P. No.22
No.22758/2024
award under Section 30 of Act 2013 is passed. Furthermore, as per
Section 30 of Act, 2013 possession cannot be taken without making
payment of entire compensation amount.
9. Under these circumstances, this Court
Court is of considered opinion
that the act of respondents in encroaching upon the land of petitioner on
the pretext that a Kachcha
Kac road was in existence for the last 40 years
cannot be upheld.
10. Accordingly, the NIT for construction of road on the land of
petitioner is hereby quashed.. The respondents are restrained from
raising any construction over the land belonging to petitioner. If any
construction has been raised, then it shall be removed forthwith and the
respondents shall put barricades thereby prohibiting
prohibiting the entry on the
land of petitioner.
11. However, respondents are free to initiate proceedings under the
Act 2013 and only after the award is passed and compensation is paid,
respondents shall take possession. However, respondents shall also be
free to invoke urgency clause,
clause if they so desire.
12. In case if construction raised by the respondents over the land
belonging to petitioner is not removed immediately, then the
respondents shall pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs.15,000/
000/- per day to
petitioner from tomorrow till the encroachment is removed.
13. With aforesaid observation the petition is allowed..
(G.S.
G.S. AHLUWALIA
AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
SR*
Digitally signed by SHANU
RAIKWAR
Date: 2024.09.17 17:55:55 +05’30’